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3ABSTRACT
Contemporary philosophy of the social sciences is dominated by methodological indi­
vidualism. Intentional agency is assumed to be conceptually and explanatorily prior to 
social facts and social practices. In particular, it is generally thought that denials o f 
methodological individualism are bound to include ontologically unnatural and, thereby, 
unacceptable views. This dissertation provides a comprehensive criticism o f this ortho­
doxy.
Part I argues that social facts do not have to be understood as aggregates o f ac­
tions and attitudes o f essentially asocial individuals. Rather, the construction o f social 
facts requires that acting as a member o f a group rather than as a disparate individual is 
a fundamental building block of social reality and social facts. This idea is explicated in 
the anti-individualistic terms of the theory of collective intentional ity.
Part II tackles the accusation that the theory o f collective intentionality is inde­
fensibly anti-naturalistic in the sense that its picture o f humans is essentially incompati­
ble with evolutionary biology. This accusation is answered in terms o f detailed analyses 
o f evolutionary models o f human sociality and empirical studies o f the nature o f social 
action. Part II concludes that it is actually the methodologically individualistic picture o f 
social action as strategic individual action that is unacceptable. The theory o f collective 
intentionality is compatible with and supported by scientific naturalism.
Part III, then, defends full-blown methodological holism. It is argued that inten­
tional action and agency as we know them actually require that individual agents (qua 
agents and not qua physical objects) are essentially constituted by social practices. In­
tentional action must be explained and understood in terms o f social practices. How­
ever, this view is argued to be perfectly naturalistic both in the sense of not assuming 
any ontologically suspect entities and in the sense of being supported by the natural sci­
ences. Indeed, it is the individualistic orthodoxy that has to apply unnatural notions.
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8INTRODUCTION
The thesis argued for over and over again in this dissertation is that the social world in 
general and meaningful social actions in particular cannot exhaustively be explained 
and understood as consisting o f conceptually prior intentional actions o f disparate, ulti­
mately asocial individuals seeking to fulfil their private goals. Rather, we must admit 
that often individual actions are accurately understandable only when the acting indi­
vidual is seen essentially as a member o f a group, seeking to realise the goals o f the 
group. In truly social action individual roles are derived from the more fundamental col­
lective project. What is more, participation in social practices must ultimately be seen as 
constitutive of individual agency, and in this sense the social really is conceptually prior 
to the individual. However, this priority o f the social is argued to be completely natural­
istic both in the sense o f building on a strictly naturalistic ontology (the world is gov­
erned by blind causal laws and consists entirely o f physical particles in fields o f force, 
as John R. Searle likes to put this in) and being supported by our best understanding o f 
the natural sciences (again, as Searle voices this, our theory of agency and society must 
fit into the same picture with our fundamental and evolutionary biology). In sum, this 
dissertation is a defence o f naturalised methodological holism vis-a-vis social ontology 
and agency.
To understand the proper scope of the argumentation it should be kept in mind 
that all the time my sole aim is to argue for naturalised methodological holism in the 
above sense. This concentration in focus results in the following ambivalence. On the 
one hand it could be said that the focus of my dissertation is too narrow: I dedicate a 
book-length study to an issue many writers address in the introductory chapter o f a 
journal article. On the other, however, the scope is extremely wide: a full-blown defence 
o f my main thesis requires me to visit several debates and arguments that are tradition­
ally seen as belonging to other fields o f philosophy, and within the limits o f this disser­
tation I o f course cannot address all the aspects o f those debates and arguments relevant 
to those other fields. Rather, I draw from such debates only to the extent it is necessary 
for a comprehensive treatment o f my main thesis. Consequently, a reader with core in­
terests different from mine might occasionally think that I fail to enter some interesting 
debates connected to the themes I discuss.
The answer both to the worry concerning narrowness and to the worry about 
wideness o f my scope is this: Methodological individualism is so generally seen as the 
obviously correct approach to the social sciences that an extended defence o f holism is
certainly called for. Moreover, precisely because holism is so generally thought o f as an 
obviously unacceptable and unnaturalistic position, the construction o f a comprehensive 
and coherent account o f naturalised methodological holism and the explication of the 
connections the position has to certain other philosophical debates is a worthy philoso­
phical accomplishment in itself, even if I have to omit some issues that are crucial for 
other philosophical projects. After all, the aim o f this dissertation is to defend naturalis­
tic methodological holism vis-a-vis social ontology and agency, not to provide a series 
o f contributions to other fields of philosophy. However, I appreciate that it is probably 
rather difficult, or at least tiring, to follow an argument that requires a whole book to 
spell out. Hence in this introduction I explain shortly how the different chapters o f my 
dissertation contribute to the main argument. This should make it evident that the scope 
of the dissertation is rather closely focused indeed. However, I also point out how, while 
developing the main line of thought, the different chapters contain several independent 
philosophical results that are also important as such and not only as part o f my overall 
defence o f naturalised methodological holism.
Part I of this dissertation sets the stage for the more substantial and more contro­
versial arguments of Parts II and III. Chapter 1.1 opens this task by asking in what sense 
the social world can be said to be objective when it is unquestionably also a human con­
struction. Building on Searle’s well-known distinction between ontological and episte- 
mological objectivity (Sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2), I construct a Durkheimian (1.1.3 and
1.1.4) analysis of social facts where what matters is that social facts are collectively con­
structed and reproduced and hence objective from any individual point o f view. This is 
the very starting point o f my methodological holism. The most central philosophical 
results here are the novel criticisms o f Searle’s influential account and its Durkheimian 
improvement, which also removes the unfortunate metaphysical burden traditionally but 
nonetheless somewhat unfairly attached to Durkheim’s notion o f social facts. However, 
the exact nature of the essentially collective construction of social facts in the improved 
account is found to be open to several interpretations.
Thus, Section 1.1.5 analyses the major ways o f understanding collective con­
struction by introducing three ways to understand social facts and discussing their inter­
connections. I call these accounts the Individualistic Account, the Wittgensteinian Ac­
count and the Durkheimian Account. The Individualistic Account holds that the actions 
required for the construction o f objective social facts are collective merely in the sense 
o f involving a number of essentially asocial individuals and their intentional interac­
tions. The Wittgensteinian and Durkheimian Accounts reject this knd o f straightforward
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methodological individualism for different reasons. The Wittgensteinian Account holds 
that the Individualistic Account is false because individual intentional action already 
presupposes social practices, and thus individual action cannot be a fundamental build­
ing block o f social reality that includes social practices. The Durkheimian Account, in 
contrast, holds that the Individualistic Account must be rejected because the construc­
tion and reproduction of sufficiently objective and robust social facts require that indi­
viduals act together in a more fundamental sense than the conceptual resources o f the 
Individualistic Account allow. Thus, Wittgensteinianism and Durkheimianism are mu­
tually logically independent: accepting one view does not require one to adopt also the 
other. Thus, the two ways of rejecting individualism must be discussed separately. The 
present dissertation defends full-blown methodological holism (i.e, comprehensive re­
jection of the Individualistic Account) in the strong sense o f defending both Durk­
heimianism (Part II) and Wittgensteinianism (Part III). The main philosophical result in 
Section 1.1.5 is the explication o f the two different ontologically naturalistic ways to 
challenge mainstream methodological individualism that are examined and defended in 
the rest of the dissertation.
Before Part II gives a full defence o f Durkheimianism, an account o f what, ex­
actly, a contemporary version of Durkheimianism could look like is required. Thus, 
Chapter 1.2 presents the so-called collective intentionality approach to social ontology 
as the major contemporary Durkheimian analysis of action sufficiently collective for 
constructing and reproducing social facts. More precisely, Section 1.2.1 offers a critical 
reconstruction o f Searle’s theory o f social reality and social facts that builds on collec­
tive intentionality. The anti-individualism in Searle’s theory boils down to his theory of 
collective intentionality, analysed in 1.2.2, as the irreducible we-mode of certain inten­
tional states and intentional actions. The accounts of collective intentionality o f the 
other major theorists of collective intentionality in the Durkheimian sense, Margaret 
Gilbert and Raimo Tuomela, are critically analysed in 1.2.3 and 1.2.4, respectively. The 
main philosophical result here is the detailed analysis of the three main accounts o f col­
lective intentionality, including their individual weaknesses and mutual compatibility. I 
argue that my final analysis o f Tuomela’s reason-based we-intention in 1.2.4 captures 
also the anti-individualistic core o f Searle’s and Gilbert’s notions o f collective inten­
tionality and defines what I mean by collective we-intentionality. Chapter 1.3, then, 
sums up the collective intentionality view o f social ontology, i.e., the contemporary 
form of Durkheimianism in the sense 1.1.5.
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Normally the question of whether or not we really need to assume the reality o f  
irreducible we-intentionality in this sense is addressed in terms o f testing our intuitions 
about social action in different imaginable cases (see, in particular, Searle 1990, Gilbert 
1989, Miller 2007 and indeed Chapter 1.2). Thus the debate proceeds such that the 
Durkheimians suggest counterexamples to Individualistic Accounts o f collective ac­
tions, and the individualists answer by arguing that in fact the Individualistic Account 
can handle the alleged counterexamples (in my view Bratman 1999 & Miller 2007 have 
a particularly strong case here). Instead o f joining the industry o f presenting my intui­
tions concerning hypothetical cases, I want to give a stronger, conceptual argument (see
II.3 and III.5.2 for an argument that empirical research indeed cannot settle the issue) to 
show that the assumption of anti-individualistic collective intentionality is indeed re­
quired if we wish to account for collective action in general. Thus, Part II provides a 
badly-needed general argument1 in favour of the reality o f sui generis, irreducible we- 
intentionality, i.e., contemporary Durkheimianism in the sense of Part I.
Part II begins this task by considering a possible attack on the naturalisticness o f 
collective intentionality in terms o f its apparent evolutionary implausibility. The basic 
evolutionary dynamics of competition and survival o f  the fittest seem to dictate that the 
kind of group-centred social solidarity implied by the theory o f collective intentionality 
is likely to have been selected against in the course o f evolutionary history (Chapter
II.l). Section II.1.1 presents this problem in a precise form and offers the group selec­
tion theory of Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson (1998) as a solution to the problem. 
However, this dissertation is not a study in biology. Nor am I doing armchair evolution­
ary theory. Accordingly, Section II.l .2 explains that my argument is not tied to the spe­
cific view o f biological evolution favoured by Sober and Wilson. Rather my aim is to 
show that evolutionary biology does not pose a conceptual or theoretical obstacle for the 
collective intentionality view. Thus, my arguments show that the view o f social behav­
iour implied by the collective intentionality theory, i.e., individuals acting essentially 
qua group members and the instrumental rationality o f their actions being revealed pri­
marily when rationality is addressed in collectivistic terms o f what the group is doing 
and what is optimal for the group, is fully compatible with and even supported by our 
best understanding o f evolutionary dynamics. This is a strong philosophical result as 
such and, moreover, a result that features prominently in the arguments o f Part III.
1 In contrast to most other writers in the field, Tuomela (e.g., 2000, 2002, 2007) shares my preference for 
general, conceptual arguments over intuitive discussions concerning particular thought experiments. Ac­
cordingly, Part II builds largely on Tuomela’s work, although the main argument is rather different from 
Tuomela’s treatment o f the issue.
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However, Chapter II.l talks only about the evolutionary plausibility o f social 
patterns o f bodily behaviour, not about forms and modes o f psychological mechanisms. 
The question concerning the psychology associated with social behavioural patterns is 
addressed in Chapter II.2 that presents my general argument for the Durkheimian we- 
mode account and against the Individualistic Account. The animating idea is to adopt an 
evolutionary perspective that guides us to address the following evolutionary design 
problem (Section II.2.1): what kind o f psychological mechanism -  in particular, indi­
vidual-mode or we-mode -  is evolutionarily the most optimal mechanism to have 
evolved to produce the kind of social behaviour we observe every day and the evolu­
tionarily plausibility o f which was addressed in Chapter II.l? Section II.2.2 follows a 
prominent tradition in the study o f social action and interprets this question as the ques­
tion concerning the possibility o f rational co-operation in social dilemma situations, 
such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Sections II.2.3 and II.2.4 show that this framing o f the 
question yields a very strong, general argument for the reality o f collective we- 
intentionality by demonstrating the functional superiority o f we-mode over individualis­
tic I-mode. In my view this argument forms a major contribution to the theory o f collec­
tive intentionality.
Note, however, that my arguments and problems are all the time conceptual and 
not empirical. After all, this is a philosophical study. I am not doing speculative evolu­
tionary biology or psychology. This is especially clear when it is kept in mind that my 
defence of we-mode intentionality in Part II remains neutral regarding Wittgensteinian­
ism, the topic of Part III. Chapter II.2 discusses evolutionary dynamics in general, i.e., 
independently of whether the selection process behind collective intentionality is 
thought to be materialised in biological (non-Wittgensteinianism) or cultural processes 
(Wittgensteinianism).
Chapter II.3, then, makes a move towards empirical considerations by asking 
whether empirical social science is able to either falsify or verify the results of the con­
ceptual argumentation in Chapter 11.2. There are approaches in empirical social science 
that are directly hostile (II.3.2) to the collective intentionality theory and approaches 
that strongly support it (II.3.3). However, Chapter II.3 concludes that such approaches 
alone cannot settle the issue. Thus, we have to go with the general, conceptual argu­
ments I have offered. Finally, Chapter II.4 concludes the defence o f the Durkheimian 
we-intentionality o f Part II.
Part III, then, takes up the issue o f Wittgensteinianism. As in Part II, I motivate 
the discussion by starting from a fundamental problem: is the framework o f intentional
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agency, assumed in Parts I and II, justified in the first place? Chapter III.l opens the 
discussion by analysing the nature and explanation o f intentional actions. The easiest 
solution to my problem would be to hold simply that the framework does not form any 
kind of philosophical problem, because intentional states and meaningful actions simply 
belong to the fundamental furniture of the natural world and feature non- 
problematically in causal chains (intentionality, be it collective or individual, would be 
seen as a biologically primitive feature o f the world, as Searle puts this). I call this com- 
mon-sense view the Standard View (III. 1.1).
However, the Standard View faces grave problems, particularly the so-called 
Logical Connection Argument (III.1.2) which seeks to demonstrate that intentional 
states are causally inefficacious and intentional explanations are not causal explana­
tions. Donald Davidson is routinely cited as the philosopher who took up this challenge 
and refuted the Logical Connection Argument, rescuing thereby the Standard View. 
Section III. 1.3 analyses Davidson’s argumentation in detail and concludes, contrary to 
the prevailing view in the philosophical community, that Davidson’s alleged refutation 
fails. Moreover, in demonstrating Davidson’s failure, Section III. 1.3 also shows that Jon 
Elster’s influential interpretation o f Davidson as the champion o f the Standard View is 
inescapably incoherent. Although these are very strong and important results in con­
temporary action theory as such, the implication they have for my overall argument is 
that one cannot follow Davidson to the Standard View and simply assume that the 
framework o f intentional agency (including collective intentionality) is not a problem 
for the strong naturalism I have committed myself to. Something else is required.
Chapter III.2 analyses another important attempt to defend the naturality o f the 
framework of intentional agency, the essentially non-Davidsonian version o f the Stan­
dard View which holds that mental states are causally efficacious qua mental -  but in a 
way that does not challenge general naturalism (III.2.1). A very widely accepted view in 
the philosophical community is that the so-called Multiple Realisability Argument can 
deliver this kind o f naturalistic defence o f the Standard View and, thereby, the frame­
work of intentional agency. However, Sections III.2.2 and III.2.3 argue that this popular 
programme is bound to fail in its own terms. Section III.2.4, then, suggests that this ar­
gumentation implies that to defend the framework o f intentional agency we must reject 
the causalist Standard View, since both the Davidsonian argumentation and the Multiple 
Realisability Argument fail to defend it. Section III.2.5 generalises this result to show 
that in fact the Standard View consists essentially o f five theses that cannot all be co­
herently accepted. One must go, and I suggest that it is the commitment to the causal
14
nature o f the framework o f intentional agency. Moreover, III.2.5 argues that the only 
real option to non-causalism is, e.g., Nancy Cartwright’s and John Dupre’s metaphysi­
cal pluralism. In addition to revealing the failures o f the celebrated Multiple Realisabil­
ity Argument, the striking conclusion o f Chapter III.2 is that to defend the framework -  
and, thus, collective intentionality -  one must accept either non-causalism or meta­
physical pluralism. Both are unacceptable positions to the vast majority o f contempo­
rary philosophers.
The arguments in Chapters III.l and III.2 presuppose that we pre-theoretically 
understand the nature of the intentional framework and then show what one must accept 
to be able to hold to the framework. To motivate the choice between metaphysical plu­
ralism and non-causalism, Chapter 1II.3 adopts a different approach and scrutinises the 
very nature o f the intentional framework itself (111.3.1). This scrutiny leads me to ad­
dress the very nature o f meaning and, in particular, its relation to rules (III.3.2). Here 
my argumentation draws heavily from the extensive literature on the so-called problem 
o f rule-following. I argue that the Standard View o f seeing psychological states as in­
trinsically meaningful (including Platonism that treats meanings as abstract objects in 
need o f contentful interpretation) is unacceptable, as is the causal dispositionalism that 
equates meaning with our causal dispositions. These views cannot deliver a coherent 
defence o f the intentional framework. III.3.3 makes the problem even worse by showing 
that straightforward communitarian solutions cannot help us to understand meaning and 
intentionality either. Thus, Chapter 1II.3 concludes that the quietist position, according 
to which we simply cannot analyse the foundations o f the intentional framework, is a 
viable option. Again, this is a strong philosophical result -  although obviously highly 
unattractive for my task o f defending naturalistic methodological holism and collective 
we-intentionality.
However, in this dark hour Chapter 111.4 comes to the rescue by introducing the 
so-called social solution to the problem of rule-following as a way to defend the inten­
tional framework in a thoroughly naturalistic way (III.4.1). Section III.4.2 argues that an 
essentially social version of the dispositional view manages to avoid the problems that 
were (111.3) fatal for psychologism, Platonism and dispositionalism, resulting in the 
Wittgensteinian view o f 1.1.5. In particular, Section III.4.3 argues that a pre-intentional 
version o f the analysis o f we-mode action given in 1.2.4 can give us the kind o f picture 
o f pre-intentional social practices that is, according to the Wittgensteinian view on rule- 
following and the social solution, required for an acceptable analysis o f the intentional 
framework. Moreover, these practices correspond to the kind o f social behaviour the
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evolutionarily plausibility o f which was defended in II.l. Although this improved ver­
sion o f the social solution to the rule-following problem developed in III.4.2 and III.4.3 
is o f course an important philosophical result in itself, from the perspective o f my main 
argument the value o f Chapter III.4 is seen only in Chapter III.5, which explicates the 
role and implications o f the argument o f III.4 for my main thesis by applying the im­
proved social solution to the major questions o f the dissertation (III. 5.2 in particular).
First, Section III.5.1 applies the improved social solution to the question con­
cerning the nature and explanation of intentional action. It is argued that the rule- 
following considerations imply that o f our two possible ways to defend the intentional 
framework, non-causalism and metaphysical pluralism (II 1.2.5), it is non-causalism that 
grounds the intentional framework (this, o f course, is not to say that metaphysical plu­
ralism is wrong but only that it is not required for the intentional framework). The im­
proved social solution gives the philosophical justification for the view o f intentional 
agency and its explanation o f the Logical Connection Argument o f III.l.
Section III.5.2, then, applies the improved social solution of III.4 and the view 
o f intentional action and its explanation o f III.5.1 to the question concerning the status 
o f collective we-mode intentionality as discussed in Parts I and II. The result is a social 
constructivist view o f collective intentionality. Thus, the argument o f Section III.5.2, 
which brings together the results of the whole preceding dissertation, is perhaps the 
most important philosophical result o f my study: III.5.2 offers a constructivist alterna­
tive to Searle’s account o f a biologically primitive collective we-intentionality currently 
dominating the theory o f collective intentionality. And whereas Searle’s account is ex­
plicitly based mainly on Searle’s intuition that the biological primitiveness o f (collec­
tive) intentionality is obvious (e.g., Searle 2007b), my constructivist alternative is based 
on series of detailed philosophical arguments and analyses. Thus, to defend the Searlean 
orthodoxy against my constructivism it is not enough to appeal to intuitions. Rather, one 
must challenge the philosophical arguments this dissertation consists in.
Finally, Section III.5.3 applies the view of the intentional framework developed 
in the earlier sections to some issues that were left open in Parts I and II when I wanted 
to keep my argumentation neutral regarding the question o f Wittgensteinianism. Most 
o f these issues have notable importance to other fields o f philosophy (e.g., my argu­
ments against evolutionary psychology and the co-operative virtue theory o f co­
operation, or my discussion concerning Ian Hacking’s doctrine o f conceptual practices 
making up people), but since they do not directly contribute to my main argument but
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rather cash out certain implications o f it, I do not explain them further here. Chapter
III.6 closes Part III by summing up the results.
Although Part I, II and III jointly form my main argument for naturalised meth­
odological holism vis-a-vis social ontology and agency and thus this dissertation, I have 
decided to add a rather longish Appendix to my main argument. The appendix has two 
goals. First, following in the footsteps o f Searle (1995), I too worry that my constructiv­
ism may be mistaken as implying an unacceptably strong form o f relativism and hence, 
like Searle, I want to add a further discussion on the connection between realism and 
my form o f constructivism -  especially since, unlike Searle, my dissertation subscribes 
to social constructivism also concerning agency and meaning and defends a non-causal 
theory o f action. Appendix argues that there is no need to worry: realism worthy o f the 
name (and our support) actually presupposes the kind of constructivism I defend.
Second, since in developing my main argument I have been forced to borrow 
rather extensively from other heated philosophical debates without addressing all the 
nuances that feature in the literature concerning those debates, I want -  if only as an ex­
ample -  connect my main argument explicitly to at least one big philosophical debate 
not directly relevant for my argument to show how the view defended in the thesis trav­
els to other fields of philosophy. The issue o f realism seems to be well-suited for this 
task, and my discussion in Appendix serves to indicate what forms further research that 
accepts the main argument o f my dissertation could take in other philosophical debates.
However, I also believe that the specific arguments given in Appendix are phi­
losophically significant in their own right. A .1.1 connects the discussion o f Chapters
III.3, III.4 and III.5 to a defence o f non-referential, direct realism. A .1.2 takes up a dis­
agreement between Martin Kusch and Robert Brandom and provides a philosophical 
house cleaning this dispute in my view clearly needs. A.2, finally, revisits Quine’s and 
Davidson’s attempts to bridge the conceptual gap between their holistic conception o f 
all things meaningful and the non-holistic material world that threatens to turn into an 
unbridgeable epistemic gap lethal for the notion o f thinking and talking about the world. 
Particular attention is given to the way John McDowell seeks to resolve the Quine- 
Davidson problem. My main argument here is, as can be anticipated, that the problem 
McDowell identifies cannot be resolved in a satisfactory way unless the kind o f natural­
istic holism I have constructed in Parts I-III is accepted. Thus, in my view the argu­
ments in Appendix give further evidence for my main argument, i.e., for the importance 
o f naturalised methodological holism vis-a-vis social ontology and agency.
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PART I:
THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF SOCIAL REALITY
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INTRODUCTION TO PART I
We all live in societies. Yet this platitude does not imply that we are thoroughly familiar 
with the nature o f social entities and social facts. Their philosophical nature is hardly an 
issue we pause to contemplate. However, since we are clearly able to act and live in so­
cial reality, we must understand at least approximately how social reality works. It 
seems to me, though, that the knowledge we possess as participants in social life is 
mainly practical “know how” type o f knowledge that consists of a largely tacit, inexpli­
cable capability to act more or less successfully in a social setting. Especially, our prac­
tical social knowledge typically does not include explicit understanding o f the nature o f 
social reality.
An unfortunate result o f our primarily implicit familiarity with the social realm 
is that also our scientific and philosophical understanding o f social reality is all too of­
ten fuzzy and confused. The views o f sociologists, economists, anthropologists and phi­
losophers range from direct denials o f the importance o f the social (extreme individual­
ism) to views that it is the social that determines the essence o f individuals (full-blown 
social holism). Consensus does not appear to be forthcoming.
Hence, insofar as we are not completely satisfied with mere practical knowl­
edge, there is true need for theoretical -  indeed, philosophical -  social theory that seeks 
to explicate the crucial features o f our tacit understanding of the social. Social ontology 
as I see it is about making explicit issues that we already master in practice. This, as we 
shall see, does not mean that the results o f such explications will not be surprising. 
Sometimes explications o f implicit mastery will require us to correct some o f our more 
uncritical views concerning the social world.
However, since the starting point o f social ontology is our tacit knowledge re­
garding social reality, our theory o f social ontology must also acknowledge what we 
know for certain about the social world and how we experience it. In particular, in our 
everyday life we presuppose a great number o f essentially social facts, such as laws, 
norms, the existence of money and universities and so on. Philosophical social ontology 
must take this into account.
Thus, instead o f presenting a philosophical theory o f the ontology o f the social 
world right at the outset I begin my journey by looking at what, exactly, we require -  
and, as importantly, what we do not require -  from a theory of social reality and social 
facts. In particular, I wish to examine in what sense the most ordinary social facts can be
2 Part III argues that this is what our knowledge o f  fundamental social practices ultimately must be like.
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said to be objective. Moreover, I will initially rely on a common-sense understanding o f 
what social facts are like. The idea is that the discussion o f the objectivity o f social facts 
will guide us to refine the common-sense notion and set the stage for further discus­
sions, for it pinpoints the issues we need to understand in the ontological structure o f 
social facts and thereby builds a bridge from commonsense understanding to high the­
ory.
CHAPTER 1.1: 
THE OBJECTIVITY OF SOCIAL FACTS3
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Are social facts objective? To get a clear grasp of the problem, let us look at a simple 
example that John R. Searle (1995), whose work I will largely concentrate on, treats as a 
paradigmatic case o f social facts:4 the pieces of paper in my pocket are money. The 
monetary status of these pieces o f paper is quite objective: which pieces o f paper in my 
possession are money and which pieces are not is, unfortunately, beyond my control.
However, just as obviously the pieces o f paper that are money do not have their 
monetary status directly in virtue o f their physical properties. It is not the physical struc­
ture of the pieces of paper qua physical entities that causes them to function as media o f 
exchange. Rather, as for example Searle (1995) and Tuomela (1995, 2002) emphasise, 
to be money is a social status based on the psychological facts that people in general 
think of certain pieces of paper as money and accept them as media o f exchange, as 
money. In other words, the pieces o f paper function as media o f exchange in virtue of 
the social status assigned to the pieces, and the assignment and constitution o f this status 
is due to collective acceptance (see Searle 1995, Tuomela 1995, 2002). Remove humans 
and their practices, and social facts and social reality disappear as well. In such a situa­
tion the pieces o f paper would not be money anymore, even though they would still 
have all their physical properties. This seems to suggest that the fact that the pieces o f 
paper in my pocket are money is not an objective fact after all.
The following definition captures this latter notion of objectivity:
(1) A fact is objective iff it obtains independently of us.5
The fact that the pieces o f paper in my pocket are money cannot be objective in the 
sense of Definition (1), since the monetary status of the pieces obviously depends on 
human practices and, hence, the obtainment o f the fact depends on us. But Searle’s ex­
ample of money also shows that any notion o f objectivity which implies that social facts
3 This Chapter is largely based on Saaristo (2003).
4 Within the limits o f  this dissertation I o f  course cannot discuss the distinguishing features o f  all the dif­
ferent social facts. Instead my goal is to explicate the core elements o f  the objectivity o f paradigmatic 
social facts. To use Hacking’s (1997) terminology, I am in the business o f  explicating the constitutive 
logic o f social facts, not o f classifying different possible empirical scenarios.
5 This definition is analogous to some standard textbook definitions o f  metaphysical scientific realism. 
Hence, even though I have chosen to conduct my discussion in terms o f  objectivity, my arguments are 
easily translatable into a discussion on the prospects o f  scientific realism in the social sciences (cf. Maki 
1996).
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are not objective, cannot be fully satisfactory. An acceptable theory o f the objectivity o f 
social facts ought to explain also the intuition that there is something perfectly objective 
in social facts.
Searle thinks that this ambiguity concerning the objectivity o f social facts cap­
tures the core puzzle in understanding social reality. In short, the fundamental problem 
is to explain how it is possible that “there are portions of the real world, objective facts 
in the world, that are only facts by human agreement” (Searle 1995, l) .6 This means 
that in order to understand properly the objectivity o f social facts we cannot be satisfied 
with Definition (1). Let us see how Searle seeks to resolve the ambiguity in the objec­
tivity o f social facts.
1.1.1 SEARLE ON THE OBJECTIVITY OF SOCIAL FACTS
The starting point o f Searle’s (1995, 7 ff.) discussion concerning the objectivity o f so­
cial facts is the idea that a universal notion of objectivity, such as the one expressed by 
Definition (1), cannot capture the different senses o f objectivity relevant for a theory of 
social facts. According to Searle, two such senses are crucial here. In order to capture 
both of the mentioned intuitions we must distinguish between ontological and epistemic 
objectivity.
Ontological objectivity and subjectivity, Searle tells us, are “predicates o f enti­
ties and types of entities” (Searle 1995, 8). An ontologically subjective entity is depend­
ent on a perceiver or a mental state. Searle’s example is pain. Brute natural objects, such 
as mountains, are ontologically objective entities. I will conduct my discussion mainly 
in terms o f facts rather than entities, and by ontologically objective facts I mean facts 
whose obtainment is independent o f human activity.
Epistemic objectivity and subjectivity, in turn, are properties o f statements, not 
o f entities. An epistemically subjective statement is such that its “truth or falsity cannot 
be settled ‘objectively,’ because the truth or falsity is not a simple matter o f fact but de­
pends on certain attitudes, feelings, and point of view o f the makers and hearers o f the 
judgment” (Searle 1995, 8). Typical examples of such subjective statements are state­
ments that are based on the taste and attitudes of the maker o f the statement. Searle’s 
example is the statement that Rembrandt is a better artist than Rubens. Epistemically
6 It is not very clear what kind o f  agreement Searle means here. It seems to me that often explicit agree­
ment is not needed; implicit, tacit agreement will be perfectly sufficient in many cases (Part III o f this 
study argues that the very possibility o f  explicit agreement actually presupposes quite a lot o f  implicit 
agreement).
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objective statements are such that their truth-values are not dependent on attitudes or 
tastes. Searle’s example is the statement that Rembrandt lived in Amsterdam during the 
year 1632. When in what follows I occasionally talk about epistemically objective (or 
subjective) facts, I use the expression as an abbreviation o f this notion o f the nature o f 
the sentences describing the facts.
Searle’s conceptual apparatus appears to meet the abovementioned requirements 
very well. The ontological notion of objectivity captures the common-sense intuition 
behind Definition (1), allowing us to conclude that social facts are not ontologically ob­
jective. The problem with Definition (1), however, was that it could not account for the 
other intuition we have: social facts appear to be objective in the sense that their ob- 
tainment is immune to our personal attitudes, desires, feelings etc. This, o f course, is not 
a problem for Searle since he can say that although social facts are ontologically subjec­
tive, the facts (or, rather, the statements describing them) are nonetheless epistemically 
objective.
Thus Searle’s solution manages to avoid the obvious problem with Definition
(1), and by doing so it also succeeds in doing justice to the core puzzle o f social reality. 
Notwithstanding these indisputable successes, I nonetheless think that we can give a 
better account of the objectivity o f social facts than the one given by Searle. Searle’s 
account, although not mistaken, is nonetheless somewhat misleading or at least incom­
plete since it fails to capture some crucial features o f social facts, and thus we should 
not be content with it. The next section explains what limitations I see in Searle’s ac­
count.
1.1.2 PROBLEMS WITH SEARLE’S ACCOUNT
There are at least three major (interconnected) shortcomings in Searle’s account, (i) It is 
not clear how the two distinctions are related to one another (and indeed to the structure 
o f social facts), and this poses problems for attempts to construct a Searlean taxonomy 
o f facts, (ii) The account fails to highlight the distinctive character o f social facts, (iii) 
The account fails to increase our understanding as to why social facts are ontologically 
subjective but epistemically objective. The last two problems are the most important 
problems here, but let me start with the first since it sheds light on the more serious 
problems.
Searle appears to think that the two distinctions -  ontological and epistemic ob­
jectivity/subjectivity -  enable us to construct a taxonomy o f facts. In other words, Searle
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seems to think that we can classify facts to those that are (a) both ontologically and 
epistemically objective, (b) ontologically and epistemically subjective, (c) ontologically 
objective but epistemically subjective and (d) ontologically subjective but epistemically 
objective. It is not clear that this way o f classifying facts will result in anything interest­
ing, largely because the epistemic distinction concerns, as Searle (1995, 8) emphasises, 
predicates o f judgements, whereas the ontological distinction deals with predicates o f 
entities. It is not obvious that the marriage o f these two distinctions, operating with 
completely different categories, will reveal anything valuable about different kinds o f 
facts in general and about social facts in particular. After all, neither of the distinctions 
is defined in terms o f facts.
And indeed the role o f some of the Searlean classifications remains somewhat 
perplexing. The class (a) is clear enough, but what should we think about, say, the class 
(c). Again, Searle’s intuition is respectable enough: “For example, the statement ‘Mt. 
Everest is more beautiful than Mt. Whitney’ is about ontologically objective entities, 
but makes a subjective judgment about them” (Searle 1995, 8-9). The problem is, 
though, that it is not clear whether this teaches us anything new about facts. The fact 
involved seems to be simply that the maker o f the statement prefers Mt. Everest to Mt. 
Whitney in aesthetic terms. Hence the entities most intimately associated with this ex­
ample -  preferences, mental states -  are by Searle’s own definition ontologically sub­
jective entities, even though this was supposed to be an example of ontologically objec­
tive entities (what mountains o f course are). I do not think Searle says anything obvi­
ously false here, but I also fail to see why this kind o f classification should be o f great 
importance when addressing the objectivity o f different kinds o f facts.
Similarly for the class (b): Supposedly we should find here value judgements 
about entities whose mode o f existence depends on mental states. An example might be 
the following: I dislike the pain I am now feeling. Again, it is not clear whether we learn 
anything new about facts by learning to classify statements like this as belonging to the 
class (b). The facts involved seem to be simply the two ontologically subjective facts 
that I am in pain and that I find it unpleasant. Searle’s point seems to be to emphasise 
that statements about pain are epistemically objective in the sense that their truth-values 
are independent o f my attitudes, whereas my dislike is an attitude and hence the same 
cannot be said about it. However, the truth-value does depend on my feelings (i.e., 
whether I do feel pain or not) and hence Searle’s (1995, 8) explicit definition seems to 
render it epistemically subjective. Similarly, when we move beyond first appearances 
the epistemic status of the judgements about my preferences becomes problematic as
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well. Preferences are by Searle’s definition ontologically subjective, but in what sense 
can we say that the judgements about them are epistemically subjective? Surely the 
truth-vallies are dependent on my tastes etc., but nonetheless there seems to be some­
thing objective in them, since many of my preferences are just given to me in introspec­
tion or action, and I cannot change them at will. It seems to me that learning to place 
facts such as the ones discussed here into the class (b) raises more questions than it an­
swers.
Finally, even if we sidestep these problems with epistemic objectivity and sub­
jectivity, there are still other confusing issues left. Searle defines the epistemic objectiv­
ity and subjectivity o f a given fact in terms of whether the truth conditions o f a sentence 
describing the fact depend on the person uttering the statement or not. Hence the same 
statement can be epistemically subjective or objective depending on who actually utters 
it. For example, the statement “John Searle likes beer” is epistemically subjective when 
uttered by Searle, but epistemically objective when uttered by someone else. As such 
this feature o f Searle’s classificatory system can be seen as an advantage, since it allows 
for a clear distinction between the first and third-person approaches to the mental facts 
cognitive psychology deals with (see Dennett 1991a for the importance o f this feature 
and Sections 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 below for what this implies for the present discussion).
However, the price Searle’s theory pays for this success is that by shifting the 
focus from the facts themselves onto their descriptions, the ultimate structure o f social 
facts remains unaccounted for. For example, a peculiar implication of Searle’s charac­
terisations is that the statements “I am in pain” and “The pieces o f paper in my pocket 
are money” have exactly the same status. These statements are about entities whose 
“mode of existence” is ontologically subjective, since the existence o f the entities de­
pends on us. However, the statements reporting the facts are epistemically objective, 
since each statement is “made true by the existence o f an actual fact [albeit ontologi­
cally subjective] that is not dependent on any stance, attitudes, or opinions o f observers” 
(Searle 1995, 9).7
7 Searle’s claim that the epistemic objectivity o f  social facts is based on their independence o f human atti­
tudes seems to be in tension with what Searle says about the ontology o f  social facts. For Searle, social 
facts “are only facts by human agreement” (Searle 1995, 1). Now surely human agreement is tied to hu­
man attitudes. However, Searle can hold that a social fact is epistemically objective due to its independ­
ence o f the attitudes o f the person observing the fact here and now, even i f  the fact is not independent o f  
attitudes in general. In the following sections this distinction is explicated and its importance is made 
clear. Searle’s failure to be clear on these issues forms one more reason why we cannot be completely 
satisfied with his account.
The other example is problematic too. No doubt pain is independent o f attitudes, but it seems to be de­
pendent on feelings, which was earlier (Searle 1995, 8) said to imply epistemic subjectivity.
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Philosophers who accept the impossibility o f private languages and advocate a 
social theory o f agency, meaning and mental content (see, for example, Williams 1999 
and Part III o f this Study) might want to argue that actually the implication o f Searle’s 
classifications that mental and social facts have the same epistemic status and refer to 
entities o f the same ontological status should be seen as an advantage o f Searle’s ac­
count. However, this would be inappropriate for two reasons. First, Searle wants to see 
an essential difference between mental and social facts, and hence his account’s failure 
to reflect what he thinks this difference is must be seen as a shortcoming of his account. 
Second, the message o f the communalists is that the structure of certain facts is, con­
trary to pre-theoretic intuitions, irreducibly social rather than individualistic. Hence a 
satisfactory classificatory system of different kinds o f facts should reveal what it is in 
the structure of social facts that sets them apart from individualistic facts, and then the 
communalist could explain why she thinks we should see the facts under scrutiny as so­
cial facts rather than as individualistic mental facts. Searle’s framework is conceptually 
too deprived to offer such clarification.
To conclude, Searle’s analysis o f the objectivity o f different types o f facts fails 
to explain what features characteristic o f social facts actually make the sentences de­
scribing the facts epistemically objective despite the ontological subjectivity o f the facts 
in question. This shortcoming makes, in my view, Searle’s account unsuitable as an 
analytic tool for shedding light on many disputes in the philosophy o f the human sci­
ences, such as the quarrel over the communalist and individualist theories o f meaning 
and mental content.
What is needed is an account o f the objectivity of social facts that can explain 
why the judgements about both individualistic mental facts and social facts are epis­
temically objective despite the ontological subjectivity o f the facts, while also explicat­
ing precisely what differentiates social facts from individualistic mental facts (if they 
indeed are different). This is something Searle’s framework cannot offer.
1.1.3 TOWARDS A DURKHEIMIAN ACCOUNT OF SOCIAL FACTS
Searle seeks to capture the different senses of objectivity by pointing out that we can 
understand “independence” in Definition (1) either as ontological independence or as 
epistemic independence. Thus, the Searlean picture replaces Definition (1) with the fol­
lowing definitions.
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(2) A fact is ontologically objective iff its obtainment is independent o f us (if it could 
obtain independently of humans).
(3) A statement is epistemically objective iff the truth-value o f the statement is inde­
pendent o f the attitudes etc. o f the maker of the statement (if a representation o f the fact 
is made true or false by something independent of the attitudes of the person construct­
ing the representation, be the fact represented ontologically objective or subjective).
The fundamental reason why Searle’s account led to the problems discussed above is 
that (2) does not actually add anything to (1), and (3) does not talk primarily about facts 
anymore, but about sentences. Hence, we need new candidates for replacing (1), (2) and
(3) that are about features o f  facts. At this point it is time to turn to the locus classicus 
o f the philosophy o f social facts, Emile Durkheim’s The Rules o f Sociological Method 
(Durkheim 1895/1982).
Durkheim seeks to capture the objectivity o f social facts with his notorious 
maxim that we must treat social facts as things. Naturally, this principle leads us to ask 
what does it mean to say that social facts are to be treated as things. Notice that the 
claim is not “that social facts are material things, but that they are things just as are ma­
terial things” (Durkheim 1895/1982, 35). For Durkheim, things include “all that which 
the mind cannot understand without going outside itself’ (Durkheim 1895/1982, 36). I 
read this as saying that a description or representation o f a thing must satisfy Definition
(3).
Hence, in Durkheim’s picture the defining feature of a thing is that the descrip­
tions of it are epistemically objective in Searle’s sense. Consequently, where Searle’s 
notion of epistemic objectivity captures a feature of neither entities nor facts, but o f sen­
tences and representations, also for Durkheim “[t]o treat facts of a certain order as 
things is therefore not to place them in this or that category o f reality; it is to observe 
towards them a certain attitude o f mind” (Durkheim 1895/1982, 36). This is good to 
keep in mind, for all too often Durkheim’s account is dismissed on ontological grounds.
However, precisely because the maxim to treat social facts as things does not go 
further than the Searlean definition (3) and hence points out only what the representa­
tions of social facts have in common with the representations of many other facts, being 
thus completely silent about the distinctive features o f social facts, Durkheim cannot 
leave his discussion on the objectivity o f social facts here. But it is not clear how Durk­
heim could proceed from here coherently. Durkheim’s dilemma is that on the one hand
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he thinks that in the name o f ontological naturalism we must accept that “society com­
prises only individuals” (Durkheim 1895/1982, 39), but on the other he is also commit­
ted to the view that the study o f social facts is an autonomous discipline, the objects o f 
which are not studied by non-social human sciences or natural sciences.
For Durkheim, the characterising feature o f social facts is that regardless o f 
which individual perspective they are observed from, social facts are always treated or 
observed as things, whereas, e.g., individualistic psychological facts are treated as 
things only when observed from the third-person perspective. Thus, in Durkheim’s view 
the crucial question for the possibility o f sui generis social science is this: Is there some­
thing in the nature of social facts that makes them things, i.e., epistemically objective, in 
this full-blown sense and thus to differ qualitatively from their constitutive parts (such 
as individualistic psychological facts), even when in the strict ontological sense society 
consists of nothing but individuals? Durkheim thinks that if he can give an affirmative 
answer to this question, he has provided an account of methodological holism (for social 
facts are then qualitatively different from their constitutive parts) which is nonetheless 
ontologically naturalistic (since society comprises only individuals). A defence o f this 
kind of naturalistic holism is also my goal in this dissertation.
As we know, Durkheim’s answer is that the epistemically objective status o f so­
cial facts is due to the fundamental structure o f social facts: “What constitutes social 
facts are the beliefs, tendencies and practices o f the group [of individuals] taken collec­
tive ly  (Durkheim 1895/1982, 54, my italics). This suggests that in order to do justice to 
Searle’s line o f reasoning about ontological and epistemic objectivity so that we also 
manage to capture the distinctive features of social facts, we should concentrate on the 
notion o f “us” in Definition (1), rather than on the notion of “ independence” as Searle 
does. We can understand “us” here in two different senses. First, “us” might be taken to 
mean something like “humans in general” or, in some cases, “the members o f the social 
group in question”.8 However, “us” may also be taken to mean “any particular individ­
ual”. Consequently, the Durkheimian replacement o f Definition (1) would explicate two 
different senses o f objectivity with the following pair o f definitions.
8 For the present purpose o f explicating the structure o f social facts the difference between “humans in 
general” and “the members o f  the social group in question” is not crucial. What matters is that both for­
mulations bring in inter subjectivity. However, for some other fundamental problems o f  the philosophy o f  
social science the difference can be central (e.g., when tackling the challenge o f cultural relativism) and 
should accordingly be explicated in the definitions o f objectivity. I thank Steven Lukes for highlighting 
the importance o f this point to me.
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(4) A fact is objective] iff it obtains independently of human attitudes and actions.
(5) A fact is objective2 iff it obtains independently o f the attitudes and actions o f  any 
particular individual.
Now Definition (4) captures the common-sense intuition o f objectivity as ex­
pressed by Definitions (1) and (2), and hence also Searle’s notion o f ontological objec­
tivity. Obviously social facts are not objective] in the sense o f Definition (4). However, 
what we required was a notion o f objectivity that captures also the intuition about the 
epistemic objectivity of social facts, as highlighted by Searle’s example o f money and 
as aspired after by Definition (3). Objectivity2 in the sense o f Definition (5) can offer 
this and, moreover, it points out why social facts are epistemically objective in the sense 
o f Definition (3), and does it in a way that sets social facts clearly apart from facts about 
individuals that are objective neither in the sense o f Definition (4) nor in the sense o f (5) 
-  a feature emphasised by both Searle and Durkheim. Furthermore, Definition (5) can 
provide all this without confusing social facts with brute natural facts that are objective 
in the sense o f Definition (4) (and, hence, also in the sense o f (1) and (2)), which, obvi­
ously, is another requirement an acceptable view must meet.
It could be argued that it is to some extent misleading to call this kind o f account 
o f social facts Durkheimian, since Durkheim’s view, as Steven Lukes (1982, 7-8) em­
phasises, characteristically includes metaphysically demanding notions such as inde­
pendent macro-level causal forces, and I do not wish to commit myself one way or an­
other regarding the existence o f such forces.9 However, I believe that the importance I 
lay upon Definition (5) justifies the label “Durkheimian”. In the following section I will 
nonetheless leave Durkheim in the background and explicate the distinctive nature o f 
social facts in terms of Uskali Maki’s (1996) discussion concerning the modes o f exis­
tence of economic entities.
9 One might wonder why I do not mention Durkheim’s notorious notion o f  the collective mind as the ex­
ample o f Durkheim’s ontologically dubious notions. The reason is that arguably that notion is o f  great 
importance, and the naturalisation o f  it is indeed the key for understanding social ontology (my use o f  the 
theory o f collective we-mode intentionality in this dissertation is meant to be precisely that kind o f  natu­
ralisation). Of course also Durkheim’s macro-causation may turn out to be indispensable -  see, in particu­
lar, III.2.5.
1.1.4 EXPLICATING THE OBJECTIVITY OF SOCIAL FACTS
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This section presents a classification o f different kinds o f facts basing on the internal 
structure of the facts themselves. I have largely adopted the terminology o f Maki 
(1996), whose line o f thought my presentation for the most part agrees with. However, 
the aim of Maki’s discussion is to examine the prospects o f scientific realism in eco­
nomics, and he states his definitions in terms of the modes o f existence o f physical, 
economic and psychological objects. The present discussion differs from Maki’s in two 
ways. First, I generalise the account to apply to social science and social reality in gen­
eral and, second, I continue to talk about facts rather than objects. Hence, in what fol­
lows the definition of independent facts is based on Maki’s (1996, 432) definition o f 
independent existence, the definition o f external facts on Maki’s (1996, 432) external 
existence and the definition o f objective facts on Maki’s (1996, 433) objective exis­
tence. I should also add that Maki is not committed to the idea that the account would 
be in any sense Durkheimian in nature.
Let us call facts that are objective in the strong sense o f Definitions (1), (2) and 
(4) independent facts.
A fact is an independent fact (it obtains independently) iff it obtains independently o f 
the human mind.
It should not confuse us that “independence” appears both in the definiens and in the 
definiendum. After all, this is not a semantic analysis o f a concept, but rather an explica­
tion of independently o f  what a fact must obtain if the fact is said to obtain independ­
ently (this remark applies mutatis mutandis also to the definitions o f external and objec­
tive facts below).
Brute natural facts are independent facts,10 whereas social (and psychological) 
facts are not. We can define the ftill-blown ontological version of methodological indi­
vidualism in the philosophy o f social science in terms o f independent facts as follows.
(07) Social facts do not obtain independently.
10 Actually, Appendix argues that the whole category o f independent facts is under a serious threat. How­
ever, in this Part I will go along with the common-sense understanding o f  independent natural facts.
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On the basis o f Section 1.1.3 above it is easy to see that Durkheim, who is generally 
seen as the ultimate sociological holist, nonetheless accepts (Ol). O f course the accep­
tance o f (07) leaves room for many anti-reductivist forms o f methodological holism, 
since (07) simply says that social facts are neither based on any novel Cartesian sub­
stance nor are they parts o f the natural world that exist independently o f human activity.
Let us call the category of facts that are epistemically objective in the sense o f 
satisfying Definition (3), but nonetheless intersubjective11 in the sense o f Definition (5), 
i.e., excluding individualistic facts, the category o f external facts.
A fact is an external fact (it obtains externally) iff it obtains independently o f (and xter- 
nal to) any individual human mind.
As a stronger notion independence clearly implies externality, and thus independent 
brute natural facts are also external facts. However, also social facts in Durkheim’s 
sense, i.e., facts that depend on human attitudes taken collectively, can be external facts. 
It is the externality of social facts that explains their ontological subjectivity and epis- 
temological objectivity. The pieces o f paper in my pocket are money because they are 
collectively accepted as money. Hence their status as money is not an independent fact. 
Despite its non-independence, however, the monetary status o f the pieces is quite im­
mune to changes in my attitudes; the fact that the pieces are money is a fact external to 
and independent of me (or of any particular individual for that matter).
At this point we can see why it is more intuitive to speak about obtaining facts 
than about existing objects. Although in the light o f what has been said we can under­
stand the complex ontological status of the statement that the British Society for the 
Philosophy o f Science is an externally existing social entity, we nevertheless tend to as­
sociate the terms “entity” and “object” so strongly with independently existing material 
things we face in our everyday lives that the talk about social objects may make us feel 
a bit uneasy. But if we instead state that it is an external fact that the President o f the 
British Society for the Philosophy o f Science is Professor Steven French, it is easy to 
understand that this fact obtains only due to several agreements and conventions.
However, this concentration on facts rather than objects does not allow us to 
avoid considerations of the status o f social entities, since, as Ruben (1985, 34) reminds 
us, if a singular de re sentence “x is P ” is true, it follows that x exists. Hence, if  we be-
11 This o f course suggests that Searle’s solution to call social facts ontologically subjective can be mis­
leading in some contexts, since the essence o f  social facts seems to rest precisely in their intersubjectivity 
as opposed to subjectivity.
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lieve that some fact about a social institution obtains externally, we are also committed 
to external existence o f the institution in question -  but as emphasised, this does not tell 
against ontological individualism in the sense o f (01). We can still argue, as I -  follow­
ing Searle -  do below, that the external existence of social institutions comes down to 
collectively accepted patterns o f behaviour and collectively held attitudes, beliefs etc.
It is possible, however, that when analysing social facts we sometimes must take 
into account also facts that are neither independent nor external. For example, there 
might be a society in which only those pieces of paper are money that are pronounced to 
be money by one particular individual (a bit as English bank notes that include the sig­
nature of the chief cashier of the Bank of England). The acceptance of a single individ­
ual is of course dependent on that individual, and hence it is not an external fact.
Nonetheless, the involvement of individual facts like this does not necessarily 
destroy the external objectivity o f social facts, since also in this case the fundamental 
fact that renders the non-external fact socially significant is itself an external fact. The 
non-external fact is socially important only insofar as people collectively accept its role 
(perhaps unwillingly or tacitly by just going along with a perceived custom). It is the 
external fact of collective acceptance that makes the non-external fact socially signifi­
cant. Even in a society where only those pieces o f paper are money that the king de­
clares to be money, the king’s declaration can assign the status o f  money to the pieces 
o f paper only insofar as the members of the society accept (perhaps tacitly) this proce­
dure as the correct way to issue new tokens o f money, i.e., grant the king a certain status 
first. Social statuses always require collective acceptance.
However, even if  we grant that in order to have social significance a non- 
external fact presupposes an underlying external fact, it remains true that there are situa­
tions in which social explanations must make use o f non-external facts such as the ac­
ceptance of a particular individual. Hence, to complete12 the framework in which the 
objectivity of different kinds of facts can be discussed, let us also examine in what sense 
non-external facts can be objective. The key insight here, I think, is Dennett’s (e.g., 
1991a, 71) insistence that the perspective o f scientific objectivity -  and in Dennett’s 
view the perspective o f all science -  is the third-person point o f view. Dennett thinks 
that if the human sciences are to be mature sciences they must be able to represent indi­
vidual facts from the objective third-person point o f view.
12 Actually, this completes only the account inspired by Maki’s argumentation. Below I give one more 
definition, that o f  social facts proper.
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Let us follow Dennett and call facts that are capable for being so represented ob­
jective facts.
A fact is an objective fact (it obtains objectively) relative to a given representation iff it 
obtains unconstituted by that particular representation.
Once again, Durkheim is in full agreement:
The facts o f individual psychology themselves [...] must be considered in this 
light [i.e., as objective facts]. Indeed, although by definition they are internal to 
ourselves, the consciousness that we have them reveals to us neither their inmost
IT •character nor their origin. [...] This is precisely why during this century an ob­
jective psychology has been founded whose fundamental rule is to study mental 
facts from the outside, namely as things.
(Durkheim 1895/1982, 36-37.)
In other words, whereas material and social facts are essentially objective in the above 
sense, facts o f individual psychology are objective only insofar as we represent them 
from the third-person perspective (to use Dennett’s terminology), i.e., only insofar as 
we treat them as things (in Durkheim’s terminology).
As the final point o f this section I should add that strictly speaking social facts as 
external facts are not completely independent of any particular individual. External facts 
depend on individuals qua group members, but the impact of each individual alone is 
quite negligible -  if the impact were not negligible, then the fact in question would not 
be an external fact, but, by definition, (presentable as) a mere objective fact (cf. Barnes 
2002, 251).
1.1.5 ARE SOCIAL FACTS SUI GENERIS?
The last remaining clarification that needs to be done before the framework for under­
standing the nature of social facts can be regarded as complete is to explicate the differ­
ent ways of understanding the status o f external social facts or, more precisely, in what 
sense we collectively construct and reproduce them. Until such an account is provided 
we have not moved beyond traditional emergentism, which simply holds that social 
facts are emergent features o f groups of individuals, and thus does not say anything 
helpful about the precise structure o f social facts. I call the different accounts to be dis­
13 Indeed, the theory o f  the “character and origin” o f  contentful mental states I defend in Part III shows 
that Durkheim is correct: I suspect some people might find the view I defend as challenging their pre- 
theoretical views on this matter.
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cussed below the Individualistic Account, the Wittgensteinian Account and the Durk­
heimian Account. In this Section I do not defend any o f the three views. Rather, at this 
point I merely want to make the competing views explicit, and an informed choice be­
tween them is the topic o f the rest o f this dissertation.
The Individualistic Account
The first candidate for a theory of the nature of social facts as external facts is to say 
that they do not form a sui generis category o f facts in any substantial sense. Rather, 
social facts as external facts are essentially aggregates o f individual psychological facts. 
In the present context paradigmatic representatives o f this account14 are, for example, 
D. H. Mellor (1982) and Peter Abell’s (2000) rational choice approach to social theory. 
Abell, for example, defines this account so that it “invites us to understand individual 
actors [...] as acting, or more likely interacting, in a manner such that they can be 
deemed to be doing the best they can for themselves, given their objectives, resources, 
and circumstances, as they see them [i.e., whether “their best” is based on egoistic, al­
truistic, or group-directed motivations, cf. II.2”]” (Abell 2000, 223) and social facts as 
nothing but aggregates o f such individual actions. External social facts, then, are sig­
nificant only in the sense that when aiming to maximise one’s utility function part o f the 
circumstances a rational agent must take into account is the behaviour o f others. Social­
ity reduces to strategic interaction.
In short, an advocate o f the Individualistic Account o f external social facts 
would hold that there are only physical (independent) facts and individualistic psycho­
logical (objective) facts. In addition to these, we may for pragmatic reasons wish to talk 
about aggregates o f objective psychological facts as external social facts. However, just 
like a collection of physical facts does not form a new basic category in comparison to 
individual physical facts, a social fact as an aggregate o f facts about individuals does 
not belong to any category substantially different from psychological facts. By the same 
token, though, this view implies eliminativism about social facts no more than modem 
physics implies that macroscopic physical entities do not exist. According to this view, 
social facts as external facts are real and consist o f systems o f interlocking beliefs and 
intentions o f fundamentally asocial individuals (cf. Bratman 1999 or Miller 2001). The 
animating idea behind the Individualistic Account is that the acceptance o f (OT) implies
14 See also the classical formulations o f  methodological individualism by Hayek, Popper, Watkins and 
others in O’Neill (1973).
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that social facts must be instantiated by an individualistic mechanism, and today it is 
often either implicitly assumed (e.g., Elster 1989) or even explicitly stated (e.g., Cowen 
1998) that the individualistic mechanisms are to be defined in terms of individual ra­
tional choice and equilibrium, and accordingly Part II argues mainly against this inter­
pretation of the account.
In sum, the Individualistic Account is based on the anti-Durkheimian assump­
tion that since society consists o f interacting individuals, the fundamental level o f social 
theory is that o f individual agents who make choices from their individual perspectives. 
Hence this account is a methodologically individualistic account par excellence. Social 
facts as external facts are not sui generis.
The Wittgensteinian15 Account
Philosophers who think that participation in social practices is what makes the human 
form of life, including individual intentional agency, possible, take a substantial step 
away from the methodological individualism o f the Individualistic Account.16 For the 
Wittgensteinians social practices are conceptually prior to individual psychological 
facts, and hence external social facts are sui generis. Indeed, they think that social facts 
cannot be aggregates o f psychological facts, because it is social facts in the sense o f ob­
jective social practices that make meaningful individual thoughts and actions (including 
language), i.e., psychological facts, possible in the first place.
The idea is that just as pieces o f paper cannot be money merely in virtue o f their 
independent physical properties, but require social practices within which the pieces are 
accepted as media o f exchange (and thus as money), also a brain state or an expression 
cannot represent or refer to anything (i.e., be intentional, about something) in virtue of 
its independent properties. For the Wittgensteinians, meaning in the sense o f conceptual 
content presupposes that one participates in social practices that assign the statuses o f 
meaningfulness and contentfulness to one’s states and expressions.
In this manner, the Wittgensteinians think, thoughts and language really are 
meaningful (intentional, about something) only within social practices. This can been
151 have labelled this account “Wittgensteinian”, since most adherents o f  this position locate its founda­
tions in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy (especially Wittgenstein 1953). As with Durkheim, 1 remain un­
committed regarding exegetical issues.
16 Examples o f Wittgensteinian philosophers in this sense -  and whose discussions proceed in terms rele­
vant to the present Chapter -  include Barnes (1983, 1995, 2000), Bloor (1996, 1997), Brandom (1994, 
2000), Esfeld (1999, 2001), Haugeland (1990), Kusch (1999), McDowell (1998a), Pettit (1993), Williams 
(1999) and Winch (1958).
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seen as the very feature that distinguishes methodological holists from individualists 
(although below I argue that the Durkheimian Account introduces an alternative way o f 
rejecting individualism):
For the individualist, concepts are individually held, mental entities. But for the 
non-individualist, these are irreducibly social. Even if it is accepted by the indi­
vidualist that beliefs often involve social concepts, he cannot dispel the view that 
they exist only as internal states of individuals. The non-individualist contends 
that, whether or not they are attitudes o f individuals, these have a constitutive re­
lation with intrinsically social practices.
(Bhargava 1992, 12.)
The arguments of the Wittgensteinians are examined in detail in Part III. Here it suffices 
to understand that although the Wittgensteinians accept the classification o f facts as rep­
resented in 1.1.4, they also emphasise that when the focus is on the human sciences the 
crucial category is that o f external social facts, as opposed to the concentration on indi­
vidualistic psychological facts, which is essential for individualistic accounts such as 
the rational choice approach. The conceptual order is not captured by the common-sense 
view that independent natural facts give rise to objective psychological facts, which in 
turn generate external social facts. Rather, independent natural facts have evolved into 
external, co-operative social practices (ultimately, language) that form the bedrock of 
the human form o f life, and it is only in virtue o f these practices that objective psycho­
logical facts are possible.
Thus, the Wittgensteinian Account turns the relation between the social and the 
individual upside down when compared to the Individualistic Account, which starts 
with asocial individuals whose actions constitute the social. According to the individu­
alistic approach, individual actions are prior to social practices, for social practices are 
but aggregates o f individual actions. The Wittgensteinian Account, in contrast, sees so­
cial practices as conceptually prior to individual actions, for it is the existence o f social 
practices that constitutes the very possibility of individual actions. Thus, the Wittgen­
steinian position is a form o f methodological holism. However, just like the Individual­
istic Account, also the Wittgensteinian Account subscribes to (07).
The Durkheimian Account
Another way o f moving away from the methodological individualism o f the individual­
istic approach without rejecting the ontological thesis (07) is to concentrate on anti- 
individualistic collective action. The idea is that truly collective action, including collec­
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tive acceptance that constitutes social facts, is based on a mode of psychology and 
agency different from individual agency. Durkheim held notoriously that social facts are 
constituted by the activities o f a collective consciousness, and hence I have labelled the 
views subscribing to this understanding o f external social facts the Durkheimian Ac­
count. This view is based on an explicit rejection o f the summative view advocated by 
the Individualistic Account. As Durkheim puts it (to use emotions as an example o f col­
lective agency), “[a]n outburst of collective emotion in gathering does not merely ex­
press the sum total o f what individual feelings share in common, but is something o f  a 
very different ordern (Durkheim 1895/1982, 56; my italics).
This is o f course the very aspect o f Durkheim’s thought that has caused a lot of 
agitation among modem social theorists. Steven Lukes captures this problem well:
When writing o f social facts as ‘external to individuals’ he [Durkheim] usually 
meant ‘external to any given individual’, but often suggested (especially to criti­
cal readers) that he meant ‘external to all individuals in a given society or 
group’: hence, the often repeated charge against him that he ‘hypostasised’ or 
reified society, a charge which is by no means unfounded.
(Lukes 1982, 4.)
In my terminology, although Durkheim typically portrays the state of the collective con­
sciousness (which constitutes social facts) as an external fact, he sometimes describes it 
as an independent fact. However, I have already argued that Durkheim accepts onto­
logical individualism in the sense of (OJ).
Hence the way to understand the strong externality Lukes talks about is the col­
lective agency view sketched above, where the collective consciousness does not belong 
to a new holistic entity, but rather consists o f a psychology different in kind from the 
psychology associated with individual action. Individuals can act qua individuals, or 
qua group-members. For Durkheim, these modes o f agency are on a par; neither is more 
fundamental. Thus, pace the Individualistic Account, in Durkheim’s view social facts 
are not aggregates of individual-mode psychological facts. O f course, a modern theorist 
cannot be content with vague appeals to collective consciousnesses, and hence the chal­
lenge for modem Durkheimians is, as Lukes (1982) constantly emphasises, to provide a 
naturalistic explication o f the micro-foundations o f Durkheim’s concepts. In my view 
the theory o f collective we-mode intentionality delivers precisely such a naturalisation.
The Durkheimian picture can be seen either as a further development o f the 
Wittgensteinian view, or as an alternative to it. Philosophers who see it as a develop­
ment o f the Wittgensteinian position, include Barnes (2000) and, to some extent, Bloor 
(1996), Kusch (1999) and possibly Tuomela (especially 2002). The motivation for their
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Durkheimian position is that they want to resist the anti-naturalist conclusion o f some 
Wittgensteinians (notably McDowell (1998a), perhaps also Wittgenstein himself), ac­
cording to Which social practices that form the bedrock o f the human form o f life are so 
fundamental that we must accept them as primitive notions not to be analysed further. 
As the slogan goes, we should not even try to dig below the bedrock. The Durkheimian 
aspiration is that the theory of collective agency might offer the tool for such excava­
tions. This research programme is analysed in Part III.
However, some Durkheimians do not accept the Wittgensteinian version o f anti­
individualism. For these philosophers intentionality, including collective psychology 
resulting in collective agency, is a biologically primitive feature of the human brain and 
not something that is constituted by social practices. Gilbert’s (1989) theory o f social 
facts and collective intentionality is explicitly both Durkheimian and anti- 
Wittgensteinian. Similarly, Searle holds that both the individual and collective mode o f 
psychology and action are aspects of human biology (Bloor 1996 and Haugeland 1990 
criticise perceptively this aspect o f Searle’s view in a context relevant for the present 
discussion). Tuomela (especially 2002) must be placed somewhere in between, since he 
argues that the Wittgensteinian view is a contingent truth about the actual world, but not 
a conceptually necessary condition for all possible meaningful action (including con­
tentful thought), as the mentioned Wittgensteinians seem to think. According to 
Tuomela (and, e.g., Pettit 1993), in some possible worlds the view o f Gilbert and Searle 
is true.
Despite the fundamental disagreement concerning the ultimate sources o f inten­
tionality (social or innate), in aspects relevant to the present task o f explicating the 
status of social facts the non-Wittgensteinian version is remarkably similar to the Witt­
gensteinian version o f the Durkheimian Account. The connecting idea is that the con­
struction and maintenance o f sufficiently stable social facts presuppose a stronger con­
ception of sociality than the summative notion of the Individualistic Account o f strate­
gic interaction of asocial individuals (cf. Barnes 2001, 23). The Durkheimians think that 
social action worthy o f the name must be based on essentially social psychology. Durk­
heim’s claim that there are collective attitudes which are not sums o f individual atti­
tudes but “something of a very different order” can, the contemporary Durkheimians 
think, be acknowledged by admitting that there are two sui generis modes o f human 
psychology and action. Sometimes we act essentially qua autonomous individual 
agents, i.e., in the individual mode (or the I-mode), and sometimes we act essentially
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qua group members, i.e., in the we-mode (these notions are discussed at length in 1.2 
and Part II).
Thus, all the Durkheimians are committed to a fourth category of facts. This is 
the category o f full-blown social facts and it can be defined as follows:
A fact is a social fact iff it is constituted by collective acceptance based on collective 
we-mode intentionality, psychology and action (or collective agency).
All social facts are external facts, but all external facts are not social facts (in particular, 
the external facts captured by the Individualistic Account cannot be social facts in this 
sense). Social facts are also external to any individual perspective, since individual­
mode perspectives do not even participate in their construction and reproduction, for the 
facts are based on collective we-mode agency. Thus the Durkheimians avoid the prob­
lem mentioned in the end of Section 1.1.4.
Where the Wittgensteinian and anti-Wittgensteinian versions o f the Durk­
heimian Account differ from each other is in the way they understand the conceptual 
order o f facts of different kind. The Wittgensteinians think that there are natural (i) in­
dependent facts that give rise to non-intentional collective agency. Collective agency, in 
turn, constitutes (ii) social facts (essentially, social practices). According to the Witt­
gensteinians, all this can be explained within the framework of evolutionary biology and 
other causal explanations of the natural sciences. The social practices, then, constitute 
the normative framework that makes psychological (iii) objective facts possible, open­
ing thus the door for normative human sciences that aim to understand human action. 
The psychological facts in place, we can finally have (iv) external facts in the sense the 
Individualistic approach sees them, i.e., as aggregates of objective, interlocking psycho­
logical facts.
The anti-Wittgensteinian view does not imply a similar distinction between the 
natural and the human sciences, or between causal explanation and normative under­
standing. However, the problem also the anti-Wittgensteinian Durkheimians see in most 
attempts for naturalistic explanations of the social world is the unquestioned commit­
ment to methodological individualism in the sense o f building all social notions on es­
sentially asocial individual agency. The anti-Wittgensteinians hold that the ontologi­
cally fundamental level is that o f natural (i) independent facts. But these natural facts 
are seen to have evolved to give rise to two modes o f intentional agency that are irre­
ducible to one another: collective we-mode agency and individual-mode agency. These
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modes are both biologically primitive features o f individual agents, and as such (ii) ob­
jective facts. Action based on we-mode intentionality constitutes truly (iiia) social facts 
whereas individual-mode actions constitute (iiib) external facts in the sense of the Indi­
vidualistic Account.
1.1.6 CONCLUSION
The distinctions made in this chapter help me to define more clearly what I am after in 
this dissertation. First, we need an account o f how objective and external social entities 
and facts (non-eliminativism) are possible in our natural world (the acceptance o f (OI)); 
or, in other words, how external and objective social reality is constructed out of natu­
ralistic building blocks. In particular, we need to examine the fine structure o f social and 
institutional facts as well as social practices and entities to find out whether the Indi­
vidualistic, the Wittgensteinian or the Durkheimian Account offers the right way to un­
derstand the nature o f external, social facts.
In the next Chapter I begin this task by examining the central arguments o f the 
locus classicus of contemporary social ontology, namely Searle (1995). In short, Searle 
thinks that ontologically speaking social facts and entities boil down to collectively up­
held patterns of behaviour. Thus, Searle’s account remains faithful to the naturalistic 
principle (OI). However, Searle thinks that to secure epistemic objectivity we have to 
take very seriously the idea that social practices are maintained collectively. This 
amounts to favouring the Durkheimian reading of social facts. Chapter 1.2, then, analy­
ses the Searlean naturalisation of Durkheim’s collective consciousness, namely the the­
ory o f collective we-intentionality.17 I connect Searle’s line o f thought to the argumen­
tation of the other two main theorists o f collective intentionality, Margaret Gilbert and 
Raimo Tuomela, and seek to develop a view that solves the problems inherent in the 
accounts o f Gilbert, Searle and Tuomela while nonetheless preserving the strengths of 
each account.
Although Chapter 1.2 captures, I think, the intuitive plausibility o f  the collective 
intentionality theory (and thus the contemporary, naturalised version o f Durkheim’s 
methodological holism), it does not amount to a general argument establishing the real­
171 should add that Searle is not committed to the idea that the theory o f  collective intentionality would be 
in any sense Durkheimian or connected to the idea o f  a collective consciousness -  indeed he categorically 
denies such connections (Searle 2006). However, I use the label to highlight a certain view o f social ac­
tion, not to suggest that the views o f Durkheim and Searle are similar tout court (cf. Gross 2006 & Lukes 
2007).
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ity o f collective intentionality. That task is left for Part II, which offers a detailed ex­
amination o f the plausibility of the theory o f collective intentionality.
Finally, both this Part and Part II, although defending Durkheimianism, remain 
neutral as to whether we should favour the Wittgensteinian (towards which Tuomela 
may be leaning) or anti-Wittgensteinian (Gilbert and Searle) reading o f the Durk­
heimian position. The debate concerning Wittgensteinianism has huge consequences for 
the philosophy o f mind, theory o f meaning and the philosophy of the social sciences 
(especially the explanation versus understanding debate), and I do not wish to bind the 
arguments o f Part I and II to any specific view on these issues. Part III, then, tackles the 
question o f Wittgensteinianism and explicates its consequences. Accordingly, my de­
fence o f the theory o f collective intentionality and, thus, naturalised methodological ho­
lism, is not complete until the end of Part III. However, arguments in earlier Parts 
should be important on their own right, i.e., relevant also for those who fail to be im­
pressed by my treatment o f Wittgensteinianism in Part III.
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CHAPTER 1.2:
COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY
AS THE DRIVING FORCE OF SOCIAL REALITY
1.2.1 SEARLE’S BUILDING BLOCKS OF SOCIAL REALITY
According to Searle (1995), the fundamental building blocks of social reality are (i) the 
assignment o f function, (ii) collective intentionality and (iii) constitutive rules. This 
Section discusses (i) and (iii), whereas (ii), collective intentionality, the heart o f Durk- 
heimianism in my sense, is analysed in the rest o f this chapter by means o f a critical ex- 
amonation of the definitions o f the main collective intentionality theorists. As with the 
objectivity of social facts, also here my attitude towards Searle’s views is somewhat 
ambivalent. Although I think that Searle’s core intuitions are again more or less correct, 
I will nonetheless move quite quickly beyond his views.
Searle (1995, 9) points out that in addition to its intrinsic features, the world ex­
hibits also features that are somehow relative to the intentionality of observers, users 
and other intentional, conscious agents. In my terminology, observer-relative features 
do not exist independently. Thus, the generation o f observer-relative features does not 
add any new independent objects to the world, although it may add external and objec­
tive facts to the world. Searle’s paradigmatic examples o f observer-relative entities in­
clude objects such as screwdrivers and paperweights. Although both objects are no 
doubt independently existing material objects, their identities qua screwdrivers and pa­
perweights are observer-relative non-independent facts. In Searle’s view this is the first 
fundamental building block of social reality: as intentional agents humans assign func­
tions to independently existing objects and to independent facts. Functions in Searle’s 
sense are never intrinsic features o f the world but are always observer-relative, assigned 
by intentional agents.
This definition allows Searle to be very explicit about when we are describing 
intrinsic features o f the world and when we are describing observer-relative functions. 
For example, although the causal processes involved in the circulatory systems o f hu­
mans are of course intrinsic features o f the world, when we assert that the function o f 
the heart is to pump blood, “we are doing something more than recording these intrinsic 
facts. We are situating these facts relative to a system of values that we hold.” (Searle 
1995, 14-15.) So the discovery o f a “natural” function, such as the function o f the heart, 
does not involve a discovery o f any independent facts beyond the facts about causal
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processes that are not functional as such. Functions are essentially normative and teleo- 
logical, and one o f the main achievements o f modem natural science has been to clear 
away such notions. Thus, functional language amounts in Searle’s view only to integrat­
ing non-normative causal facts into our value systems: “As far as nature is concerned 
intrinsically, there are no functional facts beyond causal facts” (Searle 1995, 16). To 
think otherwise amounts to nothing less than to the naturalistic fallacy o f seeing certain 
natural processes as intrinsically normative.
Biologists and philosophers o f biology by and large agree with Searle’s point. 
Elliott Sober (1993, 82), for instance, observes that although biologists disagree on 
whether we should assign adaptive functions on the basis o f what we know about the 
causal history of a trait or about its role in current ecological environment, biologists 
agree that in the world there are only non-normative causal processes. The normative 
talk in terms of functions is merely a convenient way for us to talk about the world. 
Consequently, the term function “does not occur ineliminably in any [biological] the­
ory” although we use it “to talk about theories” (Sober 1993, 83). Sterelny and Griffiths 
(1999, 224) express this by saying that biology employs exclusively a “causal role con­
ception o f function”.
A further distinction Searle draws is between agentive and non-agentive func­
tions. Searle calls a function agentive if it consists o f a fact that we as agents put (inten­
tionally) an object to use, such as in the case o f using a stone as a paperweight. Non- 
agentive functions are, then, assigned to natural objects and causal processes as part o f a 
theoretical account of the phenomenon in question, such as in the case o f saying that the 
function o f the heart is to pump blood. The distinction between agentive and non- 
agentive functions, as Searle (1995, 20-21) admits, is not a clear-cut dichotomy. How­
ever, the distinction emphasises aptly that some functions are, so to speak, more de­
pendent on continuous human activity than others. Agentive functions typically require 
that agents assigning the function continue to use the object in question in that function. 
A stone is a paperweight only insofar as it is used as one, whereas hearts keep pumping 
blood regardless o f whether we describe that as their function or not.
Finally, from the point o f view o f social ontology perhaps the most interesting 
subclass is formed by those agentive functions, the functional component o f  which is 
not based on the purely causal capacities o f the object to which the function is assigned. 
In the case of such functions it is quite natural to talk about the meaning or status as­
signed to the object in question. The fact that certain pieces o f paper function as money, 
that we can use them in buying and selling etc., is not based on the causal capacities o f
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those pieces in the same way as our ability to use stones as paperweights is due to the 
causal properties o f stones. The clearest example o f such an agentive status function 
might be the linguistic meaning assigned to certain marks on paper.
The possibility o f assigning agentive status functions is clearly not enough to 
explain the ontology o f money: even if  I sincerely intend to treat randomly chosen 
pieces o f paper as money -  an objective fact about me - 1 cannot expect others to accept 
them as money. The status o f money is a fact independent of my personal intentions; it 
obtains externally to me. Yet the status does not depend in any law-like way on the 
physical properties o f the things to which the status is assigned either. The independent 
properties of the pieces o f paper in question are largely irrelevant here; what matters is 
that the pieces are collectively accepted as money. In terms o f Chapter 1.1, the fact that 
certain pieces o f paper are money is an external fact that depends, not on any individual 
attitude as such, but on collective acceptance. Before examining the nature o f such ac­
ceptance, let us first enrich the constructivist toolbox by redescribing some agentive 
status functions in terms o f rules of acceptable behaviour.
For example, when we agree to treat certain pieces of paper as money the struc­
ture o f the assignment o f the function o f money to the pieces can be expressed, accord­
ing to Searle (1995, 28), by the following formula:
“X counts as Y” or “X counts as Y in context C”.
Searle’s example is that “Bills issued by the Bureau o f Engraving and Printing (X) 
count as money (Y) in the United States (C)” (Searle 1995, 28). Since this formula is 
meant to capture a fundamental building block o f social reality, the obvious problem 
here is that the formula seems to commit us to the existence o f the very social institution 
the construction o f which we are trying to analyse. In order for anything to be able to 
count as Y, it is obvious that Y, or at least the concept o f Y, must already be defined sat­
isfactorily.
Thus, if this is the final word Searle is able to say on this matter, we must con­
clude that Searle’s formula can at best explicate the way in which pre-existing social 
institutions get new instances or, in other words, how social reality and social institu­
tions are reproduced and, perhaps, transformed. But then the theory could not be an ac­
count o f how social reality is ultimately constructed. In order for some pieces o f paper 
to count as money we must already understand, prior to assigning the function o f
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money to the pieces, what it is to be money, indeed what money as a social institution 
is.
Fortunately, Searle has a solution to this problem o f circularity. Let us look in 
more detail at the structure of the new status Y that Searle’s formula assigns to the X- 
element. To say that certain pieces o f paper count as money amounts, according to 
Searle, actually to saying simply that the person in possession o f those pieces has cer­
tain conventional rights and duties, or deontic powers, in certain situations qua the pos­
sessor of those pieces of paper. Thus, Searle argues, the “primitive structure” o f the so­
cial status Y in the formula “X counts as Y in C” is actually that the person S in the situa­
tion C is allowed (or required) to perform certain actions -  to use Searle’s second for­
mula, “S is enabled(S does A)” (Searle 1995, 104). Or to put it in terms o f Searle’s fa­
vourite example, to say that “X, this piece o f paper, counts as Y, a five dollar bill,” is in 
fact just another way of expressing the underlying normative rule: “S, the bearer o f  X, is 
enabled (S buys with X up to the value of five dollars)” (Searle 1995, 105).
Searle’s example is not the clearest possible, since “buying” and “the value o f 
five dollars” are obviously also social notions. But that just points to another typical fea­
ture of social reality, namely that most social facts are closely connected to other social 
facts. This, however, does not mean that “buying” and “the value o f five dollars” cannot 
be given analyses similar to Searle’s original example. Thus, X, S’s behaviour, counts as 
Y, buying goods, in a shop C insofar as S behaves according to the rules governing trad­
ing, and similarly for “shop”, “trading” and so on. In Searle’s view the content o f social 
facts -  and social reality in general -  boils down to rule-governed behaviour. This, I 
think, is the core o f Searle’s answer to the form of circularity that appears to threaten 
the idea of using assignments o f functions as a fundamental building block o f social re­
ality.18
Actually, in order to secure the non-circularity of his account Searle needs to 
introduce one more distinction, the one between regulative rules and constitutive rules. 
Regulative rules, as the name suggests, regulate already existing activity. Searle’s ex­
ample of a regulative rule is the rule “drive on the right-hand side of the road” (Searle 
1995, 27). This rule regulates driving, but driving can exist prior to and independently 
o f the existence o f the rule: an activity can count as driving even if it violates that rule. 
The rule “drive on the right-hand side o f the road” does not constitute the possibility o f
18 Note that this very same idea answers also another criticism sometimes directed against Searle (e.g., 
Smith 2003 & Thomasson 2003), namely that in certain cases there seem to be no physical Xs on which 
the social status Y could be imposed, such as in the case o f  the social status o f  a corporation. Since the 
content o f  the social facts in any case ultimately boils down to rules governing the appropriate behaviour 
o f  people, this is not a problem for Searle’s theory (cf. Searle 2007b).
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driving but merely regulates it -  one may even argue that regulative rules presuppose 
the prior existence o f the activity they are regulating.
Constitutive rules are essentially different. These rules constitute the very possi­
bility o f certain activities. Let us look at Searle’s example:
[T]he rules o f chess do not regulate an antecedently existing activity. It is not the 
case that there were a lot o f people pushing bits of wood around on boards, and 
in order to prevent them from bumping into each other all the time and creating 
traffic jams, we had to regulate the activity. Rather, the rules o f chess create the 
very possibility of playing chess. The rules are constitutive of chess in the sense 
that playing chess is constituted in part by acting in accord with the rules. If  you 
don’t follow at least a large subset o f the rules, you are not playing chess.
(Searle 1995,27-28.)
The formula “X  counts as F ’ is meant to express a constitutive rule. Searle’s suggestion 
that the content of the formula comes down to acceptable patterns o f behaviour by de­
fining the proper way to act in certain situations highlights the constitutive nature o f the 
formula. In this manner the rule in Searle’s formula (or, as in the case o f chess, the sys­
tem o f rules collectively) is indeed constitutive. Constitutive rules create new types o f 
action, such as playing chess. Thus, I conclude that Searle’s theory succeeds in avoiding 
this form of circularity by appealing to constitutive rules.19
So far I have discussed functions and the corresponding constitutive rules neu­
trally relative to their status as facts. But surely the existence of such rules is not an in­
dependent fact in the terminology o f Chapter 1.1. As clearly they are objective or exter­
nal vis-a-vis individual humans; I cannot just decide what are the rules constituting, for 
example, money. So the question is, where does the externality and objectivity come 
from? We have seen that Durkheim appealed to a collective consciousness that fixes 
social facts. In a sense, Searle’s view is very similar. Social reality is based on collective 
acceptance: “There is exactly one primitive logical operation by which institutional re­
ality is created and constituted. It has this form:
We collectively accept, acknowledge, recognize, go along with, etc., that (S has power 
(S does A)).” (Searle 1995, 111.)
19 Anthony Giddens (1984) argues that Searle’s dichotomy between constitutive and regulative rules is 
misleading, since many, if  not all, rules have both constitutive and regulative elements. For example, the 
seemingly purely constitutive rules o f  chess also regulate the behaviour o f chess-players. Similarly, a 
seemingly purely regulative rule that all workers o f  a factory must clock in at 8.00 a.m., even if  it does 
not constitute work as an institution, nevertheless “enters into the definition” “o f a concept like ‘industrial 
bureaucracy”’ (Giddens 1984, 20) and is constitutive o f  that social phenomenon. However, within 
Searle’s framework one may hold that the two aspects are often present in one rule and the clear-cut di­
chotomy is just a theoretical tool for highlighting the constitutive aspect that plays a crucial role in 
Searle’s theory.
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In Searle’s view collective acceptance and other collective attitudes are based on collec­
tive intentionality qualitatively different from individual-mode intentionality. Moreover, 
Searle’s ontological naturalism implies that mere acceptance, collective or individual, 
cannot bring into existence new independent causal factors, for that would be a form of 
ontological idealism. Thus, in Searle’s view social facts are essentially normative prac­
tices that ontologically speaking boil down to collectively accepted norms o f appropri­
ate behaviour.
By integrating the notion of collective intentionality and collective assignment 
o f functions into Searle’s general framework, we get the following route from non- 
normative physical facts to normative social facts (cf. Figure 5.1 on p. 121 o f Searle 
1995). First, there are observer-independent physical facts, such as the fact that there is 
snow on Mt. Everest. Some facts, however, are observer-relative and thus non- 
independent, such as the fact that I am in pain. Further, some observer-relative facts are 
unlike the fact about my pain in the sense that they involve intentional, contentful men­
tal states, such as my desire to see IFK Helsinki to win the Finnish Hockey League. 
Next, some of such intentional facts are social in the sense that they involve collective 
intentionality,20 such as our intention to carry a table upstairs. Furthermore, certain so­
cial, intentional facts involve the assignment o f an agentive function, such as the fact 
that we use this stone as a paperweight.
Finally, some o f such collectively assigned agentive functions are not based on 
the causal capacities o f the object the function is assigned to. Rather, sometimes we col­
lectively assign status functions, such as that these pieces of paper are — or count as -  
money. And, as we saw, the monetary status is analysed in terms of norms o f acceptable 
and required actions. Thus, in Searle’s system social facts proper -  collectively assigned 
status functions -  are, ontologically speaking, collectively created, maintained and re­
produced norms o f action.
1.2.2 SEARLE ON COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY
A central aspect o f Searle’s theory of the epistemic objectivity o f social facts is the 
claim that sometimes we assign functions collectively, i.e., together in the strongest 
sense o f the word. This kind o f assignment is, according to Searle, based on collective
20 This step, namely the Durkheimian requirement that the sociality involved must be something stronger 
than the sum o f individual intentions, is what ultimately separates Searle’s account from methodological 
individualism.
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intentionality. Examples o f collective intentionality are situations “where I  am doing 
something only as part o f our doing something” (Searle 1995, 23). Collective intention­
ality is for Searle a mode o f intentionality qualitatively different from normal individual 
intentionality. This can be seen in the fact that in collective action collective intentional­
ity appears to be conceptually and factually prior to individual intentionality, and hence, 
ultimately, Searle’s account is a Durkheimian -  and not Individualistic -  Account in the 
sense of 1.1.5.
In collective action “the individual intentionality that each person has is derived 
from  the collective intentionality that they [in ideal cases] share” (Searle 1995, 25). If I 
adopt collective we-mode intentionality, I figure out what is our goal in the situation at 
hand and what is our best means for achieving that end, and then form a we-intention o f 
the form uWe will do X \  Only when I have reached this stage I derive my individual­
mode intention from the we-intention. Hence my individual-mode intention to do Y is 
subordinate to the we-intention in the sense that I first figure out that we should do X, 
and only then that in order for us to do X, I should do Y as my part of X , and hence I set 
out to do Y. In sum, collective intentionality is not in Searle’s picture reducible to indi­
vidual intentionality. Collective intentionality is sui generis.
Unfortunately, Searle does not analyse his notion o f collective we-mode inten­
tionality much further. He merely emphasises that we should not think that collective 
intentionality commits us to the existence o f “some Hegelian world spirit, a collective 
consciousness, or something equally implausible” (Searle 1995, 25). Searle makes it
71very clear that in his view individuals are all the agents there are. He thinks that some­
times the psychology and action of individuals is irreducibly in the we-mode, i.e., based 
on collective intentionality in the sense that the actions and attitudes are appropriately 
conceptualised only such that the collective “we” is the formal subject of the attitudes 
and actions.
For Searle, collective intentionality is perhaps the most fundamental building 
block o f social reality -  Searle even goes so far as to stipulate that “social fact” refers to 
any fact involving collective intentionality (Searle 1995, 26). Although I think that 
Searle’s account o f collective intentionality is basically correct, I also think that we 
ought to say more explicitly how we understand collective intentionality to work. In a 
sense, Searle’s account does not add anything more to Durkheim’s puzzling statements
21 In fact, Searle says that all intentionality must be in the heads o f  individuals. However, as I have ex­
plained, I want this and the next Part to be neutral regarding Wittgensteinianism or indeed any other spe­
cific theory in the philosophy o f mind, and thus I prefer my formulation which leaves room for external- 
ism that says that no intentionality -  be it individual or collective -  is strictly speaking in the heads o f  
individuals.
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about collective consciousness than the naturalistic conviction that, whatever collective 
intentionality amounts to, it involves only individuals. I believe that by analysing Mar­
garet Gilbert’s and Raimo Tuomela’s work on this topic we can illuminate the fine 
structure o f collective intentional ity and, thereby, the Durkheimian rejection o f meth­
odological individualism.
1.2.3 GILBERT ON COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY22
The animating idea in Margaret Gilbert’s work on collective intentional ity is her claim 
that a precondition of all social facts proper is the ability to create a collective group 
will out of individual wills. Gilbert’s main thesis is that since naturalism compels us to 
accept (01), the ultimate subject matter o f social science cannot be social entities as in­
dependently existing objects, but social action that constitutes social facts. Furthermore, 
for action to be truly social or collective, it must in her view be based on collective atti-
O'Xtudes attributable to a social group. However, as we shall see, collective intentional ity 
in Gilbert’s group-centred sense presupposes collective intentionality in the we-mode 
sense.
Gilbert subscribes to the view that our account of collective intentionality must 
not commit us to the existence o f group minds or anything ontologically equally sus­
pect. Gilbert hypothesises that the acceptance o f this naturalistic principle is the main 
reason why many philosophers and sociologists have a tendency to be sceptical about 
the very possibility o f collective intentionality. Gilbert thinks that these anti-collectivists 
accept the thesis o f psychologism about intentionality. According to this thesis, “in or­
der for the English predicate \  . .  believes’ [or ‘... intends’] to apply to something, that 
thing would have to have a mind” (Gilbert 1989, 238).
22 In what follows I concentrate largely on Gilbert (1989), for I am interested in the very foundations o f  
her views and her later works (in particular 1996, 2000 & 2006) build mainly on the theory o f 1989 in 
discussing moral and political philosophy and other issues I cannot include in this study. Moreover, Gil­
bert’s (e.g., 2002, see also Hakli 2006 for a review) interests have, in line with Velleman’s (1997) criti­
cism, turned more and more to the problem o f how several individuals can share the same intentional atti­
tude so that we can talk literally about the group’s attitude. This is very different from the aims o f  Searle 
and Tuomela, who are mainly analysing the possibility o f assigning we-mode attitudes to individuals and 
deny the literal attribution o f attitudes to groups. In a sense this difference need not be terribly deep, for -  
as I explain below -  a widespread we-mode attitude can be said to be the we-group’s attitude (see Tollef- 
sen (2004) for further discussion). Moreover, below I argue that Gilbert would do better by explicitly 
building on Searle and Tuomela here. This is not to say that securing that the individuals indeed share the 
same intention (cf. Velleman 1997) is not a difficult problem (and most certainly it is an important prob­
lem for applications o f the collective intentionality theory, e.g., when analysing collective responsibility), 
but simply that this dissertation is not the place to study that problem (see, for example, Pettit 2003 and 
Pettit & Schweikard 2006 that concentrate largely on this issue).
23 Gilbert discusses mainly specific collective attitudes, but her discussion generalises mutatis mutandis to 
intentionality in general.
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The thesis o f psychologism about intentionality is then combined with the natu­
ralistic common-sense thesis of anti-psychologism about social groups, which states 
that groups do not have minds o f their own (cf., however, the provocatively-titled Pettit 
2003). Hence, it is thought, if  collective intentionality is to be a meaningful concept at 
all, it must come down to the sum of individual intentions o f a set o f people, in which 
case it is actually not a sui generis phenomenon. Gilbert calls this kind o f view the 
summative account o f collective intentionality, o f which the paradigmatic example is 
Quinton (1975-76). The Individualistic Account of 1.1.5 would have no quarrel with this 
kind o f collective intentionality. Gilbert’s goal is to create a non-summative but onto- 
logically naturalistic theory of collective intentionality that goes beyond the Individual­
istic Account. In what follows I analyse her argumentation and argue that although Gil­
bert is successful in highlighting many important aspects o f collective intentionality, in 
the end her theory remains somewhat unsatisfactory, because in my view the only real 
option between individualistic, summative accounts and rejections o f (07) is the we- 
mode account of collective intentionality, and Gilbert is reluctant to build explicitly on 
it.
Gilbert motivates her discussion by pointing out that the summative account 
hardly captures the collectivity we want from a theory o f collective intentionality. Even 
if all -  or most of -  the brown-haired people in London happen to have the attitude X, 
this is obviously insufficient to create a collective attitude X  in any interesting sense. 
Gilbert emphasises that it will not help the summative account to add the requirement 
that the members o f the set in question must know that each member has this intention. 
Most normal adults will know if they are brown-haired persons living in London, and 
although brown-hairedness supposedly does not carry with it any special tendencies or 
attitudes, it is reasonable to assume that as normal adult humans the brown-haired Lon­
doners will have some typical intentional attitudes in common (at least in the sense o f 
conditional or situation-relative dispositions -  if it makes the case for summative ac­
count stronger, we may even suppose that these attitudes are related to the fact that they 
have brown hair). Given all this, the members of the set will also know that each mem­
ber o f the set of brown-haired Londoners has the attitude X. Still, argues Gilbert (1989, 
271), our intuitions about social action tell us that we should not say that the brown­
haired Londoners have a collective attitude X. To share the same attitude and know this 
about each other does not suffice for having the attitude collectively and together (cf. 
Searle 1990).
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The primary problem with the example presented above appears to be that the 
set o f brown-haired Londoners is not a proper social group in the sense o f having any 
sort o f social significance. The members o f the set are defined to belong to the same set 
by introducing a completely random criterion they happen to satisfy. Thus, the set is a 
set only relative to the arbitrary classification system, which, moreover, is not based on 
the social behaviour (or something similar) o f the members and, hence, the set does not 
correspond to any social group. Intuitively it seems to be essential that a collective atti­
tude is such that it is associated with a social group.
However, I am examining the claim that collective intentionality is a fundamen­
tal building block o f social reality and of social facts -  including the fact that some in­
dividuals form a social group. Hence, to say, for example, that a collective intention to 
d o X is  the sum of the individual intentions o f the members o f a social group G to do X  
would be circular. Similarly, we saw above that Gilbert thinks that collective action 
constituting social facts must be based on collective intentions, and for collective inten­
tions to be truly collective they must be held by social groups. So here is the problem: 
Either collective intentionality presupposes some social facts (about social groups), in 
which case collective intentionality cannot be a fundamental building block o f social 
facts, or collective intentionality is not a real phenomenon, in which case it by definition 
cannot be a fundamental building block of social facts.24 This is one of the main reasons 
why, for example, David-Hillel Ruben (1985) thinks that all explications o f social real­
ity in the spirit of (OI) fail and we must accept social entities as ontologically primitive.
In order to avoid this dilemma, Gilbert thinks that all summative accounts o f 
collective intentionality must be rejected, for to make the sum of individual attitudes 
socially significant seems to require a social criterion for picking out the relevant aggre­
gations. Thus, we need an account o f a process which is simultaneously an account o f 
the construction o f a social group and an account of forming a collective attitude. The 
central notion here is that o f collective action (Gilbert 1996, 178) based on collective 
intentionality: a set o f people will form a social group capable of collective action if and 
only if they are able to construct a collective intention to perform a collective action.25 
The notions o f a social group and forming a collective attitude belong together.
24 I should emphasise that the looming circularity is a problem also for Searle, for in his view “collective 
intentionality seems to presuppose some level o f  sense o f  community before it can ever function” (Searle 
1990,413). Searle, however, does not address the circularity problem in satisfactory detail -  and thus, for 
example, Jennifer Hornsby (1997, 431) sees it as a major problem for Searle’s theory.
25 In fact, it seems that forming any (non-summative) collective attitude suffices for construction o f a so­
cial group. For example, agents who believe collectively that P  form a social group in the sense a set o f  
individuals who all happen to believe individually that P  does not.
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Gilbert’s problem is how a number o f individuals can join together to construct a 
unit that is capable o f constructing a collective attitude, constituting thereby a social 
group -  or, in other words, how a set o f individuals can form a plural subject o f  an atti­
tude or action, since “a set o f people constitute a social group if and only if they consti­
tute a plural subject” (Gilbert 1989, 204). What she needs is a non-summative theory o f 
social action that explains what it is for two or more agents to act together in the strong 
sense of forming a plural subject, to which the authorship o f actions may correctly be 
ascribed.
Gilbert’s point of departure is Georg Simmel’s view, according to which the 
unity required for social action is constituted by the agents being conscious that they 
constitute a unity (Simmel 1908/1971, 7). Again, this sounds rather circular -  the exis-
96tence o f a group is a precondition for anyone to know that the group exist. However, 
Gilbert emphasises that the claim is not that “a social group is wholly constituted by 
people knowing that they form a social group with certain others” (Gilbert 1989, 147). 
Instead, Gilbert suggests the following statement -  which she calls the Simmelian 
schema — to be the correct reading o f Simmel’s view: “a social group’s existence is ba­
sically a matter o f the members o f a set o f people being conscious that they are linked 
by a certain special tie” (Gilbert 1989, 148-149). Being conscious of the “special tie” is 
the internal criterion a set o f people must satisfy in order to form a plural subject and to 
act together in the strong sense Gilbert is after.
Gilbert’s first, rather obviously unsatisfactory hypothesis for an analysis o f act-
97ing together -  and the special tie -  is the following:
(HI) Agents Aj,...Xn  in situation S satisfy the internal criteria for doingX together in 
the strong sense if and only if each o f A],...Xn  is intending to do .Yin the situa­
tion S.
26 This problem is the core o f Ruben’s (1985) rejection o f  (01). Ruben argues that the attitudes o f  mem­
bers o f  a social group cannot constitute the group, since plausible candidates for such propositional atti­
tudes are, according to him, always about the group, and hence all such accounts are bound to be circular. 
I think Ruben is partly correct: if  we are to claim that the attitudes o f individuals constitute social institu­
tions, then the attitudes must be about something else than the institution in question. As in 1.2.1, also 
here I argue that ultimately the attitudes are about acceptable and required patterns o f behaviour, not 
about institutions as such. This is a possibility Ruben does not discuss.
27 In what follows the hypotheses (HI), (H2), (H3) and (H4) are my reconstructions and explications o f  
Gilbert’s discussions about the conditions o f “sharing in action” and the criteria for the pronoun “we” to 
be used properly to refer to a we-group, the archetype o f  a plural subject (Gilbert 1989, 154-203). Since I 
am here primarily interested in the problem o f collective intentionality, I discuss exclusively what might 
be called the “internal criteria” o f  action, i.e., the relevant intentions and beliefs. However, satisfying the 
internal criteria may not suffice for collective action, which often involves also external components such 
as observable behaviour.
52
(HI) requires only that two or more agents are engaged in the same activity in the same 
time and place, and this is clearly insufficient for acting together in the strong sense. 
Anyone who has ever suffered a trip in an overcrowded London underground train dur­
ing the rush hour can testify that the passengers, who are all travelling situated far too 
close to one another, are nonetheless not travelling together in the sense o f forming a 
social group o f any sort. They are all preoccupied with their own personal projects that 
just happen to share the feature of involving an underground ride at that particular time. 
In order for agents to be doing X  together they need to have as their goal that they do X  
together.
This suggestion can be formulated as the following hypothesis:
(H2) Agents satisfy the internal criteria for acting together in the strong
sense if and only if each o f A\,...yAn is willing to share in action (or a range o f 
actions) with A\,...Xn  in circumstances o f the type at hand.
Note that this definition is “objective” in the sense that it does not require that the 
agents know or even believe anything about the views o f the others. Interestingly, this 
objectivity also means that (H2) in fact fails to capture the sufficient criteria for collec­
tive action in the strong sense we are aiming to analyse. Gilbert’s example o f  this is a 
case of two persons, both o f whom hope and intend to travel together, but who are for 
some reason too shy to communicate this desire to the other (Gilbert 1989, 157-158). 
This lack of communication leads them to fail to travel together in the strong sense, 
since although they satisfy (H2), they do not explicitly share the goal o f travelling to­
gether. However, in my view the main problem here is not the lack o f communication, 
but rather that although the goals the persons have are directed towards the other and 
their mutual co-operation, the goals are, just as in the first case, still nevertheless per­
sonal goals in the sense that they are held individually by disparate agents.
As Gilbert (1989, 160-161) emphasises, the crucial point is not the characterisa­
tion of the goal, but rather whose goal it is.28 If the goal is held by an individual agent, it 
motivates individual action. But if the goal is held by a collective, it can be the goal o f 
collective action, pursued together by acting together. Recall, however, that we cannot
28 This distinction between the directedness and content o f  goals and attitudes on the one hand and the 
agent to which the goal or attitude is ascribed on the other plays a crucial role in the main argument o f  
Part II, and thus it is important to be clear o f  the distinction already in the present context. However, 
where I wish to account for this distinction ultimately in terms o f  distinction between the we-mode and 
the I-mode applied to the attitudes o f the relevant individuals, Gilbert (e.g., 2002) often talks in terms o f  
the the group really having the attitude.
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appeal to a pre-existing social group here. Rather, the task is to explain the construction 
o f a social group in virtue o f a set of agents satisfying the criteria for acting together. In 
Gilbert’s view this requires that we include a condition concerning knowledge about the 
views o f the others to the hypothesis. Let us next look at the following hypothesis (H3):
(H3) Agents A\,...^4n satisfy the internal criteria for acting together in the strong
sense if and only if
(i) each o f A \,...yAn is willing to share in action (or a range o f actions) with
A \,...iAn in circumstances of the type at issue
(ii) each of A i,...y4n knows that (i).
Moreover, in order to really share in action, the clause (i) in (H3) should be common 
knowledge within the relevant set o f agents A\,...^4n. Hence, we need to add a clause 
(iii):
(iii) each of A\,...^An knows that (ii), and so on with higher-order knowledge as far as 
one cares to go (Gilbert 1989, 161 ff.).
However, Gilbert does not believe that a hypothesis such as (H3), even when 
strengthened with the clause (iii), can be an adequate analysis o f the internal criteria for 
collective action. The problem is that the agents are still acting individually, performing 
their own tasks that may be synchronised and other-regarding, and the fact about this is 
common knowledge, but the tasks and goals -  indeed the intentions -  are, nevertheless, 
still personal tasks, goals and intentions o f individual agents. The situation captured by
(i)-(iii) o f (H3) does not give rise to normative attitudes that characterise collective in­
tentionality and collective action in the sense o f acting together (Gilbert 1989, 162) -  
recall also Searle’s view that ontologically speaking social facts boil down to norms of 
appropriate action. Gilbert thinks that what is missing here is the element o f being 
jointly committed to reaching the goal, or accepting the goal jointly to be their goal. Or, 
as Gilbert likes to put it, “each must manifest his willingness to constitute with the 
other[s] a plural subject o f the goal” (Gilbert 1989, 163). Thus, we need to add the “idea 
that each one is aware of each one’s willingness by virtue of each one’s expression o f 
his willingness to the others” (Gilbert 1989, 182).
Gilbert appears to think that this amounts to something like (H4):
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(H4) Agents Aj,...^4n satisfy the internal criteria for acting together in the strong 
sense if  and only if
(i) each of A),...^4n is willing to share in action (or a range o f actions) with
in circumstances of the type at hand
(ii) each of A knows that (i) as a result of each one’s having, in effect, ex­
pressed this willingness to each of the others
(iii) each ofAi,...^4n knows that (ii), and so on as far as one cares to go.
In sum, (H4) says that in order for two or more agents to do X together in the strong 
sense, the agents must (i) each be willing to share in action with the others, (ii) express 
this willingness to the others, and (iii) all this must be common knowledge among the 
participants. Gilbert thinks that the clauses (i)-(iii) in (H4) are necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the agents A\i...yAn to satisfy the internal criteria for acting together. 
Moreover, in Gilbert’s view this is equivalent to saying that if the clauses (i)-(iii) o f 
(H4) are satisfied, the agents A\,...^4n are able to create a collective intention to perform 
a collective action, or, as this can be summed up, they form a social group in the strong 
sense of forming a plural subject of a collective intention. Gilbert appears to think that 
the expression o f willingness to participate to the pursuit o f a joint goal amounts to a 
commitment that brings in the rights and duties that a joint goal places upon the partici­
pants in the plural subject in question. Here I think Gilbert is after the idea that, as 
Searle puts it, in the context o f collective action individual action-intentions (individual 
roles in a collective task) are derived from an irreducible collective intention and thus 
collective considerations are conceptually prior to individual-mode considerations. But 
it is very difficult to hold this in Gilbert’s framework.
In particular, {H4) appears, contra Searle’s theory o f collective intentionality, to 
employ standard individual-mode attitudes. The attitudes in (H4) are intentions to form 
(with the others) the kind o f plural subject that can adopt a goal o f its own, and the indi­
vidual action-intentions are then derived from this collective intention. In short, (H4) is 
not an analysis of a collective we-mode action-intention, but an analysis of what it takes 
to form a plural subject that can have such intentions. However, if this is the correct 
reading of Gilbert’s account, then Gilbert nonetheless fails to deliver what she explicitly 
wants to deliver, namely o f a theory of social action that goes beyond the Invidualistic 
Account o f social facts by accepting an ontologically naturalistic version o f Durk- 
heimianism (1.1.5). A card-carrying methodological individualist would have no prob­
lems in accounting for (H4); she would only say that o f course individuals may have the
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kind o f pro-social I-mode attitudes that (H4) talks about. The joint acceptance and joint 
commitment cannot be mere matters o f explicit expressions if we are to exceed the In­
dividualistic Account.
As we know (1.1.5), Gilbert is explicitly committed to Durkheimiamsm and, 
consequently, she is forced to de-individualise her analysis afterwards. This is what she 
seeks to do in her later writings (cf. Gilbert 2003, 53 ff , where she admits that, although 
basically correct, the 1989 view must be socialised). Let us look, for example, at the 
analysis o f group action in Gilbert (2000):
A group G performed an action A if and only if, roughly, the members o f G 
were jointly committed to accepting as a body the relevant goal X, and acting in 
the light o f this commitment, relevant members o f G acted so as to bring X 
about.
(Gilbert 2000, 131.)
Here the notions doing the philosophical work are again “jointly committing to 
accept as a body” and “acting in light of this commitment”. Gilbert explicitly contrasts 
joint commitment with personal commitment and explains that it is precisely this notion 
that brings in the strong anti-individualism of her view (e.g., Gilbert 1996, 7 f f ;  2000, 3 
ff. & 130-131; 2003, 54). However, Gilbert does not really analyse this crucial notion. 
Indeed, what Gilbert requires of a joint commitment even in her later works is merely 
that the participating individuals are ready to commit themselves to a joint enterprise in 
the sense of (i) being willing to share in action with the others and (ii) communicating 
this to others (Gilbert 1996, 366). This, however, does not add anything to (H4). Gilbert 
appears to think that the jointness o f the attitudes o f the individuals forming a plural 
subject guarantees that in fact (H4) operates with Durkheimian attitudes that go beyond 
the Individualistic Account of 1.1.5. However, Gilbert does not tell us what this joint­
ness o f the relevant attitudes ultimately is. Requiring mutual communication is clearly 
insufficient. In my view, the best way to understand the jointness o f the attitudes is in 
terms o f Searle’s (1.2.2) and Tuomela’s (1.2.4) we-mode attitudes.29
29 Hence, form the point o f view o f the present analysis the main difference between Gilbert on the one 
hand and Searle and Tuomela on the other is one o f focus: Gilbert aims at analysing what she calls full­
blown plural subject phenomena, whereas Searle and Tuomela are interested (also) in the psychological 
foundations o f such phenomena. Gilbert (2007) accepts this division o f  labour but argues that Searle’s 
conceptual apparatus is insufficient for addressing what she sees as the crucial question, namely how dif­
ferent individuals can literally share the same intention in the strong sense that allows us to speak o f  a 
group’s intention that brings in morally relevant group responsibilities (cf. Velleman 1997). For the pre­
sent essay, however, this is not crucial: my aim is to explicate the factor that makes the collective inten­
tionality theory anti-individualistic (and not all the possible applications o f the theoiy, no matter how im­
portant and interesting they are), and also in Gilbert’s view this factor is the “jointness” o f  the relevant 
participant attitudes, which 1 analyse in terms o f  the we-mode.
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Hence, according to this reading of Gilbert’s plural subject theory, the we-mode 
attitudes (bringing in “joint commitment to accept a goal as a body”) o f individuals 
guide the individuals to join together to pursue a collective goal. And when they have 
formed such a collective goal, the individuals can derive their individual roles in the 
collective task o f realising the goal and in this sense “act in the light o f their joint com­
mitment”. Thus, “[t]he goal of any joint action is seen by the participants as the goal o f 
a plural subject” (Gilbert 1989, 164), and the sub-goals of the participants are derived 
from that goal.
Although this reading presents Gilbert’s account as largely similar to Searle’s 
view, the transparency of Gilbert’s analysis allows us to address the circularity problem 
more explicitly than within Searle’s theory. To recapitulate, the problem is that we do 
not want to end up saying that the existence o f  a social group X  depends on anyone’s 
consciousness that there is an X, since the “possibility o f the latter appears to depend on 
the former” (Gilbert 1989, 222; cf. Ruben 1985). If we look at what Gilbert has actually 
said, I think we can conclude that the account is not circular in this sense. After all, Gil­
bert thinks that the existence of a social group comes down to the following features: (i) 
those who are to form a group are willing to jointly commit to uniting their individual 
wills to create a pool o f wills (Gilbert calls this the willed unity condition), and, (ii), 
everyone must express the will mentioned in (i) to the others (the expression condi­
tion),30 and, finally, (iii), this expression of willingness must be common knowledge 
(the common knowledge condition) (Gilbert 1989, 222-223).
Moreover, if it is indeed essential (as I think it is) that collective attitudes are ir­
reducible to individually held attitudes, we have here further evidence for the inevitable 
failure o f any summative account. As Gilbert puts it, it is “both logically necessary and 
logically sufficient for the truth of the ascription o f group belief [...], roughly, that all or 
most members o f the group have expressed willingness to let a certain view ‘stand’ as 
the view o f the group” (Gilbert 1989, 289). This makes it possible for Gilbert to ac­
knowledge another important feature o f collective attitudes: the collective attitude o f the 
group does not have to be an attitude that the majority o f the members o f the group hold 
personally (Gilbert 1989, 300). Indeed, the jointly accepted group attitude needs not be 
the personal I-mode attitude of any member o f the group (Gilbert 1989, 298-299; 1996, 
200 ff.).
30 In fact, in my view implicit, tacit expression is often enough -  sometimes even mere holding back re­
sistance suffices. Gilbert thinks she needs explicit expression to ground unambiguously the deontic ele­
ments o f  joint action required, in particular, for applications in moral philosophy. However, as becomes 
clear below, I think one ought not to build this element into the theory o f  collective intentionality.
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This is perhaps the main argument against summative accounts o f  collective 
group attitudes. A summative account that captures a widespread individual view may, 
for example, be a crucial piece o f information for explaining why the collective came to 
change its view in the matter in question. The fact about how well the belief o f a group 
corresponds to the summative majority view o f the members, or to a given personal 
view, may be an important factor in social scientific explanations, but its importance 
does not affect the “logical” independence o f a group belief from personal (individual) 
beliefs (Gilbert 1989, 310).
However, a surprising feature in Gilbert’s 1989 view is that she appears to think 
that a group G’s “joint acceptance” o f a given view P  presupposes that it is common 
knowledge in G that the members of G have expressed their willingness to accept P  to 
be the view o f the group. I do not quite see why this is assumed. Could it not be suffi­
cient to say that the members have expressed their willingness to find a view that can be 
adopted as the view o f the group G, or their willingness to let any view that is selected 
through a certain process to stand as their view? What 1 have in mind is that in some 
cases the members o f a group might want to accept a system o f forming a group view 
which does not require all group members to participate actively in that process. For 
example, the citizens of a nation state might accept that some people (say, the members 
o f the parliament) represent them in certain matters and form (e.g., by discussing and 
voting) a view that will then count as the view o f the whole group including those citi­
zens who are not members o f the parliament. In this example the citizens have not ex­
pressed (even implicitly) their willingness to accept P  (as opposed to some other view 
Q) as the view of their social group (i.e., the nation), but their willingness to accept 
whatever view it is that the parliament decides to be the view of the whole social 
group.
I think that this possibility is in fact consistent with (H4). Indeed, in a later work, 
Gilbert (1996, 209) explicitly accepts the kind of scenario I have described above, i.e., 
that the citizens o f a country accept as their view whatever view the government will 
adopt. There Gilbert simply states that this does not speak against the 1989 plural sub­
ject theory, although the original 1989 formulation was explicitly argued to require 
strengthening in terms of what she called the members’ knowledge principle. According 
to this principle, a necessary condition for a group G to have the view P  is that the
31 This principle o f  the division o f  social labour is highly analogous to Putnam’s (1975) famous principle 
o f  the division o f  linguistic labour. Indeed, in Part III and Appendix it is argued that in the case o f  one 
fundamental social institution, language, it is absolutely crucial that individuals can commit themselves to 
views the content o f  which they do not personally know.
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members o f G know that G has the view P  (Gilbert 1989, 259). However, the members’ 
knowledge principle is not necessary for what is valuable in Gilbert’s theory. In order to 
form a plural subject, only the intention to find a collectively acceptable view -  and the 
expression o f this intention -  is supposed to be common knowledge. In fact, I do not 
believe that the members’ knowledge principle is even a desirable feature o f a theory o f 
collective attitudes including collective intentions, since it would make it much more 
difficult to deal satisfactorily with many complex features o f social reality and group 
phenomena -  and indeed also Gilbert (1996) is at least implicitly willing to modify the 
condition (Gilbert 2000 remains silent concerning this issue): Members must know that 
there is a way o f forming a group belief, not what the belief is.
In sum, although Gilbert’s account takes us in a sense further than Searle’s the­
ory (especially in addressing the circularity problem explicitly), it nonetheless remains 
somewhat unsatisfactory in certain aspects -  and in my view does indeed worse than 
Searle’s account in many crucial points. For example, Gilbert’s formulations are ex­
pressed in terms o f the members o f a collective being in fact willing to share in action 
with the other members and the members knowing this to be the case. But surely we 
would like to be able to account for cases where only some agents are willing to share in 
action because they believe -  falsely, as it happens -  that the others are willing to do so 
as well, whereas in fact the others do not share the willingness and are rather prepared 
to take advantage of the naivety of the believers.
Similarly, for Gilbert a collective intention really is a shared attitude o f the plu­
ral subject, whereas for Searle a collective intention is a we-mode attitude (shared or 
not) of individuals. A natural way to resolve this difference is simply to say that where 
Searle (and Tuomela) are interested in the psychological preconditions of social action, 
Gilbert analyses social actions that already presuppose the we-mode psychology (in the 
guise o f joint commitment). Gilbert, however, is not happy with this reading. Some­
times she writes as if full-blown group attitudes were required prior to we-mode atti­
tudes to make conceptual room for the admittedly important ideas that (i) sometimes no 
individual personally holds the group view and (ii) in collective action individual ac­
tion-intentions (roles) are derived from a collective intention.32 However, as I demon-
32 Gilbert (2007) also suggests that on conceptual grounds a Searlean must think that we-mode intentions 
presuppose prior group intentions, because in Searle’s (1983) theory the content o f  an intention represents 
its conditions o f satisfaction and, according to Gilbert, a central satisfaction condition o f  an individual’s 
we-intention is that there really is a group-level collective intention. This argument, however, is based on 
a misguided reading o f  Searle’s theory o f  intentions: in the Searlean view, the satisfaction conditions o f  
intentions have the world-to-mind direction o f  fit (with some complications relating to causal self- 
referentaility that need not concern us here) and not the mind-to-world direction o f  fit that, e.g., beliefs 
have. It is not a satisfaction condition o f intending to order a beer that one already has ordered a beer.
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strate in 1.2.4, the same conceptual room can be made in terms o f the we-mode versus I- 
mode distinction without the ontologically dubious appeal to the attitude o f the group, 
literally shared by group-members.
Moreover, there are reasons to favour the way in which Searle and Tuomela 
build collective attitudes in Gilbert’s sense on we-mode attitudes. First, as we saw, the 
we-mode view allows us to be more explicit concerning the anti-individualistic joint­
ness aspect of the constitutive attitudes o f the group-members that also Gilbert relies on 
but which remains rather opaque in Gilbert’s writings. Moreover, Gilbert’s group atti­
tude view does not leave room for the idea that only one individual can adopt the anti- 
individualistic stance -  and switch between the we-mode and the I-mode. This idea 
plays a major role in Parts II and III o f this dissertation, and Part II indeed provides 
what I think as the decisive argument in favour o f the we-mode view, and thus the in­
terpretation o f Gilbert that sees her discussions as highly compatible with the we-mode 
theory is good for Gilbert too.
However, to get there we first need a more detailed analysis o f collective we- 
mode intentionality that is able to accommodate these considerations foreign to Gilbert 
and not focused on by Searle. In other words, we need to analyse collective intentional­
ity from the point of view of a single agent who is willing to share in action with others, 
because she believes -  rightly or wrongly -  that also the others are willing to form a 
plural subject. To do this, let us turn to the third major theorist o f collective intentional­
ity, Raimo Tuomela.33
33 In Gilbert’s view favouring the we-mode at the expense o f  the fundamentality o f  shared attitudes at­
tributed to the group is not a goal worth pursuing. However, in line with my strictly naturalistic and indi­
vidualistic ontology, I share Searle’s and Tuomela’s emphasis on the importance o f  the we-mode provid­
ing a coherent way o f talking as i f  groups were full-blown agents with intentional attitudes, without the 
need to talk about literally shared attitudes o f  the group -  and thus to get the results o f  Gilbert with less 
worrying ontology. Moreover, I fully agree with Searle (personal communication) that by explicitly as­
suming full-blown language in her analyses o f  shared intentions (in particular, the expression condition, 
cf. Footnote 30) Gilbert’s discussion is not suitable for a general theory o f  social institutions, for surely 
language itself is a central institution indeed (however, in Part III it will become clear that my view o f  the 
construction o f language is very different from Searle’s, which builds on the notion o f intentionality as a 
biologically primitive feature o f the world (cf. Searle 2007a)). Thus, when Velleman (1997) and Gilbert 
base their accounts o f securing the literal sharedness o f  an intention to public, linguistic commitments, 
this is by no means a strategy foreign to Searle or Tuomela (see especially Tuomela’s (2000, 2002, 2007) 
Bulletin Board View); Searle and Tuomela just emphasise the importance o f  analysing the we-mode atti­
tudes that make such language-based co-operation possible -  and which I have argued also Gilbert im­
plicitly relies on (by emphasising the “jointness” o f  the attitudes in (H4)) as the very source o f  her anti­
individualism. Following Miller (2007), one could say that Gilbert’s notion o f  commitment conflates two 
senses o f “commitment”: the non-normative sense o f  irreversibility in making up one’s mind characteris­
tic o f intentions (e.g., jumping o ff a cliff; at some point the jumper commits herself, there is no turning 
back) and the institutional, normative sense o f  putting oneself under a public obligation. The alleged 
jointness o f  the former comes from the we-mode o f  the relevant attitudes and o f  the latter from applying 
the social institution o f  promising or other relevant linguistic tools. The present essay concerns primarily 
the former aspect and accordingly I prefer Searle’s and Tuomela’s framework, where it is easy enough to
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1.2.4 TUOMELA ON COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY
Although the theory of collective intentionality allows us to talk o f group agents in a 
more substantial sense than the summative view, the commitment to (OI) requires that 
ontologically speaking individual agents are the only agents there are in the social 
world. Accordingly, I think the question of how individual agents come to adopt collec­
tive we-mode attitudes -  which, when shared, can then be seen as the attitudes o f a 
group or a plural subject -  is an even more important question than Gilbert’s analysis o f 
when a set of agents forms a plural subject.
Recall that Searle thinks that when an agent’s intentionality takes the form o f 
we-mode intentionality, the agent’s action is rationalisabe only to the extent the agent is 
seen acting essentially as part o f her group. Although I think Searle’s view is basically 
correct, in this section I will seek to define the view in more detail. I start with Raimo 
Tuomela’s (2000) definition, although I will abandon it almost immediately. However, 
although Tuomela’s explicit definition fails, his informal descriptions (and what I take 
to be his core intuitions) are, I argue, correct, and hence what follows ought to be seen 
as my explication o f the core o f Tuomela’s views rather than as a criticism o f 
Tuomela’s position.
According to Tuomela, the most central notion in this context is that o f a collec­
tive attitude. It is a general notion that has collective intention as a special case. Follow­
ing Tuomela, let x  stand for a member o f a collective, Bx(q) for jc’ s  belief that q, ATTx(p) 
for jc ’ s  attitude with the contentp, WATTx(p) for a we-attitude with the contentp  held by 
x, MB(p) for a mutual belief (in the relevant collective) that p , and, finally, ATTe(p) for 
everybody in the collective having the attitude p ? A With these symbols, Tuomela de­
fines a collective we-attitude held by an individual x  as follows (Tuomela 2000, 50; 
2002, 23):
WATTx(p) <-> ATTx(p) & Bx(ATTE(p) & MB(ATTE(p))).
keep these two different aspects explicitly separated. I am grateful to John Searle and the members o f  his 
research group on social ontology at UC Berkeley for discussing these issues with me.
34 Of course it is not realistic to require literally everybody to hold the attitude. Usually it is sufficient that 
almost all the members, most o f  them or the operative members hold it. But these are complications re­
quired for particular applications that does not need to concern us when explicating the basic structure o f  
a collective we-attitude.
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Although as it stands Tuomela’s definition does not require it, “[a]n intuitive idea re­
lated to we-attitudes is that a person has ATT in part because the others have ATT and 
this is mutually believed in the group” (Tuomela 2000, 50).35 To see how this idea can 
be built in to the definition, let us move from the general level o f collective attitudes to 
the special case we are primarily interested in, namely to that o f forming a collective 
we-intention.
Let IX(G) stand for jc intending (in the individual mode) G. We are interested in a 
situation where the attitude in question is jc’ s  intention, i.e., where ATTx(p) = IX(G). As 
an illustration we can think o f Ruben’s (1985, 119) example of jc ’ s  engaging in the Brit­
ish custom of drinking tea at breakfast. Thus, let IX(G) be “x intends (drink tea at break­
fast)”. The fact that jc intends to participate in an existing custom means that her inten­
tion is not simply of the form IX(G), since it would not include the social element o f her 
intention (Ruben 1985, 121-122). When G is jc’ s  we-mode intention, such as the inten­
tion to participate in a social custom, let us write it as IwetX(G).
Note that Iwe,x(to drink tea at breakfast) reads only as “ jc we-intends (to partici­
pate in the custom of the relevant collective) to drink tea at breakfast”; her success in 
really participating depends of course on, for example, there really being such a custom 
in which she can participate. Thus, Tuomela’s framework will immediately allow us to 
reach beyond Gilbert’s account, which required the collective practice (or at least the 
shared willingness to construct one) to really be there and the agents to know this. With 
these clarifications, we can now write Tuomela’s definition in the following form (see 
Tuomela 2000, 51):
Iwe,*(G) = df Ix(G) & B x(Ie(G ) & M B (Ie(G ))).
When applied to Ruben’s example this definition says that jc intends to participate in the 
custom (of the relevant collective) to drink tea at breakfast (jc we-intends to drink tea at 
breakfast) if and only if (i) she intends to drink tea at breakfast and (ii) she believes that 
(a) (more or less) everyone in the relevant collective (say, those interested in cherishing 
traditional British customs) intends to drink tea at breakfast and that (b) there is a mu­
tual belief in the collective in question that (a).
35 Instead o f  groups, I prefer to use socially more neutral terms to avoid accusations o f circularity (the 
ongoing theme o f  this chapter). In accordance with 1.2.3, the process o f forming we-attitudes is simulta­
neously the process o f  forming a group in the socially significant sense. Hence the notion o f a group must 
not be presupposed in the analysis.
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This example points out nicely why Tuomela’s intuition about jc’ s  reasons for 
having the intention in question is so important. The definition, as it stands so far, 
leaves open the possibility that although x believes that there is a custom of drinking tea 
at breakfast, her reasons for intending to do so also herself have nothing whatsoever to 
do with her belief (or indeed the object the belief, the custom). Surely we would not say 
that in such a case x we-intends to participate, qua a member o f the group o f tea- 
drinkers, in the custom (see Tuomela 2000, 180-181 for a discussion on correct reasons 
for following a social norm). To exclude this possibility, Tuomela (2000, 51-52) repre­
sents a reason relation with /r and, correspondingly, adds the index r to Iwe,x(G) to refer 
to the intention being a reason-based notion. Thus we get the following (cf. Tuomela 
2002, 26):
Irwe,x(G) = df Ix(G /r B x(Ie(G ) & M B (Ie(G )))).
This definition says that jc we-intends G if and only if jc intends G, and this is so at least 
partly for the reason that jc believes that everyone in the relevant collective intends G 
and because jc believes that there is a mutual belief in the relevant collective that every­
one intends G. Or to use our example, jc intends to participate in the British custom of 
drinking tea at breakfast insofar as her beliefs about the British tea-drinkers form (at 
least partly) the reason why she intends to drink tea at breakfast.
Here my reasoning has departed slightly from Tuomela’s line o f thought. In con­
trast to my subjective version of jc ’ s  reason-based we-intention, Tuomela thinks that the 
reason-based notion o f jc ’ s  we-intention should be written in the objective form, i.e., as 
follows (Tuomela 2000, 51):
Irwe,x(G) =df IX(G /r Ie(G ) & M B (Ie(G ))).
In Tuomela’s version it is not jc ’ s  beliefs about the intentions of her fellow collective- 
members that form jc ’ s  reason for her own intention, but the facts that (i) the others in-
' IfL
deed do intend G and that (ii) there is a mutual belief that the first fact obtains. In an 
ideal situation these facts no doubt are the reasons, but I believe it is important to pay 
attention to the subjective version o f the reason-based notion of a we-intention.
36 In fact, in Tuomela’s definition the scope o f  /r is not perfectly clear; I take it that the mutual belief is 
meant to be included in the scope. Tuomela (2002, 23 ff.), reformulates this definition in the subjective 
form. The scope o f /„ however, remains somewhat unclear in that work too.
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The subjective version allows us to do justice to situations where x sincerely has 
a we-mode intention but the intention is based on false beliefs, x may be the only mem­
ber of the collective who is in fact ready to form a collective intention and to engage in 
collective action in the situation in question. Tuomela almost makes this point himself 
when he writes that an agent must be required to believe that the objectively stated rea­
son holds, and, according to Tuomela, this “‘subjective channelling’ property is as­
sumed to have been built into the /r relation” (Tuomela 2000, 52).
In Tuomela’s view the beliefs seem to be the proximate mechanisms that link 
the facts as causes to x’s intention. I do not want to adopt this line o f thought for two 
reasons. First, Part 111 examines whether the relation here is causal at all, and I do not 
want the present account to be committed either way. Second, I do not think the present 
analysis should require that the beliefs must be true. In contrast to my subjective ver­
sion, Tuomela’s notion cannot take into account the possibility that the “subjective 
channelling” process misrepresents the facts behind the beliefs.
In addition to these considerations on subjectivity, there are a few more ambi­
guities in Tuomela’s discussions that must be clarified before we can be satisfied with 
the account. Tuomela tells us that his definition requires that the facts about the others 
are that “the others we-intend G and that there is a mutual belief about this” (Tuomela 
2000, 51, my italics). But this is not what Tuomela’s definition in fact says, since the 
intention o f the others is formalised as Ie(G), which says that everyone intends G, not 
that everyone we-intends G. However, I think that Tuomela’s informal description is 
closer to what we want to say. Using Tuomela’s formal notation, Tuomela’s informal 
description o f jc’ s  reasons for having the intention G should actually be expressed as fol­
lows:
Irwe,x(<3) = df IX(G  / r (Iwe.E(G ) &  M B (Iwe,E(G )))).
On the first approximation, this way of writing the definition looks suspiciously 
circular, since the we-intentionality I aim to define appears both in the definiens and in 
the definiendum. To apply the definition to Ruben’s tea-drinking example, this defini­
tion appears to say that x we-intends to participate to the custom of drinking tea at 
breakfast if and only if the reason why jc intends to drink tea at breakfast is that every­
body in the relevant collective we-intends to do so and there is a mutual belief about it.
This would be acceptable if  we were willing to restrict the scope o f the analysis 
exclusively to those cases where jc comes from outside a group to join  it and its pre­
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existing institutions. However, if we want, as I think we should, to consider the analysis 
to reveal something essential about the construction o f social institutions, this kind o f 
circularity cannot be accepted. The abstract definition should represent the situation 
from the point of view o f any individual belonging to the relevant collective (or even 
more correctly, of any individual belonging to a set of individuals joining together to 
form a social group that does not exist prior to this), and then we cannot presuppose the 
fact about pre-existing we-intentions.
This problem of circularity shows why my subjective way o f treating collective 
intentionality is preferable also for more fundamental reasons than the one discussed 
above. Perhaps it could be argued that a partial reason why x intends G is not that eve­
ryone in the collective we-intends G, but rather that she takes the other members o f the 
collective to we-intend G. Note that if we interpret the definition like this, we have 
again taken the subjective path, since now it is only in the defmiendum where the objec­
tive fact that someone has a we-intention can be found, whereas in the definiens we find 
only x's beliefs about the others having we-intentions, and not a we-intention as such. 
We do not want to say that the reason why x holds the intention G is that the other 
members o f the collective have the we-intention G, but rather the (partial) reason is that 
jc believes that this is what the members of the relevant collective collectively intend. 
Hence, the formulation that avoids circularity, offers us a more realistic picture and al­
lows us to capture what we intuitively want to say is as follows:
Irwe.x(G) = df IX(G  /r B x(Iwe.E(G ) & M B(IweE(G )))).
O f course it could be argued that even if  I do not assume we-intentionality actu­
ally to appear in the definiens, the circularity is nonetheless there, since the concept of 
we-intentionality is mentioned as part o f the content o f x’s beliefs that are required for 
the formation of a we-intention. My answer to this objection is that my analysis is a fac­
tual or ontological analysis and not semantic; supposedly x will have some sort o f idea 
what it is to intend something together (see Tuomela 2000, 75 for similar reasoning), or 
what it is to be committed to a joint project. We do not have to presuppose that x actu­
ally possesses the concept o f we-intentionality, and hence her belief needs not be stated 
in terms o f it. What I am after with the belief about we-intentions is some sort of, possi­
bly tacit, psychological framing of the situation in question as a collective task. This in­
volves seeing also the others as intentional participants in the task (as willing to share in 
action, as the Gilbertian (H4) put this). It is only that from the perspective o f the present
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analysis of jc ’ s  we-intention it is more convenient to conceptualise the contents o f x ’s 
beliefs in terms o f we-intentions. A semantic analysis would be a different matter. I 
conclude that my subjective version is not circular in any vicious sense.
Unfortunately, the ambiguities in Tuomela’s discussion do not end here, since 
Tuomela goes on to explain that actually the facts about the others are “a partial reason 
for x to we-intend G” (Tuomela 2000, 52, my italics). It seems that even my subjective 
version o f Tuomela’s revised objective definition does not amount to this. However, 
once again Tuomela’s informal description captures what we really do want to say bet­
ter than the formalisations we have seen so far. X s belief that G is what the relevant 
collective intends collectively may be a partial reason why jc intends G, although jc may 
have some completely different reasons for that too. Be that as it may, surely jc ’ s  belief
that the relevant collective we-intends G is a partial reason why jc adopts the we-
intention G, regardless o f her reasons for individually intending G.
The formalisation corresponding to Tuomela’s informal descriptions o f we- 
intentionality so far, should, I think, be the following:
Irwe.x(G) = df Iwe X(G  / r (Iwe,E(G) & M B (Iwe,E(G )))) .
This can be again transformed to the preferable subjective form as follows:
Ir\ve,x(G) =df I\ve,x(G /r B x(Iwe,E(G ) & M B (IweE(G )))).
Moreover, if we add — as I indeed think we should -  the point I made about jc ’ s  simulta­
neous individual and collective intentions we get a definition o f the following form:
r we!x(G) = df (IX(G ) & Iwe,x(G)) /r B x(Iwe,E(G ) & M B (Iwe,E(G )))).
This definition says that jc, a member o f a collective c, we-intends G if and only if
(i) jc intends G
(ii) jc we-intends G
(iii) (i) and (ii) at least partly for the reason that x believes that (a) everyone in c
we-intends G and that (b) there is a mutual belief in c that (a).
However, by smuggling the factual notion o f we-intentionality to reappear in the 
definiens, clause (ii) seems to force us to face the problem of circularity all over again.
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Fortunately we can -  for the problem is now beginning to be all too familiar -  easily 
envision the cure to this problem: perhaps taking a more subjective path could once 
more save us from the problem o f circularity. Undeniably, clause (ii) should not require 
that x literally speaking we-intends G, but rather that x sees herself as participating to 
what she thinks her fellow collective members are doing (in terminology o f II.3.3, jc 
identifies herself with the collective and their activities).
This, I think, amounts to saying that x is willing to share in action with her fel­
low collective members, or in other words, that x is willing to join her social partners to 
do G together. I will represent this formally by writing that jc believes that she is we- 
intending G {i.e., Bx(Iwex(G'))), although what I have just said shows that this is not 
strictly speaking the ideal way o f formalising the thought behind the new clause (ii). 
Firstly, the concept o f we-intentionality appears again in the definiens, which is un­
pleasant although not fatal for a factual analysis (recall my comments above). Secondly, 
as was mentioned, what I take jc to believe is not really that she is we-intending G but 
that there is a joint activity for her to participate in, and this contributes to the construc­
tion o f her we-intention. (Both the first and the second point apply naturally also to jc ’ s  
belief about everyone in group we-intending G that turns up in jc ’ s  reason for intending 
G.) But the definition is already complicated enough without introducing new symbols, 
so I will stick to this formalisation.
With these reservations, my penultimate definition o f the reason-based notion o f  
jc ’ s  we-intending G is as follows):
l rwe?x(G) =df (IX(G ) & B x(Iwe?x(G ))) /r B x(Iwe^ (G ) & M B (Iwe,E(G )))).
This definition should be read as saying that that jc, a member o f a collective c, we- 
intends G if and only if
(i) jc intends G
(ii) jc is willing to share in action with other members o f c in the situation in
question
(iii) (i) and (ii) at least partly for the reason that jc believes that (a) everyone in c
we-intends G and that (b) there is a mutual belief in c that (a).
Or to use Ruben’s example, jc’ s  we-intention to participate in the British custom to drink 
tea at breakfast amounts to the following:
(i) jc intends to drink tea at breakfast
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(ii) jc sees herself as a member o f the relevant collective (say the people who 
value cherishing traditional British customs) and jc believes that her drinking 
tea at breakfast amounts to joining a prevailing custom o f the collective in 
question
(iii) (i) and (ii) at least partly for the reason that x believes that (a) everyone in 
the collective sees themselves as (ii) describes jc to see herself and that (b) 
there is a mutual belief in the collective that (a).
This definition represents the situation from the perspective of a single member 
o f the collective (i.e., x), whose beliefs about the situation could be radically mistaken. 
If this were the case, jc would have a we-intention but, despite her sincere intention, 
there would not be a social project to which jc could participate. However, when the re­
quirements o f the clauses (i)-(iii) are in fact fulfilled (even if the beliefs are not true), it 
is an objective fact that jc we-intends to G. And, moreover, if this objective fact is true of 
all the members of c (if jc ’ s  beliefs are true), there is indeed a mutual belief about the 
intentions o f the group-members, and moreover, the mutual belief is also a true mutual 
belief. Hence, in such a case the members o f c indeed we-intend G jointly together, fully 
and objectively. Thus, I have developed Tuomela’s account to show how the collective 
intentions o f individuals can form a plural subject, i.e., how we can get from the subjec­
tive perspectives of individual agents to an objectively existing, shared we-intention.
Hence, also in Tuomela’s framework we can adopt the general perspective and 
say that agents xj,...,x„ that form the collective c we-intend G together exactly when the 
criteria for f we<x(G) are true for each jc/ , . . . jc„. A s can easily be seen, this amounts almost 
to the same view we arrived at when the starting point was the general perspective 
rather than the perspective o f a single group-member, namely to (H4) that I argued to be 
the best way to understand Gilbert’s (1989) discussion. Although I do believe that the 
definition I have constructed starting from Tuomela’s discussion is basically correct as 
it stands, the fact that I need to say that it almost justifies (H4) suggests that one more 
clarification must still be done.
What I have in mind is the distinction between individual and collective inten­
tions. When discussing Gilbert’s account I argued that it is an important merit o f her 
theory that it allows people to adopt a collective intention even if individually speaking 
they do not consider it to be such a good idea in the first place. My analyses in this sec­
tion seem to contradict this, since clause (i) in the informal analysis above requires that 
in order for jc to collectively we-intend G, she must also individually intend G.
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Thus, it seems that as it stands (i) fails to capture what we really want to say. In­
stead o f requiring jc to individually intend G we should say that when an agent x we- 
accepts to treat the realisation o f G as the collective goal of her group (when jc we-
XIintends G), x must also intend to do her part in the collective task. In the case o f Gil­
bert and Searle this was expressed by saying that when agents A \ , . . .^  collectively ac­
c e p t^  as their collective intention, their individual roles in the collective task o f realis­
ing X, namely individual goals and intentions X ] , . . . yX„  are derived from the collective 
intention X. In light of this, it seems that I need to do one more final modification to the 
definition. Let g  stand for an individual intention derived from G in the above sense, 
and jc ’ s  reason-based we-intention to G can be analysed as follows:
l rwe,x(G) = df (Ix(g ) &  B x(Iwe,x(G ))) /r B x(Iwe,E(G ) &  M B (Iwe,E(G )))).
As should be clear by now, this definition says that jc, a member o f a collective 
c, we-intends G if and only if
(i) jc intends to do her individual part in realising G (i.e., x intends g)
(ii) jc is willing to share in action with other members o f c in the situation in 
question
(iii) (i) and (ii) at least partly for the reason that jc believes that (a) everyone in c 
we-intends G and that (b) there is a mutual belief in c that (a).
When jc has a we-intention her reasons for this must be largely social, although -  as the 
tea example illustrates -  she can o f course have also some individual reasons for intend­
ing to perform the very same action, i.e., she may have also an individual intention g.
The distinction between intentions that stem from collective-mode considera­
tions and intentions that stem from individual-mode considerations (regardless o f 
whether these intentions coincide or not) will be o f utmost importance in Part II, and 
hence it is crucial to observe here that the present analysis can easily include this fea­
ture. Similarly, the final modification o f the definition also eliminated the very last in­
stance o f an individual intention G (i.e., the term IX(G)) from the definition. This high­
lights further the fact that individual intentionality and collective intentionality are not 
only distinct, but also fully independent o f each other. In this chapter this independence 
has been used for establishing the irreducibility o f collective intentions to individual in-
37 For the present purposes we can use “goal” and “intention” interchangeably since we are talking about 
intentions to realise some goal.
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tentions. In Part II this independence will play at least as crucial a role in my arguments 
on how agents capable for we-mode action can resolve social dilemma situations.
The final modification allows us also to hint at the sources o f what Tuomela 
(2000, 80) calls the “quasi-moral” nature of social institutions, we-intentionality and 
we-mode action. In 1.2.1 we saw how normativity is indeed crucial for the present the­
ory of social reality, since social facts, entities and institutions were seen ontologically 
speaking to boil down to ontologically subjective but epistemically objective norms o f 
appropriate action. The key, I think, is the fact that an agent who has adopted the we- 
mode sees individual tasks as derived from the collective-goal, which in turn is origi­
nally formed on the basis of what is the rational course of action for the collective to 
take. Hence the collective goal has a normative status in virtue o f being (taken to be) 
collectively optimal, and the normativity flows down to individual roles in the collective 
task in virtue o f the norms o f rationality governing derivation.
I o f course realise that at this point this sounds rather unsatisfactory. However, 
Part II addresses the collective optimality of collective goals in detail, and Part III the 
normativity of the rules of rationality. Thus the intrinsic and irreducible normativity o f 
social reality and social practices cannot be properly seen until in the end o f this disser­
tation. However, already at this point it is clear that social reality consists o f essentially 
normative requirements and inferences.
What I have said here already suffices for seeing why Tuomela’s (and Gilbert’s) 
way to account for the quasi-moral right to expect that the others will do their part in the 
collective task in terms of the communication o f  acceptance (of the collective goal) 
condition and the knowledge o f other participants’ acceptance condition (Tuomela 
2000, 29), or the requirement that there must be mutual knowledge concerning the ac­
ceptance resulting from communication between the agents (Gilbert), is not the road I 
want to take. The conditions may be of great practical relevance when agents seek to 
sort out concrete problems (for example, in the case of a free-rider it is relevant to point 
out that the free-rider had openly communicated her intention to participate in the col­
lective task). However, the relevance is due to the fact that, say, the communication of 
acceptance is almost universally assigned a normative status, and thus the conditions 
mentioned by Gilbert and Tuomela should not be built into the analysis, since ultimately 
(ontologically!) they simply beg the question. However, we must wait for Parts II and 
III before this can be seen properly.
Note also that the present analysis should be understood as compatible with Gil­
bert’s view (discussed above) that when a collection o f agents actually forms a we-
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intention, they form a plural subject o f collective action, which, moreover, is equivalent 
to saying that the collection o f agents in question forms a social group. On the first ap­
proximation it might seem that my informal explications o f the formal definition o f f~ 
w e , x ( G )  contradict this idea, since I have included in the definiendum the statement “x, a 
member o f a collective c”. However, the expression should here be understood in a so­
cially insignificant way, i.e., as saying merely that x belongs to some set c o f  individu­
als. The set or the collective c becomes a socially significant group only when (or if) the 
members o f the set c form the relevant we-intentions, just as was argued in the context 
o f Gilbert’s plural subjects.
The reason why I have used the expression “collective” here instead of talking 
about individuals xj,...,xn (or something similar) is that the perspective here has all the 
time been that of a single agent. I have wanted to do justice both to the idea that the 
analysis should apply to cases where x joins an already-existing social group -  even if  
she does not know all the members o f the group {e.g., the tea-drinking case) -  and to 
cases where agents form a completely new group. Even in cases o f the latter kind x 
needs to have an idea that there is a relevant collection {i.e., c) o f agents, although the 
collection will form a social group only insofar as they each adopt a we-intention and 
create a plural subject together. Hence the definition o f a we-intention in the sense o f 
?we,x(G) does not undermine the role o f collective intentionality as a building block o f 
social reality, including social groups.
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CHAPTER 1.3: 
CONCLUSION
So what kind o f picture of social entities and social facts emerges from the considera­
tions in this Part o f my study? To put it shortly, I have accepted Searle’s view that the 
core o f social reality is ultimately to be found, not in social entities or facts as such, but 
in collectively accepted and required patterns o f behaviour. What is characteristically 
social in social entities is a collectively assigned status. As I have argued, to avoid cir­
cularity the status must be assumed ontologically speaking to consist in collectively ac­
cepted and required forms o f behaviour, i.e., a social practice. Ultimately, when we col­
lectively construct social facts via collective acceptance, the acceptance does not con­
struct its own object as a new solid entity, but rather a consensus that certain actions are 
to be performed in certain circumstances (cf. Collin 1997, 196-197).38
This, in effect, is one way of highlighting the difference between the methodol­
ogically holistic nature of the view 1 defend and the methodological individualism of, 
for example, mainstream rational choice account o f social facts. In my view social facts 
are essentially normative practices based on collective we-mode attitudes that place 
normative requirements for those who wish to participate in the practices (be one o f us). 
This holds both in the sense that social facts are ultimately status functions that consist 
o f rules of appropriate behaviour and in the sense that full participation in social prac­
tices requires one to adopt the we-mode perspective such that one’s individual action- 
intentions are derived from the collective task. Consequently, in truly social action indi­
vidual performances are to be rationalised in terms o f their role in the collective task 
and not in terms o f individual-mode private goals (of course, however, individual-mode 
free riders can exploit the we-mode o f others -  and the practices they maintain -  to their 
own advantage, as long as there are sufficiently many we-moders to maintain the prac­
tices).
Methodologically individualistic views, in contrast, tend to see social facts as 
non-normative aggregates of actual choices and expectations o f individuals that essen­
tially asocial individuals take into account when contemplating how to maximise their 
utility functions. This contrast is addressed in detail in Part II; here it suffices to note
38 Searle (1995) is also very explicit concerning these issues: “it is tempting to think o f  social objects as 
independently existing entities on analogy with the objects studied by the natural sciences”, but in truth 
“[sjocial objects are always [...] constituted by social acts; [...]  the object is ju st the continuous possibil­
ity o f  the activity” (Searle 1995, 36) -  “hence, our interest is not in the object but in the processes and 
events where the functions are manifested” (Searle 1995, 57). “What we think o f as social objects [ ...]  are 
in fact just placeholders for patterns o f activities” (Searle 1995, 57).
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that the emphasis my account puts on normativity and dynamic practices could form a
39sufficient reason for avoiding the terminology o f facts altogether.
As we saw in 1.2, this applies fully also to the standard example of a social fact, 
namely that the pieces o f paper in my pocket are money. It is easy to lose sight o f this 
essentially dynamic feature o f social facts for two reasons. First, in our everyday speech 
we rather misleadingly tend to classify social facts as independent facts ontologically on 
a par with brute natural facts, whereas in reality they are merely external and objective 
(1.1). Externality and objectivity is enough for social facts -  and the practices they ulti­
mately consist o f -  to be things in the technical sense o f Durkheim, which is the second 
reason why the dynamic nature of social facts is easy to forget.
Although there are different ways o f using the notion “social fact” (1.1.5), the 
crucial question must be the nature o f social action that underlies social facts. In this 
part I have been mainly interested in approaches that challenge methodological indi­
vidualism. Suppose there is a country where everybody simply drives on the left-hand 
side of roads. Is the prevalence o f left-hand side traffic a social fact? In a sense it obvi­
ously is, for the fact involves a number o f agents. However, in the Weberian tradition 
the left-hand side traffic is a social fact only if the actions the fact consists in are social 
actions: “Action is social in so far as, by virtue o f the subjective meaning attached to it 
by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account o f the behaviour o f others and 
is thereby oriented in its course” (Weber 1922/1947, 88). In other words, if  the reasons 
why people in fact drive on the left do not mention the behaviour o f others, the resulting 
practice does not constitute a social fact.
In this part, however, I have aimed to analyse social facts in even a stronger 
sense, according to which strategic individual action (which satisfies Weber’s criterion) 
does not suffice for truly social action and practices that social facts consist in. Follow­
ing mainly Gilbert, Searle and Tuomela I have concentrated on social facts in the strong 
anti-individualistic sense that involves collective we-mode intentionality. To anticipate 
Part II, social facts in this sense require that agents act together instead of simply play­
ing a coordination-requiring social game qua individual players.
This strong notion o f togetherness that goes beyond methodological individual­
ism is meant to capture social facts qua social practices in the core sense in which the 
reason for following the practice is not any individual-mode evaluation o f costs and 
benefits, but rather the practice itself, or at least cost-benefit analyses at the collective
39 This point plays a crucial role in III.3.3 and III.4.1, where I analyse Kripke’s notion o f  social practices 
that are not fact-based but rather normative practice-based. I argue that such normative practices can be 
fact-based in my sense o f  a social fact, although not in the sense o f a methodological individualist.
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level, i.e., in the we-mode. This is what my development of Tuomela’s notion o f a rea­
son-based we-intention was meant to capture. Social facts in the core sense consist of 
social practices in this strong sense which, in turn, requires collective we-mode inten- 
tionality such that it is participation in the practice that motivates individual action- 
intentions: In truly social action individual action-intentions are derived from collective- 
level we-mode considerations. This is the exact opposite o f standard methodological 
individualism (such as the picture implied by rational choice approaches to social ac­
tion), where compliance with a practice is motivated by individual-mode beliefs and 
desires. This is the well-known distinction between Homo Sociologicus and Homo 
Economicus.
Admittedly I have not provided ultimately satisfactory arguments as to why 
these strongly social notions are required for the core forms o f social action. Thus far I 
have simply appealed to intuitive examples o f social activities that are meant to show 
that an analysis that does not go beyond Weber’s strategic interaction to full-blown col­
lective intentionality (or plural subject) cannot suffice for many familiar social situa­
tions. Personally, I am satisfied with such appeal to intuitions. However, general, 
concpetual arguments in favour o f the theory o f collective intentionality are to be found 
in Part II.
Philosophers inclined to favour even more holistic approaches in the full onto­
logical sense of rejecting (01) (although more often than not such ontological anti­
naturalism is obscured with an appeal to unanalysable “emergence”) sometimes argue 
that the kind of constructivist view I am defending on the basis o f Gilbert, Searle and 
Tuomela cannot capture the externality of social facts in a sufficiently strong sense (see, 
e.g., Collin 1997 & Niiniluoto 1999). The basic form of this accusation is simply the 
claim that an account building on collective acceptance cannot capture social reality, for 
many o f the most basic social facts are essentially more durable than the de facto  exist­
ing attitudes o f acceptance (Collin 1997, 206).
For example, it is conceivable that the social entity European Union outlasts all 
the individuals living at the moment. I think that this, simple as it may sound, is an im­
portant point -  although not fatal for the present account. The point highlights nicely the 
importance o f the strong methodological anti-individualism inherent in the present the­
ory and the unacceptability of summative accounts. The social entity in question -  here, 
the European Union -  must be identified with the practice of normative requirements 
created by collective attitudes, not the attitude-tokens o f individuals themselves. 
Ruben’s example of the British institution o f drinking tea at breakfast is also helpful
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here. The institution consists o f a practice constituted by collective we-attitudes, and my 
analyses o f the formation o f a reason-based we-intention in 1.2.4 explained explicitly 
how new individuals can join the practice, allowing thus other participants to leave the 
practice.
A stronger form o f the accusation that mere externality (in the sense o f intersub­
jectivity) cannot give sufficiently robust status to social facts can be made in terms o f 
the threat of social relativism. As Collin puts this point, it is difficult to see how a Sear- 
lean analysis (including, I take it, the present analysis) could “provide for the distinction 
between a correct and an incorrect way to proceed within a convention [a practice]” 
(Collin 1997, 206).40 A collective acceptance view can describe how a collective repro­
duces its practices, but how could it leave room for addressing the correctness o f the 
practice, for it is the collective agreement concerning how to proceed that constitutes the 
very practice? It seems that the whatever the collective takes to be the correct way to 
reproduce the practice must be the correct way, in which case there is no distinction be­
tween correctness and incorrectness.
The paradigmatic example here, appealed to by both Collin and Niiniluoto, is 
the law. As Collin puts it, ontologically individualistic, constructivist views (known as 
legal realism in the philosophy of law) seem to lean towards the view that “the law is 
what Supreme Court judges would actually decide” (Collin 1997, 207), for in our legal 
practices Supreme Court judges have the final word on what forms o f behaviour are ac­
cepted and required in certain situations. However, this is problematic:
In declaring that decisions of Supreme Court judges determine what the law is, 
legal realists overlook the fact that judges, including those o f the Supreme 
Court, try to conform to the law and to discover what the rules actually dictate. 
The judges treat the rules as norms to be adhered to and do not consider them­
selves at liberty to create law in passing sentence [...]. Indeed, the realist con- 
strual renders it impossible to make sense o f what Supreme Court judges are do­
ing when they enter into a subtle arguments to decide a complicated case. Their 
deliberations are clearly not attempts to predict what they will themselves decide 
in the case in question, or else judges would be chasing their own coat tails for­
ever.
A proper understanding of the judicial process must allow for a distinction be­
tween what the judges happen to decide and the true content o f the law.
(Collin 1997, 207.)
This is a noteworthy problem for all constructivist accounts o f social facts. As I have 
argued (1.1.4 in particular), externality suffices for epistemic objectivity from the point 
o f  any individual taken singly. But if social facts are not independent facts (i.e., if  we
40 Different aspects o f Collin’s worry are addressed in detail in III.3 onwards.
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subscribe to (Ol)), how can there be conceptual room for epistemic objectivity from the 
point o f view o f the whole community involved? It seems that a community cannot be 
collectively mistaken about social practices -  there seems to be no distinction between 
“what the judges happen to decide and the true content o f the law”.
This problem is so serious that both Collin and Niiniluoto see no other option 
than to revert to Karl Popper’s weak Platonism, where social facts are said to belong the 
Platonist, objective World 3, the inhabitants o f which are in an important sense inde­
pendent of human attitudes (that belong to the subjective World 2 o f contentful psy­
chology), although originally created by such attitudes. The view is supposed to be on- 
tologically monistic, since World 2 is said to emerge from the physical World 1, and 
World 3 from Worlds 1 and 2. However, in my mind this cannot amount to a serious 
solution. The notion of emergence remains completely unaccounted for,41 and therefore 
the view seems to hold confusingly that social facts are independent without being in­
dependent. This is hardly satisfactory.
Although I do not consider this kind of emergentism to be a serious alternative, I 
accept that my view must be able to answer Collin and Niiniluoto’s criticism. The first 
point to notice is that it is not at all obvious that social relativism -  a collective being 
always right -  is unacceptable when it comes to social facts. As Robert Brandom (1994, 
53) points out, “[wjhatever the Kwakiutl treat as an appropriate greeting gesture for 
their tribe [...] is one; it makes no sense to suppose that they could be collectively 
wrong about this sort o f thing”. Any individual member of the tribe can o f course be 
mistaken about appropriate greeting gestures, but not the tribe collectively. Perhaps we 
could say that the situation described by Collin is simply a complicated form o f this 
kind o f situation.
The main difference between the Kwakiutl greeting practices and the law is that 
the law is not a practice unconnected to other practices. On the contrary, the law is ex­
plicitly tied to the rules o f logic and rationality, prevailing norms and customs and so 
on, and the last word on these issues is not given to Supreme Court judges. Rather, our 
practices dictate that the Supreme Court is to have the last word on what shall be done 
in legal controversies (the Supreme Court is assigned a certain status function), but as 
explicitly our practices acknowledge that the law is connected to other social practices 
(many o f which are governed by implicit, tacit norms) -  ultimately, to the practices 
governing the meaning o f words. Thus^pace Collin, I think the constructivist view does
41 In particular, Collin’s (1997, 209) appeal to “construction by idealisation” as opposed to “construction 
by convention” does not help, for he gives no explanation what construction by idealisation behind Pop­
per’s World 3 amounts to.
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have conceptual room for the distinction between what the law really dictates and what 
the Supreme Court will decide.
The true content of the law is what really follows from our commitments to 
laws, norms o f rationality, rules governing the use o f words and so on -  and the Su­
preme Court is not the last authority when it comes to, say, rules o f logic. Moreover, 
since the Supreme Court cannot hope to make all these commitments explicit in any 
single case, we explicitly acknowledge the possibility that the Supreme Court may be 
mistaken. Our practices do not require that the Supreme Court is infallible. After all, the 
Supreme Court can be corrected afterwards -  the practice of interpreting the law is 
open-ended (III.4 onwards). Rather, our practices say that for practical purposes we will 
let the Supreme Court to have the last word. However, because of their dependence on 
other practices, also legal practices are in principle open for criticism. This is one more 
reason why methodological holism is to be preferred to individualistic views. As I ex­
plained above, it is the methodologically individualistic conception o f social facts that 
identifies the facts with actual choices of individuals, whereas a holistic picture leaves 
room for identifying social facts with open, normative practices (Appendix). Collin's 
problem is a problem for methodological individualism (including what 1 in III.3.3 call 
the naTve communitarian view), not for methodological holism.
I believe this answer suffices as an answer to Collin. The case o f Niiniluoto 
(1999), however, is more complicated. Niiniluoto argues that to defend the kind o f 
openness to criticism that is required to save the constructivist view, a constructivist 
must, just as I have done above, ultimately appeal to the rules governing forms o f ac­
ceptable inferences and acceptable linguistic assertions. But, says Niiniluoto, then the 
constructivist cannot anymore build the argumentation on the point that social relativ­
ism regarding such rules is harmless. Surely we want to say that the collective can be 
collectively mistaken about, say, the principles of logic and mathematics or whether or 
not it is true to say that there is a cat on the mat. At least these practices must be objec­
tive in a more independent sense than intersubjective externality and hence, according 
to Niiniluoto, we must accept Popper’s postulation o f the emergent, independent World 
3. Niiniluoto presents this line o f thought as a criticism of social theories o f meaning 
and language (especially the so-called meaning finitism): In Niiniluoto’s mind the only 
way to make sense o f the community being wrong about, for example, forms o f deduc­
tive reasoning is to say that the true laws of logic exist independently in World 3, and 
our representations o f them can be true or false.
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This, I admit, is a serious criticism. Moreover, it takes us so deep into the phi­
losophy o f language that I cannot answer it satisfactorily here. However, Part III o f this 
dissertation can be seen as an answer to Niiniluoto’s criticism. For example, in III.3.3 I 
discuss -  and reject -  precisely the kind o f social relativism (under the label “naive 
communitarian view”) Niiniluoto has in mind and argue that my constructivism is not 
committed to anything like it. Moreover, I argue that actually it is Niiniluoto’s alterna­
tive, the idea that rule-governed practices ought to be understood in terms o f rules inde­
pendent o f the practices, that leads to grave problems. The details o f this argumentation, 
however, must wait until Part III and Appendix.
PART II:
THE EVOLUTION AND PSYCHOLOGY 
HOMO SOCIOLOGICUS
INTRODUCTION TO PART II
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In Summer Term 2001, Daniel C. Dennett gave a series of lectures and seminars at the 
London School o f Economics on the topic of the evolution of human freedom (pub­
lished as Dennett 2003). During those seminar meetings, Dennett once illustrated the 
basic dynamics o f natural selection by telling the following story: Once upon a time two 
friends were camping in the wilderness o f Alaska. One evening when the campers were 
relaxing by the campfire, they suddenly saw a huge bear approaching them. Naturally, 
they panicked. The first camper started very quickly to put his track shoes on. “Don’t be 
stupid”, cried the other camper, “surely you can’t outrun a bear even with your running 
shoes on!” The first camper, however, was not disturbed by the comment o f his com­
panion but just kept on tying his shoes: “But my dear friend, I don’t need to outrun the 
bear. It’s perfectly enough if I run faster than you)”*2
Dennett’s story illuminates aptly a feature that seems to be essential part o f evo­
lutionary dynamics, namely that the tendency to take care of one’s own survival at the 
expense of helping others is a behavioural trait evolution never fails to favour. Natural 
selection appears to promote egoistic and self-centred behaviour so strongly that we 
should expect non-calculating solidarity to be selected away rather soon. Defection pays 
better than philanthropy in the struggle for the survival o f the fittest. In short, evolution­
ary theory seems to dictate that all apparently altruistic or social behaviour must, ulti­
mately, be based on mechanisms which guarantee that the behaviour will on average 
lead to the best possible outcome from the individual perspective o f a single, egoistic 
agent, since otherwise such forms o f behaviour would have been selected away. As Pe­
ter Singer sums this up, “for a Darwinian there is a problem in assuming that individuals 
behave altruistically for the sake o f a larger group” (Singer 1999, 20).
Contrast this with the picture o f social action painted by my analysis o f collec­
tive we-mode action in Part 1.1 argued that the theory o f collective intentionality holds 
that the essence o f social action is such that the possible outcomes o f the combined ac­
tions of individuals are assessed in collectivistic terms o f considering what is optimal 
for the whole group, and individuals then derive their individual tasks from the collec­
tive level considerations. Consequently, the actions o f individuals may well be sub- 
optimal if assessed from the individualistic perspective, albeit optimal in the task o f re­
42 John Dupre (2001, footnote 19 on p. 43 & 2002, 198) tells a version o f the same anecdote. The moral 
Dupre draws from the story is, however, somewhat different from my treatment.
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alising the collective goal, i.e., precisely o f the kind Singer says a Darwinian has a prob­
lem with.
Should it, then, be concluded that the argumentation in favour o f irreducible col­
lective attitudes and action as presented in Part I is based on wishful and idealistic 
thinking -  on a refusal to take seriously the teachings o f evolutionary biology? Does the 
fact that human beings form a species that has evolved via natural selection imply that 
Searle must be fundamentally mistaken when he states that “the selectional advantage o f 
cooperative behavior [based on collective intentionality] is [...] obvious” (Searle 1995, 
38)? Or, to put it in other words, is a theory that operates with plural subjects in Gil­
bert’s (1989) sense actually evolutionarily impossible? I think the answer must be “no”; 
we-mode co-operation is not only a possible outcome o f evolutionary process, but also 
quite likely to have evolved (although, as I argue before, the selectional advantages o f 
we-mode co-operation are far from obvious but require a rather lengthy defence).
This Part aims to show how evolutionary dynamics are perfectly compatible 
with the strong thesis o f human sociality I am analysing and defending in this disserta­
tion. I will start by following Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson’s discussion on the 
evolution o f human altruism as presented in their book Unto Others: The Evolution and 
Psychology o f Unselfish Behavior (Sober & Wilson 1998). My aim is to use Sober and 
Wilson’s theory to show, pace Singer, how respectable evolutionary biology can fit in 
the same picture with the strongly collectivistic views on human sociality 1 defend.
Moreover, 1 will also show how independent social ontology and philosophy o f 
social action, building on collective we-mode attitudes -  rather than altruism (which is 
an individual-mode attitude, albeit directed towards others) -  as an ultimate motiva­
tional mechanism behind social behaviour, can also contribute to the development of 
Sober and Wilson’s theory. Thus, what is at stake in this Part of my study is not merely 
the question o f social solidarity versus self-centred egoism. Rather, the underlying issue 
is again the debate between (methodological) individualism and holism: are uncontest- 
able evolutionary facts compatible with and supportive o f the kind of holistic sociality 
the theory o f collective intentionality subscribes to? The main argument o f Part II is that 
not only is thw answer to that question positive; moreover, the evolutionary considera­
tions provide a very strong, general argument in favour o f  we-mode intentionality.
I start by examining whether evolution can favour forms o f behaviour that are 
fitness-maximising from the perspective o f the group an agent belongs to but sub- 
optimal from the perspective of the personal fitness o f the agent. Such behaviour would 
be evolutionarily altruistic.
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CHAPTER II. 1: 
EVOLUTIONARY EGOISM AND ALTRUISM
When we talk about egoism and altruism we usually have in mind psychological theo­
ries of motivation. An action -  even if it is an intentional act o f helping others -  is psy­
chologically egoistic if it is ultimately rationalised in terms o f the expected welfare (or 
pleasure) o f the agent performing the action. A psychological egoist may value the psy­
chological satisfaction and social esteem she gets from helping others so highly that she 
is willing to pay the price (putting herself in danger, not maximising her financial bene­
fits, or something similar) of helping others. However, in such a case the welfare of oth­
ers is not the ultimate goal o f the agent, and thus the action does not count as psycho­
logically altruistic. In contrast, the evolutionary concepts o f egoism and altruism do not 
involve intentional explanations of action at all. The evolutionary concepts concern 
solely the effects a given behaviour has on survival and reproduction {i.e., the fitness o f 
the agent). As Sober and Wilson put it, “[individuals who increase the fitness o f others 
at the expense o f their own fitness are (evolutionary) altruists, regardless o f how, or 
even whether, they think or feel about the action” (Sober & Wilson 1998, 6). In this sec­
tion I will concentrate on the evolutionary notions o f egoism and altruism, for behaviour 
associated with collective intentionality are unquestionably evolutionarily altruistic. The 
psychological question is addressed in Chapter II.2 onwards.
II. 1.1 GROUP SELECTION
To highlight the evolutionary problem of altruism, let us look at the following example 
(adopted from Sober & Wilson 1998, 19-21) o f a model that shows why we should not 
expect altruistic behaviour to evolve. To make the model simpler, let us first assume (i) 
asexual reproduction and (ii) that altruistic behaviour influences only reproduction. 
Thus, in what follows the number of offspring is a sufficient measure o f fitness, al­
though normally fitness is understood to include both the individual’s ability to survive 
and its ability to reproduce.
Consider a population o f n individuals such that there are two genetically en­
coded traits, altruism {A) that occurs with frequency p  and selfishness (5) occurring with 
frequency (1 -  p). Thus the number o f altruists in the group is np and the number o f 
non-altruists «(1 - p ) .  Moreover, let the average number o f offspring o f each individual 
in the absence o f altruistic behaviour be X, and the influence o f altruism be such that an
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individual behaving altruistically will cause itself to have c fewer offspring and a single 
other member o f the group to have b more offspring.
Hence, each altruist will experience the cost of its own altruistic behaviour ( -  c), 
but each altruist may also receive the benefit b as the result of altruistic behaviour o f 
some other altruistic member o f the group. However, the number o f possible benefac­
tors for each altruist is np -  1, whereas a non-altruist can receive benefits from np indi­
viduals. Since the altruists are dispensing their benefits among (n -  1) individuals, we 
get the following average fitnesses of each altruist ( Wa) and non-altruist (Ws):
WA= X - c +  [b(np —!) / ( »  — 1)]
Ws = X + [ b n p / ( n - \ ) ]
Obviously, Wa < Ws. Hence, altruism will be selected against within this population.
To make the result even clearer, let us look at a particular example (also from 
Sober & Wilson 1998) where the parameters o f the model get the following values:
>2 = 1 0 0  
p  = 0.5 
X =  10
b = 5 
c = 1
With these values the average fitnesses can be calculated as follows:
WA = 10 -  1 + [5(100 • 0.5 -  1) / (100 -  1)] = 9 + 245 / 99 -  11.47 
Ws = 10+ [(5 • 1 0 0 -0 .5 ) /(1 0 0 -  1)] = 10 + 2 5 0 /9 9 -  12.53
Hence, the presence o f altruism increases the average fitnesses o f all the members o f the 
population. Nevertheless, non-altruists benefit more than altruists, since non-altruists do 
not have to pay the price c. The total number o f offspring («’) is
n' = npWA + n(l -p )W s = (100 • 0.5 • 11.47) + (100(1 -0 .5 ) -  12.53) = 573.5 + 626.5 = 
1200.
Thus, the frequency o f altruists among the offspring (p ’) is
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p ' = npWA / n ' = (100 • 0.5 • 11.47) / 1200 ~ 0.478.
Obviously, p ’ < p, which is equivalent to saying that there is a selection force acting 
against altruism. Moreover, since the population cannot grow to infinity, let us assume 
that mortality returns the population to the size n = 100. Since it was assumed that altru­
ism does not affect survival, reduction of the population does not alter the frequency p 9 
of altruists and, hence, if  the procedure is repeated over many generations, the altruists 
will continue to decline in frequency and ultimately non-altruism will go into fixation. 
In other words, altruism will be selected away.
This model seems to suggest than altruism indeed cannot evolve, because natu­
ral selection never fails to promote evolutionary egoism. Note that since at this point we 
are talking about evolutionary concepts o f altruism and egoism, it is indeed true by defi­
nition that natural selection always favours egoism, since egoism was defined as behav­
iour that maximises the fitness o f the actor. Still, Sober and Wilson insist, the conclu­
sion does not follow: “On the contrary, it is easy to show that altruism can evolve when 
more than one group is present” (Sober & Wilson 1998, 23). To see how Sober and 
Wilson seek to justify their claim, let us look at the simple model o f the evolution of 
altruism Sober and Wilson provide as an example (Sober & Wilson 1998, 23-26).
Using the symbols introduced above, let us look at a population where
n = 200 
p  = 0.5 
X =  10 
b = 5 
c = 1
Let us this time assume that before reproduction takes place, the global population of 
size n divides into two separated sub-groups of sizes n\ and « 2  such that «i = « 2  = 100. 
Further, let us also assume that in this division altruists and non-altruists tend to associ­
ate with other altruists and non-altruists, respectively, such that p\ = 0.2 and p 2 = 0.8. 
Thus, when the individuals in the sub-groups (let us call them Group 1 and Group 2) 
reproduce, they produce the following outcomes:
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Group 1 
nj  =  100
Pi = 0.2
WA] = 10 -  1 + 5( 100 • 0.2 - 1) / (100 -  1) = 9 + 95 / 99 ~ 9.96 
WSj = 10 + (5 • 100 -0 .2 )/ (1 0 0 -1 )=  10+ 1 0 0 /9 9 -1 1 .0 1
= (100 • 0.2 • 9.96) + [100(1 -0 .2 )  • 11.01] = 199.2 + 880.8 = 1080 
p j9 = (100 • 0.2 • 9.96) / 1080 ~ 0.184
Group 2 
«2 = 100 
P2 =  0.8
WA2 = 10 -  1 + 5(100 • 0.8 - 1) / (100 -  1) = 9 + 395 / 99 ~ 12.99 
WS2 = 10 + (5 • 100 • 0.8) / (100 -  1) = 10 + 400 / 99 ~ 14.04 
n29 = (100 • 0.8 • 12.99) + [100(1 -0 .8 )  • 14.04] = 1039.2 + 280.8 = 1320 
p i  = (100 • 0.8 • 12.99) / 1320 ~ 0.787
And in the global population o f both groups taken together (n = 200), 
n' = « r  + n2' = 1080 + 1320 = 2400
p' = (p, ’ ■ «, ’+ pi  ' n2') / n' = (0.184 • 1080 + 0.787 • 1320) / 2400 -0 .5 1 6
Note that the sub-group with higher frequency o f altruists grows larger than the 
other group (rn2 > « i’), resulting altruists to increase in frequency in the global popula­
tion {p' > p). This is not, however, sufficient for showing how altruism can evolve, 
since both sub-groups behave just like the group in the one-group example: within each 
group, there is a selection force acting against altruism (p\ < p \ and p 2 < pi),  and hence 
natural selection will eliminate the altruists in both groups, just as was the case in the 
first example. The growth in the global frequency o f altruists will turn out to be a tran­
sient phenomenon.
Suppose, however, that after the first round o f reproduction the two sub-groups 
merge again to one global population only to be divided into two new sub-groups before 
producing the next generation. If this new division is again done in such a way that al­
truists tend to concentrate in one group, will be higher than p \  just like p ’ was 
higher than p.  Hence:
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If this process is repeated over many generations, altruists will gradually replace 
the selfish types, just as the selfish types replaced the altruists in the one-group 
example. O f course, we still must explain how, generation after generation, al­
truists tend to find themselves living with altruists, and selfish individuals tend 
to associate with other selfish individuals. [...] Altruism can evolve to the extent 
that altruists and nonaltruists become concentrated in different groups.
(Sober & Wilson 1998, 26.)
Thus, in Sober and Wilson’s model the necessary conditions for altruism to 
evolve are that (i) there must be a population o f groups, (ii) the groups vary in their pro­
portion of altruists, (iii) the groups with more altruists will produce more offspring (or 
be more fit) than groups with low proportion o f altruists and (iv) the population must be 
divided into relatively isolated groups (relatively isolated, since the groups must be 
mixed again for the formation o f new groups) (Sober & Wilson 1998, 26). O f these the 
only problematic prerequisite is (ii) (the variation o f groups in Sober and Wilson’s ter­
minology). However, it seems plausible to assume that organisms can develop devices 
for distinguishing between altruism and egoism, by learning from past experience or 
otherwise (see also Skyrms 1996 who discusses this under the heading o f correlation). 
Be that as it may, models in which even random variation appears to be sufficient are 
discussed below (and thus the condition (ii) does not seem to be necessary after all).
The conditions (i)-(iv) do not o f  course undermine the fact that evolutionary al­
truism is inescapably “maladaptive with respect to individual selection”, but, neverthe­
less, explicate when altruism can be “adaptive with respect to group selection. Altruism 
can evolve if the process of group selection is sufficiently strong.” (Sober & Wilson 
1998, 27.) Sober and Wilson mean that although the altruistic trait in question by defini­
tion indeed decreases the fitness of the individual possessing the trait, the group-level 
dynamics can nonetheless be such that the trait evolves. Although the trait is not benefi­
cial for the individual, it is natural to say that it is nevertheless beneficial for the whole 
group, or that the trait increases the fitness o f the group.
Sober and Wilson think that their group selection model reveals the group-level 
causal processes responsible for the evolution o f altruism, although they admit that the 
process can be seen also as a standard individual-level selection process. But the indi­
vidualistic perspective falls, according to Sober and Wilson, guilty of what they call the 
averaging fallacy, and fails to provide proper understanding o f the process. The indi­
vidualistic perspective involves calculating the average number of offspring o f ,4-types 
and 5-types across the sub-groups (thus looking only at the global population). In the 
example above, the result is that ,4-types have an average o f 12.38 offspring and 5-types 
an average o f 11.62 offspring. This averaging procedure, which does not change any
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facts o f the original two-group model, seems to hint that ^4-types evolve by normal indi­
vidual selection because on average, ^4-types are more fit than S-types. “In short, a sin­
gle trait can appear to be altruistic or selfish, depending on whether fitnesses are com­
pared within groups or averaged across groups and then compared” (Sober & Wilson 
1998, 32).43
Sober and Wilson think that the averaging approach is not able to say more than 
that in the one-group model, which was an example o f the evolution o f evolutionary 
selfishness, S-types were on average more fit than ^4-types but, miraculously, in the two- 
group model the very same ^4-types are on average more fit, whatever the causes o f  this 
are. The averaging approach is silent about the (causal) dynamics o f complex, multi­
group evolutionary processes, including the tension between the within-group selection 
force on the one hand and the between-group selection force on the other.
Sober and Wilson call, correctly in my mind, the averaging approach a fallacy 
due to its concentration on the net outcome and the corresponding blindness concerning 
the component factors that in fact determine the net outcome. Although the averaging 
approach is able to describe the correct outcome and even to explain it in some sense, I 
think it is clear that the group selection model offers a better explanation, since it gives 
us illuminating and more detailed information about the causal processes producing the
44outcome.
In their models of the evolution of altruism, mainstream evolutionary theorists 
tend to assume a population structure that fulfils the requirements o f group selection.45 
First, there is a large global population that divides into smaller sub-populations o f size 
n in which the interaction that determines fitness takes place. An individual’s fitness is 
assumed to depend on its own behaviour and the behaviour of its social partners (i.e.,
43 A paradigmatic example o f uncritical acceptance o f  the averaging fallacy is Matt Ridley’s popular book 
The Origins o f  Virtue (1996). Ridley (1996, 19) even claims that the so-called Price equation proves “in­
disputably” that apparently altruistic traits are, ultimately, evolutionarily egoistic. Thus Ridley (1996, 
175) concludes that “biologists have thoroughly undermined the whole logic o f  group selection. It is now 
an edifice without foundation.” The present Chapter shows how Ridley’s conclusion is mistaken. More­
over, Sober and Wilson (1998, 71-79) demonstrate how the Price equation is very explicit about the con­
tributions o f  both within-group and between-group selection forces to the outcome o f  natural selection. So 
instead o f proving group selection impossible, the Price equation is, pace  Ridley, one o f  its clearest ex­
pressions.
44 Sober and Wilson think that also other models o f the evolution o f  altruism that are commonly seen as 
alternatives to group selection, most notably kin selection (including the closely related selfish gene ap­
proach), are in a similar manner just different ways o f viewing evolution in populations o f  several sub­
groups. It is just that “the theories are formulated in a way that obscures the role o f  group selection” (So­
ber & Wilson 1998, 57). I will not enter into the discussion about the status o f  kin selection theory here. 
Sober and Wilson’s arguments how sibling groups form just the kind o f population structure needed for 
group selection to be effective can be found on pages 62 -  67 o f  their book; see also Skyrms (1996, 61) 
for a similar line o f  thought.
45 This applies fully also to Skyrms’ (1996) discussions.
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the fellow members o f the same sub-group). After the interaction has occurred, the sub­
groups dissolve and the individuals blend back into the global population to form new 
sub-groups. (Sober & Wilson 1998, 79-80.)
Let us look at a simple model where n = 2 {i.e., the division into sub-groups 
amounts simply to pairing up for the purposes o f a round of play). The possible out­
comes can then be presented in a simple 2 x 2  payoff matrix. Suppose that altruists {A) 
give their partner 4 fitness units at a cost o f 1 unit to themselves. Thus, when playing 
with a selfish type (S) an altruist suffers a loss of 1 fitness unit, and when paired with 
another altruist gets a net benefit of 3 units. The selfish type gets 4 units when playing 
with an altruist, otherwise nothing. When these possibilities are put into the payoff ma­
trix, we get the following matrix that obviously corresponds to the well-known social 
dilemma situation known as the Prisoners’ Dilemma:46
A
Individual I
S
Obviously, altruism has a low relative fitness within sub-groups (an altruist will 
never do better than its partner). However, the presence o f altruism increases the fitness 
o f the sub-group taken together (3 + 3 = 6 > 4  + (-1) = 3 > 0). Although this model is a 
standard group selection model for the evolution o f altruism -  the outcome depends on 
the amount of variation among groups -  biologists applying evolutionary game theory, 
however, tend to use in their calculations the individual fitnesses calculated by averag­
ing across groups as follows (using the notation o f Sober & Wilson 1998, where p\} is 
the proportion o f / types that interact with j  types):
W a = P a a ( 3 ) + P a s ( - \ )
Ws = /?s a (4) + pss(0)
It is tempting to conclude, as many game theorists indeed do, that A evolves by 
individual selection when Wa > Ws. In the light o f what has been said before it is, how­
ever, easy to see that such a conclusion would be a typical example o f the averaging fal­
Individual II 
A S
Both get 3 I gets -1 , II gets 4
I gets 4, II gets -1 Both get 0
46 The dilemma is usually called the Prisoner’s Dilemma, but in line with my emphasis on the group- 
perspective, I follow Bruno Verbeek (2002, 35-36) and talk about the Prisoners ’ Dilemma, since from the 
perspective o f  a single prisoner there is no dilemma: defection (5) is clearly the dominating strategy.
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lacy. Actually, what evolves depends on the relative strengths o f the within-group selec­
tion force for S and the between-group selection force for^L In the example the within- 
group selection force for S is so strong that if  individuals are randomly distributed into 
groups, A will not evolve. Or, as mainstream evolutionary game theorists would pre­
sumably like to put this, <S’s average fitness is higher and thus evolves by individual se­
lection. However, if the amount of variation among groups is increased, between-group 
selection will eventually become stronger -  causing A to have the higher average fitness 
-  and altruism will evolve. If  we concentrate on individual selection modelled by the 
average fitnesses, “self-interest is defined as whatever evolves in the model, and altru­
ism and group selection are defined out of existence” (Sober & Wilson 1998, 84). The 
averaging approach defines “individual selection” to be a synonym for “natural selec­
tion”.
Sober and Wilson have shown that altruism can evolve by group selection when 
there is a sufficient amount o f variation in fitness among groups, or to put it in other 
words, when there is a sufficient amount o f correlation so that altruists tend to group 
with other altruists (since in Sober and Wilson's models the proportion o f altruists cor­
relates with the variation in fitness). However, random groupings (or random variation) 
can also suffice for altruism to evolve, given that altruism entails only a modest disad­
vantage within sub-groups.
Consider one o f the most celebrated strategies (see, for example, Axelrod 1984 
and Singer 1994 & 1999) in evolutionary game theory, that o f Tit-for-Tat. Let us look 
again at a model where the size o f a sub-group n = 2 but the members o f the sub-groups 
interact with each other repeatedly before blending back into the global population. Tit- 
for-Tat is the strategy o f behaving altruistically in the first interaction and imitating the 
partner’s behaviour thereafter. The payoff matrix o f different pairings o f Tit-for-Tatters 
(7) and selfish types (»S) is as follows (assuming that an average of P  interactions take 
place within each group before the groups dissolve).
T
Individual I
S
Sober and Wilson observe that “[a]s before, groups o f altruists (TT) outperform mixed 
groups (TS), which in turn outperform groups o f selfish individuals (SS)” (Sober &
Individual II 
T S
Both get 3P I gets -1 , II gets 4
I gets 4, II gets -1 Both get 0
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Wilson 1998, 85). Group selection is still needed for T to evolve, since T can never do 
better than S when they are paired against each other. Nevertheless, random groupings 
(random variation in Sober and Wilson’s terminology) appear to be sufficient for altru­
ism to evolve.
For those who have become comfortable with the multilevel framework, it is 
child’s play to see the groups in evolutionary game theory, calculate relative fit­
nesses within and between groups, and determine what evolves on the basis of 
the balance between levels o f selection.
(Sober & Wilson 1998,85.)
Of course it is once again possible to calculate the average fitnesses o f compet­
ing strategies across groups and insist that individual selection causes T to evolve. The 
averaging process, however, falls again guilty o f hiding the relevant dynamics o f the 
model, and, hence, insofar as it guides one to think that Tit-for-Tat is a selfish strategy, 
it is a seriously misleading way o f looking at the process. This can be easily seen from 
the payoff matrix, which, as mentioned, shows that T can never win a paired encounter 
(and S can never lose), but groups o f T do so much better than other groups that T can, 
nevertheless, evolve.47
Sober and Wilson’s conclusion is twofold. First, their model o f group selection 
can resolve the puzzle of the evolution of (evolutionary) altruism. Second, the process 
o f group selection does not include any features unacceptable for a naturalistic biologist. 
Group selection in Sober and Wilson’s sense is a natural process that is most probably 
rather common in nature (see the empirical evidence discussed in Sober & Wilson 
1998). Moreover, although sibling groups can offer exactly the kind o f population struc­
ture required for group selection, the group selection theory does not restrict altruistic 
behaviour to relatives. Hence the theory appears tailor-made for resolving the evident 
tension between the observed co-operative behavioural tendencies among certain social 
animals (including humans) and the theoretical implications of the uncritical rejection of 
group selection theories in favour o f kin selection in contemporary biology.
A good example o f this is Anne E. Pusey’s (2002) puzzlement regarding the so­
cial behaviour o f our close relatives, chimpanzees. Pusey observes that intergroup hos-
47 As a matter o f  historical interest, Sober and Wilson (1998, 85 ff.) provide evidence for the claim that 
Anatol Rapoport, the inventor o f  Tit-for-Tat, saw the strategy as an example o f  altruism that evolves by 
group selection in Sober and Wilson’s sense. Moreover, Robert A. Axelrod concludes his report on his 
famous computer Prisoners’ Dilemma tournaments won by Tit-for-Tat, followed by other strategies that 
are “nice” (i.e., that are never the first to defect), as follows: “The nice rules did well in the tournament 
largely because they did so well with each other, and because there were enough o f  them to raise substan­
tially each other’s average score” (Axelrod 1984, 35). Obviously also this is highly compatible with the 
group selection interpretation favoured by Sober and Wilson -  also Axelrod is forced to refer to the sub­
structure o f the global population in order to explain the average fitnesses.
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tility and intragroup co-operation are characteristic features o f chimpanzee groups 
(Pusey 2002, 17). Pusey (2002, 25-26 & 33) also points out explicitly that the constant 
within-group co-operation among unrelated male chimpanzees poses a problem for the 
kin selection orthodoxy o f contemporary biology. For a group-selectionist, o f course, 
there is no problem here -  especially since, as Pusey herself explains in the very same 
article, chimpanzees typically live in a “fission-fusion society, in which the individuals 
o f the community spend some time alone and frequently join and leave temporary sub­
groups” (Pusey 2002, 14; see also Stanford 2002, 100). Moreover, Pusey observes that 
although such a social system “is unusual among primates and mammals in general” it 
“does occur in lions, hyenas, elephants, spider monkeys, and humans” (Pusey 2002, 14) 
which are all paradigmatic examples o f a highly social species. In sum, these social spe­
cies tend to (i) exhibit altruistic behaviours that are not explainable in terms o f individ­
ual or kin selection and (ii) characteristically live in the kind o f fission-fusion societies 
required for the group-level selection o f altruistic sociality. As a good kin-selectionist 
Pusey sees here a problem. I do not.48
Thus, it seems that Sober and Wilson’s group selection theory is exactly what is 
needed for an evolutionary explanation o f human sociality (including the biological ba­
sis o f collective intentionality). Nevertheless, before I can go on to discuss the relevance 
o f Sober and Wilson’s theorising for social ontology and action, let us look at Samir 
Okasha’s criticism o f Sober and Wilson’s programme. Okasha provides, I believe, an 
important insight that helps to see more clearly the ontological status o f group selection. 
The moral I draw from Okasha’s argumentation is, however, quite different from the 
objectives of his original discussion.
11.1.2 THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF GROUP SELECTION
Okasha (2001) addresses the question concerning the ontological status o f the group se­
lection processes in Sober and Wilson’s sense. Sober and Wilson argue that their theory 
describes a group-level process analogical to individual selection where groups play the
48 Kitcher (1998) shares my suggestion that the known facts about the strong sociality o f  the Great Apes 
and about the typical structure o f  the groups they live in might support the importance o f group selection 
in the evolutionary explanations o f sociality. O f course the question concerning the role group selection in 
fact played in the evolution o f  the social traits o f humans and other animals is a question I must leave to 
biologists. A very recent review o f these issues concludes that although the question is still somewhat 
open, empirical estimates show that the genetic structure o f  early human groups were such that they could 
account for the evolution o f human sociality via a group selection process (Bowles 2006). Be that as it 
may, this Part shows that evolutionary considerations do not speak against the we-mode view o f  this 
study but rather support it.
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roles of individuals. However, what really matter in the group selection models are 
normal individual interactions in temporary groupings. All the actions that take place in 
the models are interactions between individuals. Moreover, the fact that Sober and Wil­
son’s theory treats as any temporary sub-group within a larger population where indi­
viduals “influence each other’s fitness with respect to a certain trait but not the fitness o f 
those outside the group” (Sober & Wilson 1998, 93) shows that the term “group” in So­
ber and Wilson’s theory is used to pick out a class very different from the class o f  
groups in any socially significant sense. Groups in Sober and Wilson’s sense may have 
no role whatsoever outside evolutionary models: they are not what we mean by social
49groups.
Hence, I think it is reasonable to conclude that Sober and Wilson’s model is not 
a model o f group-level processes as such. It is not the behaviour of groups as independ­
ent entities that is at stake, but that o f individuals, and the system o f organising the rela­
tions between interacting individuals. Sober and Wilson’s group selection does not op­
erate at some higher ontological level. The operative processes are essentially -  onto- 
logically -  individualistic; that is, they take place between individual organisms. Sober 
and Wilson simply show that sometimes the outcome o f a series o f such processes is 
influenced crucially by the groupings o f these individual interactions, and that behav­
iour that benefits the group can be selected. Nonetheless, for a group selection process 
to be truly a group level process there should be real group reproduction and group 
heritability. These features, however, are missing from Sober and Wilson’s theory 
(Okasha 2001,35).
Sober and Wilson do not want to accept this interpretation but commit them­
selves to a serious attempt to show that it does indeed make sense to talk about group 
heritability and group reproduction within their model (Sober & Wilson 1998, 110 ffi). 
Be that as it may, I tend to agree with Okasha that even if  it is possible to apply the con­
cepts of group reproduction and group heritability in Sober and Wilson’s model, this 
possibility is in fact irrelevant to the issue o f group selection. After all, Sober and Wil­
son’s fundamental motivation for the introduction o f group selection models is the need
49 Note that this is highly compatible with the present suggestion that group selection in Sober and Wil­
son’s sense can explain the evolution o f collective intentionality: Sober and Wilson’s theory can justify 
Searle’s seemingly circular (recall Part I) claim that although collective intentionality is a fundamental 
building block o f  social reality including social groups (Searle 1995), nonetheless “collective intentional­
ity seems to presuppose some level o f sense o f  community before it can ever function” (Searle 1990, 
413). However, the “sense o f community” assumed in Sober and Wilson’s model is based on interactions 
quite independent o f  groups in any socially significant sense and hence do not presuppose the existence o f  
social groups. Correspondingly, the fact that Sober and Wilson’s theory does not operate with socially 
significant groups must in the present context be seen as a virtue o f the theory.
92
to explain the evolution o f altruism, which is a trait o f an individual (albeit social in the 
sense of being directed towards others), not of a group. Moreover, since the concept of 
fitness applied in the model is the average individual fitness o f the organisms in a 
group, and not the group’s propensity to leave offspring groups, the notion o f group 
heritability appears indeed to be irrelevant (Okasha 2001, 40-41).
The whole idea o f “benefiting the group” that plays such a crucial role in Sober 
and Wilson’s theorising is not measured by an individual’s capacity to cause a “group to 
leave more offspring groups”, but whether an individual will cause “the individuals in 
the group to leave more individual offspring” (Okasha 2001, 43). Hence, when Sober 
and Wilson conclude that “[a]t the behavioral level, it is likely that much o f what people 
have evolved to do is fo r the benefit o f the group” (Sober and Wilson 1998, 194), this 
means simply that understanding the dynamics o f a group-level selection force allows 
us to see that acting for the common good o f one’s group, even at the expense o f one’s 
own fitness, is a strategy that can be, and most probably has been, selected during the 
course o f evolutionary history.
Thus, I think that Sober and Wilson succeed in showing the importance o f expli­
cating the social dynamics in the models o f the evolution o f group-behaviours, but their 
theory should nonetheless be understood as supporting ontological individualism (OI) in 
social ontology. When Sober and Wilson insist that their group selection theory is a the­
ory about the behaviour o f groups, they are in a sense misrepresenting their own theory. 
In Sober and Wilson’s models the only functional units are individuals, not some meta­
physically questionable social objects at a new ontological level.
Although the group selection theory subscribes to ontological individualism, it 
does speak against methodological individualism in its standard form. The theory points 
towards exactly the kind o f view reaching beyond the traditional individualism versus 
holism debate that also the collective intentionality theorists are envisaging. The group 
selection theory suggests that although there are no group agents, we should not under­
stand individuals as disparate social atoms either. Rather, the theory supports the plau­
sibility of seeing humans as social animals. By this I mean that we should expect hu­
mans to be inclined to perform actions the rationality of which cannot be understood if 
humans are seen simply as individuals acting strategically to maximise their own indi­
vidual benefits. The group selection theory hints that some forms o f behaviour can be 
understood as rational action only when we see the behaviours essentially as intercon­
nected tasks that are derived from a collective goal, and cease to consider the behav-
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iours as private strategies for private goals. Group selection favours social behaviour 
that follows collective-level rationality.
Thus, the group selection arguments for evolutionary altruism suggest that the 
picture of human sociality appropriate for explanations of human social behaviour is not 
the picture one finds in standard rational choice models. Some forms o f behaviour can 
be understood only when the agent is seen essentially as a member o f her group, i.e.9 in 
the we-mode. To put this in Gilbert’s terminology, some actions may be properly under­
stood only when the individual performing the action is seen as a member and constitu­
ent of a plural subject.
The reason why this view is only suggested and not implied by the group selec­
tion arguments is that so far I have discussed only the evolutionary concepts o f altruism 
and egoism. However, we explain human action in psychological terms o f beliefs, de­
sires and intentions. As emphasised above, the evolutionary arguments presented so far 
consider only the fitness consequences o f different behavioural strategies regardless o f 
the psychological states associated with those strategies. It is possible that even if  hu­
man evolution has favoured (evolutionarily) altruistic behaviour, the psychological 
processes involved are nonetheless egoistic (or at least individualistic) in nature.
This idea is familiar from several traditions in the history o f philosophy. The 
great Swedish natural philosopher Carl von Linne (Linnaeus) argued that the divine or­
der o f the world guarantees that individuals seeking their own benefit will unintention­
ally follow God’s plan, realising thus also the collectively optimal state o f affairs (see, 
for example, Larson 1971). Early liberalists, such as the Finnish economist/philosopher 
Anders Chydenius (1765/1994), accepted this idea, or, like the Scottish philosopher 
Adam Smith, aimed to give it a more naturalistic account in terms o f the doctrine o f the 
invisible hand.50 Similar ideas can also be found in the context o f classical German ide­
alism, within which it was argued that sometimes individualistic actions must be under­
stood as participating in the collectively rational action of the objective spirit.
However, ontological individualism compels us to abandon such ontologically 
dubious solutions -  with the exception o f the invisible hand doctrine. Thus the question 
is whether evolutionarily altruistic behaviour, selected by a group selection process, can 
be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of exclusively egoistic and individualistic psy­
chology. We shall see Sober and Wilson arguing that this cannot be done; psychological
50 Although Smith is routinely seen as a methodological individualist, Robert Sugden (2002, 82) argues 
convincingly that Smith’s notion o f  fellow-feeling is after an idea similar to the collective we-mode. If 
Sugden is correct, then Smith might actually have agreed with the anti-individualistic view reaching be­
yond the rational choice framework that I defend in the next Chapter.
altruism as an ultimate human motivation must be assumed. However, as can be antici­
pated, I argue that even psychological altruism is not sufficient. A naturalised version o f 
the Durkheimian collective consciousness is needed -  we must reject Individualistic 
Accounts in favour o f the collective intentionality view o f Part I. These considerations 
form the topic o f Chapter II.2.
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CHAPTER II.2
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL ACTION51
Evolution can select traits and patterns of behaviour that do not maximise the individual 
fitness of the agent. Thus, if the explanatory question we are interested in is why indi­
viduals perform behaviours that benefit the group the individuals in question belong to 
but decrease the personal fitness of the individual performing the behaviour, the answer 
may be that during the (biological and/or cultural) evolutionary history o f humans group 
selection was such an effective force that such behaviour was indeed selected, despite 
the individualistic within-group selection force acting against it. However, sometimes 
this is not the kind o f explanation we want. We may rather be interested in the nature of 
the psychological processes underlying the action in question. If this is the case, the an­
swer should be stated in terms o f the intentions, beliefs and desires people have. In 
short, we are not interested only in evolutionary explanations o f patterns o f behaviour. 
Sometimes we are after psychological explanations o f actions.
Let us begin the quest for psychological explanations of evolutionarily altruistic 
actions with Sober and Wilson’s question: Are human motives always ultimately self­
directed or are we sometimes motivated by other-directed considerations? In Sober and 
Wilson’s terminology a person’s psychological motives are self-directed if the ultimate 
goal of the person’s actions is to maximise her own benefits and well-being. Similarly, a 
person’s motives are other-directed if she is concerned about the well-being o f others as 
an end in itself. Thus:
Psychological egoism is the theory that all our ultimate desires are self-directed; 
(...) psychological altruism maintains that we sometimes care about others for 
their own sakes. The theories agree that people sometimes want others to do 
well; the debate concerns whether such desires are always instrumental or are 
sometimes ultimate. (Sober & Wilson 1998, 201.)
Note that egoism is by definition a strictly monistic theory. Egoism says that all the ul­
timate motivations are self-directed: we perform other-directed actions only as means to 
our more fundamental self-directed goals. Altruism, in contrast, is essentially a plural­
istic theory o f motivation: it says that although self-interest no doubt often explains our 
behaviour, we also have other ultimate reasons for action.
The pluralism o f altruism is very important from the point o f view o f my disser­
tation. I argue that there is no a priori reason to restrict the ultimate ends an agent may
51 This Chapter expands on Saaristo (2007).
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have exclusively to egoistic ends on the one hand and altruistic ends on the other. Psy­
chological pluralism can go further by accepting also some other ultimate ends, such as 
the benefit or well-being o f a group. Moreover, I argue that we need a view that allows 
not only pluralism in terms o f the directedness o f intentional attitudes, but also in terms 
o f the mode in which the attitudes are held. However, in order to demonstrate the impor­
tance of pluralism in terms o f the modes o f attitudes, it is important to see why Sober 
and Wilson’s pluralism in terms o f the directedness o f attitudes is not sufficient. This is 
the aim of the next section.
II.2.1 AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE
How can we tell whether intentional attitudes that explain altruistic actions are always 
ultimately self-directed or sometimes also other-directed? Since neuroscience does not 
answer this question (and arguably cannot even in principle, see Part III), the most 
straightforward way o f finding out the answer appears to be to construct psychological 
experiments that provide direct evidence concerning motivational mechanisms. How­
ever, psychological work has not been able to achieve a consensus in this matter (see 
Chapter 8 of Sober and Wilson 1998 for a review o f a number o f psychological studies 
— my own analysis o f the prospects o f such empirical approaches is given in II.3 and
III.5.3 below).
Moreover, it is practically impossible to distinguish between psychologically al­
truistic and psychologically egoistic desires insofar as we allow egoism to appeal to 
purely internal rewards such as feelings o f satisfaction when behaving (seemingly) al­
truistically. Desires seem to be such that in most cases we can expect that the realisation 
o f a desired state o f affairs will bring feelings o f satisfaction regardless of the directed­
ness of the desire. Thus, the mechanism of internal rewards in terms o f satisfaction al­
lows an egoist to insist that an advocate o f altruism cannot falsify the egoistic theory. 
An altruist, on the other hand, could say that the satisfaction derived from fulfilled de­
sires is part o f the nature o f our intentional psychology in general, and has nothing to do 
with the question o f the directedness o f our motives.52 In other words, it is not clear 
what solid evidence for or against psychological egoism would even look like.
52 For a similar line o f  thought, see Rachels’ (1986, Chapter 5) “Psychological Egoism”. Rachels con­
cludes that “if  someone desires the welfare and happiness o f  other people, he will derive satisfaction from 
helping them; but this does not mean that those feelings are the object o f  his desire. They are not what he 
is after. Nor does it mean that he is in any way selfish on account o f  having those feelings.” (Rachels 
1986, 60.)
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Since direct empirical evidence has not been able to solve the problem o f psy­
chological egoism and altruism, let us use as a point of departure what Sober and Wil­
son (1998, 298) call an indirect method o f addressing the question and analyse evolu­
tionary models o f social action. The problem this method concentrates on is an evolu­
tionary design problem. What kind o f psychological mechanism is the most plausible 
candidate to be the device that has evolved to be responsible for evolutionarily altruistic 
action?
Note that all the competing views here, i.e., self-directed (egoism), other- 
directed (altruism) and we-mode psychology (collective intentionality), differ from each 
other only in their representations of ultimate attitudes, not in the physiological devices 
they require from the agents the views apply to. Thus there should be no considerable 
differences in terms o f availability or energetical efficiency either (cf. Sober and Wilson 
1998, 320-327). Hence, when considering which o f the competing views has the highest 
degree o f evolutionary plausibility as a theory o f the central psychological mechanism 
explaining evolutionarily altruistic actions, we can concentrate exclusively on reliabil­
ity. The psychological mechanism that turns out to be the most reliable device for pro­
ducing evolutionarily altruistic action is the one that we should think o f as the most 
plausible candidate to be the mechanism that in fact has evolved for that purpose.
It is, of course, crucial for my argument that Sober and Wilson are correct in 
claiming that there are no differences in terms of availability and energetical efficiency 
between the competing mechanisms. Optimality arguments, such as my concentration 
on reliability, can explain only why we should expect the evolution o f the most optimal 
o f the traits that were available in a given population. Needless to say, such a trait may 
not be the most optimal trait we can imagine. As Sober (1993, 120) puts it, 
“[ajdaptationists might expect zebras to evolve from Slow to Fast but will not expect 
them to evolve machine guns with which to counter lion attacks”. However, the compet­
ing psychological mechanisms, unlike the mechanisms needed for running and for pro­
ducing machine guns, do not differ in terms of the equipment and devices they require. 
Hence the deciding factor is reliability.53
At this point I must add a word of warning. In what follows my arguments con­
centrate on evolutionary dynamics purely in the abstract. In this part I do not even take a 
stand on whether the evolutionary dynamics I analyse should be understood as biologi-
53 If this conclusion turns out to be false, my conceptual reliability arguments need to be completed by 
biological studies concerning availability and energetical efficiency. Such a completion would not, o f  
course, undermine the plausibility o f  the reliability arguments discussed in this study.
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cal or cultural evolution.54 Recall how Section 1.1.5 identified two possible ways o f un­
derstanding the nature o f intentionality: the Wittgensteinian account that sees intention­
a lly  essentially as a social institution and the anti-Wittgensteinian picture o f intention­
ality as a biological feature o f the brain. This huge issue was left open in Part I. Simi­
larly, in this Part I want my arguments to be relevant for all philosophers interested in 
the nature o f rational social action.
Thus, if  one thinks, as for example Searle does, that intentionality is an internal, 
biological feature o f the brain, then my arguments can be interpreted as applicable to 
standard biological evolution of causally efficacious natural properties. If one is more 
inclined, in the manner of, for example, John Haugeland (1990), to consider intentional­
ity as a social institution, then my evolutionary arguments should be interpreted in terms 
o f the cultural evolution o f social institutions and norms. The question o f the ontologi­
cal nature o f intentionality, including its implications for the philosophy o f mind and 
intentional explanation, is addressed in Part III.
II.2.2 SOCIAL DILEMMAS: THE UTILITY TRANSFORMATION RULES
Although Sober and Wilson see the goal o f their defence o f the plausibility o f both evo­
lutionary and psychological altruism to be the creation o f a naturalistic and robust the­
ory of the foundations of human sociality, their argumentation in favour o f psychologi­
cal altruism is conducted in terms of human parental care, which is not a paradigmatic 
example o f human sociality. After all, parental care is both strictly limited in its scope 
and, arguably, largely based on blind instincts instead of deliberations with conceptual 
content. Both features are clearly uncharacteristic of human sociality as we know it. 
When we turn our attention to paradigmatically social cases that I call social dilemma 
situations, Sober and Wilson’s arguments in favour o f other-directed altruism will be 
found wanting.
The first thing to notice is that although Sober and Wilson talk about other- 
directed altruism in the sense o f preferring someone else’s benefit in comparison with 
one’s own benefits, also for them it is often group-directed sociality (in the sense o f
54 My discussion builds largely on the views o f  Sober and Wilson (1998) for whom the context is mainly 
biological evolution. However, they share the view that what matters is the basic structure o f  group selec­
tion, regardless o f  whether this structure is instantiated in a biological or cultural process. After all, Sober 
and Wilson base their theory largely on the Price equation which, as Knudsen (2004) argues, offers an 
account o f selection without any explicit biological content, being thus in principle applicable also to non- 
biological evolutionary processes. A good example o f  this is Wilson’s (2002) own later work, which is an 
application o f  the ideas o f Sober and Wilson (1998) to purely cultural processes.
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asking what is the best behaviour for maximising the benefit o f one’s group, including 
the actor) that matters. As opposed to an altruistic agent, a group-directed agent is not 
asking herself how to maximise someone else’s benefit, but what to do to maximise our 
benefits, how to act qua a group-member: “Behaving as part o f a coordinated group is 
sometimes a life-or-death matter in which the slightest error -  or the slightest reluctance 
to participate -  can result in disaster for all” (Sober & Wilson 1998, 335-336). Or else­
where, even more clearly: “The T  is defined by relating it to a ‘we.’ Human beings 
don’t simply belong to groups; they identify with them. This is an important fact about 
human experience.”55 (Sober & Wilson 1998, 233.) This is indeed the kind o f sociality 
we are after, not parental care. It will trun out that Sober and Wilson’s defence o f psy­
chological altruism fails to account for this.
Thus, the basic problem here concerns the most reliable candidate for the inten­
tional mechanism rationalising the kind o f social action that makes possible the rise of 
social reality with robust social institutions and social facts (and which is selected by 
group selection), not the explanation o f parental care. Accordingly, instead o f looking at 
parental care, I follow an influential tradition in social philosophy and accept that the 
problem boils down to the problem o f achieving collectively rational solutions in so- 
called social dilemma situations.56 I define a social dilemma situation by following a 
general description provided by Raimo Tuomela (Tuomela’s “collective action di­
lemma” can here be understood as a synonym for my “social dilemma situation”):57
The problem of collective action or a collective action dilemma is a dilemma or 
conflict between collectively and individually best action, where the action re­
quired for achieving the collectively best outcome or goal is different from (and 
in conflict with) the action required for achieving the individually best outcome. 
Or, as we may also put it, means-end rational action realizing what is collec­
tively best is in conflict with means-end rational action realizing what is indi­
vidually] best.
(Tuomela 2000, 258.)
In a social dilemma situation agents need to find a way to co-operate so that they 
can achieve the collectively (socially) best outcome even when from each agent’s indi-
55 Obviously, this supports not only group-directedness but also the plausibility o f  we-mode collectivism, 
i.e., the possibility o f  having we-mode desires qua a member o f  a group, regardless o f  the content and 
directedness o f those desires (see Part I and Section II.2.4 below). Moreover, Sober and Wilson’s explicit 
appeal to the notion o f  social identification points directly to social identity theories in social psychology, 
which are, as I argue in II.3 below, best understood in the context o f  we-mode notions.
56 For an extensive discussion and arguments in favour o f  this tradition, see, for example, Hardin (1982) 
and M. Taylor (1987).
57 For Tuomela this description is just a general illustration o f  such a situation; much o f  Chapter 10 o f  
Tuomela (2000) is devoted to defining in detail what is a collective action dilemma. For my purposes, 
however, the informal description suffices.
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vidual point o f view the best strategy for maximising the expected individual benefits is 
not to co-operate, i.e., to defect. I call the co-operative strategy C and defection D. 
Moreover, I concentrate on the strongest (in terms o f conflict) kind o f social dilemma 
situation, famously exemplified by the one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) game. No 
doubt some weaker problems would also be o f considerable interest to discuss in the 
present context, but since my problem is the reliability of psychological motivational 
mechanisms for producing mutual co-operation in social dilemma situations, I need to 
tackle the problem in its strongest form. And that is exemplified by one-shot PDs.58 
So let us look at the payoff structure o f a standard one-shot PD game:
(PD)
C
Player 1
D
Let us assume that players 1 and 2 recognise the payoff structure PD, formed by the ob­
jective and external features o f the situation. These objective features form the given 
utilities of the agents. In what follows these are represented such that stands for 
player k's given utilities o f the outcome created by player 1 playing the strategy i and 
player 2 the strategy j . 59 In the present context o f a two-person PD the parameters i and 
j  must be either C or Z), while k can be either 1 or 2. For example, player 1 ’s utility in 
the outcome produced by both players playing C is ucci= 3- In the above PD udcj = 4, 
ucci ~ 3, uddj = 2 and ucdi = 1 and, similarly, uqd2 ~ 4, «cc2 = 3, udd2 = 2 and udc2 = 1 • 
Thus, both player 1 and player 2 will reason that whatever the other player is going to 
play, she herself will maximise her expected utility by playing D, resulting to the collec­
58 Sometimes it is argued (e.g., M. Taylor 1987) that a one-shot PD cannot exemplify a social dilemma 
situation realistically, since in social life we quite probably will face similar dilemmas over and over 
again, and, hence, we should talk only about repeated PD games. However, we have already seen (II.1.1) 
that the repetition simply brings in the standard structure o f  group selection models, and the successful 
behaviour in a repeated PD game that appears to be egoistic is in fact evolutionarily altruistic, the selec­
tion o f  which requires group selection. For the present psychological discussion this implies that success­
ful strategies in repeated PD games, because o f  their evolutionarily altruistic nature, already presuppose a 
psychological mechanism capable o f  explaining altruistic actions. Hence, to use such games in the present 
context would beg the question. Moreover, humans exhibit co-operative social behaviour also in cases 
where they are not likely to interact with the same partners in the future. I think that this is a sufficient 
answer to the worry concerning the justification o f my concentration on one-shot games, but I will none­
theless return to this problem in II.2.4 both in the context o f  Tit-for-Tat strategies and in the context o f  the 
so-called argument from long-term considerations.
59 This notation is a simplified version o f  the notation o f Tuomela (2000, 219 ff. and, especially, pp. 281 
ffi), whose line o f  thought my discussion partly follows.
Player 2 
C D
3,3 1,4
4,1 2,2
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tive outcome DD. In this manner individually rational deliberations will in a PD game 
produce a collectively sub-optimal result.
I read Sober and Wilson as arguing that the design problem o f the nature of our 
ultimate psychological motivations can be formulated as the question o f how the players 
transform the objective features o f the situation (the given utilities) into motivationally 
effective utilities u ’-,jk upon which the agents act. The crucial presuppositions60 in Sober 
and Wilson’s argumentation are that the given utilities uyk represent external rewards 
and, moreover, that the agents are not required to act on those utilities, but instead they 
are allowed to form their effective utilities u)jk in accordance with how they personally 
value different possible reward distributions.
Since we are here especially interested in to what extent the agents are disposed 
to let the considerations concerning the other agent’s benefits enter into their own deci­
sion making, we can follow Tuomela (2000, 281) and represent player l ’s effective 
utilities u'yi as the sum auyj + buy2, where the parameters a and b can have the values 
from -1 to 1. As Tuomela puts it, although such a linear model can at best be “empiri­
cally approximate’', it nonetheless “serves to give conceptual illumination” (Tuomela 
2000, 281), which is what I am after in this dissertation. Moreover, let us look at the 
“pure” cases in which a and b can only have the values -1 , 0, and 1. Looking at the 
situation from player 1 ’s perspective, we get the following 9 possible utility transforma­
tion rules:
a b
(i) -1 -1 C
.' II 1 c 1 c K> (group-sacrifice)
0 0 -1 0 U ’ ijl =  -  U j j , (self-sacrifice)
(iii) -1 1 u ’ ijl =  -  U j j ,  +  U j j2 (self-sacrificial altruism)
(iv) 0 -1 u ’ ijl =  -  U i j2 (aggression)
(v) 0 0 u ’ ijl = 0 (apathy)
(vi) 0 1 u ’ ijl =  U ij2 (altruism or other-directedness)
(vii) 1 -1 U ’ ijl =  U j j ]  -  U ij2 (competition)
(viii) 1 0 U ’ ijl =  U j j i (egoism or self-directedness)
(ix) 1 1 U ’ ijl = U j j i  + U j j 2 (group-directedness)
O f these 9 possible “pure” psychological mechanisms for adjusting oneself to a social 
interaction situation it is, obviously, cases (vi), (viii) and (ix) that have direct bearing on
60 These presuppositions will be discussed -  and rejected -  below. Let us, however, play along for a while 
since it allows me to show where exactly Sober and Wilson go wrong in their defence o f  psychological 
altruism and why collective we-mode concepts are needed.
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the present discussion. To resolve Sober and Wilson’s design problem we must examine 
which o f the three rules is the most reliable rule for transforming the given utilities that 
form a PD situation into such effective utilities that will guide the players to realise the 
collectively rational universal co-operation outcome CC.
Case (viii), egoism, recognises the given utilities also as the effective utilities. 
Thus, when two egoistic players face a social dilemma situation exemplified by PD, 
both players figure out that whatever the other player does, the agent herself will be bet­
ter off by playing D. The result is, o f course, universal defection and a socially inferior 
outcome, which, moreover, is the second worst also from the individual point o f view of 
each player. Thus, egoistic motivations fail to provide collectively rational action in so­
cial dilemma situations such as PD.
Case (vi), altruism, is more interesting. If  both players in a PD game are altru­
ists, the payoff matrix PD’ o f their final, i.e., transformed effective utilities, can be rep­
resented as follows:
(PD’ -  two altruists)61
C
Player 1
D
Here player 1 will reason that whatever the other player does, she can better realise her 
altruistic goal by playing C, and similarly for player 2. Thus, two altruistic players 
should end up in the collectively optimal outcome CC. Are we to conclude, then, that 
psychological altruism is indeed a reliable mechanism for providing collectively ra­
tional outcomes? I do not think so. The peculiar feature of reciprocal altruism as a solu­
tion to social dilemma situations is that although it leads to CC, both players will also 
feel unsatisfied with the result. This is due to the fact that as altruists both players would 
prefer the situation where she herself plays C and the other player plays D  to the univer-
f\0sal co-operation outcome CC. This is why psychological altruism cannot be a reliable
61 The label PD’ might be a bit misleading, since the game is not a PD game anymore. However, the label 
is simply meant to indicate that the new game is formed from a PD game by applying a utility transforma­
tion rule.
62 Compare this to the somewhat perverse game between an altruist and an egoist. Whatever strategy the 
other player follows, the altruist will reach her ends better by playing C and the egoist by playing D. The 
resulting outcome is CD  in which the egoist ruthlessly exploits the altruist and both players prefer this 
situation to any other possible outcome. They manage to solve the PD in a psychologically satisfactory 
way, but this combination o f psychological mechanisms cannot produce a socially bearable -  or indeed 
stable -  outcome (or behaviour selectable in a group-selection process).
Player 2 
C D
3,3 4,1
1,4 2,2
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device for rational production o f socially optimal outcomes in social dilemma situa­
tions.
Suppose that when two altruists transform the original PD into PD’ in accor­
dance with their altruistic inclinations they do not act immediately on their transformed 
utilities but are able to contemplate also the new payoff matrix PD’. Player 1 may now 
reason that if they both play C as the transformed utilities would imply, she cannot (for 
the reason stated above) be satisfied with the outcome. Moreover, player 1 may con­
tinue her reasoning and infer that player 2 will no doubt play C. If  player 1 will indeed 
reach this conclusion about the expected behaviour o f player 2, player 1 will also realise 
that the rule (vi) says that as an altruist she in fact must play D, since that will maximise 
the benefit o f player 2. The twist here is o f course that player 2 may engage in exactly 
similar reasoning, and hence they may end up in the mutual defection outcome DD. 
This is what Tuomela (2000, 288) calls “the Altruist’s first dilemma”.
As Tuomela’s naming o f the dilemma suggests, there is also another problem 
that altruists will have to face. It is also possible that after the players have transformed 
their utilities and formed PD’, the players will not act on those utilities even in the sense 
o f the Altruist’s first dilemma. Rather, the agents may realise that after the transforma­
tions have taken place, what they actually are looking at is a completely new situation. 
And the altruistic theory o f motivation tells us that when facing a new situation, an al­
truist will transform her utilities as dictated by the rule (vi). The problem is o f course 
that mutual application o f (vi) to PD’ o f two altruists will lead to the original Prisoners’ 
Dilemma PD. As Tuomela puts it, “[i]f our altruists cannot stop their transformations, 
they are caught in a never-ending new dilemma, as they never get down to action. This 
indecision problem we can call the Altruist’s second dilemma.” (Tuomela 2000, 288.) I 
conclude that insofar as we understand altruism as a psychological mechanism corre­
sponding to the utility transformation rule (vi), altruism is not a very probable candidate 
for solving the design problem of producing collectively rational action. The two altru­
ist’s dilemmas show that the altruistic solution is far too unstable for being the most re­
liable solution available.
Let us, then, look at the group-directed utility transformation that was captured 
by the rule (ix) above. If two agents that are disposed to group-directed behaviour face 
the PD, the rule (ix) will lead their effective utilities to form the following payoff struc­
ture:
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(PD’ -  two group-directed agents)
Player 2 
C D
C
Player 1
D
As Tuomela puts it, the rule (ix) has transformed PD “into a harmless coordination 
game” (Tuomela 2000, 283); each player will reason that whatever the other will do, she 
herself will be better o f by playing C. Hence, the result is the universal co-operation 
outcome CC, or in other words, the collectively rational and socially optimal result CC 
is also individually the number one choice o f each agent. Thus, the crucial difference 
from altruism in the sense o f (vi) is that group-directed players will also be psychologi­
cally satisfied with the outcome CC and will feel no need to re-modify their behaviour 
or utilities. Thus, it seems plausible to conclude that in a PD with a payoff matrix as the 
one presented above, group-directedness in the sense of (ix) is a more reliable psycho­
logical mechanism for producing socially optimal action than pure other-directed altru­
ism in the sense of (vi).
However, this kind of criticism o f Sober and Wilson's emphasis on altruism 
overlooks Sober and Wilson’s insistence that altruism should not be understood as a 
monistic doctrine. The criticism of altruism as presented above has to assume that the 
pluralistic nature o f altruism means simply that sometimes we base our actions on 
purely egoistic motives and sometimes on purely altruistic motives. This, however, is 
not the most charitable way o f interpreting altruism as a pluralistic theory o f  motivation 
in general, and in particular it is not how Sober and Wilson interpret it.
On the contrary, Sober and Wilson are very explicit that the most interesting 
cases o f motivational pluralism are those in which egoistic and altruistic motivations 
coexist simultaneously in one individual (see especially Sober & Wilson 1998, 242- 
250). For example, Sober and Wilson (1998, 354, Footnote 23) discuss the possibility o f 
an action where both egoistic and altruistic motivations are effective and, moreover, 
weighed as exactly equally important. This would, o f course, model a situation similar 
to (ix), since, as Tuomela (2000, 283) points out, the group-directedness o f (ix) is essen­
tially the average between purely egoistic and purely altruistic mechanisms. Perhaps 
group-directed psychology should not be seen as a third form o f human motivational 
mechanisms but rather as a combination o f simultaneous egoistic and altruistic motives.
6,6 5,5
5,5 4,4
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However, the group-directed transformation rule (ix) does not always lead to a 
uniform solution in PD type games. Actually, the plausibility o f (ix) is very sensitive to 
the given utilities. Tuomela (2000, 284-285) discusses a PD situation in which free rid­
ing is slightly more beneficial than in the original case discussed above (PD). Suppose, 
for example, that if an agent plays D while the other player plays C, the agent playing D  
would get 6 utiles instead of 4, i.e., let us consider a situation with the following payoff 
matrix:63
(PD*)
Player 2 
C D
C
Player 1
D
The rule (ix) would then transform the payoff matrix o f the effective utilities to be the 
following:
(PD*’ -  two group-directed agents)
Player 2 
C D
C
Player 1
D
Clearly in this case C is no longer the dominating strategy; the players have created a 
new co-ordination problem for themselves. Although Tuomela admits that insofar as 
CC is the collectively preferred outcome, what the group-directed players indeed have 
here is a new dilemma to be solved, he unfortunately does not discuss the new dilemma 
too much. Tuomela is mainly interested in explaining how individuals can reach an out­
come they both agree with and thus he is able to by-pass this new dilemma, since here 
“the participants can easily come to agree on one o f the (7,7)-pairs, which are equilibria 
in this coordination game” (Tuomela 2000, 285).
Admittedly Tuomela is right that the new dilemma is not very challenging if  the 
explanatory goal is agreement, since there is no serious clash between the utilities o f the
63 Note that PD* does not satisfy some standard definitions (e.g., Axelrod 1984, 10) o f  a Prisoners’ Di­
lemma game, since in PD* the players can get out o f  their dilemma by taking turns in exploiting each 
other, i.e., a reciprocal pattern o f  C-D-C-D-... and D-C-D-C-... is for each agent better than mutual co­
operation. I return to this point below.
6,6 7,7
7,7 4,4
3,3 1,6
6,1 2,2
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players (although the players may o f course have serious practical problems in choosing 
the same equilibrium). But if the goal is to explain the achievement o f collectively op­
timal behaviour in a more objective sense, the situation is harder to deal with. Firstly, it 
is not that clear what is the collectively optimal combination o f actions here. Remember 
that the context o f discussion is a one-shot game64 and the given utilities are assumed to 
represent external rewards. Hence, it seems that the realisation o f CC is indeed objec­
tively speaking a better outcome than CD or DC  (see Skyrms 1996 for a discussion on 
the objective advantages of fairness), although both players would prefer them to CC 
because of their psychological mechanisms. If this is the case, PD*’ represents a serious 
dilemma.
Fortunately Sober and Wilson, although they do not explicitly discuss social di­
lemma situations, are nevertheless able to offer a way of dealing with PD* and PD*’. 
Sober and Wilson appear to think that real agents are quite probably what they call ‘E- 
over-A pluralists’ (Sober & Wilson 1998, 245). E-over-A pluralists do want others to do 
well, but when the self-interest and the welfare o f others are in too strong a conflict, an 
E-over-A pluralist will abandon the altruistic standpoint and secure her own gains. In a 
situation such as PD* an E-over-A pluralist might reason that she cannot ascribe the 
utility of 7 to the situation in which she plays C and the other player plays D.
However, this type of pluralism is available also from the point o f view o f a per­
son who thinks that group-directed desires should be understood as psychologically ul­
timate motivations. Moreover, it could be argued that such a E-over-G pluralism is at 
least sometimes a more realistic model of what is in fact going on in the minds o f ordi­
nary agents than the E-over-A pluralism combining egoism and altruism. In some cases 
an agent may reason that even though a given form o f behaviour would bring great 
benefits to the group, it nevertheless requires a too dramatic sacrifice from her own part. 
In such a situation the agent might conclude that it just is not fair to require such a be­
haviour from her, and she is therefore justified in performing the egoistic action D.
This kind o f reasoning corresponds to free-riding situations in which an agent is 
considering whether or not she should participate in the production o f a collective good. 
An example might be cleaning a park. From the egoistic point o f view the agent would 
be better off by letting others to do the dirty work o f cleaning the park, and just enjoy­
64 If the context were that o f a repeated game, the socially optimal solution would no doubt be to alternate 
between CD and DC, not to always go for CC. But a reliable realisation o f  such a rule would presuppose 
that the players indeed understand that following that rule is better for them collectively, and to follow  
that rule is what they should do together as their joint task. Below (in the context o f PD*, Tit-for-Tat and 
the so-called argument from long-term considerations) I will argue that these solutions are, once again, 
best understood in the context o f  we-mode notions.
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ing the outcome o f the others’ efforts. Compare this to the case o f  a group-directed 
agent who might reason that it is better for the group if  all the members participate in 
the collective task, and hence she will participate too. However, if  it is clear that in or­
der to co-operate she would have to go through a considerable amount o f trouble 
(maybe she is the only one who showed up in the meeting organised to plan the volun­
tary work of cleaning the park), the egoistic perspective might take over. No doubt there 
are cases in which a pluralism combining egoism and altruism would intuitively seem 
more plausible than a pluralism combining egoism and group-directedness, but the point 
I am making is that there are situations in which group-directed attitudes seem intui­
tively quite realistic.
The argument presented above as well as everyday experience seem to suggest 
that as long as the personal price to pay is not too high, our motivations are quite often 
group-directed in nature. In other words, the E-over-G pluralism is often psychologi­
cally more believable than the E-over-A pluralism. The twist here is that the E-over-A 
pluralism can be interpreted such that it does better in theoretical models.
I interpreted above Sober and Wilson’s E-over-A pluralism such that an E-over- 
A pluralist may adopt an attitude towards one possible outcome within one game that is 
different from the attitudes she has towards the other outcomes. This reading would im­
ply that Sober and Wilson’s E-over-A pluralism is even more comprehensive pluralism 
than merely an application o f the rule (ix). Sober and Wilson seem to think that agents 
can apply different utility transformation rules to different action combinations even 
within one game. Thus, when two E-over-A pluralist face a situation such as PD*, they 
will both recognise the given utilities and apply the altruistic utility transformation rule 
(vi) to all the other possible outcomes, except the one in which the agent herself plays C 
and the other player plays D. As E-over-A pluralists the agents will realise that the out­
come CD includes an unacceptably high personal price and, hence, apply the egoistic 
utility transform rule (viii) to that outcome. The result is the following payoff matrix:
(PD*’ -  two E-over-A pluralists)
Player 2 
C D
C
Player 1
D
3,3 1,1
1,1 2,2
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E-over-A pluralists would transform PD* into a very straightforward65 co-ordination 
game in which both players prefer the universal co-operation outcome CC to all the 
other possible outcomes. Note also that since the E-over-A utility transformations 
eliminate the temptations o f the CD and DC  outcomes, the above payoff matrix is also 
the result o f the utility transformations when two E-over-A pluralist face the situation 
corresponding to the original PD above.
Compare this to the case where E-over-G pluralists face a situation with the 
(given) utility structure PD*. E-over-G pluralists apply the group-directed utility trans­
formation rule (ix), except when their personal losses would be unbearable. The payoff 
matrix o f their transformed utilities would be as follows:
(PD*’ -  two E-over-G pluralists)
Player 2 
C D
C
Player 1
D
In this transformed game defection is once again the dominating strategy. Similarly, the 
E-over-G transformation turns the original PD into a game in which achieving the uni­
versal co-operation is not as straightforward as it is with the E-over-A utility transfor­
mations:
(PD* -  two E-over-G pluralists)
Player 2 
C D
C
Player 1
D
In this (transformed) game, known in game theory as the Stag Hunt, the universal co­
operation outcome CC is again preferred to all the other outcomes by both players. 
Nonetheless, the E-over-A utility transformation rule does not appear to be a very reli­
able motivational mechanism: if an E-over-A pluralist cannot be positive that her co-
65 Straightforward from the perspective o f  common sense, that is. From the perspective o f standard game 
theory, however, PD*’ o f  E-over-A pluralists instantiates a Hi-Lo game, which is (in)famously irresolv­
able in standard game theory (since there are two Nash equilibria between which we cannot rationally 
choose in the context o f  standard game theory).
6,6 1,5
5,1 4,4
6,6 1,7
7,1 4,4
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player is not an egoist, she may not find it rational to play C, since the possible loss is 
far greater than when playing D.
So what is the conclusion one should derive from all the above discussions? Is 
my thoroughly pluralistic interpretation o f Sober and Wilson’s E-over-A pluralism a 
reliable mechanism for producing collectively optimal outcomes? I do not think so, but 
this does not mean that 1 would think that any o f the other options discussed so far 
would be a better choice. Firstly, if we follow Hardin and M. Taylor’s line o f thought 
faithfully, we should consider only pure PD situations, and not some modifications that 
are not strictly speaking PD games (cf. Axelrod 1984, 10), such as PD*. In pure PD 
games genuine group-directedness in the sense o f the transformation rule (ix) might be 
more reliable than E-over-A pluralism, since a group-directed player will play C regard­
less of what she believes the other player will do. An E-over-A pluralist, on the other 
hand, would play D  if  she were led to believe that the other player is going to play D. 
Furthermore, the E-over-G pluralism, which appears to be the most intuitive option in 
the light o f the reflections of our own motivational mechanisms, does not do very well 
in theoretical models. It seems that we have only bad options available.
I hope that what I have said above shows that the present line o f thought should 
in fact be seen as a kind of reductio ad absurdum treatment o f the whole programme 
building on utility transformation rules. When the game theoretical models are em­
ployed in testing hypotheses about motivational mechanisms in the sense o f utility 
transformation rules, it seems the even the slightest modification of the (given) utility 
structure turns the corroborating support from one hypothesis to another. Similarly, by 
playing with the different interpretations o f pluralism the original game can be trans­
formed such that the problem vanishes. One cannot but feel that the successful utility 
transformation rules are more or less bound to be tinkered to fit the particular model at 
hand, i.e., to be quite ad hoc in nature.66
However, our task was to find a psychological mechanism that guides agents to 
collectively optimal outcomes across a range o f social dilemma situations. This is some­
thing the context-specific (or indeed case-specific) transformation rules cannot deliver. 
Thus, 1 think that although Sober and Wilson’s rhetoric as well as our general intuitions 
suggest that sometimes we have ultimately group-directed motives,67 insofar as the dis-
66 Compare, e.g., Routledge (1998, 98-99) who demonstrates how “[a]ltruism may resolve the dilemma in 
some situations but not others [...] the amount o f  altruism required to prevent all PD’s is extremely pre­
cise.”
67 In particular I think that any acceptable solution must be able to accommodate the E-over-A (or E-over- 
G) idea that although we are sometimes willing to act for the common good, egoism can override such 
solidarity if  the individual cost is too high. Crucially, the we-mode solution I favour is not only much
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cussion proceeds exclusively in terms o f the directedness o f our desires, the discussion 
cannot help with the fundamental problem I am addressing in this Chapter. Utility trans­
formation rules cannot give us stable collectively rational behaviour in social dilemma 
situations such as PD and PD*.68
11.2.3 BEYOND PHILOSOPHICAL EGOISM
There is still a deeper reason why a fundamental change is needed in the way we ap­
proach the problem of the psychological motivations underlying co-operative, collec­
tively rational action. Both Sober and Wilson’s discussions on the directedness o f  our 
ultimate motivations and Tuomela’s models of utility transformations rest on a pair of 
debatable assumptions. The first is that the given utilities represent some external re­
wards towards which an agent can, in accordance with her psychological inclinations 
(captured by the relevant transformation rule), form a new attitude. The second is that 
the formed attitude can transform the given utilities into effective utilities, i.e., the agent 
is not compelled to act upon her given utilities. In the present context, however, the 
whole idea o f transforming players’ utilities simply begs the question.
Tuomela’s utility transformation rules can be informative when used for expli­
cating different possible psychological inclinations,69 but when one uses them for sub­
stituting a new game for the original game, one falls guilty o f refusing to face the im­
portant theoretical problem represented by the original game. What we need to tackle is 
a PD game o f effective, transformed utilities. All relevant altruistic, group-directed etc.
70considerations must be included in the utility structure that forms the PD.
This point is put well by Martin Hollis (1996), who argues that the reason why 
individually rational choices do not sum up to a collectively preferred outcome in social 
dilemma situations is the philosophical egoism inherent in individualistic rational
more general than the case-specific utility transformation rules but it also caters easily for the possibility 
o f  egoism taking over in some situations (this is discussed in the context o f Tit-for-Tat strategies below).
68 See Verbeek (2002, 86-98) for a similar result.
69 See, for example, Kollock (1998), who uses utility transformation models to interpret empirical studies 
o f  collective action dilemmas.
70 This, I think, is also the core o f  Binmore’s (1994, 80 & 180 ff.) criticism o f Gauthier’s (1986) pro­
gramme, according to which individuals can rationally accept principles that constrain their utility maxi­
misation, resolving thereby PDs in a collectively optimal way. Binmore thinks that such considerations 
should be included in the payoff matrix that forms the PD. I think that this criticism applies, mutatis mu­
tandis, also to Frank’s (1988) programme insofar as Frank’s commitment model is thought to solve the 
fundamental theoretical problem. As an explication o f  (an aspect of) the evolutionary role o f  emotions 
Franks’ view may well succeed -  especially if  the group selection structure inherent in Frank’s models is 
made explicit. However, I will not enter into these debates in this dissertation. See, however, Section 
II.2.4 below, where I analyse McClennen’s argument from the long-term perspective, which is closely 
related to the views o f  Gauthier and Frank.
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choice theory. By philosophical egoism Hollis means a view “that the only desires 
which can move us are our own” (Hollis 1996, 6). That is, my desires can be self­
directed, other-directed, group-directed or what have you, but to have an effect on my 
behaviour they must be my personal desires. Hollis’ philosophical egoism is not a moral 
or psychological view, but is rather meant to expresses the ontological thesis that al­
though individual agents may care for the welfare o f others, individuals are still ines­
capably the only units o f action there are in social life.
Hollis argues that even if we can come up with a sophisticated model of utility 
transformations that converts any PD situation agents may face into a harmless co­
ordination game, this is not an answer to the real problem we should be confronting. 
The egoism that causes the problems in social dilemma situations is not psychological 
but philosophical. In other words, regardless o f the psychological directedness o f the 
motives o f agents (regardless of what utility transformation rules they use), it is possible 
that their motives lead the agents to a situation representable as a PD game. “There are 
Prisoner’s Dilemmas for altruists as well as for egoists. Also a maxim commanding un­
selfishness can paralyse everyone, if everyone follows it. (Try cooking dinner for a 
group o f relentless altruists with different tastes.)” (Hollis 1996, 76-77.) We may add 
that there are PD situations also for group-directed agents, at least insofar as they see the 
situation a bit differently from each other (i.e., insofar as they do not possess perfect 
knowledge of the situation).
Some writers seem to miss this point. Singer (1981, 47), for example, appears to 
think that agents who care as much for the interests of others as they care for their own 
interests can resolve PD situations in the collectively optimal way. Singer’s view 
amounts simply to favouring the transformation rule (ix). The technical motivation for 
this view stems from the fact that if the players agree about the given utilities, then the 
rule (ix) eliminates the conflict between the players. In addition to the problems dis­
cussed in II.2.2, Singer’s view presupposes that the agents have perfect information 
about the situation and about the preferences o f the other player (and that inter-agent 
utility comparisons are seen as unproblematic), and hence I doubt if this solution can be 
very reliable.71 As Barry Barnes (2000, 56) emphasises, mere individualistic utility cal-
71 Actually, it is not obvious that even perfect information would help here. After all, there are no numeri­
cal utilities out there in the world. Thus it is not obvious that there is the correct way o f  representing a 
given situation in terms o f  utilities (or o f  comparing those utilities), and hence it seems to be conceivable 
that even group-directed agents with perfect information about the situation they face could find them­
selves in a PD.
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culations -  no matter how benevolent they are -  simply cannot be sufficiently reliable
79for the construction and maintenance o f co-operative practices.
First o f all, the group-directed solution seeks to circumvent this problem by re­
fusing to discuss the problems involved with perfect information and inter-agent utility 
comparisons. Unfortunately, for a naturalistic (and realistic) theory o f rational co­
operation it is not sufficient to refrain from appeals to collective minds; also Platonist 
appeals to shared pieces o f perfect information must be resisted. Real agents do not 
have access to God’s point of view, and hence the possibility o f a PD situation remains. 
Moreover, even if for sake o f argument we bypass the problems of perfect information, 
the group-directed solution, as Bruno Verbeek puts it, “helps only in a small class o f 
collective good problems and is very unhelpful in another class of problems” (Verbeek 
2002, 97) and hence cannot offer the kind o f general solution I am after.73
Second, as Barnes (1995) emphasises, we are not primarily interested in artifi­
cial mathematical models, but real cases o f collective action that instantiate free-rider 
problems. Barnes’ example is “an individual deciding whether or not to purchase a cata­
lytic converter to purify her car exhaust and contribute to the provision o f unpolluted 
air” (Barnes 1995, 27). The collectively optimal solution is that everyone acquires a 
converter. However, while the cost of purchasing a converter may be relatively high, the 
impact a single converter has on air quality remains negligible. Thus, the directedness of 
our motives is irrelevant here. Purchasing a converter is irrational regardless o f whether 
motivations are self-directed, other-directed or group-directed: “To make a negligible 
difference to the air benefits nobody” (Barnes 1995, 29), and therefore (individual­
mode) considerations of benefits, no matter whose benefits they are, cannot rationalise 
collective action. Barnes conceptualises this by stating that “the problem is not that [...] 
individuals are self-regarding but rather that they operate independently’ (Barnes 1995, 
29). In other words, the fundamental problem of social action is not created by psycho­
logical egoism as such but by Hollis’ philosophical egoism.
Hollis urges us in the name o f intellectual honesty to take the original PD to rep­
resent the final, effective utilities of players 1 and 2 in a social dilemma situation, re­
72 Bames (2000) argues that in order to explain stable co-operation we need to assume the reality o f  irre­
ducible collective agency (and thus overcome the philosophical egoism o f Hollis). Below I argue that the 
theory o f  collective intentionality does precisely this. Barnes’ views on collective agency are discussed in 
detail in Part III.
731 thank Damien Fennell, Raul Hakli and Govert den Hartogh for pushing me to explicate my reasoning 
concerning the problems with the group-directed utility transformation rule. They all pointed out that 
mathematically speaking my claim that there are PD situations also for group-directed agents is false. I 
trust that what I have said above shows that when we move our focus from the idealised world o f  abstract 
models onto the world o f  real agents with limited (individualistic!) perspectives, my claim still holds.
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gardless o f whether we think that human agents are egoists, altruists or group-directed 
agents. Hollis’ philosophical egoism maintains that insofar as we are dealing with indi­
vidual agents that make rational choices from their own individual perspectives, the 
possibility o f facing an irresolvable PD situation will remain. There is no guarantee that 
there will always be present a benevolent invisible hand securing that agents making 
individually rational choices will arrive at a collectively rational outcome.
Since people nevertheless quite often manage to achieve collectively rational 
outcomes in social dilemma situations, the conclusion Hollis (1996, 5) feels compelled 
to draw is that often human action simply is not instrumentally rational. Hollis (1996, 6) 
appears to be saying, just as was the case with Tuomela’s utility transformation rules, 
that the rational choice theory can no doubt give us models that are useful tools in some 
contexts, but as a general theory (or as the general theory, as its adherents all too often 
seem to think) o f human sociality and the driving force o f social reality it cannot suc­
ceed. According to Hollis, truly social action simply is essentially irrational. According 
to Hollis’ irrationalism, co-operation is highly characteristic of human social action, but 
it cannot be rationalised in instrumentalist terms.
It seems to me that, for example, Verbeek (2002) agrees with Hollis here. The 
conclusion Verbeek draws from considerations largely analogous to my criticism o f 
utility transformation rules is that to solve the design problem of agents capable o f col­
lectively optimal action in social dilemma situations we must assume the existence o f a 
non-psychological disposition that simply causes us to behave altruistically in social 
dilemma situations despite our rational deliberations pulling to the opposite direction. 
Verbeek calls such behavioural dispositions co-operative virtues.
While I appreciate the motivation behind Verbeek’s causalism and Hollis’ irra­
tionalism, I cannot accept their conclusions: If Hollis and Verbeek are right, truly social 
behaviour cannot be rationalised at all, and thus there can be no intentional (rationalis­
ing) explanations o f social behaviour. This, in turn, implies that there are no truly social 
actions: social behaviour consists o f meaningless bodily movements, not intentional (ra- 
tionalisable) actions (cf. Part III).
However, by moving to discuss at the psychological level I have already ex­
pressed my commitment to the view that co-operation in social dilemma situations is the 
paradigmatic example o f truly social action and thus must be explained and understood 
in terms o f contentful, intentional psychology. I cannot follow Verbeek and explain in­
dividual action in terms o f intentional psychology, and social action in terms o f non- 
psychological dispositions. Crucially, we all know on the basis o f first-hand experience
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that sometimes co-operative action requires a considerable amount o f rational delibera­
tion. This is a feature Verbeek’s dispositional solution cannot capture, for co-operative 
virtues are explicitly seen as opposed to rational deliberations. Indeed, this point implies 
also the unacceptability o f Hollis’ irrationalism, for, in Barnes’ words, “[c]ollective ac­
tion is scarcely well-described as irrational, since it may be exquisitely calculated and 
highly effective instrumental action, but it cannot be rationalised by reference either to 
altruistic or self-interested [or indeed group-directed] individual goals” (Barnes 2000, 
57).
Thus we find ourselves in a difficult situation indeed. The utility transformation 
rules cannot save the solution basing on individual-level considerations o f instrumental 
rationality, but we cannot follow Verbeek to straightforward dispositionalism or Hollis 
to irrationalism either. However, according to Hollis’ philosophical egoism these are the 
only options we have.
Hence, I think we must make room for an acceptable solution by rejecting 
Hollis’ philosophical egoism. Since social actions cannot be rationalised in individualis­
tic terms, perhaps the rationality should not be attributed to individual agents, but to the 
collective o f agents from whose perspective the social interaction appears as instrumen- 
tally rational. Maybe the true agent o f social action is not the individual, but the group. 
Hollis does not even consider this kind of solution, since in his view the rejection of 
philosophical egoism amounts to a commitment to the existence o f a group mind or 
something ontologically equally dubious.
However, it is a mistake to think that an ontological thesis denying the inde­
pendent existence o f group minds implies methodological individualism in the sense of 
the thesis that all actions o f individuals must be individual-mode actions. The analysis 
o f the ontological structure of social facts in Part I led us to construct a modem, onto­
logically acceptable naturalistic interpretation of the Durkheimian notion o f a collective 
consciousness, and the discussion concerning the psychology o f social action in this 
Part has pointed out exactly the same need. Not so surprisingly, my suggestion is that 
indeed the notion o f collective we-mode intentionality of Part I provides just the kind of 
solution we need also in the present context.
To put it in Gilbert’s terminology, I argue that in order to achieve the collec­
tively preferable outcome in social dilemma situations the agents must overcome their 
individual perspectives and form a plural subject (or, as Bames (2000) puts this, only 
agents capable for collective agency can perform truly social actions). This, I believe, is 
the key for making the required methodologically holistic move o f overcoming Hollis’
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philosophical egoism without rejecting the ontologically naturalistic underpinnings o f 
his view. In what follows I argue that the collective we-mode o f truly social actions and 
attitudes is not only the most plausible psychological mechanism for producing collec­
tively rational outcomes in social dilemma situations, but also that such a mode is onto­
logically perfectly acceptable. The collective we-mode, therefore, is the most plausible 
and probable solution to the evolutionary design problem o f reliable production o f evo­
lutionarily altruistic, group-benefiting behaviour.
II.2.4 COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND CO-OPERATION
The basic idea is very simple. Let us not concentrate so much on the directedness o f the 
motives of agents in a social dilemma situation, but rather on the mode in which those 
motivations are held. Since we have seen that individualistic psychology cannot reliably 
account for collectively rational action, it is quite natural to think that the most reliable 
method for achieving that outcome must be to judge the rationality of different out­
comes from the point o f view o f the whole collective involved, i.e., adopting a collec­
tive perspective to the situation. This amounts to (i) choosing the collectively optimal 
outcome to form the collective goal of the group, (ii) figuring out what combination o f 
individual actions realises that outcome and (iii) performing the derived individual ac­
tions. A process following the steps (i)-(iii) is, o f course, suitable for dealing with Bar­
nes’ (1995) excellent example o f purchasing expensive catalytic converters. Moreover, 
(i)-(iii) amount to the standard characterisation o f collective we-mode intentionality as 
presented in Part I.74
Crucially, this requires us to postulate neither unnatural social entities nor group 
minds to form the collective-level plan. The only requirement is that ordinary individual 
agents have a tendency to overcome their individual perspectives and adopt a collective 
stance, and that this tendency is (sometimes) activated in social situations. If, that is to 
say, I adopt a collective we-mode attitude towards a social (dilemma) situation, I will 
consider myself primarily as a member o f a we-group and reason first what we should 
do in this situation, and only then derive my own individual task qua a group-member 
from the group-level plan. This is not a form o f irrationality, although it is not a form o f
74 In other words, the theory o f collective intentionality in my sense agrees with Elizabeth Anderson’s 
reconstruction o f  Amartya Sen’s criticism of standard rational choice theory. Anderson argues that truly 
social action, exemplified paradigmatically by co-operation in Prisoners’ Dilemmas, requires that agents 
identify themselves with their social groups and consequently ask, not “What should 1 do?”, but rather 
“What should we do?” (Anderson 2001, 28). For the link between collective intentionality and the theory 
o f  social identification, see 11.3.3 below.
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individual-level instrumental rationality either. The rationality involved is collective ra­
tionality, although nothing ontologically suspect has been assumed. Collective we-mode
75intentionality is a question o f a psychological framing of a social situation.
If the players in a social dilemma situation adopt collective we-mode stance to 
the situation, it is relatively easy for them to infer that CC76 is indeed the collectively 
rational outcome they collectively should aim to realise. Hence, they will both deduce 
that what each o f them should individually do qua a group member is C. Clearly collec­
tive we-mode psychology is a more reliable psychological mechanism for delivering 
socially optimal behaviour than altruism or group-directedness. This claim agrees with 
Searle’s (1990, 406) assertion that taking up the we-mode is a precondition o f all true 
co-operation and with Gilbert’s (1989) insistence that the willingness to create a plural 
subject is the starting point o f all truly social behaviour. Moreover, as for example Mi­
chael Tomasello and Hannes Rakoczy (Tomasello & Rakoczy 2003, 127) argue force­
fully on the basis of their empirical work, precisely this kind o f essentially social “de­
rived normativity” of individual actions is “a key characteristic” in the architecture of 
the human cognition.
Moreover, a mode-pluralist can alternate between the we-mode and individual­
mode in a way that is not possible for a mode-monist. In particular, a mode-pluralist can 
act against her given individual utilities without transforming them. The given utilities 
are indeed final, but only final individual utilities, and hence irrelevant when the mode- 
pluralist has switched to the we-mode. In a sense the individual-mode considerations are 
present in the motivational basis o f social action, but in suitable circumstances an agent
75 Sugden (2000) gives a very similar description o f  collective reasoning. However, Sugden insists on 
building on the directedness o f  intentions, which is an approach I have rejected. However, Sugden may 
well be using “directedness” in a sense different from mine. In any case -  due to his concentration on co­
ordination games -  Sugden does not explicate the important distinction between directedness and mode. 
Since I am interested mainly in games o f conflict, the distinction is needed, for the central aspect o f  the 
proposed solution is that we give up Hollis’ philosophical egoism -  and social directedness remains in- 
dufficient for this. It seems to me that Hans Bernhard Schmid (2004, 2005) is developing a view similar 
to the one defended here when he argues that the theory o f  collective intentionality can be employed to 
make sense o f Amartya Sen’s (1977 & 1985 in particular) perplexing claim that sometimes a person’s 
rational choices are not based on the pursuit o f her own goals -  in other words, Sen seems to agree that 
true co-operation presupposes a rejection o f  Hollis’ philosophical egoism. A further closely related ac­
count is that o f  Carol Rovane (1998). Rovane argues that there is no a priori reason to restrict rationality 
considerations to the perspective o f a disparate individual. Rovane uses this insight to argue for the possi­
bility o f group agents, whereas I opt for a more modest attempt to argue that individual agents may adopt 
a group perspective without becoming committed to the perplexing view o f  seeing groups as persons (cf. 
Part I). The we-mode group perspective view allows us o f  course to talk as i f  groups really were agents 
(Tuomela 2007).
76 Actually this gets the conceptual order wrong. Strictly speaking we-mode agents do not start by charac­
terising the collectively optimal outcome in terms o f  (a sum of) individual choices (as the term “C C ’ ob­
viously does). Rather, figuring out that CC -  the relevant combination o f  individual choices -  allows 
them to realise their collective goal is a further problem social agents must solve in order to be able to 
derive their individual tasks in the collective project.
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can switch to the we-mode and ignore her individual-mode utilities. This leaves open 
the possibility that if  the we-mode considerations are in too strong a conflict with the 
individual-mode considerations, the agent will deviate from the we-mode and act on her 
individual-mode utilities and preferences. Thus, the we-mode view does justice to the 
core intuition behind Sober and Wilson’s E-over-A pluralism.
Moreover, we-mode collective attitudes provide exactly the kind o f psychologi­
cal mechanism we need for a reliable production of, for example, the Tit-for-Tat strat­
egy that was seen (II. 1.1; cf., e.g., Axelrod 1984 and Singer 1994 & 1999) to be such a 
successful strategy at the behavioural level. When an agent faces a social dilemma situa­
tion and realises that she is going to play it repeatedly with the same partner, it is quite 
natural for her to frame the situation as a collective task she and her partner face to­
gether. Hence, the agent may be led to adopt the we-mode approach and, consequently, 
to believe that she and her partner form a plural subject that will rationally choose the 
universal co-operation outcome CC as their joint goal. Thus the agent can deduce that 
her individual role in the collective task is to play C.
If the other player, however, defects and plays D, it is reasonable from the point 
o f view o f the co-operative agent to infer that she was wrong about the situation: her 
beliefs about the players forming a collective intention together -  putting the game be­
hind them -  were not true. Thus, she thinks, there is no plural subject present after all, 
but the players face the situation qua individual agents. This amounts to saying that the 
agent’s we-mode psychology collapses and she falls back to the perspective of indi-
77vidually rational strategic choices and, accordingly, plays D in the following round. 
Had the other player answered the co-operative move by playing C as well, the stability 
o f the first agent’s we-mode attitudes would have been strengthened, and she would 
have had all the more reason to keep playing C. Her beliefs about the existence o f a plu­
ral subject would have been confirmed.
Hence, a mode-pluralist can have the best o f both worlds: she can avoid the 
problems created by Hollis’ philosophical egoism without rejecting (instrumentally) ra­
tional considerations. It is just that the rationality in question is not always individual- 
level rationality. Sometimes the relevant rationality takes the form o f collective rational­
ity, contemplated in the we-mode. Crucially, this whole process does not involve any 
transformation o f the original individual utilities. Thus the introduction o f the collective 
we-mode perspective is not an ad hoc move o f changing the game when drawn against a
77 In rel life a player’s we-mode may o f course be so strong that it endures a single play o f defection from 
the part o f the other player. This depends on the particular features o f the situation at hand, personal histo­
ries o f  the players involved etc.
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difficult social dilemma situation. Adopting a we-mode attitude means simply adopting 
a new collective perspective to the same old game. I conclude that the assumption that 
agents register their we-mode considerations as the ultimate considerations that rational­
ise action in social dilemma situations is the most reliable, and hence the most plausible, 
solution to the design problem of getting rational individuals to co-operate in social di­
lemma situations, for there are no intragroup Prisoners’ Dilemmas for we-mode agents. 
Social action is rationalisable (and, hence, intentionally explainable -  cf. Part III) only 
in collective we-mode terms.
Moreover, the present discussion allows me to pin down what, exactly, I take the 
core of the theory o f collective intentionality to be. In short, in my view the crucial step 
is the rejection of methodological individualism in the sense o f Hollis’ philosophical 
egoism. Social life does not amount to the sum of individual-mode interactions. Ulti­
mately, social life and truly social action is not presentable as a game o f distinct (indi­
vidual-mode) individuals, regardless o f how benevolent one takes them to be. We must 
accept that truly social action is based on we-mode psychology.
This is the fundamental reason why in my discussions I have not included, for 
example, Michael Bratman’s (e.g., 1999) or Seumas Miller’s (e.g., 2001) work as an 
example o f the collective intentionality approach, although Bratman, together with Gil­
bert, Searle and Tuomela, is widely considered as one o f the major contributors in the 
field (see, for example, Deborah Tollefsen’s (2004) influential review o f the collective 
intentionality approach).78 Contrary to Gilbert, Searle and Tuomela, Bratman and Miller 
seek to account for social action exclusively in terms o f individual-mode attitudes that 
are collective only in terms o f their content and directedness -  and thus they operate 
firmly within Hollis’ philosophical egoism. Hence, whatever virtues their accounts may 
have in other contexts, they cannot help with the problems I am addressing in this Part. 
Durkheimianism is required.
At this point I need to discuss one more way o f arguing against the form o f plu­
ralism and methodological holism defended in this Chapter. This line o f thought is mo­
tivated by the difference between short-term and long-term self-directedness. This idea 
is also sometimes (e.g., Skyrms 1996) conceptualised as the problem of the modularity 
o f rationality, and is defended, for example, by Edward F. McClennen and Scott 
Shapiro (McClennen 1997 and McClennen & Shapiro 1998).
78 However, Tollefsen (2004) emphasises correctly that unlike those o f  Gilbert, Searle and Tuomela, 
Bratman’s is essentially an account o f  shared, rather than collective, intentionality.
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The standard example with which this approach can be illustrated -  discussed 
also by Sober and Wilson -  is the problem o f quitting smoking. Imagine a person who is 
a regular smoker. She very much enjoys each cigarette she smokes, but knows also that 
in the long run her smoking can cause fatal health problems. The dilemma the smoker 
has is the following: Each time she considers lighting a new cigarette, she knows (i) that 
were she really to light the cigarette, she would gain a considerable short-term benefit 
and, moreover, (ii) that any single cigarette -  including the one she is now about to light 
-  will have only a negligible impact on her health (note the structural similarity to Bar­
nes’ converter example). If the smoker cares only about short-term benefits, she will 
light up the cigarette, whereas if  she cares enough about the long-term quality o f her 
life, she will stop smoking immediately and, hence, not light up. Put differently, she will 
voluntarily commit herself to a rule “do not smoke”. The point to note here is that the 
two possible, explicitly opposite strategies o f smoking and not smoking are both based 
on self-directed individual-mode motivations (Sober & Wilson 1998, 227).
The suggestion here is, o f course, that “a strategic decision problem [one faces] 
with one’s own future self [...] [is] a problem analogous to that faced by a person who 
interacts with other (rational) selves, who may have different preferences with respect to 
outcomes” (McClennen & Shapiro 1998, 365; see also McClennen 1997, 216). Hence, 
perhaps psychological egoism can deliver collectively optimal solutions to social di­
lemma situations after all. Perhaps a motivationally self-directed agent needs not to 
transform the utilities of the social dilemma game she faces, but just to realise that they 
are the utilities as judged from the standpoint o f her short-term preferences, and the 
same situation can be presented as a different game when judged from the perspective 
o f her long-term preferences. In a way, this would allow the agent to switch her per­
spective to the game in a manner similar to how I argued it is possible to alternate be­
tween individual mode and we-mode. Maybe the agent could reason that although she 
would maximise her immediate benefits by defecting, in the long run it is better for her 
to establish a reputation as a social and nice person or, alternatively, that in the long run 
mutual co-operation will be better for everyone.
However, this line o f thought is based on a failure to see philosophical egoism in 
Hollis’ sense as the source o f problems in social dilemma situations. In some actual 
cases the long-term considerations may lead to co-operation but, as I have shown, this 
solution does not help us at all with the theoretical problem we ought to concentrate on. 
The final utilities that form the PD the agent faces are assumed to include the agent’s 
evaluations o f both the short-term considerations and the long-term considerations.
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Moreover, I have argued (in the context o f Tit-for-Tat strategies) that we-mode consid­
erations are both intuitively more realistic and theoretically more plausible candidates 
for the psychological mechanisms behind collectively beneficial action even in the con­
text o f repeated games.
In short, the attraction o f the long-term argument in favour o f psychological ego­
ism and individualistic instrumental rationality must be based either on considerations 
about reputation (or something similar), or on considerations that mutual co-operation 
will in fact lead to a result collectively preferable to universal defection. If the former, 
the argument may be relevant to some empirical scenarios, but remains inescapably 
powerless in front o f Hollis’ philosophical arguments. If the latter, it is an argument in 
favour o f the collective perspective which is naturally combined with we-mode collec­
tive attitudes. McClennen is correct to argue that co-operation that overcomes individual 
preferences in a social dilemma situation can be instrumentally rational, but fails to ap­
preciate that such rationality must be collective in nature.79
Indeed, McClennen’s (1997, 243 ff.) discussions about the mutually beneficial 
co-operation in Assurance games and Prisoners’ Dilemmas point directly towards the 
notion of the we-mode. McClennen just feels the need to deny all references to any sort 
o f collective concepts, since he thinks that they inevitably include an appeal to some 
“notion o f a ‘communal’ or ‘collective’ se lf’ (McClennen 1997, 243), and he explains 
that he has no “metaphysical taste” for such notions. In my view this is nothing but the 
by now familiar mistake o f thinking that (07) implies full-blown methodological indi­
vidualism (Part I) or that ontological considerations necessitate philosophical egoism 
(this Part). I would like to suggest that with the notion o f the we-mode advocated in this 
study McClennen could have the results he needs while remaining true to his meta­
physical taste, which is a taste I wholeheartedly share. Be that as it may, I feel justified 
to conclude that the argument from long-term considerations fails to challenge meth­
odological holism as defended in this dissertation.
Finally, I want to emphasise that my argument for the success of we-mode col­
lective psychology in social dilemma situations is based on the possibility o f we-mode 
attitudes forming a sui generis form o f psychology that is on a par with (qualitatively
79 In fact, also McClennen and Shapiro drift to talk about how “each member o f  a group o f  interacting 
persons can often do better by adopting a rule which allows the members o f  the group to coordinate their 
actions” (McClennen & Shapiro 1998,367). McClennen even explicitly builds upon notions such as what 
is “mutually advantageous to a set o f persons who find themselves faced with a problem o f  interdepend­
ent choice” and suggests that his arguments support the rationality o f thinking “more holistically about 
interactions with others” (McClennen 1997, 216). I think the lasting core o f  this reasoning in general and 
McClennen’s plea for holism in particular are best understood in terms o f the theory o f  collective we- 
mode intentionality.
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different from and irreducible to) individual-mode psychology. In other words, I side 
with Sugden (2000), who argues that truly collective action simply cannot be accounted 
for in the individualistic terms o f mainstream rational choice theory (henceforth, RCT). 
Social action does not amount to a game o f disparate individuals, but to acting together.
Thus I am reluctant to adopt Tuomela’s (2000, 315) notation, according to 
which the basis o f an individual’s decision-making act could be modelled with the fol­
lowing formula: EUt(X) = WjEUj(X) + wgEUg(X):
Here EUt(X) means the total expected utility of a choice X for a participant in a 
situation o f strategic interaction. The weights, viz., the individual or i-parameter 
Wj and the collective or g-parameter wg, add up to one: Wj + wg = 1, 0 < wj, wg <
1. The factors in Uj are supposed to be factors viewed from an individual’s per­
spective, whereas those involved in Ug are factors viewed from the group’s per­
spective. [...] Some special cases and some dependencies between the parame­
ters can be noted. Thus Wj = 0 entails unconditional cooperation and wg = 0 en­
tails acting on merely personal preferences (which of course may be other- 
regarding). If a person strictly accepts a goal G as his collective goal and is fully 
committed to it, this entails that wg = 1. However, he can in a weaker sense take 
group factors into account while also respecting individual factors. [...] If a par­
ticipant conforms to the standard game-theoretical dominance principle for i- 
preferences, then wg = 0 for him in a PD.
(Tuomela 2000,315.)
I fear that adopting this presentation translates the we-mode concepts back into 
the Individualistic Account of RCT, and thus loses the very essence o f we-mode con­
cepts (Sugden 2000), making we-mode arguments fall prey to the criticism o f Hollis. 
Insofar as Tuomela’s formula is interpreted to model the deliberative decision-making 
processes o f an individual from the point o f view of that individual, the appeal to we- 
mode concepts in the present context would simply beg the question. This is so because 
under this interpretation the agents facing a social dilemma situation would have to de­
liberately choose what values they will assign to the parameters w, and If  they both
choose wg = 1, they will reach a better outcome than if they both choose w, = 1. How­
ever, the best outcome for each agent occurs when she herself chooses w, = 1 and the 
other player chooses wg = 1. In fact, no matter what the other player does, each agent 
can maximise her own benefits by choosing wt = 1. Thus, the situation the individuals 
would face in choosing which kind o f rationality to apply would have the structure o f a 
Prisoners’ Dilemma. I conclude that a switch to we-mode psychology should not be 
modelled as a deliberative process.80
80 This is not what Tuomela suggests either (personal communication). Hence the point I am making here 
is not a criticism o f  Tuomela -  but an important clarification nonetheless.
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In fact, this is exactly the core o f my evolutionary arguments for understanding 
collective intentionality as a primitive feature: in social dilemma situations we-mode 
considerations must form our ultimate considerations. In particular, they cannot be 
based on more fundamental individual-mode considerations, since that would only acti­
vate the higher-order PD, and, hence, lose the reliability.
In this sense my view o f collective intentionality as a primitive phenomenon 
amounts to the Dennettian (see especially Chapter 8 of Dennett 2003) idea o f giving up 
the myth of the Cartesian Theatre. The Cartesian tradition understands the ultimate sub­
ject of human action to be the Cartesian self, the metaphysical ego, who sits in the 
command headquarters o f the conscious processes (the Cartesian Theatre) o f a human 
body and monitors all the possible self-directed, other-directed, we-mode etc. tenden­
cies and then makes the decision about action. This, o f course, is the core o f  the phi­
losophical egoism thesis as well. My (and Dennett’s) view rejects this picture categori­
cally. In a sense, the self is nothing but those competing tendencies.81 Sometimes, when 
the circumstances are suitable, I simply act on my we-mode considerations. Giving up 
Hollis’ philosophical egoism amounts to giving up also the idea of all intentional ac­
tions being based on the choices o f a metaphysical ego sitting in the Cartesian Theatre.
The conclusion I have arrived at allows us to take one more step on the road to­
wards naturalised methodological holism. Part I argued that the anti-individualistic the­
ory of collective we-mode intentionality is naturalistic in the sense o f being ontologi- 
cally perfectly acceptable. Now we can say that the theory is naturalistic also in the 
more specific sense o f being supported by our understanding o f evolutionary dynamics. 
Moreover, in addition to appeals to intuitive plausibility that dominate the collective 
intentionality literature, my evolutionary considerations form a strong, independent and 
general argument in favour o f irreducible we-mode psychology.
8] The nature o f  agency is analysed in detail in Part III. For an explication o f what, exactly, my line o f  
thought implies vis-a-vis the self and personhood, see Saaristo (2004a).
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CHAPTER II.3: 
COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND 
EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE82
The theory of collective intentionality in my sense is motivated by conceptual problems 
faced by attempts to provide individualistic analyses o f (i) social practices constituting 
social facts in general and (ii) collectively rational action in social dilemmas in particu­
lar. The claim is that individual-mode intentions, even when combined with mutual be­
liefs or common knowledge concerning the intentions, will not add up to the strong 
sense of intending and acting together that is required for truly social action. Hence, ir­
reducible collective intentionality is needed.
However, arguably the theoretical and philosophical arguments in favour o f the 
theory o f collective intentionality can only take us to the point where we can see that the 
theory is plausible, it makes sense, and that we have good reasons to think that collec­
tive intentionality most probably is an irreducible part o f human intentionality. Hence, 
the theoretical and philosophical arguments in favour o f the collective intentionality 
theory ought to be strengthened by empirical studies examining whether human social 
behaviour in fact shows evidence o f collective intentionality. In what follows 1 shortly 
review certain empirical approaches to social action. I argue that even if  such studies 
cannot settle the issue watertightly (cf. III.5.3), together with my philosophical argu­
ments they make a strong case for the theory o f collective intentionality.
11.3.1 SOCIAL SANCTIONS
One reason for thinking that I am exaggerating the importance o f we-mode social action 
might be the following. In most societies actions that have direct welfare consequences 
for others tend to be governed by more or less explicit norms and rules. Such norms 
typically reward socially beneficial actions and sanction egoism (often officially with 
formal laws when the behaviour is actually harmful to others and with informal social 
norms when just indifferent concerning the well-being o f others). Such norms and cor­
responding punishments and rewards appear to turn seemingly altruistic action to one 
that is rationalisable from an egoistic/individualistic point o f view. The objection is
82 This Chapter builds largely on Saaristo (2006b).
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(e.g., Fehr & Gintis 2007), then, that might not we-mode social behaviour, be uncalled- 
for in societies where individuals sanction free-riding behaviour o f others?
The point to notice is that even if  the secondary action of punishing and reward­
ing forms of primary action transforms the primary action so that it does not require 
non-egoistic motives, it is the secondary action which is now in need of explanation. 
And it clearly is not explainable from the egoistic standpoint, mainly because o f the 
free-rider problem (see, for example, Barnes 1995, 79). From the point o f view o f each 
individual it is not rational to participate in the maintenance of a system o f punishing 
and rewarding regardless of whether the others actually do it.
However, the individual costs o f participating in the maintenance o f the system 
o f social norms may be relatively small (although even then the effect -  reward or pun­
ishment -  can be very effective). Thus it may be natural to consider the participation as 
individualistically rational. Evolutionary speaking, such secondary actions are never­
theless group-level traits:
From the evolutionary standpoint [...] the fact that the cost is trivial does not al­
ter the level at which the behavior evolves. Secondary behaviors evolve more 
easily by group selection than primary behaviors because they are less strongly 
opposed by within-group selection, but they still evolve by group selection. 
(Sober & Wilson 1998, 144.)
This means, first, that secondary action -  promoting seemingly altruistic primary behav­
iour -  might have evolved by group selection even where the within-group selection 
force is so strong that the resulting, seemingly non-egoistic primary behaviour could not 
have evolved by itself. Second, since a system o f social norms is evolutionarily speak­
ing a product o f group selection, the arguments presented in this Part about the reliable 
psychological processes underlying evolutionarily altruistic behaviour apply fully also 
to such secondary actions.
I conclude that the existence o f systems of sanctions and rewards that turn col­
lectively beneficial action into individually rational action is not evidence against the 
pluralistic view o f this essay. On the contrary, this line o f thought just makes the we- 
mode view even more plausible. If  it is only the secondary actions, the cost o f which is 
rather small even from the egoistic perspective, that presupposes collective attitudes, it 
is all the more understandable that agents do not in general deviate from the collective 
standpoint to egoistic free riding. With this possible objection now cleared away, I can 
next turn to more complicated empirically orientated arguments.
II.3.2 THE DISCOVERED PREFERENCE HYPOTHESIS
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One allegedly empirically motivated line o f thought that could be seen as an objection 
to the we-mode view o f this essay comes from experimental economics. Economists 
studying human action sometimes subscribe to the so-called discovered preference hy­
pothesis (the label is taken from Plott 1996). The idea can be seen (cf. Hausman 2000) 
as a reaction to the earlier doctrine of a revealed preference hypothesis. However, part 
o f my argument will be that, rather surprisingly, vis-a-vis the present problem the dis­
covered preference view actually fails to overcome the limitations o f the revealed pref­
erence view. Therefore it is useful to start with the revealed preference view and then 
move on to the discovered preference thesis.
The motivation behind the revealed preference view is the behaviouristic convic­
tion that a scientific perspective to human action must not engage in folk psychological 
speculations about what is going on in the minds o f the agents. Rather, scientists must 
study actual choices as they become manifest in observable external behaviour. The 
preferences behind the behaviour are then reconstructed theoretically on the basis o f ob­
servations. In this sense the behaviour o f an agent is thought to reveal unambiguously 
the (individual-mode) preferences of the individual agent in question. An agent does 
what she prefers to do in that situation and, consequently, observations o f behaviour are 
thought to provide direct empirical evidence concerning the preferences behind the be­
haviour.
Although in the spirit o f Hollis’ philosophical egoism it is no doubt quite tempt­
ing to interpret a choice made by an individual as an obviously individual-mode choice, 
the interpretation is based on a plain stipulation that whatever an individual chooses to 
do, the choice is based on the agent’s individual-mode considerations. As it is usually 
set up, the framework of the revealed preference hypothesis simply defines a priori all 
action and intentionality to be in the individual mode. Thus, the word “revealed” is 
rather misleading here. The economists subscribing to this approach simply construct a 
theoretical model for explaining and predicting behaviour. The psychological-sounding 
concepts, such as preferences, desires and beliefs play a purely instrumental role in the 
model, for the whole idea is not to speculate about mental states. Obviously, however, 
this kind o f instrumentalism cannot be used as an argument in the debate concerning the 
nature of real psychological mechanisms. In short, the revealed preference hypothesis 
does not form a relevant argument for the present discussion, which is about the psy­
chology o f real agents, not about the models o f dogmatic economists.
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However, some economists tend to drift away from the instrumentalist and 
rather simplistic standpoint o f the revealed preference hypothesis and argue that results 
o f economic experiments do provide a posteriori evidence for the view that all delib­
eration is done in the individual mode when we acknowledge explicitly that the prefer­
ences o f an agent are not constructed out o f factual choice behaviour. This acknowl­
edgement is conceptualised as a move from the revealed preference hypothesis to the 
discovered preference hypothesis. This is the direction in which, for example, Charles 
R. Plott (1996) and Ken Binmore (1999) want to take experimental economics.
In short, the discovered preference view holds that “each individual has coherent 
preferences, but these preferences are not necessarily revealed in decisions” (Cubitt, 
Starmer & Sugden 2001, 386). The individual must discover what her preferences in 
fact require her to do in a given situation. This may require a lot o f time and effort (in­
formation gathering, deliberation, learning from experience and so on), but only when 
this process is complete will the behaviour o f the agent reveal the true (discovered) 
preferences. It would be a crucial mistake to think that behaviour prior to the comple­
tion of the discovery process reveals real preferences. A characteristic example o f the 
discovered preference approach is experimental work on the Ultimatum Game.
It is a well-known fact that real agents characteristically act irrationally (from 
the point o f view o f mainstream rational choice theory) in the Ultimatum Game. Instead 
o f rationally seeking to maximise their own benefits, people all over the world tend to 
follow an implicit norm of distributive justice (Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Gintis, 
McElreath & Fehr 2001) that is rational only from the collective point o f view. Bin- 
more, however, argues -  basing on the empirical experiments he has conducted (see, in 
particular, Binmore, Shaked & Sutton 1985) -  that if  the Ultimatum Game is repeated in 
an experimental setting such that agents are allowed enough time to think about the ac­
tivity and learn from experience, it will be noticed that the agents will move closer to 
the behaviour predicted by the theoretical models built on the assumption o f self­
directed individual-mode motivations (Binmore 1999, F20).84
831 can o f course concentrate only on a small aspect o f  experimental economics. For a general overview 
o f the field, see, for example, Kagel & Roth (1995).
84 Binmore’s (1999) interpretation o f  the results o f Binmore, Shaked & Sutton (1985) is, however, con­
troversial (see Binmore 1999, F20 where Binmore explains his interpretation paraphrased above). Many 
theorists think that unless the players are given explicit guidance (which Binmore et al. in effect did), the 
phenomenon o f  actual behaviour in the Ultimatum Game moving towards the theoretical predictions is 
never observed (see, e.g., Henrich et al. 2001). Naturally, if  Binmore’s description o f  the results is not 
warranted, the results do not challenge the theory o f  collective intentionality at all. In this section I aim to 
show that even //Binmore’s description is accurate, it does not automatically count against the theory o f  
collective intentionality. I thank Joseph Henrich and Natalie Gold for discussions on this point.
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It might be tempting to interpret Binmore’s results as suggesting that our actions 
are indeed governed by individual-mode deliberations. Perhaps some actual situations 
just are so complex that real agents find it difficult to figure out what rationality, con­
templated in the individual mode, requires them to do. Repeated games in the “pure” 
circumstances o f Binmore’s laboratory would then show that agents indeed gradually 
discover what self-directed individual-mode rationality calculations actually dictate in 
the situation at hand and behave accordingly, although their actions have all the time -  
even when manifestly different from theoretical predictions -  been motivated by the 
same type o f considerations. This would save the standard rational choice interpretation 
o f instrumental rationality as individual-mode benefit maximisation from the apparent 
falsification by the empirical fact that real people tend to co-operate even when it is not 
rational from their individual point o f view (not even from the perspective o f their long­
term considerations). This, of course, is precisely the goal of Binmore’s argumentation.
However, 1 think that this is not a decisive case for the present problem o f the 
nature of human psychology. It is quite possible to re-describe Binmore’s results to fit 
the theory of collective intentionality. Note that the collective intentionality theory does 
not deny the existence of individual-mode rationality considerations. It is just that in 
social life agents are often able to overcome the individualistic perspective and act in 
accordance with collective rationality, i.e., in the we-mode. Binmore’s experimental set­
tings could be interpreted as special circumstances that lead agents, contrary to “nor­
mal” social surroundings, to give up collectivistic considerations and to follow individ- 
ual-mode rationality. Indeed, the empirical data (e.g., Henrich et al. 2001) suggests that 
people rather universally tend to approach social situations such as Ultimatum Games as 
the collective intentionality theory would predict, but with sufficient training they can
Of
be taught to overcome their social tendencies and act in the individual mode.
Perhaps agents have natural tendencies for both collective we-mode action and 
individual-mode action. If so, no doubt it is possible to create circumstances that en­
courage or even require exclusively individual-mode strategic action. In such circum­
stances the individual-mode tendencies would be activated and we-mode tendencies 
suppressed. If this is the case, then Binmore’s experiments do not tell us the whole truth 
o f human psychology, even if it is true to say that in an environment encouraging indi- 
vidual-mode considerations agents are indeed capable o f modifying their thinking and
85 Thus, the crucial question is whether the process Binmore describes is a process where an agent discov­
ers her true preferences or where she is being taught new preferences (cf. Footnote 80). A full answer to 
this question presupposes a general theory o f  intentional action, and hence it must wait until Section 
III.5.3.
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behaviour accordingly, i.e., capable o f acting exclusively on their individual-mode con­
siderations.
Note also that if this motivationally pluralistic interpretation o f Binmore’s re­
sults is correct, then the misinterpretation o f the experiments that treats the emerging 
individual-mode picture as the complete picture o f human psychology is not only unjus­
tified, but it also has potential for rather unfortunate practical consequences. If  the 
model o f human agency we have in mind when designing our social institutions is that 
o f individual-mode self-directed agents, we may end up creating circumstances where 
agents are required to act and think egoistically in order to be successful in their activi­
ties, although the agents would have had the capacity to collectively rational we-mode 
action as well.
The idea I am applying here is, to use Ian Hacking’s terminology, that the cate­
gories of the human sciences are interactive, since “people [...] can become aware o f 
how they are classified [or how rationality is characterised] and modify their behavior 
accordingly” (Hacking 1999, 32). A fitting example o f this is Robert H. Frank, Thomas 
Gilovich and Dennis T. Regan’s (1993) well-known study on how studying economics 
tends to transform the behaviour o f students o f economics to conform with the standard 
economic models that assume slef-directed individual-mode motivational monism. 
Hacking calls this the looping effect o f social scientific theorising. Social science does 
not simply describe mind-independent reality; rather, since social reality consists 
(partly) o f the beliefs and attitudes of individuals, social scientific theories may trans­
form their own object (C. Taylor 1985). Therefore, misunderstandings at the level of 
philosophical psychology may lead to unattractive consequences at the level o f social 
reality by modifying human behaviour into an undesirable direction.
However, I shall not elaborate on these enormously important themes presently. 
Part III returns to these issues in more detail. For now it suffices to notice that the work 
on experimental economics cannot provide the kind o f unambiguous empirical evidence 
against the collective intentionality theory that I am after. First, the instrumentalist 
framework of the revealed preference hypothesis is unsuitable for providing empirical 
arguments concerning the true nature o f human psychology. Second, when experimental 
economists seek to move beyond instrumentalist model-building of the revealed prefer­
ence view to the discovered preference hypothesis, their results can typically be inter­
preted as compatible with the pluralism o f the theory o f collective intentionality. In­
deed, it seems to me that to defend the individualistic interpretation o f his experimental 
results Binmore must return to the a priorism  o f the revealed preference view and sim-
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ply postulate that the process of discovering the true preferences may be regarded as 
complete only when observable behaviour complies with the individualistic theory. But 
then, o f course, the individualistic theory is not discovered empirically to be true. More 
straightforward empirical evidence is needed.
II.3.3 THE SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH
In order to find empirical studies that target the precise problem at hand, the psycho­
logical processes present in social action, it is quite natural to turn to social psychology 
which, by definition, studies precisely this issue. However, all too often also social psy­
chologists tend to simply assume the atomistic framework and regard social action as 
essentially similar to individual action (Hogg & Abrams 1988, 3), the only difference 
being that in the social case the context an agent must take into account is (partly) so­
cial. Such an account o f sociality is fully graspable in terms o f the Individualistic Ac­
count (1.1.5) and has no use for the notion o f collective intentionality.
Nevertheless, within social psychology there are also research traditions that 
have reservations concerning the dogmatic acceptance o f individual-mode social atom­
ism. In this paper I concentrate on one such tradition, the so-called social identity ap-
OiT
proach. Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams describe it as follows:
The central tenet o f this approach is that belonging to a group (of whatever size 
and distribution) is largely a psychological state which is quite distinct from that 
o f being a unique and separate individual, and that it confers social identity, or a 
shared/collective representation o f who one is and how one should behave. It 
follows that the psychological processes associated with social identity are also 
responsible for generating distinctly ‘groupy’ behaviours, such as solidarity 
within one’s group, conformity to group norms, and discrimination against out­
groups.
(Hogg & Abrams 1988, 3.)
The three core elements o f this theory are captured well by the title o f John 
Drury and Steve Reicher’s article “Collective Action and Psychological Change: The 
Emergence o f New Social Identities” (Drury & Reicher 2000). The social identity ap­
proach holds that truly collective action is such that it involves a psychological change 
in the agents performing the action. The change is taken to be that of social identifica­
tion. Hogg and Abrams (1988, 7) emphasise that an individual’s identification with a 
social collective is a psychological state that is “very different from” or even
86 For a concise history o f  the approach, see, e.g., Brown (2000).
130
R7“qualitatively distinct from” standard individual-mode psychology. In social action 
agents identify themselves with a collective, forming thus a social group, and “[t]hese 
processes create identity and generate behaviours which have a characteristic and dis­
tinctive form, that o f group behaviour” (Hogg & Abrams 1998, 17). Moreover, as Hogg 
and Abrams put it, “social identity theorists posit a switch o f identity in the group (from 
personal to social)” (Hogg & Abrams 1988, 153). Drury and Reicher specify this by 
emphasising that “individuals in crowds do not lose their identity but rather shift from 
behaving in terms o f disparate individual identities to behaving in terms o f a contextu­
ally specified common social identity” (Drury & Reicher 2000, 581).
My point, o f course, is that when the social identity theorists explain what their 
view amounts to, their descriptions are almost word by word identical with the standard 
descriptions of the collective intentionality theory. Accordingly, in my view the switch 
the social identity theorists conceptualise fashionably in terms of altering identities and 
identifications is nothing else than the capacity to act and deliberate both in the individ­
ual mode and in the collective we-mode.
Moreover, Hogg and Abrams (1988, 97-101) appear to share my scepticism 
concerning models that treat social action and social facts in the manner o f mainstream 
rational choice theory, i.e., merely as a result o f a combination o f individual-mode stra­
tegic choices (1.1.5). Hogg and Abrams argue that both empirical evidence and theoreti­
cal reasons “strongly suggest that a social identity analysis may be more profitable” 
(Hogg & Abrams 1988, 105). By a social identity analysis they mean an approach 
which interprets true social action as action taken qua a group-member {i.e., the indi­
vidual performing the action identifies herself with the group, and acts, accordingly, in 
the we-mode). The individualistic essence o f the mainstream rational choice theory 
tends to lead rational choice theorists to interpret co-operative social agents as irrational 
and, moreover, to posit suppressed drives (or something similar -  recall Verbeek’s co­
operative virtues) to explain flights from rationality. Crucially, the social identity ap­
proach does not appeal to such ad hoc explanations.
Similarly, Hogg and Abrams accept the view that sometimes in social situations 
the rationality followed is collective rationality and thus unselfish, co-operative behav­
iour can be seen as (collectively) rational. “Rather than depicting collective behaviour 
as a manifestation o f latent impulses, it is considered to result from altered self­
conception. Rationality is not so much suspended as changed.” (Hogg & Abrams 1988,
87 Thus, similarly to the theory o f  collective intentionality, also the social identity theory is essentially an 
heir ofDurkheim’s sociology (Hogg & Abrams 1988, 15-16)-recall Durkheim’s almost identical charac­
terisation o f the difference between individual and collective emotions quoted in 1.1.4.
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136.) In sum, “apparently inconsistent social performances may result from switches 
between personal and social identity” (Hogg & Abrams 1988, 129). Translate Hogg and 
Abrams’ fashionable language o f altering identities into the language o f individual­
mode and we-mode action and I could not agree more.88 Correspondingly, if the social 
identity theory is well confirmed by empirical evidence, this evidence will also speak 
for the theory o f collective intentionality.
A major empirical motivation for the social identity approach comes from em­
pirical studies o f social dilemma situations (Brewer & Schneider 1990, see also 
Klandermans 2000 and Kerr & Park 2001).89 In coherence with the philosophical argu­
ments given above, also Brewer and Schneider hold that the atomistic individual-mode 
dogmatism inherent in most contemporary social science “makes it difficult to account 
for the high level o f apparently voluntary social co-operation evidenced in both field 
and laboratory studies o f social dilemmas” (Brewer & Schneider 1990, 170). They con­
clude that empirical studies o f social dilemma situations support the view that co­
operation in collective action dilemmas is due to individuals identifying with their col­
lective90 -  or, in my terminology, to adopting the we-mode. Correspondingly, if the in­
dividuals stick to their individualistic perspectives, the mutually beneficial co-operative 
outcome remains unreachable. In words of Brewer and Schneider:
When the interdependent group is seen as a collective o f distinct individuals, in­
dividualistic motives are presumed to be modal and self-interest dominates col­
lective welfare. When relevant social identities are activated, however, social 
motives are subject to transformation reflecting changes in the perceived nature 
o f the interdependence among members of the collective. When social categori­
zation corresponds to the collective as whole, co-operative interdependence is 
salient and decisions are motivated by a desire to maximize joint or collective 
outcomes.
(Brewer & Schneider 1990, 177-178.)
88 There are even more similarities between the results o f my theoretical arguments and the empirical 
theories o f the adherents o f  the social identity approach. Firstly, Hogg and Abrams think that “a collection 
o f  individuals [...]  becomes a group to the extent that it exhibits group behaviour” (Hogg & Abrams 
1988, 106), i.e., to the extent that the members experience the psychological change o f  switching from 
personal identity to social identity. Similarly, I argued in Part I that a collection o f  individuals forms a 
group insofar as the individuals lay aside their individual-mode considerations and adopt collective we- 
mode forming thus a plural subject.
89 It might seem dubious that studies o f social dilemmas provide both conceptual and empirical evidence, 
especially since we are searching for empirical approaches that would lend independent support to the 
conceptual arguments. The fact that the social identity theorists study social dilemma situations empiri­
cally rather than in terms o f conceptual analysis should help to calm such worries. However, the fact that 
in the present context the conceptual and empirical aspects are hopelessly intertwined forms a major part 
o f  my philosophical argument in Part III, and thus I fully share the worry.
90 Recall my references to Sen (via Anderson and Schmid) in II.2.4.
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This phenomenon is well documented by the so-called minimal group studies 
characteristic o f the empirical experiments o f social identity theorists. For the present 
purposes the following rough summary of the results o f minimal group studies suffices. 
If  individuals agents are provided with conceptual tools -  perhaps rather trivial91 -  with 
which to classify agents to “us” and “them”, this is sufficient for promoting co­
operative attitudes towards the members o f the we-group (and competitive attitudes to­
wards the non-members) even in tasks completely unrelated to the underlying classifica­
tions:
Once group identification has been established, intragroup orientations are char­
acterized by the best o f human motivations: perceived mutuality, co-operation 
and willingness to sacrifice individual advantage for the sake o f group goals. 
However, when in-group identity is achieved through differentiation from other 
groups at the same level o f organization, intergroup orientations are character­
ized by just the opposite: perceived conflict o f interest, social competition and 
willingness to sacrifice joint welfare for the sake o f in-group advantage.
(Brewer & Schneider 1990, 178.)92
Thus, Brewer and Schneider’s conclusions o f the teachings o f empirical studies 
o f social dilemma situations seem to confirm Sober and Wilson’s conjectures concern­
ing the implications of their multilevel selection theory: “Group selection favors within- 
group niceness and between-group nastiness” (Sober & Wilson 1998, 9). Similarly, the 
view o f the social identity theory corresponds to the understanding o f the relationship 
between an individual and her we-group raising from Sober and Wilson’s group selec­
tion theory: “The T  is defined by relating it to a ‘we.’ Human beings don’t simply be­
long to groups; they identify with them.” (Sober & Wilson 1998, 233). As Wilson in­
deed concludes, “[mjultilevel selection theory is the perfect compliment to social iden­
tity theory” (Wilson 2002, 139; see also p. 144). Consequently, just as was the case with 
Sober and Wilson, also Brewer and Schneider’s findings are best interpreted as resulting 
from agents’ natural tendency to adopt we-mode attitudes.
91 For example, the experimenter may claim, perhaps counterfactually, that the individuals can be divided 
into two groups according to their taste in music or something similar.
92 Thus, a theory building on we-attitudes might provide a theoretical justification for Peter Singer’s view, 
according to which expanding the scope o f  ethically relevant we-groups (recall the title o f Singer 1981) is 
the core problem o f  ethics. Indeed, the present marriage o f  the theory o f  collective intentionality and So­
ber and Wilson’s group selection theory is both better supported by arguments and ethically more ambi­
tious than Singer’s own naturalism, which builds on a straightforward kin-selection theory (Singer 1981, 
194). The present account can accommodate easily what Singer (1981, 111) sees as the essence o f  ethics, 
namely that the scope o f ethics is not limited to family members or other individuals with whom the agent 
has had long-term immediate contacts. In contrast, Singer’s (1981, 194) kin selectionism presupposes that 
the human mind is able to break free from the natural order o f  the world and adopt “the point o f  view o f  
the universe” (Singer 1994, 228-229) from which ethical judgements are made. I wonder whether this is 
compatible with Singer’s pronounced naturalism and kin-selectionsim.
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Moreover, the social identity theorists recognise the point emphasised in this 
study (in particular, Parts I and III), namely that when agents switch to we-mode their 
actions and intentions have (at least partly) purely social reasons. We-mode agents do 
something because that is what they think is appropriate for a member of their group to 
do. No further reason for action is required. This role of social identification is captured 
nicely by the title o f a classical article in the social identity tradition, Nelson N. Foote’s 
“Identification as the Basis for a Theory o f Motivation” (Foote 1951). As Foote puts it, 
only by acknowledging such thoroughly social explanations o f human action can social 
psychology truly deserve the name “social” (Foote 1951, 21). Similarly to my argu­
ments in Parts I and III, also Foote’s view is far from the Standard View (III.l), exem­
plified by mainstream rational choice theory, according to which actions must always be 
explained and rationalised in terms o f an individual-mode belief/desire pair.
Notwithstanding the similarities between the views raising from the conceptual 
arguments o f the present dissertation and the account motivated by the empirical studies 
within the social identity approach in social psychology, there are, however, also certain 
interesting differences. First, although I think the social identity approach can offer us a 
very realistic picture o f the workings o f human psychology in social settings, the psy­
chologists do not always have suitable conceptual tools for expressing their views 
clearly and coherently. Brewer and Schneider, for example, repeatedly fail to be explicit 
about the precise nature o f the distinction they are making between individual and social 
identity. In particular, they do not distinguish clearly whether sociality in their view 
amounts to the mode o f intentional attitudes, to the content o f such attitudes or perhaps 
to the directedness o f such attitudes. These distinctions are absolutely crucial for the 
philosophical debates on rational co-operation and in this respect I think the present phi­
losophical approach can assist the empirical tradition towards more advanced concep­
tual precision.
Similarly, Hogg and Abrams, who do not possess the concepts o f we-mode and 
collective intentionality, are forced to use vague metaphors, such as “the group in the 
individual” (Hogg & Abrams 1988, 3 & 217) and obscure illustrations such as “people 
in groups, unlike atoms in molecules, can contain psychologically the whole within 
themselves” (Hogg & Abrams 1988, 101). Thus, I would like to suggest that the phi­
losophical theory provided by the present study could be used to make the conceptual 
apparatus of the social identity theory more precise. The social identity theorists’ main 
interests lie in empirical studies o f group behaviour, not in conceptual clarifications.
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The philosophical and the empirical approaches complement each other in an important 
manner.
Although it seems clear to me that the social identity approach in social psy­
chology lends very strong empirical support to the philosophical theory o f collective 
intentionality, it remains true -  just as was the case with experimental economics too — 
that the social psychologists need to interpret the experiments they refer to quite radi­
cally. No doubt also some other kind of interpretation would be possible. In particular, 
mainstream economists would say that the categorisations of minimal group studies ac­
tivate individual-mode pro-attitudes directed at one’s group. The synthesis o f the theory 
o f collective intentionality and the social identity theory amounts to a possible concep­
tual framework within which social action can be analysed and understood. The econo­
mists offer another possible framework. Thus I can conclude neither that my theoretical 
results have been empirically proven beyond all doubt nor that the social identity ap­
proach in social psychology is unambiguously supported by empirical evidence.
This conclusion, even if not fully satisfactory,93 is nonetheless largely sufficient 
for my purposes, for I have already presented strong philosophical arguments in favour 
o f the collective intentionality theory, and in the social identity approach in social psy­
chology we have at least one interesting empirical scientific research programme that 
could bring the philosophical theory o f collective intentionality in touch with empirical 
social sciences in a fruitful way. Collaboration and co-operation o f philosophers and 
empirical social scientists could lead to a mutually beneficial outcome: The philoso­
phers could get much needed empirical support for their theories, and the empirical sci­
entists could apply the conceptual clarifications o f philosophers to get a better grasp o f 
the cluster o f problems they are approaching from the empirical point of view. What I 
have said concerning the social identity approach suffices to point one possible place 
where such a co-operation and collaboration could get off the ground.
93 Actually, the examination o f  the nature o f intentional action and its explanation in Part III demonstrates 
that we cannot require a stronger result here. There is no fa c t  independent o f  our practices o f  accepting 
certain frameworks that would make one or the other framework unambiguously true (III.5.3).
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CHAPTER II.4: 
CONCLUSION
I opened this Part with Daniel Dennett’s story that was meant to illustrate how evolu­
tionary processes always promote (i) evolutionary egoistic behaviour and (ii) psycho­
logical motivations that operate strictly within Hollis’ philosophical egoism. However, 
closer analyses have led me to reject both (i) and (ii). The question is, then, does my ar­
guments show that we should reject Dennett’s picture o f evolutionary dynamics as fun­
damentally false? I do not think so. The picture given by Dennett’s story is not so much 
false  as it is incomplete. The story captures well the within-group selection force for 
egoistic behaviour, but remains silent about the between-group selection force favouring 
socially beneficial behaviour -  and similarly for corresponding psychological mecha­
nisms.
Thus I would like to replace Dennett’s story as the recommendable illustration 
o f the evolutionary dynamics with another story that better captures the complexity o f 
human psychology. The story I have in mind is the famous opening scene o f Ian McE- 
wan’s thought-provoking novel Enduring Love, which captures aptly the two modes o f 
human psychology, as well as the tension between them. Somewhat tellingly, this story 
is not a comical story, but a tragedy.
In the novel the characters face an idyllic scene that turns into a nightmare. An 
enormous balloon, with a small child in its basket, is anchored to the ground. But it is a 
windy day: a violent blow lifts the balloon high into the air, tearing the anchor off the 
ground. Five men, previously unknown to each other, rush to help and manage to catch 
the ropes hanging from the basket. Within seconds the men find themselves hanging on 
the ropes several feet above the ground. Everything happens so quickly that the men 
have no time to form an explicit plan, or indeed to communicate a collective intention, 
about what they should do.
Here is McEwan’s narrator:
I didn’t know, nor have I ever discovered, who let go first. I’m not prepared to 
accept that it was me. But everyone claims not to have been the first. What is 
certain is that if we had not broken ranks, our collective weight would have 
brought the balloon to earth a quarter of the way down the slope a few seconds 
later as the gust subsided. But as I’ve said, there was no team, there was no plan, 
no agreement to be broken. No failure. So can we accept that it was right, every 
man for himself? Were we all happy afterwards that this was a reasonable 
course? We never had that comfort, for there was a deeper covenant, ancient and 
automatic, written in our nature. Co-operation -  the basis o f our earliest hunting
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successes, the force behind our evolving capacity for language, the glue o f our 
social cohesion. Our misery in the aftermath was proof that we knew we had 
failed ourselves. But letting go was in our nature too. Selfishness is also written 
on our hearts. This is our mammalian conflict -  what to give to the others, and 
what to keep for yourself. Treading that line, keeping the others in check, and 
being kept in check by them, is what we call morality. Hanging a few feet above 
the Chiltems escarpment, our crew enacted morality’s ancient, irresolvable di­
lemma: us, or me.9
Collective we-mode psychology can indeed collapse easily if the individual price to pay 
appears to be too high, or if there has not been enough time for communication to estab­
lish trust between the individuals. In McEwan’s story there was no stable plural subject. 
Although, tragically, all the individuals could see that there could -  and should -  have 
been.
In addition to the themes discussed in this Part, McEwan suggests that the ten­
sion between collectively rational we-mode actions and individually rational individual­
mode actions is a major source o f our moral or ethical considerations. Although this is a 
theme I cannot discuss properly within the limits o f this dissertation, let me say a couple 
o f words about it -  this may be taken as an indication for the need of further research. 
McEwan’s story highlights the fact that there appears to be a collective requirement that 
in social life people should follow collective rationality and not their individual self- 
interest.95 To put it in terms o f traditional moral philosophy, the Kantian idea o f con­
trasting mere individually instrumental action with truly moral action seems to capture 
our moral intuitions rather well. The extract from McEwan’s novel suggests, however, 
that instead of attributing morality to those intentions that stem from abstract considera­
tions of timeless and universal moral principles, we should, perhaps, compare individu­
ally instrumental considerations with considerations executed from the collective we- 
mode perspective.
Thus the universality required from ethics would be open to a naturalistic expla­
nation without a reference to timeless and universal moral principles. So although ac­
cording to this view the end products of ethical reasoning might be guidelines compara­
ble to Kantian imperatives, the source o f morality would not be unworldly contempla­
tion of Platonist moral ideas. Rather, the starting point o f morality would be the adop-
94 Ian McEwan, Enduring Love, London, Vintage, 1997, 14-15.
95 Correspondingly, social identity theorists have found in their experimental studies that people tend to 
conceptualise the tension between individual-mode rationality and collective considerations in the obvi­
ously normative terms o f  good and bad (see Kerr & Park 2001,118). Similarly, for Singer (1994, 229) the 
requirement and starting point o f ethics is “the possibility o f  detaching myself from my own perspective” 
-  but, as I have explained above (Footnote 92), in Singer’s view realising this possibility requires that we 
overcome our natural tendencies and adopt the view from nowhere.
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tion of a collective we-mode perspective to instrumental rationality -  which obviously 
corresponds in an interesting way to the Kantian maxim of never treating other agents 
as mere means relative to one’s (individual) ends (cf. Singer 1994, 231), i.e., rejecting 
the rational choice picture o f social action as strategic individual-mode action.
Since this dissertation is not a treatise in moral philosophy, I will not develop 
this line of thought further here. However, Part III defends a naturalised (in the sense o f 
de-Platonisation), essentially Kantian theory of action, rationality and agency, which is 
highly analogous to the view o f morality sketched above. Correspondingly, even such a 
brief excursion to moral philosophy brings once again forward the fundamental onto­
logical view argued for in this essay. In short, whether we are interested in collective 
action and rationality, social institutions or morality, my argumentation points towards a 
view that is ontologically naturalistic in the sense o f not appealing to unnatural entities, 
be they collective minds or timeless principles in Plato’s heaven. On the other hand, the 
arguments nonetheless support methodological anti-individualism.
Once the ontological picture is clear {i.e., when (07) has been accepted) and we 
are operating safely at the level o f individuals, it is a mistake to think that the accepted 
ontological view forces us to treat individuals as isolated social atoms with exclusively 
individual-mode psychology -  recall McClennen (II.2.4), who, mistakenly in my mind, 
thought that appealing to collective notions at the level of individuals would commit 
him to ontologically suspect notions. Similarly, Hollis’ mistake is to think that there are 
no ontologically acceptable alternatives to philosophical egoism.
However, there is a third way between atomistic individualism on the one hand 
and unnatural ontological holism on the other. Ontologically speaking, the social world 
consists exclusively o f individuals, but they are essentially linked to each other. The 
link, I have argued, is we-mode psychology. Gilbert (1989), Pettit (1993), Searle (1995) 
and Tuomela (1995) all accept views that are, although different from one another, 
nonetheless essentially similar to mine in this respect. The view I defend is not meth­
odological individualism, but it is not traditional ontological holism either. This is why 
Pettit calls such views individualistic (as opposed to collectivism in the sense o f reject­
ing (07)) holism (as opposed to atomism in the sense of disparate individual-mode 
agents), and Tuomela interrelationism. In this dissertation my goal is to explicate an 
acceptable version o f such a view. I take this Part to have shown that the view is evolu­
tionarily and psychologically plausible: It is well supported both theoretically (social 
dilemmas) and empirically (especially by studies within the context o f the social iden­
tity approach in social psychology).
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Note that the picture sketched in this Part, although drawing heavily from evolu­
tionary considerations, is clearly different from approaches known as socio-biology or 
evolutionary psychology. Most importantly, my approach does not assume any kind o f 
direct relation between genes and specific actions or mental modules and contents. This 
is something that mainstream evolutionary psychology is correctly accused o f (Sterelny 
2003). In fact, I Consider my work to be highly compatible with such uncompromising 
criticisms o f evolutionary psychology as Dupre (2001) (this connection is made explicit 
in III.5.3). Moreover, my account does not need to assume that humans are simple rep­
licators that copy the most effective strategy they observe (cf. Skyrms 1996). My ap­
proach allows,pace, e.g., Hollis and Verbeek, collectively rational action to be based on 
complicated deliberations o f instrumental rationality (executed in the we-mode).
In short, the main theses of this Part are the following. First, contrary to what 
might appear to be the case, the claim that we-mode collective intentionality is a primi­
tive feature o f human psychology is compatible with our understanding o f evolutionary 
dynamics. Second, we-mode collective intentionality is not only compatible with evolu­
tionary dynamics; it is also a more plausible candidate than mere individualistic psy­
chology (including the psychological altruism favoured by Sober and Wilson) to be the 
core psychological mechanism behind truly social action. Thus, in addition to accepting 
ontological individualism, the theory o f collective intentionality is in this Part shown to 
be naturalistic also in the more specific sense of being compatible with and even sup­
ported by our understanding o f evolutionary dynamics. The Homo Sociologicus does 
not contradict evolutionary theory. Third, the arguments o f this paper continue to speak 
strongly against mainstream methodological individualism by showing that not only are 
purely social reasons possible reasons o f human action, but evolutionary considerations 
should make us to expect it to be often the case in social interactions. Contrary to meth­
odological individualism, rational human agency is, sometimes, irreducibly collective in 
its form and mode.
PART III:
ACTION AND AGENCY
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INTRODUCTION TO PART III
“Anyone who cannot form a community with others, or who does not need to because 
he is self-sufficient [...] is either a beast or a god.”
- Aristotle, Politics, 1253a, 27.
I have already argued for two o f the main theses o f this dissertation. First, I have argued 
that, ontologically speaking, social institutions and the whole o f social reality consist of 
collectively accepted and required patterns o f behaviour (Part 1). Despite their objectiv­
ity, social institutions are nonetheless mind-dependent; their construction requires there 
to be intentional agents who collectively assign and maintain normative functions. Sec­
ond, I have argued that the theory o f collective intentionality as a fundamental building 
block of social reality is supported by our understanding of the dynamics o f the evolu­
tionary theory and the evidence gathered by the empirical social sciences, and these ar­
guments for a strong, general argument in favour of Durkheimianism in the sense of 
1.1.5 (Part II).
The remaining question in the present ontological project concerns the justifica­
tion of the broad strategy of building on the notion of intentional agency (and, ulti­
mately, the status o f Wittgensteinianism in the sense of 1.1.5). We must ask whether the 
general framework o f intentional agency, which has been presupposed in the earlier 
Parts, is really warranted. More precisely, we must ask what is the nature and status of 
intentional explanations. This question is o f course relevant to all human sciences that 
operate with the notion o f intentional agency. Thus this part should be o f interest even 
for those who do not accept the views defended in Parts I and II -  although I shall argue 
that answering the question compels us to accept the views defended in the earlier parts 
o f my dissertation. Moreover, also this question will guide us to accept naturalised 
methodological holism. Or so I argue.
When assessing the soundness o f the framework o f agency the animating ques­
tions are, once again, ontological in nature: What is intentional agency? How could 
there be intentionality, or aboutness, in the world that ultimately consists of blind physi­
cal processes? However, if  agency and folk psychology, which are essentially conceived 
o f  in terms o f contentful and intentional mental states, are mere illusions, or at least 
readily reducible to physicalist neuroscience that has no use for the notion o f intention­
ality, then the whole programme established in the earlier parts of this dissertation 
seems to vanish into thin air. Hence the status o f the views defended in this dissertation
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cannot be established until the (ontological and explanatory) status o f intentionality is 
addressed in detail.
The answer to the challenge o f eliminativism in this Part takes the methodologi­
cal holism defended in the earlier parts even further. I argue that the quotation above 
from Aristotle is literally correct: intentional agency and personhood as we know them 
are possible only within social practices. Intentional human agents are (partly) consti­
tuted by what I call social bedrock practices. Outside such practices there can be only 
non-intentional and non-rational beasts whose behaviour is determined by blind disposi­
tions or gods who do not belong to the natural order o f the world.
The starting point of my argumentation is the platitude that human activities can 
be studied from several different angles. What distinguishes the perspective o f  the 
moral, human or social sciences from that o f the natural sciences is that the former study 
human action and not mere human behaviour. The distinction between action and mere 
behaviour is aptly captured by Max W ebers well-known depiction: “In ‘action* is in­
cluded all human behaviour when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a sub­
jective meaning to it” (Weber 1922/1947, 88).96 Thus, the defining feature o f action ap­
pears to be its meaningfulness. In some sense action must, as it were, be understood 
from within -  we do not grasp an action accurately if  we do not understand the meaning 
it embodies.
The crucial question, then, is what does it mean to say that action must be under­
stood from within. From within what? It seems that we have two competing intuitions 
on how to answer that question. It appears sensible to say that actions must be under­
stood from within the mind of the acting individual. Acting is doing something for a 
reason: An agent intends to achieve something with her actions. Weber’s definition 
seeks to capture this by emphasising the role o f the subjective meaning an individual 
attaches to behaviour. In this individualistic view the intentionality o f action is derived 
intentionality; its intentionality and meaning is derived from the intrinsic original inten­
tionality o f the mental states of the acting individual.
96 Perhaps Weber would not approve o f the way I group together the moral, human and social sciences. 
Weber famously argued that the social sciences study social action, and in his view “action is social in so 
far as, by virtue o f the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes 
account o f  the behaviour o f others and is thereby oriented in its course.” (Weber 1922/1947, 88). For the 
present purposes my grouping is, however, justified, since (i) even if  one accepts Weber’s distinction be­
tween individual and social action, the distinction between action and mere behaviour is still philosophi­
cally absolutely crucial and (ii) below (Chapter 111.3 onwards) I defend a view similar to that o f Peter 
Winch, according to which ultimately “all meaningful behaviour must be social, since it can be meaning­
ful only if  governed by rules, and rules presuppose a social setting” (Winch 1958,116).
142
However, also a holistic intuition, according to which action must be understood 
from within the social rules that give human action its meaning, seems appealing. A 
physical behaviour o f raising one’s arm is the action o f greeting a friend only if  there 
exists a social convention that assigns the physical movement in question the status o f a 
greeting (note the obvious connection between this view and the discussion on the as­
signment of functions and the construction o f social statuses in Part I o f this study). The 
very same physical behaviour could have different meanings -  be a different action -  in 
different social circumstances. Thus, similarly to the individualistic view, in a sense also 
the holistic view treats the intentionality o f action as derived intentionality, but locates 
original intentionality in our social practices.
The holistic view of original intentionality seems to re-invoke the ever-present 
problem o f this study (recall especially 1.2), namely the dilemma of choosing between 
the circularity of argumentation and the reification o f society and social practices. Ac­
cording to holism, the intentionality o f action presupposes social practices. However, 
general ontological individualism (01) seems to dictate that to avoid reification, the 
practices themselves must be based on intentional actions o f individuals. To avoid such 
circularity, the holistic view seems to require practices that exist independently o f  indi­
vidual actions. But this, in turn, appears to imply an explicit rejection o f the ontological 
principle (07).
This dilemma motivates John R. Searle (1995) to think that the theories which 
see social facts as collectively assigned statuses, e.g., the theory defended in Part I o f 
this study, must in the end be individualistic in a stronger sense than the mere ontologi­
cal sense of (07). Searle thinks that holism is correct about all the other meaningful or 
functional things in the world except the minds o f individuals, which are intrinsically 
intentional. Pieces o f paper can be money, speech-acts can be communication, ink stains 
on a paper can have meaning and so on only if they are collectively assigned such 
statuses in our social practices o f requiring and accepting certain behaviours. However, 
Searle reasons, to avoid ontological reification such practices must be based on individ­
ual acceptances (albeit in the we-mode) and, finally, to avoid circularity the mental 
states of individual acceptances must, according to Searle, be intrinsically meaningful 
and intentional. Hence, Searle concludes, we must accept individualism in the strong 
sense o f thinking that individual agents are intrinsically capable of intentional thoughts 
and actions.
Daniel C. Dennett has ridiculed this line o f thought on the grounds that it seems 
to postulate (to use Dennett’s terms) the existence o f some kind of magical wonder tis­
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sue which can be intrinsically meaningful and intentional (about something) — and that 
brains are the only objects made of this wonder tissue. Dennett thinks that since argu­
mentation along the lines o f Part I of this study shows that there cannot be intrinsic 
functions and intrinsic intentionality in the physical world, one cannot go on to assume 
the existence o f intrinsically intentional minds. This would surely be a case o f treating 
individuals as gods outside the natural order o f the world.
I think that Dennett is correct here: In Chapter III.3 onwards I argue that Sear- 
lean individualism cannot be accepted. We are not gods. However, I refuse to admit that 
there would be anything naive or ridiculous in Searle’s reasoning. The apparent alterna­
tives are, after all, at least as unacceptable. Since we do not want to reify social prac­
tices it is no wonder that Dennett is often, despite his repeated protests, seen as an 
eliminativist who has no place for thoughts, meanings or intentional actions. If  there is 
no original intentionality, there seems to be no intentionality at all. But this amounts to 
treating individuals as non-intentional and non-rational beasts.
Hence the fundamental task undertaken in this Part o f my study is to salvage the 
intentionalist programme by providing an account o f intentionality, meaning and action 
that avoids the four unacceptable solutions I have just sketched: (i) individualism (indi­
viduals as gods), (ii) circularity o f practices and actions, (iii) reification (rejection o f 
(OI)) and eliminativism (rejection of the intentionalist programme; individuals as 
beasts).
The solution, I argue, requires that we find a way to be holists without falling 
guilty of circularity or reification: we must naturalise holism. Such holism must main­
tain that our most fundamental social practices that make intentionality possible are 
based on pre-intentional behaviour (as opposed to meaningful action) at the sub­
personal level (Chapter III.4). These fundamental practices then bootstrap intentionality 
into existence -  and turn behaviour into action. Here intentionality is seen as a kind o f 
self-validating social performance, and the intentionality o f individual psychology, ac­
tion and public language are all constructed at the same time. Original intentionality re­
sides in social practices. This view is analysed and defended in detail in Chapter III.3 
onwards. Ultimately, this examination o f the nature and sources of intentionality will 
deliver a novel, constructivist theory o f collective we-mode intentionality (III.5.2).
However, before we can look at the fundamental preconditions o f intentional ac­
tions we must understand the nature of action. In particular, in addition to the problem 
o f individualism versus holism (is original intentionality to be found in individual brains 
or social practices), the nature o f meaningful action presents another central problem
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relevant to the philosophical foundations o f the views defended in this study. This is the
07long-lasting debate between causalist naturalism and non-causalist humanism. Only 
when we have cleared this cluster o f problems we can return to the problem o f formulat­
ing an acceptable version o f holism. So let us look at the nature of intentional action and 
its explanation in terms o f the naturalism versus humanism debate.
97 In this dissertation I cannot o f  course develop and defend a philosophical theory o f causation. Thus I 
have done my best to write in such a way that my arguments are not tied to any particular view o f causa­
tion. However, in what follows I am committed to a realist, mind-independent notion o f  causation, which 
sees causal relations as nomological relations (in terms o f  Part I, such law-governed relations obtain inde­
pendently). I contrast such mind-independence with normative notions that are rule-based and depend on 
what we take the rules and norms to be (such norms may nonetheless obtain externally and objectively). 
Thus, if  one holds a view according to which causation is in fact projected onto the world by our psycho­
logical or linguistic categories that are based on our notion o f  agency (or something similar), such that 
causal notions are ultimately psychological or normative notions, then my talk o f  causation should be 
translated into talk about whatever one takes to be governing the mind-independent physical world - cf. 
Stoutland (2005,130), whose views the present study tends to agree with, not only in this respect, but also 
in general (see, in particular, Stoutland 1986 & 1988), although in accepting that also the “environment” 
o f  observable behaviour is “intentional, and not merely physical phenomena” (Stoutland 1988, 44), Stout­
land comes, at least apparently, dangerously close to McDowell’s (1994) idealism, which is criticised and 
rejected in A.2.
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CHAPTER III. 1: 
INTENTIONAL ACTION AND ITS EXPLANATION98 
III. 1.1 THE STANDARD VIEW
When we aim to describe the sense in which behaviours have meanings and, thereby, 
are actions, we are led to statements such as that actions are behaviours performed for a 
reason or that actions are behaviours that we do as opposed to what happens to us. In A. 
I. Melden’s words, there “is a difference between my arm raising and my raising my 
arm, my muscles moving and my moving my muscles -  in short, between a bodily 
movement or happening and an action” (Melden 1960, 70). Hence, actions may be said 
to be behaviours that are under our control. The obvious question then, o f course, con­
cerns the nature o f the control.
The standard way o f approaching this question, which is one o f the most funda­
mental questions in the philosophy o f mind, action theory and the philosophy o f  the 
human sciences, is to rephrase the question as an inquiry into the fundamental nature o f 
the following principle (L) that plays a central role in intentional explanations (the fol­
lowing formulations are adopted from Rosenberg 1995):
(L) If  any agent, X, desires D, and believes that doing A is the best means to attain D  
under the circumstances, then X does A."
(L) allows us to construct the standard form o f intentional explanation as follows:
1. X  desires D.
2. A"believes that A is the best means to attain D  under the circumstances.
(L) If any agent, X, desires D, and believes that doing A is the best means to attain D  
under the circumstances, then X does A.
Ergo: X  does A.
98 This Chapter expands on Saaristo (2006a).
99 Obviously, (L) requires a ceteris paribus clause: (L) holds only if  X  does not have any other desires 
overriding D, if  X  knows how to do A, if  X  is able to do A etc. Arguably the ceteris paribus clause cannot 
be removed from (L). Important as this issue may be, it is not something I want to address presently, for 
in III.5.1 I argue that the ceteris paribus problem is not a problem for the interpretation o f  intentional ex­
planations I defend in this study.
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Here a behaviour A is (or counts as) an intentional action of X  iff doing A is under X s  
control in the manner described by (L). Hence the question concerning the nature o f the 
control can now be expressed in the context o f intentional explanations as the question 
concerning the status o f (L) and indeed the status o f the practical inference that the ex­
planation consists o f
Broadly speaking, we have two options. First, we could hold that Premises 1 and 
2 pick out the mental states o fX  which in fact causedX to do A. Here (L) is regarded as 
expressing a universal, causal law of nature describing the causal functioning o f charac­
teristically rational agents such as humans. According to this view, our actions are under 
our control in the very natural sense o f being caused by our intentional states (in par­
ticular, our intentions, beliefs and desires). This conception of (L) and intentional expla­
nation seems to agree very well with general scientific naturalism. Rationality is seen as 
a natural property o f beings such as humans, and (L) is a descriptive claim. Conse­
quently, if this conception is accepted, intentional explanations can be regarded as natu­
ralistic, causal explanations o f action similar in nature to the explanations o f the natural 
sciences.
Alternatively, we could maintain that reasons and actions are not causal issues 
and thus intentional explanations are not causal explanations at all. Rather, the gist o f an 
intentional explanation would be to render an action intelligible. According to this con­
ception, human actions, as the humanistic slogan has it, are not explained but under­
stood. Here (L) is not seen as a causal law o f nature but as a normative principle ex­
pressing how reasons and actions ought to be connected for the agent to count as ra­
tional (or indeed for the behaviour to count as action and the individual to count as an 
agent).
Adherents o f this humanistic Verstehen conception will have to face at least two 
further, albeit closely connected questions concerning the nature o f (L). First, where 
does (L) come from? If one has Kantian or Platonist inclinations, one could argue that 
(L) expresses a universal rational principle graspable by pure reason. Those humanists 
who find Platonism in all o f its forms metaphysically dubious tend to favour a social 
account, according to which (L) is socially constructed and resides in our practices 
rather than in the realm o f universal ideas.100
100 Or as Robert B. Brandom (1994, 2000, 2002) -  who does not hesitate to spice up his detailed argu­
mentation with very broad generalisations from the history o f  philosophy -  sees this, the move from the 
causalist to the normative view amounts to a move from Cartesianism to Kantianism, and the de- 
Platonisation o f (L) in terms o f  social constructivism amounts to a move from Kantianism to Hegel’s (and 
later Wittgenstein’s) philosophy. I think that this kind o f  anti-Platonist naturalism is also the core of, for 
example, Barnes and Bloor’s (e.g., 1982) much-misunderstood relativism, which is simply the naturalistic
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The second question concerns the role o f (L). Does (L) merely regulate rational 
behaviour, telling how actions ought to be connected to mental states? Or should we see 
(.L) as a constitutive rule and say that (.L) interdefines beliefs, desires and actions, such 
that (.L) partly constitutes rationality and intentional states?101
If (L) is seen as a regulative rule, it should be formulated as follows:
(L*) If any agent, X, desires D, and believes that doing A is the best means to attain D  
under the circumstances, then rationality requires X to do A.
With this interpretation, if Premises 1 and 2 are true -  and (Z*) holds -  it still does not 
follow that X  will indeed do A. Rather, A is what X rationally ought to do under the cir­
cumstances. If A" does not perform A, no laws o f nature have been broken. Rather, X  has 
done something wrong. X  has failed to comply with the norm o f rationality expressed by 
(Z*).
If, in contrast, (Z) is seen primarily as a constitutive rule, we can keep the origi­
nal formulation of the principle. According to this reading, however, (Z) does not con­
nect distinct entities or events but rather explicates a normative (inferential) framework 
within which there can be beliefs, desires and actions. This notion leads directly to the 
holism o f the intentional realm (III.1.2 & III.1.3). According to this conception, what it 
is foxX  to do A is that X  has desires and beliefs as described by Premises 1 and 2, for 
they are what constitute X s behaviour qua intentional action A. Similarly, what it is to 
have a belief described by Premise 1 is to be committed to performing A if the belief is 
accompanied by the desire described by Premise 2. Finally, to have the desire described 
by Premise 2 is to be committed to moving from Premise 1 to the action-conclusion A. 
Consequently, the humanist scheme states, we cannot say that the desire and belief 
cause the action, for they do not exist independently o f the action (III.l .2).
Below I defend the humanistic Verstehen position in the rather extreme sense 
that accounts for (Z) in terms o f social practices (Chapter III.3 onwards) and sees (Z)
largely as a constitutive rule (III. 1.2 and Chapter III.3 onwards). To motivate such an
10?admittedly heretical view in contemporary analytic philosophy o f mind and action we 
need first to understand what the alternatives are and why they cannot be accepted.
claim that norms such as (I)  must be brought from the Platonic heights o f  Kant’s noumenal world into 
our natural world by showing how they are constructed and maintained in (how they are relative to) our 
social practices.
101 Recall the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules in 1.2.
102 A view very similar to mine is defended by Stoutland (e.g., 2005) but not by many others.
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All the four combinations one can construct in terms of the two fundamental dis­
tinction I have introduced -  individualism versus holism and naturalism versus human­
ism (or explanation versus understanding) -  are possible positions and, arguably, ought 
to be discussed separately.103 However, I will be explicitly concerned with only two o f 
the four possibilities. I set aside the combination o f causal explanation and (ontological) 
holism, for I have already rejected such a view in Part I of this study by accepting that 
the only causal factors in social life must be individuals and their physical environment. 
I also will not explicitly address the combination o f individualism and humanism, be­
cause the considerations in Chapter III.3 clearly write off the acceptability o f this com­
bination. The view I think we ultimately should accept, the combination o f ontology- 
cally naturalistic methodological holism and anti-causalist humanism, will be argued for 
and analysed in detail in Chapter III.3 onwards. Thus, for the time being I want to con­
centrate on what I call the Standard View, namely the customary way o f combining in­
dividualism and causalism.
Among social scientists and philosophers o f social science the Standard View is 
routinely seen as the view famously defended by Donald Davidson (1963). However, as 
1 argue in III.1.3 and III.2 below, it is not obvious that Davidson in fact held the Stan­
dard View in any straightforward sense. Hence, rather than Davidson's own writings, a 
typical example o f the Standard View in the present sense is, for instance, Jon Elster’s 
interpretation o f Davidson in the article “The Nature and Scope o f Rational-Choice Ex­
planations” (Elster 1985).
The Standard View maintains that the mental states of an agent -  in particular, 
her beliefs and desires -  are the causes of the actions o f the agent. However, the Stan­
dard View sees an intentional explanation as something more than a mere causal expla­
nation o f an action. The explanation also renders the action intelligible by showing how 
the action was (instrumentally) rational in light o f the beliefs and desires o f the agent. 
This aspect of understanding the action is combined with causalism about intentional 
explanation in the sense o f explaining the action in terms of a causal structure distinc­
tive o f rational agents. The explanatory power o f intentional explanations comes from 
seeing the reasons for an action as the causes o f the action.
The causal, explanatory aspect o f intentional explanations requires us to focus 
on mental states qua relata in causal relations, i.e., qua concrete particular things or 
events (depending on one’s metaphysical categories) out there in the world. Modem ma-
103 For example, Martin Hollis (1994) builds his entire examination o f  philosophy o f  the social sciences 
around the four possibilities.
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terialists are inclined to think that this amounts to approaching mental states in terms o f 
the physical brain states that are believed to realise the mental states (these issues are 
discussed and analysed in detail in III. 1.3 and III.2). The rationalising aspect o f inten­
tional explanations, on the other hand, compels us to concentrate on mental states essen­
tially qua mental states, i.e., in terms o f the propositional contents o f or the meanings 
embodied by the mental states in question.
This being the case, it is worth noting that we appear to be dealing with two fun­
damentally different categories here. The causal conception seems to guide our attention 
towards the physical states picked out by the descriptions “.Y’s belief that P ” and “X *s 
desire Q \  regardless of what propositions P  and Q stand for. The relation that matters 
for causal explanation is a (causal) connection between concrete, physical particulars. 
The rationalising conception, in contrast, is pulling into the opposite direction. What 
matters for rationalisation is the propositional contents expressed by P  and Q, regardless 
o f how those contents are instantiated. The relations in which P  and Q stand to one an­
other that matter for rationalisation are normative, logical and conceptual relations. The 
fundamental problem addressed again and again in the present Part o f my study is the 
compatibility of these two explanatory functions. I argue that in the end they are indeed 
so different that one ought not to imagine that a single form o f explanation could cap­
ture the two.
This, however, is precisely the bold aim of the Standard View. What the advo­
cates of the Standard View wish to say is that somehow the content o f a mental state is 
its physical realisation (recall the wonder tissue theory), and hence it is the content that 
has the causal strength or efficacy to cause actions. As my chosen representative o f the 
Standard View puts this point, intentional explanations o f human actions must satisfy 
three conditions (Elster 1985, 311-312):
(i) Beliefs and desires rationalise actions in the sense of (L).
(ii) Beliefs and desires cause actions.
(iii) Beliefs and desires cause actions qua reasons.
This is a very ambitious view, and a great deal must be said before we can see why it 
must be rejected.
III. 1.2 THE LOGICAL CONNECTION ARGUMENT
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The Logical Connection Argument104 against the Standard View is motivated precisely 
by the distinction between a non-normative, causal relation between physical entities 
and a normative, conceptual (or logical) relation between propositional contents. The 
Logical Connection Argument holds that the principle (L), which the Standard View 
regards as a law o f nature describing the causes o f actions, is rather a defining mark of 
rationality and rational agency. Moreover, (.L) and other such rules governing theoretical 
and practical reasoning, are constitutive o f rationality. Thus, if a person violates (L), she 
is not breaking any laws o f nature. However, the Logical Connection Argument is not 
simply saying that in such a situation the person fails to act rationally. Rather, the argu­
ment goes, if the person violates all or most o f such rules, she fails to display what we 
call beliefs, desires and performances of intentional actions. According to the Logical 
Connection Argument, what it is to have contentful mental states and to perform actions 
is simply that one’s activities are coherently describable in terms o f (L) and other simi­
lar principles.105
104 It is difficult to pick one authoritative formulation o f the Logical Connection Argument. The label re­
fers to a cluster o f  views that were inspired by Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and which had their hey­
day in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s -  Davidson, for example, says simply that his 1963 paper, which is 
generally seen as the decisive attack on the Logical Connection Argument (see III.1.3 below), joined 
Hempel in “swimming against a very strong neo-Wittgensteinian current o f  small red books” (Davidson 
1976, 261). In the classical form the view is stated in Winch (1958), but I concentrate mainly on the ele­
gant formulation o f  the argument given in another small red book, namely von Wright (1971). However, 
my motivations are systematic rather than historical: I am concerned with what I take to be the strongest 
form of the argument, i.e., my own reconstruction rather than von Wright’s actual version, although I do 
agree with Frederick Stoutland (personal communication) that my version may at least in spirit be rela­
tively close to what von Wright had in mind all the time (cf. Footnote 182 below). However, my aim is 
not to trace the historical development o f von Wright’s thought (for this, see Schilpp & Hahn 1989, 
Kusch 2003 and indeed von Wright 1989a & 2001). For example, in 1971 von Wright was still reluctant 
to talk explicitly about rationality, not to mention the explicit principle (L) (for discussion, see Black 
1989). I also talk in terms o f reasons for action -  a convention von Wright adhered to only in his later 
works (cf. Kusch 2003, 338). Stoutland, whose position I largely agree with, says that he defends a view  
that he attributes also to von Wright “in terms that he himself might not have used but that bring it into 
more explicit contact with current work in the philosophy o f action” (Stoutland 2005, 128). The same 
applies to the present study. In addition to Von Wright, the spirit o f the Logical Connection Argument, as 
we shall see, continues to live, for example, in the works o f Brandom (1994 & 2000), Esfeld (2001) and 
McDowell (1998a & 1998b) and the present study.
105 Thus, it is somewhat unfortunate that this view is known as the Logical Connection Argument, be­
cause “it is a mistake [...] to understand the intentionalist view [the Logical Connection Argument] to 
mean that there is a relation o f logical entailment between the premisses and the conclusion o f  a practical 
argument” (von Wright 1976b, 422, cf. Kusch 2003, 339, which argues that von Wright actually changed 
his mind here and, finally, Malcolm 1989 for a discussion concerning this problem). The point is, rather, 
that the premises and the conclusion do not name events or states conceptually independent o f  one an­
other. This is what von Wright (1971, 117; 1972) means with his perplexing claim that although ex post 
actu the connection between the premises and the conclusion can be seen as that o f conceptual necessity, 
we cannot before the action happened predict the action on the basis o f  the mental states o f  the agent. O f 
course this is but a reformulation o f the view that intentional explanations are rationalising expositions 
operating with constitutive rules rather than causal explanations operating with causal laws. Conse­
quently, I will talk somewhat loosely o f  a logical, conceptual or normative connection.
151
Thus, according to the Logical Connection Argument, (L) serves to interdefine 
beliefs, desires and actions. In short, the Logical Connection Argument says, as G. H. 
von Wright puts it, “that a distinguishing feature o f the causal relation is that cause and 
effect are logically independent o f one another” (von Wright 1971, 93) and since be­
liefs, desires and actions are logically dependent on one another, they cannot stand in 
causal relations.
To drive home this point von Wright invites us to consider the problem of veri­
fying106 whether an agent has a certain intention:
Let it be asked how, in a given case, one ascertains (verifies) whether an agent 
has a certain intention, “wills” a certain thing — and also how one finds out 
whether his behavior is o f a kind which his intention or will is supposed to 
cause. Should it turn out that one cannot answer the one question without also 
answering the other, then the intention or will cannot be a (humean) cause o f his 
behavior. The facts which one tries to establish would not be logically independ­
ent o f one another. I shall try to show that an investigation o f the problem of 
verification must lead to this result.
(Von Wright 1971,94-95.)
The starting point o f von Wright’s argument is the observation that Premises 1 and 2 as 
well as the conclusion in our paradigmatic model o f an intentional explanation above 
“are contingent, i.e., empirically and not logically true or false, propositions. It must 
therefore be possible to verify and to falsify -  or at least confirm or disconfirm -  them 
on the basis o f empirical observations and tests” (von Wright 1971, 107).
106 For those uncomfortable with von Wright’s empiricist emphasis on verification I should add that in my 
view Tuomela is correct in claiming that “von Wright could as well [and indeed should] have made his 
point without employing the (methodological) notion o f verification. For his general idea is the concep­
tual one that, both in discussing the premises and the conclusion o f the practical syllogism [an intentional 
explanation], we have to assume the ‘teleological framework’ or the ‘standpoint o f  agency’. [ ...]  Thus it 
seems we can say that action (as opposed to ‘mere’ movement) and the (overall) intention connected with 
and expressed by it are intrinsically connected both in an ontic and in a semantic sense (and not only 
methodologically). To describe something as action means [ ...]  that there is a ‘conduct plan’ (e.g. a prac­
tical syllogism) which matches the action” (Tuomela 1976, 195). Indeed, Tuomela (1977, 185) points out 
that the mere methodological point about verification is clearly insufficient for establishing a conceptual 
or ontological dependence; it is quite possible that two logically independent scientific propositions are 
nonetheless never independently testable (cf. Kusch 2003, 332). My treatment o f  the Logical Connection 
Argument agrees with Tuomela’s “wide” reading o f von Wright’s central ideas, where what matters is the 
ontology o f  actions and not methods o f  verifying propositions (cf. von Wright 1989b, 813-814). Kusch 
(2003) appears to read Tuomela’s point about the insufficiency o f verification as Tuomela’s criticism  o f  
von Wright’s Logical Connection Argument, whereas I think that at least in Tuomela (1976), on which I 
concentrate, the aim is rather to explain what von Wright’s real position behind the unfortunate verfica- 
tionist terminology is -  and with which Tuomela (1976, 195-196) explicitly largely agrees (also von 
Wright (1976a, 402) writes that in this respect “Tuomela’s comments are not at odds with my own opin­
ions”). Tuomela (personal communication) agrees with my interpretation o f the 1976 paper; his 1976 
criticism o f the Logical Connection Argument is not based on von Wright’s alleged verificationism but on 
von Wright’s reluctance to include causal factors in intentional explanations: although Tuomela (1976) 
accepts that the conceptual connection constitutes behaviour qua action, for him the explanatory work is 
still done by causal connections.
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Actually, however, the issue is trickier than it first appears. Assume, for exam­
ple, that the action we are explaining is X s  greeting of her friend by raising her arm. In 
normal cases it is easy enough to verify what physical movements X s  arm went 
through. But in order to identify the movement as X s  action it is not enough to record 
the movements. The task is to verify X ’s action o f greeting her friend. To do that, we 
must show that the physical movement was not something X  brought about only acci­
dentally or by mistake -  in other words, we need to show that what took place is some­
thing X  did and not something that only happened to her. In short, to verify that X  is 
greeting her friend we must show that X s  behaviour, the movement her body is going 
through, is intentional under the description “greeting her friend” (von Wright 1971, 
108).
So to verify that someone intentionally did something, we must show that the 
person was aiming at doing that very performance. Here problems arise for the Standard 
View:
But to establish that a certain item o f behavior aims at a certain achievement 
[...] is to establish the presence in the agent o f a certain intention [desire, pro­
attitude] and (maybe) cognitive attitude concerning means to ends. And this 
means that the burden o f verification is shifted from the verification o f the con­
clusion to that o f the premises o f a practical inference [an intentional explanation 
in the present terminology].
(Von Wright 1971, 109.)
Hence, an attempt to verify the conclusion without verifying the premises o f the inten­
tional explanation o f the action fails. This leads von Wright to conclude that “the inten­
tionally is in the behavior” in the sense that “intentionality is not anything ‘behind’ or 
‘outside’ the behavior. It is not a mental act or characteristic experience accompanying 
it.” (Von Wright 1971, 115.) To say that a behaviour is an action simply is to say that 
the behaviour embodies intentional ity. It is not possible to identify an action and then go 
on to discover the beliefs and desires that cause it, for what makes a behaviour an action 
in the first place is the conceptual connection to the reasons for it (in this case, to a cer­
tain belief-desire pair). According to the Logical Connection Argument, this amounts to 
saying that (L) expresses a logical or conceptual connection, not a causal law.
In short, von Wright’s line of thought seems to be the following. A bodily be­
haviour is an action only if  the behaviour embodies a meaning. The behaviour embodies 
a meaning only if  there is an agent who intends to do something by the behaviour. The 
agent intends to do something by her behaviour only if there is a description o f the be­
haviour that can be rationalised in terms of the reasons the agent had (and (L)). The pos­
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sibility of this description gives the behaviour the content in virtue o f which it is an in­
tentional action. Thus, the connection between the reasons and the action is a constitu­
tive conceptual connection, not an empirical connection between self-sufficient events. 
Therefore, the connection cannot amount to a causal relation.
Another way o f approaching the Logical Connection Argument is to look at the 
status o f (L) directly. Von Wright’s point that intentionality is in the behaviour and not 
“outside” it appears to amount to saying that (L) is a conceptual definition we use to re­
describe the very event we seek to explain in terms o f beliefs and desires. (L) allows us 
to do that in virtue of interdefining the meanings o f “belief’, “desire” and “action”, not 
in virtue o f picking out a causal connection. The Logical Connection Argument treats 
intentional explanations as largely analogous to explications o f conceptual connections 
in a language rather than to empirical explanations o f the natural sciences.107 An inten­
tional explanation is a clarification comparable to, say, a situation in which a person 
learning English finds the statement “John is a bachelor” intelligible only when it is ex­
plained that John is an unmarried man and all unmarried men are bachelors. Whatever 
this kind of explanation may explain, it surely does not amount to a causal explanation 
o f why John is a bachelor (the example is from Rosenberg 1995, 43).
Thus, the Logical Connection Argument takes very seriously the Weberian in­
sight that action is essentially meaningful behaviour. This is taken to mean that actions 
indeed have a conceptual content in virtue o f which they are meaningful. John McDow­
ell captures this nicely: “Kant says ‘Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions 
without concepts are blind’. Similarly, intentions without overt activity are idle, and 
movements o f limbs without concepts are mere happenings, not expressions o f agency.” 
(McDowell 1994, 89).108 The way to understand McDowell’s declaration is to follow G. 
E. M. Anscombe’s (1959) central insight that actions are essentially actions “under a 
description”. To use Anscombe’s example, when we observe a sequence o f physical 
movements o f a man and ask “What was he doing?”, there may well be more than one 
true answer. The man was moving a lever up and down. He was pumping water into the 
cistern o f a house. He was pumping poisonous water into the house where evil men 
meet. He was poisoning the men in the house.
However, for a behaviour to be an action there must be a description, under 
which the action is intentional, that describes what one intends to do with one’s per­
107 Hence the often misunderstood hermeneutic metaphor o f the human sciences treating social phenom­
ena as texts.
108 It is important to note the close similarity between thoughts and actions on the one hand and the essen­
tial connection o f  both to conceptual contents on the other. Both broadly Kantian themes will resurface 
repeatedly in this Part.
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formance. Hence one may act intentionally under description A so that one performs 
also an action under description B, even though one does not intend to act under de­
scription B. The central role of descriptions in (Anscombean) action theory highlights 
the conceptual element inherent in all intentional actions. Conceptual descriptions are 
(partly) constitutive of intentional actions qua actions.
The Logical Connection Argument sees an intentional explanation precisely as 
capturing the process of forming a description under which an action may be performed. 
An intentional explanation redescribes the action in terms o f beliefs and desires such 
that the action is intentional under that description. In other words, an intentional expla­
nation captures the process of giving a conceptual content to behaviour (and thus turn­
ing it into an action) by describing the behaviour in intentional terms that place the ac­
tion into a normative pattern constituted by rational rules such as (L). In von Wright’s 
mind a rationalising description of behaviour -  an intentional explanation o f action -  is 
what gives meaning and content to behaviour and thus constitutes the behaviour qua 
intentional action. Stoutland (1976) explains this well when he emphasises that von 
Wright does not seek to decompose intentional action into its more basic elements. For 
von Wright, the concepts of intentionality and intentional agency are irreducible.
One does not understand the concept o f intentional action by first understanding 
a concept like (mere) behavior and then adding to it other concepts like causality 
or desire. To understand the concept is not to eliminate it in favor o f other con­
cepts but to see its place in a larger conceptual structure, by possessing which 
we are agents who can act and see others acting, and who can explain our action 
and the action of others.
(Stoutland 1976, 279.)
Stoutland’s description captures very aptly the essence o f the non-causal human­
ism behind the Logical Connection Argument. Stoutland also points out the reasons 
why this kind o f humanism is often seen as anti-scientific and anti-naturalistic. After all, 
the view appears to be that action, agency and other such phenomena (i) are real phe­
nomena, (ii) do not belong to the causal order o f the natural world and (iii) cannot be 
reduced to phenomena belonging to the causal order. To put it in Sellars’ (1963, cf. 
Stoutland 2005, 131) terms, the notions o f agency and action belong to the logical space 
o f reasons and normative rationality and not to the logical space o f nature (the space of 
non-normative causal explanations within which the natural sciences operate). This cer­
tainly appears to challenge the naturalism I have promoted throughout this study.
Since I nonetheless want to defend a revival of the Logical Connection Argu­
ment, one o f the main tasks undertaken from Chapters III.4 onwards is to give an ac­
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count o f how there can be an irreducible normative space of reasons in the natural 
world. In other words, where many humanists advocate straightforward anti-naturalism, 
I wish to defend irreducible humanism within the framework of general naturalism. Be­
fore I can take up that task, however, let me continue to trace the fate o f the Logical 
Connection Argument in contemporary philosophical debate.
The received wisdom in the contemporary philosophy o f action is that the Logi­
cal Connection Argument is invalid. The conclusion does not follow. But which conclu­
sion, exactly, is not thought to follow from the considerations that are clustered under 
the label “the Logical Connection Argument”? That intentional explanations as such are 
not causal explanations? That (L) is a normative, constitutive rule and not a causal law 
o f nature? Or perhaps that terms such as “belief’ and “desire” do not name (ultimately 
physical) states that could have as their effects events that are the behavioural compo­
nents of intentional actions? In the course o f this Part of my study I argue that precise 
answers to these questions -  or in other words, what, exactly, we take the core o f the 
Logical Connection Argument (and the standard Davidsonian criticism o f it) to be -  are 
absolutely crucial for adequate understanding o f the nature o f action, intentional expla­
nation and the nature o f human agency. The issue becomes clear when we turn to ana­
lyse the arguments o f Davidson, which are generally supposed to rebut the Logical 
Connection Argument.109
III.1.3 DAVIDSON’S ALLEGED REFUTATION OF THE LOGICAL CONNECTION 
ARGUMENT
Donald Davidson opens his attack on the Logical Connection Argument in his famous 
article “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” (1963) by pointing out that even if  we grant that 
by giving an intentional explanation o f an action we redescribe the action in terms of 
beliefs and desires (a point emphasised by von Wright), it does not follow that beliefs 
and desires cannot be the causes o f the action. On the contrary, we often do redescribe 
events precisely in terms of their causes. For example, when someone is injured we may 
redescribe the event by saying that he was burned (Davidson 1963, 10). In this case the 
man’s injury is redescribed in terms o f the man being burned, but surely the possibility
109 As Alfred Mele puts this, “Davidson’s greatest contribution to the philosophy o f action is his resurrec­
tion o f causal theories o f  action and action explanation. As long as Davidson’s challenge to noncausalists 
remains unmet [...]  causalism will be the biggest game in town, if  not the only one.” (Mele 2003, 82.) In 
the next section I argue, contrary to the view accepted almost universally in contemporary action theory, 
that -  pace Davidson and Mele’s claims to the contrary -  Davidson does not even present a serious chal­
lenge for noncausalists to meet.
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of such a redescription does not prevent us from seeing burning as the cause o f the 
man’s injury. The possibility of giving different descriptions o f the very same event lies 
at the heart o f Davidson’s argument against the Logical Connection Argument.
However, an adherent of the Logical Connection Argument might think that this 
example is essentially different from a redescription o f an action in terms o f the reasons 
(beliefs and desires) for the action. After all, as von Wright emphasises, the main con­
cern is the logical or conceptual connection between reasons and actions. We cannot 
make sense o f the one without appealing to the other. This does not hold for burnings 
and injuries. The connection between them is empirical, not conceptual or logical.
Davidson has an answer readily available. Suppose “A caused Z?” is true. If  so, 
we can redescribe “A” as “the cause o f 5 ”. By substituting this redescription into the 
original claim, we have “the cause of B caused B”, which, as Davidson (1963, 14) puts 
it, is an analytic and not synthetic statement. In other words, we know the sentence to be 
true in virtue o f a conceptual connection. The lesson Davidson wants to teach with his 
example is that only the descriptions “the cause of i?” and “Z?” are conceptually con­
nected, whereas the events they pick out are causally connected. After all, the original 
sentence, “A caused B'\ is not an analytic statement. “The truth o f a causal statement 
depends on what events are described; its status as analytic or synthetic [whether or not 
the connection is conceptual] depends on how the events are described” (Davidson 
1963, 14).
Thus Davidson appears to be saying that even if the Logical Connection Argu­
ment is correct about the conceptual connection between our attributions o f reasons and 
actions, it does not follow that the terms cannot pick out events that stand in a causal 
relation to one another. An intentional explanation talks about a certain process in inten­
tional terms. These intentional terms or descriptions (or the attributions o f reasons and 
actions) may be conceptually connected, much as the Logical Connection Argument 
argues. Since we are not Cartesian dualists, we shall nonetheless assume that the con­
crete particulars the intentional explanation refers to can be given also physicalist de­
scriptions. To the extent that these new, physicalist descriptions (physical event-types) 
are covered by a causal law o f nature, the connection between the particulars falling un­
der such physical types is a causal connection no matter how we in fact happen to de­
scribe the particulars.
Note that Davidson is making an ontological point. For the argument to work we 
have to know neither the physicalist descriptions nor the law covering them; it suffices 
that the particulars could in principle be redescribed in law-governed physicalist terms.
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If the law-covered redescriptions exist at least potentially, then, since the original inten­
tional explanation talks in terms of mental types about the very same particulars as the 
alternative description does in terms o f physical types falling under a causal law, the 
connection the intentional explanation refers to is in fact a causal connection, even if the 
intentional explanation fails to reveal that (see Davidson 1967, 155 & 159-160). In this 
case, Davidson argues, also the intentional explanation can be said to be a causal expla­
nation.
However, it seems to me that the sense in which an intentional explanation can 
be a causal explanation in Davidson’s theory is obviously a derived or even contingent 
sense. Let me explain what I mean by this.
For Davidson an adequate intentional explanation o f action consists o f a ration­
alisation and an identification o f a causal connection (Davidson 1963, 4; 1974a, 233), 
and consequently the explanation must acknowledge the causal nature o f the process the 
explanation picks out by including a premise asserting that the mental states cited as the 
reasons for action (here, a belief and desire) are also the causes o f the action. It is im­
portant to understand that for Davidson’s argument to work, such a clause must be seen 
as a singular causal claim stating that a certain desire and a certain belief caused a cer­
tain behaviour. This singular causal claim is about concrete particulars; it does not func­
tion as a general law connecting certain types o f propositional attitudes with actions of 
certain kind (Stoutland 1976, 283-284). For Davidson, beliefs and desires are causally 
efficacious qua concrete particulars out there in the world.
Hence, we can model Davidson’s view o f intentional explanation as follows:
1. X  desires D.
2. X  believes that A is the best means to attain D  under the circumstances.
3. This concrete particular instantiating X s  desire and this concrete particular instanti­
ating X s  belief cause this concrete particular instantiating X s  action A.
(L) If any agent, X , desires D , and believes that doing A is the best means to attain D  
under the circumstances, then X does A.
Ergo: X do ts  A.
Hence, in Davidson’s view an adequate explanation o f an action must, on the one hand, 
rationalise the action by placing it into the normative web o f rational relations between 
the intentional types involved by describing the particulars the explanation talks about 
as tokens o f mental types -  just as the Logical Connection Argument says -  and, on the
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other, acknowledge the causal relations between the particulars in question by explicitly 
postulating that the relation between the particulars is a causal relation.
This reading o f Davidson amounts to attributing more or less the same view of 
intentional explanation to Davidson as the one defended by Raimo Tuomela in his 1976 
paper.110 Both Davidson and Tuomela accept the core idea of the Logical Connection 
Argument (and Tuomela indeed puts this in terms o f an explicit acceptance o f the Logi­
cal Connection Argument111), namely that (L) is not a causal law o f nature at all but 
serves to render an action intelligible by pointing to the conceptual or logical relation in 
which the action stands to beliefs and desires.
In fact, although Davidson does not explicitly accept the Logical Connection 
Argument, in his well-known writings on the nature of the mental (especially Davidson 
1970 & 1974a) Davidson explicitly explains that his famous thesis o f the anomalism o f
i n
the mental (that mental types are not covered by strict laws) is based on the holistic 
nature o f the mental, i.e., the view “that the content o f a propositional attitude derives 
from its place in the pattern” (Davidson 1970, 221, see also p. 217 & 1987, 114 and, 
especially, 1995, 130) and therefore “[t]he meaning o f a sentence, the content o f a belief 
or desire [or indeed action], is not an item that can be attached to it in isolation from its 
fellows” (Davidson 1982, 183). Moreover, “the satisfaction conditions o f consistency 
and rational coherence may be viewed as constitutive of the range o f applications of 
such concepts as those of belief, desire, intention and action” (Davidson 1974a, 237; my 
italics -  see also Davidson 1982, 184). As Jaegwon Kim (2003) puts this, for Davidson
[b]eliefs, intentions, and the rest are possible only as elements o f an integrated, 
“holistic” system, and what give the system intelligible structure are the princi­
ples of rationality, consistency, and coherence. For Davidson, the norms o f ra­
tionality and coherence [such as (L)], which underlie mental holism, are the 
“constitutive principles” o f mentality; they give intentional mentality their dis­
tinctive identity as an autonomous domain.
(Kim 2003, 119.)
110 Tuomela (1998), on the other hand, defends a version o f the Standard View -  and, accordingly, 1 think 
the 1976 paper is actually more successful (see 111.2 below).
111 In his later writings also Davidson (e.g., 1982, 173 & 174) talks explicitly about a logical connection.
112 “Holistic” in the Quinean sense, not in the sense o f  social holism as the word is mainly used in this 
dissertation. Similarly, Dagfinn Follesdal (1982) argues that Davidson’s theory o f  action in a sense wid­
ens Quine’s meaning holism to include actions and not only mental states such as beliefs and desires. 
Quine’s holism holds that the meaning o f  a belief is constituted by its place in a larger conceptual system 
(a web o f beliefs). Since actions are routinely defined, following Weber, as meaningful behaviours, it is 
natural to think o f  actions as including propositional contents that are constituted by their place in a con­
ceptual system that includes, e.g., reasons. This view is o f  course highly compatible with von Wright’s 
Logical Connection Argument. I address the relation between Quinean meaning holism and social holism 
in 1II.3 onwards (including Appendix).
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But this is o f course precisely the claim of von Wright’s Logical Connection Argument. 
Principles such as (L) constitute the conceptual framework within which we can talk 
about reasons and actions.
Moreover, the place in the conceptual framework that constitutes the contents o f 
reasons and actions is defined in terms o f normative, conceptual connections, and hence 
when we approach behaviour in terms of its reasons (i.e., qua meaningful action) “we 
necessarily impose conditions o f coherence, rationality, and consistency. These condi­
tions have no echo in physical theory, which is why we can look for no more than rough 
correlations between psychological and physical phenomena.” (Davidson 1974a, 231; 
my italics.) In other words, normative constraints and constitutive principles such as (L) 
are not descriptive causal claims.
The claim that the constitutive principles o f the mental domain have no echo in 
the constitutive principles o f the space o f nature (roughly, causal laws o f nature govern­
ing the physical domain) is a cornerstone o f Davidson’s philosophy o f mind. A proper 
understanding o f this thesis is absolutely vital also for the present study. The thesis is 
examined and defended in detail in 111.3 and III.4 below, but let me shortly sketch the 
main line o f thought also here (my sketch follows partly the wonderfully clear discus­
sion of Kim (1985, 200 fif. & 2003, 119)).
Suppose one believes, as my first English textbook at school used to declare ad  
nauseam, that Spot is a dog. Davidson’s holism o f the mental -  or (Quinean) meaning 
holism for short -  states that the propositional content o f this belief (in virtue o f  which 
the belief is intentional) is constituted by the rules o f rationality that require one to hold 
also the beliefs that Spot is a mammal, Spot is not a mere machine, Spot is a living crea­
ture and so on. Since these requirements are constitutive o f the belief qua contentful, if 
one does not believe these other things (or a large number of such beliefs) one does not 
hold a contentful belief at all.
Call the belief that Spot is a dog M. Suppose we are now wondering whether we 
should attribute the person who believes M, that Spot is a dog, also the belief M*, that 
Spot is a living creature, or the belief M \  that Spot is a furry, inanimate machine. Sup­
pose further that available perceptual evidence does not discriminate between M* and 
M \  However, in Davidson’s view the rules o f rationality require the person who accepts 
M  to accept M* and to reject AT, for M ' is not rationally compatible with M. Similarly, 
as interpreters we rationally ought to attribute the person holding M  also the belief M* 
and not M ' (recall Davidson’s (1973b) famous principle o f charity). It is absolutely cru­
cial to understand that in Davidson’s picture the rules connecting M to  the acceptance o f
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M* and to the rejection of M ’ are normative rules partly constitutive o f M, M* and M* 
qua contentful judgements.
Suppose now that the claim that the rules o f rationality have no echo in the 
physical domain is false. Presumably this would mean that there are purely physical, 
neural events N  and N* that are sufficient (although not necessary, if  we want to make 
room for the multiple realisability o f mental states -  see III.2 below) for M  and M* to 
occur, respectively. Since by assumption the connection between M  and M* is reflected 
in the law-like constitutive principles o f the physical domain, it is a law o f nature that 
whenever N  (which is sufficient for A/to occur) occurs, N* (sufficient for M*) occurs as 
well. This, however, is highly implausible, for it -  and therefore the assumption that 
Davidson’s no echo thesis is false — has quite unacceptable implications.
First, the law connecting N  and N*, and thereby M  and M * as well, would imply 
that the connection between M  and M* is not really a normative connection after all, but 
merely a projection of a non-rational (non-normative) causal law governing physical 
events. “In consequence, the intentional mental domain would be threatened with a loss 
o f its distinctive identity, which is defined by norms o f rationality and coherence” (Kim 
2003, 120). Therefore, insofar as Davidson is correct in holding that the mental realm is 
essentially normative (in the sense o f the normative rules of rationality being constitu­
tive of mental states),113 the rejection o f Davidson’s no echo thesis would in effect lead 
to the elimination (or reduction) o f the mental realm.
Second, in terms of the example above, in Davidson’s picture it is essential that 
the choice between M* and M ’ is based on irreducibly rational (conceptual, normative) 
constraints. These rational constraints give, according to Davidson, M* and M ’ their 
contents, i.e., constitute M* and M ’ qua mental states. Now if we reject the no echo the­
sis and assume that the occurrence of the neural state N* is sufficient for M* to occur, 
the rational constraints pointing to M * instead o f M ’ lose their essentiality. To recapitu­
late, for Davidson a constitutive feature o f M* is that the conditions o f its attribution are 
essentially normative. However, the neural state N* presumably has purely naturalistic 
(non-normative) attribution conditions. Thus, if N* is sufficient for M*, M * has suffi­
cient, non-normative attribution conditions and, therefore, the normative attribution 
conditions of M* lose their essentiality and, as before, this implies that the mental do­
main is either eliminated or reduced away.
113 The argument that normative rationality is indeed necessary for mental qua mental and qua contentful 
(but that this does not challenge naturalism) is defended in detail in Chapter III.3 onwards.
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These two ways o f explaining the implicit content of Davidson’s no echo thesis 
are based on the assumption that there is a neural event identical114 with the mental 
event. However, rather than thinking about particular neural events, an anti-Cartesian 
monist could argue that the instantiation o f a mental state depends on a wide system of 
causal processes, including, say, the agent’s physical and social environment. Such a 
causalist could maintain that the physical materialiser that gives rise to the mental state 
is a system o f a number of causal capacities, each essentially different from the capacity 
ascribed to the mental state. Thus, the causalist attribution conditions o f any o f the 
physical causal capacities would not be identical with the attribution conditions o f the 
causal capacity o f the mental state, although nothing Cartesian has been assumed. In 
such a case the mental state could be argued to have a causal capacity different form the 
capacities o f any physical event (I take this to be close to what Dupre (1993) is saying -  
see III.2.5).
However, it seems to me that Davidson’s no echo thesis is meant to cover also 
this line of thought. Post 1963, Davidson avoids talking about mind-brain superven- 
ience, and this seems to suggest that he does not want his view to be restricted to views 
that see a neural event as sufficient for a mental event. The core o f his no echo thesis 
appears rather to be the argument that if we try identify (or indeed talk about) the mental 
in causal terms, we have changed the subject, for the mental is constituted by addressing 
it in normative terms, whereas causal talk is always non-normative.
Thus, the philosophical core o f Davidson’s no echo thesis (and therefore his 
Anomalous Monism) is the mutual incompatibility o f the following three theses: (i) the 
mental realm is essentially normative (it belongs to the logical space o f normative ra­
tionality), (ii) the physical (causal) realm is essentially non-normative (it belongs to the 
logical space of non-normative nature) and (iii) there are systematic connections be­
tween the mental realm and the physical realm. Davidson argues that one o f the three 
must be rejected, and he rejects (iii). However, this is compatible with Davidson’s anti- 
Cartesian monism, since for Davidson both the physical and the mental realm are essen­
tially conceptual categories, i.e., incommensurable ways of conceptualising the world of 
concrete particulars either as tokens of mental types (the mental realm) or as tokens of 
physical types (the physical realm). The two conceptual frameworks, although about the 
same world, are not and cannot be systematically connected.
Contrary to what is often claimed, the no echo thesis implies that intentional ex­
planations o f action cannot be causal explanations. Intentional explanations operate
114 At least to^e/i-identical; see III.2 below.
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within the mental realm, whereas causation belongs to the physical realm. And since 
there are no systematic connections between the two realms, one cannot smuggle causal 
notions from the physical realm to the mental realm.115
Thus, it seems obvious that the notion of the normative holism o f the mental, 
which, according to Davidson, implies anomalism, amounts in fact to the acceptance o f 
the Logical Connection Argument in von Wright’s sense. The explanans o f the standard 
form o f intentional explanation that consists of Premises 1 and 2 and the principle (L) 
has nothing causal in it (since the premises “have no echo in physical theory”). How­
ever, unlike von Wright, Davidson still wants to stick to the view that a successful in­
tentional explanation must in some sense be a causal explanation, and hence he adds 
(implicitly) Premise 3 that contains all the causal import there is in the explanans.
The main reason for Davidson’s insistence on the causal nature o f intentional 
explanation is, as Tuomela (1976, 202) explains, that a mere rationalisation will not in 
Davidson and Tuomela’s view allow us to pick outA^s operative reason out o f the class 
o f possible rationalisations o f X's action. For example, we could rationalise JCs going 
to the theatre by pointing out that X  desired to see the play and believed that the way to 
do that is to go to the theatre. But we could also point out that as a collector o f auto­
graphs X  desired to get the autograph o f his favourite actor and believed that this can be 
done by going to the theatre. Now the question is, which intentional explanation is the 
correct explanation, i.e., which explanation captures the operative reason for s action. 
Tuomela’s answer (1976, 203), which agrees with Davidson’s original theory, is that the 
correct explanation is the one referring to those reasons that caused X*s action. The op­
erative reason is the cause of the action.
However, this means simply that we have to add a causal element (as expressed 
by Premise 3 above) to the non-causal, standard form o f intentional explanation. Here is 
the point where it matters that we see the singular nature o f the causal claim correctly. 
Premise 3 talks about the particular tokens o f belief and desire qua concrete particulars. 
As Tuomela (1976, 203) emphasises, as it stands the singular causal claim o f Premise 3 
is indeed just a claim and hence in need o f justification. In the view o f Tuomela and
115 It is important to notice that Davidson’s no echo thesis does not appeal to the exact form o f  the causal 
relations governing the physical realm (or even to mental states being also physical states) but only to the 
essential difference between normative and non-normative relations. In III.2 I discuss views that reject the 
essential normativity o f  the mental realm and seek to account for the irreducible and ineliminable nature 
o f the mental in terms o f  irreducible mental causation. I argue that most o f these attempts fail in their own 
terms. However, even those views that survive my criticism in 1II.2 (notably views that do not suppose 
that the physical domain is causally closed) require that one denies either the essential normativity o f the 
mental or the non-normativity o f the causal. In III.3 onwards I argue that neither can be done. The prob­
lems created by my unbridgeable gap between the normative mental realm and the non-normative physi­
cal (causal) realm are discussed in Appendix.
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Davidson, scientific causal claims must be backed by means o f some laws, since “where 
there is causality, there must be a law: events related as cause and effect fall under strict 
deterministic116 laws” (Davidson 1970, 208). However, since psychological concepts 
and connections (such as (L)) “have no echo in physical theory”,117 the backing laws 
must be physical. This, as Davidson explains, amounts to redescribing the concrete par­
ticulars Premise 3 talks about as tokens o f physical types and subsuming these descrip­
tions under a causal law.
Crucially, such a law does not connect reasons with actions, i.e., mental or inten­
tional types (see Stoutland 1976, 285), but physical types with other physical types.
The Laws whose existence is required if reasons are causes o f actions do not, we 
may be sure, deal in the concepts in which rationalizations must deal. If the 
causes o f a class o f events (actions) fall in a certain class (reasons) and there is 
no law to back each singular causal statement, it does not follow that there is any 
law connecting events classified as reasons with events classified as actions -  
the classifications may even be neurological, chemical, or physical.
(Davidson 1963, 17.)
Suppose m, a mental event, caused p , a physical event; then, under some de­
scription m andp  instantiate a strict law. This law can only be physical [...]. But 
if m falls under a physical law, it has a physical description; which is to say it is 
a physical event.
(Davidson 1970, 224.)
Justifying the insistence on causation requires that we think o f the particulars in ques­
tion qua physical events -  and in particular not qua reasons (since reason-talk has “no 
echo in physical theory”).
Hence, according to the Davidson-Tuomela view, intentional actions include 
two components that must, because o f the no echo thesis, remain essentially separated: 
“Two ideas are built into the concept o f acting on a reason (and hence, the concept o f 
behaviour generally): the idea o f cause and the idea of rationality” (Davidson 1974a, 
233). This, I think, implies that Davidson and Tuomela are committed to the view that 
in fact there is no one form o f explanation that would be suitable for intentional action. 
First, we need the traditional model o f intentional explanation, which rationalises the 
action in a non-causal way. Second, we need a causal explanation o f the behavioural 
component o f the action in question, and this is given by a non-intentional causal expla­
116 For the role o f  determinism, see III.2.5.
1,7 In Tuomela’s (1976) view this anomalism o f  the mental (the lack o f  causal laws in psychology) is an 
empirical claim. As we saw, Davidson is prepared -  and I agree -  to make a stronger claim: he thinks that 
the holism o f the mental shows that causal psychological laws are a priori impossible.
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nation that does not invoke norms o f rationality such as (.L) but causal laws connecting 
physical types.
This, however, simply means that the Davidsonian model above tries to merge 
two completely different explanations (different explananda and different explananses) 
into one inference. One is a causal, non-intentional explanation o f behaviour, and the 
other is a non-causal, intentional explanation o f action. The obsession to formally in­
clude both these aspects in a single inference does not undermine the fact that there are 
two different issues at stake.
But this does not speak against the Logical Connection Argument anymore; in 
fact, it is the point o f the Logical Connection Argument. As von Wright puts it, the ex- 
planandum of a causal explanation o f behaviour is “why parts o f his body move, under 
the causal influence o f stimulations o f his nervous system, and not why he moves parts 
o f  his body” (von Wright 1971, 119), which is an action and consequently must be ex­
plained in terms o f a non-causal intentional explanation. The Logical Connection Ar­
gument is not aimed to show that both explanations cannot be important and interesting, 
but only that one ought not to confuse the two, as they are genuinely different explana­
tions. This is something Davidson's view does not -  and cannot -  challenge, for David­
son is simply saying that an intentional explanation can pick out a connection which is 
(also) a causal connection, but nonetheless the intentional explanation cannot talk bout 
the connection qua causal (because of the no echo thesis).
As von Wright (1971, 119) emphasises, when we explain actions, we give non- 
causal, intentional explanations where mental types stand in rational relations. When we 
explain bodily behaviour, we give causal, non-intentional explanations where physical 
types stand in causal relations. Rather surprisingly, the same result follows from a care­
ful reading of Davidson’s argumentation, although Davidson is generally regarded as 
the philosopher who refuted the Logical Connection Argument. If  Davidson still wants 
to insists that what he says is sufficient for calling intentional explanations causal ex­
planations, we can see that he must mean this in a very weak, derived sense, since the 
causal nature is not due to the intentional explanation as such, but to the possibility o f 
redescribing the components o f the intentional explanation in terms of a causal explana­
tion of behaviour -  which, as Davidson himself admits, amounts simply to “changing 
the subject” (Davidson 1974a, 230). Von Wright would not disagree with this.
Now we can finally return to the questions I asked in the end o f Section III.1.2. 
It is often simply taken for granted that Davidson’s defence o f the causal interpretation 
o f intentional explanations shows that the Logical Connection Argument is invalid, full
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stop. I suggested that such an unqualified claim is not likely to be acceptable. Indeed, if  
the core of the Logical Connection Argument is thought to be the claim that intentional 
explanations as such are not predominantly causal explanations, I conclude that David­
son’s alleged refutation fails, since even in Davidson’s picture the causal nature does 
not come from intentional explanations per se but is derived from the possibility o f 
physicalist redescriptions that can be subsumed under causal laws. Similarly, if  the core 
o f the Logical Connection Argument is thought to be the idea that (L) does not express a 
causal law o f nature but rather a conceptual or normative connection (that has “no echo 
in physical theory”), I conclude that Davidson’s alleged refutation also fails.
However, if one regards the Logical Connection Argument primarily as an at­
tempt to show that mental terms such “belief’ and “desire”, as they are used in inten­
tional explanations, cannot talk about processes of which also a non-mental description 
may be given and which in this sense can feature in causal explanations, I think David­
son’s refutation is successful.1,8 But this should not be seen as a refutation o f the Logi­
cal Connection Argument. Rather, this should be seen as an acceptance o f the Logical 
Connection Argument with an explicit emphasis on the importance o f the rejection o f 
Cartesian dualism and the role o f causal knowledge in modern descriptive (natural) sci­
ence. Again, I doubt if a sophisticated advocate o f the Logical Connection Argument, 
such as Georg Henrik von Wright, would call into question any o f this (see, e.g., von 
Wright 1989b, 806 & 1988).
Thus, in fact Davidson’s argumentation implies a direct denial o f the Standard 
View. Indeed, the Davidsonian arguments, if correct, render the Standard View impos­
sible. This is rather surprising, since the Standard View is often explicitly supposed to 
be an essentially Davidsonian position. This is, for example, the claim o f Jon Elster 
(1985), whose argumentation I will next turn to.
Elster starts with the customary assertion that he wants to analyse rational or in­
tentional explanations o f actions as opposed to mere behaviour. In his view this 
“amounts to demonstrating a three-place relation between the behavior (B), a set o f 
cognitions (C) entertained by the individual, and a set o f desires (D) that can also be 
imputed to him.” (Elster 1985, 311).119 Elster thinks that the relevant relation between
118 However, it does not follow that mental states necessarily supervene on brain states; the view leaves 
open the possibility o f  externalism. Perhaps mental states supervene on a system significantly larger than 
mere internal brain states, i.e., on a system including the agent’s (physical and social) environment.
119 Already here it is clear that this cannot be a Davidsonian view, for Davidson (1970, 1974a) was forced 
to admit that von Wright was right to think that reasons and actions (qua reasons and actions) are not dis­
tinct events but dependent on each other (the holism o f the mental) and, moreover, exist only relative to 
the normative framework constituted by norms such as (L). Elster’s very starting points show that by 
treating actions, cognitions and desires as distinct categories he fails to appreciate the mental holism char-
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beliefs (or cognitions) and desires on the one hand and behaviour on the other can be 
defined in terms of three conditions. If  the conditions are satisfied, we have reached a 
successful intentional explanation, and the behaviour in question has been shown to in­
stantiate an action. I have paraphrased the conditions in the end of Section III. 1.1. Now 
I wish to add a critical discussion concerning the conditions. My aim is to show that if 
the background theory really is Davidson’s theory, as Elster says, then the three condi­
tions necessary for the Standard View cannot be satisfied.
In Elster’s view a successful intentional explanation must be a causal explana­
tion, but since we are talking about causal explanations applicable to rational beings, 
Elster’s first condition requires that “the desires and beliefs are reasons for the behav­
iour” (Elster 1985, 311), i.e.,
(i) Given C, B is the best means to realize D. (Elster 1985, 311; cf. Davidson 1963, 5.)
In the spirit o f the standard causalist approach (recall Davidson and Tuomela’s argu­
ments above), Elster thinks that (i) cannot alone be sufficient. Besides the problem of 
multiple rationalisations, an agent may have the right belief and desire, and perform the 
required behaviour without the behaviour being his intentional action. For example, an 
actor may be asked to shudder as a part o f a scene. He may have the appropriate beliefs 
and desires, but the real explanation o f his behaviour may still be that he saw a snake 
and this caused him to shudder. In such a case (i) would be satisfied, but the actor none­
theless did not shudder intentionally. Shuddering was not what he did, it was not his ac­
tion. Rather, it happened to him.
Elster thinks that this shows that we need to add another condition “ensuring that 
his behavior was actually caused by his intention to behave in that way” (Elster 1985, 
311). Elster formulates this condition as follows:
(ii) C and D caused B. (Elster 1985, 311; cf. Davidson 1963, 12.)
The combination of (i) and (ii) is o f course the core o f Davidson’s causal theory o f in­
tentional explanation. In the original version of Davidson’s 1963 article, Davidson 
states (Footnote 5) that in addition to considering (i) and (ii) to be necessary conditions 
for intentional action, he also believes that (ii) “can be strengthened” to make (i) and (ii)
acteristic o f  Davidson’s philosophy o f  mind (recall also the quotation from Stoutland 1976, 279 in 
III. 1.2).
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jointly sufficient for intentional action. In the 1963 article Davidson nonetheless con­
centrates exclusively on the necessity o f the conditions.
However, in “Freedom to Act” (Davidson 1973a) Davidson returns to suffi­
ciency. His view is formulated in relation to the following example:
A climber might want to rid himself o f the weight and danger o f holding another 
man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he 
could rid himself o f the weight and danger. This belief and want might so un­
nerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it might be the case that he 
never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do it intentionally.
(Davidson 1973a, 79.)
In this case both (i) and (ii) are satisfied, but as Davidson explicitly admits, the climber 
does not loosen his hold intentionally. It is not an action of his. Conditions (i) and (ii) 
are, Davidson thinks, necessary, but the example shows that they cannot be sufficient:
If the agent does jc  intentionally, then his doing x is caused by his attitudes that 
rationalize jr. But since there may be wayward causal chains, we cannot say that 
if attitudes that would rationalize jc  cause an agent to do jc , then he does jc  inten­
tionally.
(Davidson 1973a, 79.)
Hence, if the causalist interpretation o f intentional explanation is to be defended, some­
thing needs to be added to (i) and (ii) -  or, as Davidson put this in his 1963 footnote, (ii) 
must be strengthened. The required further condition is that the beliefs and desires must 
cause the action “ in the right way” (Davidson 1973a, 79). We must require that the 
“causal chain must follow the right sort o f route” (Davidson 1979, 78).
But this is hardly satisfactory. We want to know what “the right way” is. This is 
where Davidson’s confident argumentation starts to shake. Instead of giving a clear an­
swer, he suggests vaguely that “we might try saying” that the belief and desire must 
cause the action “through a course of practical reasoning” (Davidson 1973a, 79) so that 
the action is, and here Davidson is paraphrasing David Armstrong in a non-committal 
way, “produced by a causal chain that answers, at least roughly, to the pattern o f practi­
cal reasoning” (Davidson 1973a, 78). All this is terribly imprecise, which Davidson is 
well aware of: “What I despair o f spelling out is the way in which attitudes must cause 
actions if  they are to rationalize the action” (Davidson 1973a, 79).120
Elster, on the other hand, does not lose hope. He thinks that the problems in the 
example are due to the fact that it is “a mere accident that in the case of the climber they
120 Note also that Davidson’s problem is precisely that he seems not to be able to get rid o f  normative 
notions, just as the Logical Connection Argument implies.
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[the belief and the desire] happen to cause the very same behavior for which they are 
reasons” (Elster 1985, 312). As soon as we see this, Elster thinks, the solution is obvi­
ous. To rule out situations such as the climber example, we must add a third condition 
stating that in order for a belief and a desire to explain intentionally an action, the belief 
and the desire must have produced the causal effect they did in virtue o f being reasons. 
Or in Elster’s notation:
(iii) C and D caused B qua reasons. (Elster 1985, 312.)
Elster thinks that (iii) offers the kind o f strengthening Davidson’s original footnote in 
the 1963 article envisaged and the 1973a climber example requires. And as I explained 
in III.1.1, together (i), (ii) and (iii) constitute the Standard View.
Admittedly Elster’s reasoning is quite appealing. To save the essential intuitions 
behind the Standard View, namely the idea that human reasoning must matter (causally) 
to our actions, something like (iii) must indeed be added. However, for Davidson it is 
clear that we cannot add anything like (iii). As I have explained in detail above, a cru­
cial part of Davidson’s reasoning is that we can treat intentional explanations as causal 
explanations precisely because the concrete particulars (or tokens) an explanation talks 
about do not have to be treated as reasons. Causation enters the picture precisely to the 
extent that the tokens are considered qua physical entities in general and not qua reasons 
in particular.
In sum, the whole Davidsonian possibility o f treating intentional explanations as 
causal explanations is based on the explicit denial o f Elster’s condition (iii). The reason 
why Davidson does not in fact support the Standard View and why he does not intro­
duce a third condition similar to that o f Elster is that his argumentation is incompatible 
with the Standard View as defended by Elster. If  Davidson is correct, then Elster’s posi­
tion is inherently and inescapably incoherent. In the Davidsonian context, Elster’s in­
quiry into the necessary and sufficient conditions o f the Standard View has turned into a 
strong argument against the Standard View by exposing its inbuilt impossibility.
Rather revealingly, Davidson omits the suggestion that the conditions (i) and (ii) 
could be strengthened to make them jointly sufficient to define the relation between rea­
sons and the actions they explain from the 1980 reprint o f his 1963 article. In the 1980 
version the message o f Footnote 5 (p. 12 o f the reprint) has been completely inverted.121 
The new version seeks “to cancel any suggestion” that the conditions could be suffi-
1211 thank Damien Fennell for drawing my attention to this interesting detail.
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cient, whereas the original version expressed very explicitly Davidson’s suggestion that 
precisely such a strengthening can be done. I think Elster has shown that for such a 
strengthening to deliver the required conclusion (resulting in the Standard View) we 
would need to add something that cannot be added, i.e., Elster’s condition (iii). Thus, in 
his introduction to the Essays on Actions and Events (Davidson 1980) Davidson ex­
plains that the reasoning behind his 1973a article “Freedom to Act” forced him to con­
clude that intentional action “cannot be analysed or defined” (Davidson 1980, xvii) in 
purely causal terms. A causal theory cannot give “sufficient conditions o f intentional 
(free) action” (Davidson 1980, xvii; see also Davidson 1974a, 232).
Indeed, the conclusion o f Davidson’s 1973a article, that “we cannot see how to 
complete the statement o f the causal conditions o f intentional action” (Davidson 1973a, 
80), is a direct denial o f both Davidson’s own optimistic original Footnote 5 in David­
son 1963 and Elster’s Standard View. As Davidson admitted in 1980, the causalist in­
terpretation o f intentional explanation cannot succeed “at least without appeal to the no­
tion of intention” (Davidson 1980, xvii). The climber’s loosening o f his hold, thus re­
lieving himself from the weight and danger, was his intentional action only if  by his be­
haviour he intends to relieve himself from the danger and weight. Stoutland gets this 
exactly right:
The causation o f the behavior is not relevant; what is relevant is that the agent 
intends a result by it, so that the behavior is understood in terms o f the intention. 
In this way the intention relates to the behavior in that direct way required to 
rule out the aberrant case [Davidson’s climber example].
(Stoutland 1976, 291.)
As Davidson says, there is no hope o f success without an irreducible appeal to inten- 
tionality.
Hence we are back with the Logical Connection Argument. Davidson’s revised 
view amounts, of course, to what von Wright had been saying all the time. We cannot 
explain and understand actions by simply looking at their causes. What makes a behav­
iour an action is precisely that it is intentional. Moreover, “the intentional ity is in the 
behavior [...], intentionality is not anything ‘behind’ or ‘outside’ the behavior.” (Von 
Wright 1971, 115.) The intentionality o f actions cannot be explained or reduced away. It 
is a conceptually or logically necessary component o f actions, just as the Logical Con­
nection Argument says -  and as Davidson admitted explicitly in 1980.122
122 Thus my reading o f  Davidson -  unusual as it may be -  agrees largely with at least one well-known 
interpretation o f  Davidson: Jaegwon Kim sums up his reading o f  Davidson as follows. “The view o f  psy­
chology that emerges from Davidson is one o f  a broad interpretative endeavor directed at human action,
The upshot o f Davidson’s alleged refutation of the Logical Connection Argu­
ment is that the Logical Connection Argument is alive and well; what must be rejected 
is the Standard View as exemplified by Elster (1985).
to understand its ‘meaning’ rather than search for law-based causal explanations that are readily converti­
ble into predictions; psychology is portrayed as a hermeneutic inquiiy rather than a predictive science” 
(Kim 1985, 211). This could as well be a description o f  von Wright’s position, and consequently I find it 
surprising that Kim does not consider von Wright’s view to be very sophisticated (Kim 1991, 294) and 
that, moreover, Kim uncritically accepts the (mistaken) received view, according to which Davidson 
(1963) refuted the Logical Connection Argument (Kim 1998, 63; see, however, also Kim 1985, 195 
where he seems to group Davidson together with the Wittgensteinians).
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CHAPTER III.2: 
THE MULTIPLE REALISABILITY ARGUMENT FOR MENTAL CAU­
SATION
III.2.1 INTRODUCTION
The Davidsonian approach cannot be used to defend the Standard View, which amounts 
to seeing the reasons for action as the causes o f the action in question. Davidson’s 
anomalous monism implies that the assessment o f reasons for actions is -  in virtue o f 
the holism o f the mental, or the Logical Connection Argument -  done in a framework 
characterised by rationality considerations and other normative issues, whereas talk o f 
causation belongs to the framework o f physical laws, brain states, behaviour and other 
non-normative descriptive matters o f fact. If we insist, as the Standard View does, that 
agency is first and foremost a causal affair, then the Davidsonian line o f thought is dis­
astrous, for the contents o f mental states and the meanings embodied in bodily behav­
iour cannot have anything to do with agency. Thus, to the extent that causation is indeed 
essential for agency, Davidson’s view “implies that what we believe, intend, and desire 
has no bearing on what we do. It implies that what a person thinks has as much rele­
vance to what he does as what a sound means has to the amount o f pressure it exerts on 
a glass.” (Dretske 1989, 3.)123
Hence, if  the Standard View is to be defended, we need a theory that allows 
mental states to be causally efficacious qua mental. In other words, the causalist inter­
pretation of intentional explanations can be saved if there is a way o f allowing mental 
types to feature in causal laws in a manner that is not simply derived from or parasitic 
on (and thus reducible to) standard physical causation in the sense of nomological con­
nections between physical types. The task o f demonstrating that there can be cases o f 
irreducible mental causation in our thoroughly physical world is the bold aim o f the 
doctrine of mental causation and non-reductive materialism.
I have already shown that both Davidson and von Wright think that this task is 
doomed to fail, since the connections between mental types are normative, rational con­
nections and as such “have no echo in physical [causal] theory” (Davidson 1974a, 231). 
These normative relations are essential for and constitutive o f the mental domain (the
123 It may be a little misleading to appeal to Dretske here, since although I do think the arguments o f this 
chapter apply fully also to Dretske’s views, in what follows I concentrate on the problem o f  mental causa­
tion in general without paying explicit attention to Dretske’s position. This is because I doubt if  I can add 
anything original to Kim (1991), which I take to be a decisive criticism o f Dretske’s naturalism.
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holism o f the mental), and hence “[s]hort of changing the subject, we cannot escape this 
feature o f the psychological; but this feature has no counterpart in the world o f  physics 
[realm o f causation]” (Davidson 1974a, 230), and hence mental types cannot feature in 
causal relations.
I believe Davidson and von Wright are correct here. They both agree with Peter 
Winch’s observation, according to which when we try to speak o f reasons and actions 
(qua reasons and action) in causal terms, “we literally do not understand what we are 
saying. We cannot understand it, because it has no sense.” (Winch 1958, 94.) As far as 
actions are considered, the focus must be on irreducibly normative relations, and to 
bring in causal connections amounts to changing the subject from actions to bodily be­
haviour, since what an intentional state (including actions) consists in is precisely its 
position in a web of normative connections.
Thus, in my view the attempt to salvage the Standard View on the basis o f a the­
ory of mental causation is deeply misguided. However, since the dual doctrine o f  mental 
causation and non-reductive physicalism tends to dominate contemporary philosophy o f 
mind and action theory, I believe it is important to demonstrate its unacceptability in its 
own terms.
III.2.2 THE MULTIPLE REALISABIL1TY ARGUMENT
We have already seen that Elster’s attempt to defend the causalist Standard View on the 
basis o f Davidson’s philosophy o f mind fails. However, most contemporary philoso­
phers who accept the Standard View do not base their views primarily on Davidson, but 
on the so-called Multiple Realisability Argument.124 As Elliott Sober (1999, 542) ob­
serves, the received view in contemporary philosophy o f mind is that the Multiple Re­
alisability Argument allows us to establish irreducible mental causation against elimina- 
tivism and reductionism without compromising the idea that, ontologically speaking, 
everything is fixed at the level o f fundamental physics (cf., however, II1.2.5).
124 The argument is due to Putnam (1967) and it is discussed virtually in every serious paper on the mind- 
body problem published since that. In what follows I will concentrate mainly on the versions o f  the argu­
ment defended by Fodor (1974) and Tuomela (1998). On Fodor, because his article is clear and influential 
and on Tuomela partly because adopting his terminology makes it easier to connect the present discussion 
to the Logical Connection Argument o f Chapter III.l and ultimately to Parts I and II o f this study, and 
partly because I find it interesting that both my criticism o f the Multiple Realisability Argument (includ­
ing Tuomela 1998) and the anti-causalist alternative I defend are largely inspired by my reading o f  
Tuomela himself (1976 and 2002). My criticisms o f Tuomela (1998) lead also directly to the further de­
velopments in UI.2.5 and III.3 onwards. Excellent criticisms o f  other influential defences o f  the Multiple 
Realisability Argument and mental causation can be found in Kim (1998), which discusses, e.g., Lynne 
Rudder Baker, Ned Block, Tyler Burge, Terence Horgan, Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit’s programme 
explanations and John Searle.
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The problem is, in short, that if  everything is ultimately physical, it seems to fol­
low that everything that happens, including actions, are dictated by the laws o f physics 
and thus there seems to be no room for responsible actions (things that we do as op­
posed to things that happen to us).125 Von Wright aimed to rescue the relevance o f 
agency by arguing that causation is irrelevant for actions, for actions are essentially 
normative issues that have no echo in causal relations. Views building on the Multiple 
Realisability Argument take a different route. They reject the essential normativity and 
non-causality of the mental and seek to show that mental states are causally efficacious 
qua mental, and therefore cannot be eliminated or reduced away. In this Chapter I seek 
to show that, despite its popularity, also this attempt to defend the Standard View is un­
successful.
To recapitulate, the challenge o f mental causation is to show that mental states 
can be causally efficacious qua mental states or, in other words, that mental states can 
feature in causal laws in virtue o f being instances o f a mental type. To use Tuomela’s 
(1998, 7)126 notation, we may use a four-place causal relation Q{mJid,b,F) to express a 
relation which holds just in case m qua M  causes b qua F, where m and b stand for 
event-tokens and M  and F  denote predicates corresponding to mental or intentional 
types (including action-types). A typical case would be one where M  expresses beliefs 
and desires rationalising an action of the type F, and m is an instance o f M  and b a be­
haviour instantiating F. General naturalism and ontological monism commits us to the 
view that the truth of “(?(/«,M,6,F )” entails the truth of “m causes b” or, to stick to 
Tuomela’s notation, “C{m,b)n (mere singular causation), which in turn is a true causal 
relation (and not a mere accidental connection) only if there is another four-place rela­
tion R(m,Pi,bJ?2) such that P, are physical types connected by a strict causal law (or a 
set o f causal laws). In other words, R subsumes event-tokens m and b (qua instances o f 
Pi and P 2) under a physical law in the sense o f the D-N model o f explanation.
Now the problem of mental causation concerns the nature of the rationalising re­
lation (L) between M  and F. The Standard View holds that Q expresses a sui generis 
causal relation and, consequently, that M  and F  are connected by a sui generis causal 
law or, in other words, that (L) expresses a causal law o f nature after all. Connections
125 Thus, the questions addressed in this Part could easily be translated into the language o f  the so-called 
problem o f free will. The view I ultimately defend is an updated version o f Strawson’s (1962) famous 
view, according to which even if  causal determinism is true it is not a threat to human freedom, for human 
agency and intentional actions are not causal matters. Actions are, as Kant taught us, what we are respon­
sible for, and hence belong to the normative space o f  reasons and not to the domain o f  causal connections 
and the natural sciences. As should become clear in Chapter III.3 onwards, I see my approach as related 
also to Dennett’s (2003) recent compatibilist defence o f  free will.
1261 have re-named the variables to be consistent with my other discussions.
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such as the one between M  and F (i.e., (L)) are what the laws o f the special sciences, 
such as psychology, consist in (Fodor 1974). Thus, the Standard View can be defended 
only if  we can argue that Q is neither epiphenomenal, parasitic on nor reducible to R, 
while being nonetheless indispensable (so that we cannot be eliminativists about Q), and 
this requires that there exists an independent causal law to connect M  and F  (Tuomela 
1998, 7-8).
Tuomela (1998), for one, accepts these requirements. Thus, Tuomela’s core 
problem is that although he accepts that “ [a]ll concrete particulars are material” 
(Tuomela 1998, 4), to defend the Standard View he must be able to defend the thesis 
“that there are genuine, irreducible cases o f mental causation” (Tuomela 1998, 1). For 
the Standard View to be accepted, mental causation must be an objective, irreducible 
feature of the world (Tuomela 1998, 4). In particular, mental causation cannot be a mere 
pragmatic notion or a statistical generalisation we use for practical purposes when we 
for one reason or another cannot be bothered to find out the real, fundamental causal 
factors in a given situation and the relevant laws o f physics (III.2.4). This is what I call 
the strong notion of mental causation. My aim is to show that the Multiple Readability 
Argument cannot deliver this, for the strong notion requires the mental types M  and F  to 
have causal powers independent o f  the physical properties Pi9 and this is beyond the 
scope o f the Multiple Realisability Argument.
Despite its Cartesian tone, mental causation in this strong sense is exactly what 
the causalist view on intentional explanation and human agency requires. In short, my 
intention to do something must matter causally to the movements o f my body -  and, 
more precisely, my intention must matter qua a mental event and not only qua a physi­
cal event. It is the content o f my intention -  what I set out to do -  that must be causally 
efficacious if the causalist interpretation of intentional explanations and human agency 
is to be accepted (Stoutland 1988, 44). The Standard View stands or falls together with 
this extremely strong notion o f mental causation. In Tuomela’s terminology this 
amounts to the truth of the following thesis T*:
T*) (Em)(Eb)(EM)(EF)(M is mental & Q(m,M,b,F) & ~(Ep)(EP)(Q(p,P,b,F) 
& P is material)).
In words, there are singular events m and b and predicates M and F such that M 
is a mental predicate and m qua M caused b qua F, while there is no material 
event p and no material predicate P (especially no such predicate in the base 
supporting M) such that p qua P caused b qua F.
(Tuomela 1998, 12.)
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In standard cases we can require that m and p  are identical in the causal sense o f having 
the same causes and effects, i.e., m =cp.
Tuomela’s goal is to argue that although C(m,b) and m =c p  together entail 
C(p,b), “the causal identity of the events m and p does not give the analogous entail- 
ment for gwa-causation [i.e., the relation Q]” (Tuomela 1998, 13), speaking thus for the 
independence o f mental causation. It is not quite clear to me what Tuomela means by 
this. Presumably his thesis is that if we pick out m qua an instance o f M, and see it as 
causing b qua F, we cannot pick out a causally identical event p  qua an instance o f a 
physical type P  and see it as causing b qua F, even if  by definition p  does cause b (qua 
an instance o f some physical type Pj). In other words, from Q(mJvf,b,F) and m = cp  one 
cannot conclude Q(p,P,b,F). This holds, according to Tuomela (1998, 8 & 16), because
(i) the relation Q is backed by a causal law o f nature connecting M-events with F-events 
and thus
(ii) if m had not been M  it would not have caused b qua F, even if m had caused b.
Tuomela explains that (ii) is simply a “more complex reading” (Tuomela 1998, 8) o f (i), 
and hence he sees no need to discuss the transition from (i) to (ii) any further. I, on the 
other hand, think that this is precisely the point where the weakness of Tuomela’s ar­
gument lies.
On the basis o f III. 1.3 we can see that (i) and (ii) are claims fundamentally dif­
ferent from one another. Clause (i) expresses a non-normative connection between M  
and F, whereas (ii) expresses a conceptual connection. After all, it was precisely the 
point o f the Logical Connection Argument that when we talk in terms o f intentional 
types (such as M  and F), to understand some event b as an intentional action F, is “to 
see its place in a larger conceptual structure” (Stoutland 1976, 279), and this conceptual 
structure -  and hence the fact that b is F  -  is constituted partly by seeing some other 
events as reasons, i.e., by seeing m qua M. What it is for an event to be an action (for b 
to be F) is partly that reasons can be given and asked for it {i.e., that m is M).
Hence (ii) expresses a logical, conceptual or normative connection between M  
and F, which is o f course radically different from the non-normative nomological con­
nection (i) postulates between M  and F. Davidson’s mature (post-1963) view was that
(ii) makes (i) impossible:
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What lies behind our inability to discover [...] [causal] psychophysical laws is 
this. When we attribute a belief, a desire, a goal, an intention or a meaning to an 
agent, we necessarily operate within a system o f concepts in part determined by 
the structure o f beliefs and desires of the agent himself [posing normative ra­
tionality constraints on our attributions]. Short o f changing the subject, we can­
not escape this feature of the psychological; but this feature has no counterpart 
in the world o f physics [in the realm o f causation].
(Davidson 1974a, 230.)
If this is correct, then Tuomela’s (1998) programme cannot succeed, for the core of his 
argument is to deny that “[t]he causal powers of a mental event-token are completely 
determined by its material properties” (Tuomela 1998, 6), and he thinks that to do that it 
is sufficient to establish that “[i]f m had not been M then b would not have been [F]” 
(Tuomela 1998, 6). However, if von Wright, Stoutland and Davidson are correct (and I 
think they are), the latter statement is about conceptual (constitutive) rules and not about 
causation, and hence it is perfectly compatible with the former statement, which is a di­
rect denial o f mental causation.
In III.1.3 we saw that in 1976 Tuomela actually saw this even more clearly than 
Davidson by explicitly accepting the Logical Connection Argument and, consequently, 
admitting that the causal backing of intentional explanation must be due to a physical 
redescriptions o f the event-tokens in question, to be subsumed under a physical law 
(Tuomela 1976, 203). I also showed how Davidson’s views imply a fundamental inco­
herence o f Elster’s version o f the Standard View by showing how Tuomela’s clause (i) 
(which for the present purposes is equivalent to Elster’s condition (iii)) cannot be ac­
cepted. Tuomela (1976) saw this, but, surprisingly, Tuomela (1998) returns to the Stan­
dard View. The reason is the -  in my view very unfortunate -  new orthodoxy o f seeing 
the Multiple Realisability Argument as a way (or the way) to defend “a weak kind o f 
emergentism or ‘nonreductive materialism’” (Tuomela 1998, 4) that nonetheless is sup­
posed to deliver strong mental causation and, therefore, the Standard View.
To see the problem of mental causation in its proper light it must be kept in 
mind that the contemporary problem o f mental causation is a problem for materialists. 
The task is, as Tuomela explicitly admitted, to defend full-blown, irreducible mental 
causation in the world that is thoroughly physical. The philosophers I am mainly con­
centrating on in this Chapter (including, e.g., Fodor, Kim, Papineau, Pettit and 
Tuomela) understand the “thoroughly physical” nature o f the world as the combination
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o f the thesis that everything there is supervenes127 on the physical and the principle o f 
the causal closure o f the physical domain.
The closure principle says that all physical events have sufficient physical 
causes. I shall not argue for this principle here, but let me point out that in the view of 
the mentioned philosophers the principle is (i) presupposed by our best science, (ii) ac­
cepted by all serious participants in the contemporary debate on mental causation and
(iii) an essential aspect of general ontological naturalism and materialism, since its de­
nial would entail that some physical events do not have sufficient physical causes but 
are magically caused by non-physical substances -  and this would certainly be a form o f 
Cartesian dualism (however, in III.2.5 we shall see that all these claims can be ques­
tioned). David Papineau (2002), for example, argues that the principle o f the causal clo­
sure is a cornerstone of the contemporary world-view, since together with the causalist 
thesis that at least sometimes mental causes have physical effects it forms the ultimate 
argument for materialism. If the mental really has physical effects, then the mental 
must, ultimately, be also physical, since the physical domain is causally closed. If the
1 98mental is not ultimately physical, it cannot have physical effects.
Thus, in the context o f these assumptions we face the following dilemma. Either 
there are non-normative, causal psychophysical laws (e.g., connecting reasons and ac­
tions) or there are not. If there are, then the principle of the causal closure o f the physi­
cal domain seems to dictate that the mental causes are not really mental, or at least that 
their causal powers are reducible to physical causation, and hence the mental events are 
not causally efficacious qua mental. This kind o f reductionism would prevent the possi­
bility of strong mental causation, refuting thus also the Standard View. On the other 
hand, if there are no (causal) psychophysical laws, we are back with Davidson’s anoma­
lous monism, which “permits mental properties no causal role” (Kim 1989b, 270). As 
Kim sees, if the mental is causally inefficacious and we maintain a causalist view o f
1271 shall not enter into the debate on the correct technical formulation o f supervenience (see, e.g., Kim 
1993) here. Important as that debate may be, for the present purposes a general notion, according to 
which A/-properties are said to supervene on P-properties if  it is not possible that two things should be 
identical in respect o f  their P-properties without also being identical in respect o f their A/-properties, is 
sufficient.
128 In fact, Papineau (2002) thinks that we must add a third claim stating that there is no massive causal 
overdetermination: it is not the case that in addition to the sufficient physical cause a physical effect must 
have, there is always present also another sufficient, non-physical cause o f  the effect in question. Such 
massive overdetermination would certainly sound strange, and 1 think we can join Papineau in accepting 
the thesis o f the non-existence o f  massive causal overdetermination. Kim (1993, 1998) also argues that 
there is no such overdetermination, but he thinks that this follows directly from the principle o f  causal 
closure -  the counterfactual situations where we remove the physical cause the effect would nonetheless 
be there, since also the non-physical cause is assumed to be sufficient for the effect, and this would vio­
late the principle o f  causal closure. See II1.2.5 -  where also accounts o f  mental causation that reject the 
closure principle (in particular, Dupre (1993) are examined -  for further discussion.
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human agency and intentional action, “anomalous monism [...] is a doctrine virtually 
indistinguishable from outright eliminativism” (Kim 1989b, 270), which, needless to 
say, would be just as devastating for the Standard View as reductivism.
Hence, the only way to rescue human agency and the possibility o f intentional 
actions is to avoid the dilemma. As III.1.3 made clear, my view is that von Wright has 
got it right: we must admit that there are no causal psychophysical laws and hence the 
mental indeed is causally inefficacious qua mental. But this concession does not imply 
eliminativism regarding agency and intentional action, for we reject also the dogma o f 
seeing agency and action as causal affairs. Kim seems to make room for this view by 
offering the following as the best way to coherently hold the Davidsonian position.
I suggest the following line o f reconciliation: on Davidson's account the mental 
can, and does, have its own ‘laws’; for example, ‘laws’ o f rational decision mak­
ing. The crucial point, though, is that these are normative rather than predictive 
[causal] laws.
(Kim 1985,211.)
This means that one way in which one might try to eliminate the incompatibility 
[between materialism and the relevance o f the mental] is to interpret rationaliz­
ing [intentional] explanation as a fundamentally noncausal mode o f understand­
ing actions. I believe that this is an approach well worth exploring: a rationaliz­
ing explanation is to be viewed as a normative assessment o f an action in the 
context o f the agent’s relevant intentional states.
(Kim 1989a, 240, Footnote 4).129
The fundamental motivation for the Multiple Realisability Argument is the view 
dominating contemporary philosophical community, according to which none o f the 
three possibilities I have described above is acceptable. The claim is that we must reject 
reductivism, eliminativism and non-causalism. In other words, we must find a way to 
defend the Standard View. And we have to do all this without compromising material­
ism and the principle o f the causal closure o f the physical world. This huge -  in my 
view, impossible -  task is, the contemporary received view goes, attainable with the 
Multiple Realisability Argument. In what follows I argue that the argument fails. 
Whether we like it or not, as long as we remain materialists in this sense (as opposed to, 
for example, Dupre’s (1993) pluralism, which denies the principle o f causal closure -  
see III.2.5) the choice between reductionism, eliminativism and non-causalism is all we 
have.
129 In his 1998 book Kim nonetheless repeatedly confirms his commitment to the causalist programme 
and the importance o f  mental causation (although he argues that no acceptable defences o f  these positions 
exist thus far), implying that the non-causal normative view cannot in his mind be satisfactory.
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According to the Multiple Realisability Argument, the dilemma of reductionism 
and eliminativism is based on a false dichotomy. It is not the case that either mental 
states are fully reducible to physical states (full-blown reductionism) or completely dis­
connected from them (psychophysical anomalism). What is needed is a weak anoma- 
lism where a physical state is still nomologically sufficient for a mental state it instanti­
ates, but not vice versa (Kim 1989b, 273). In other words, the mental must be seen to 
supervene on the physical. This, the argument goes, can be achieved when we replace 
the so-called type-identity theory (e.g., Smart 1959) with token-identity theory.
The type-identity theory says that in a sense we can pick out the same natural 
kind by using both physicalist and mental concepts. The concepts, although having dif­
ferent senses, are nonetheless extensionally equivalent. Hence, according to the type- 
identity theory, when we have a psychophysical law connecting a mental state M  with 
an action F, which seems to violate the causal closure o f the physical domain (for M  is 
not a physical predicate), there is a physical predicate Pj which is co-extensional with M  
as well as a physical redescription P2 o f the action F  such that Pj and P 2 are connected 
by a physical law. Hence, according to type-identity theory M-events are identical with 
Py-events and F-events are identical with Prevents, and since P, are proper physical 
events connected by a physical law, the connection M  —► F, which first appeared to 
threaten the principle o f causal closure, is perfectly compatible with the principle after 
all. The situation is as presented in Figure 1 below, where vertical lines represent (type) 
identities and horizontal arrows causal relations.
M - > F  
I I
->Px-»Pl-»P2^Py-+
Figure 1: Type-identity Theory
Here causation remains safely within the physical domain, and thus the principle o f 
causal closure is not violated. But, o f course, also mental causation is lost. In this pic­
ture the mental is not even epiphenomenal; it is wholly reducible into normal physical 
causation. Clearly this kind o f reductivism cannot deliver the kind o f sui generis strong 
mental causation Tuomela (1998) and other causalists are after.
This is where the Multiple Realisability Argument gets underway. As Fodor 
(1974, 689) points out, ontological materialism, including the principle o f the causal 
closure o f the physical domain, does not require mental predicates to be co-extensional 
with physical predicates. Instead o f type-identity, let us try token-identity and a theory
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that can be called token physicalism: “Token physicalism is simply the claim that all the 
events that the sciences talk about are physical events” (Fodor 1974, 689). All events 
are physical, but nonetheless non-physicalist concepts may reveal patterns which are 
real, objective features o f the world but which cannot be captured if  we stick to physi- 
calist concepts (cf. Dennett 1991b). The Multiple Realisability Argument asserts that 
there are multiple ways in which a given mental event-type can be realised. In other 
words, where the type-identity theory requires that there are identity relations connect­
ing mental types with physical types, the token-identity theory (or token physicalism) 
says that there are identity relations connecting only event-tokens.
To put it in Tuomela’s (1998) terminology introduced above, when we have a 
case in which an event-token m is an instance of a decision to perform an action o f the 
type F, i.e., m is an instance o f M  (and when m indeed causes an event-token b instanti­
ating the event-type F), m and b are identical with physical events. In other words, in 
addition to being instances o f M  and F, m and b are also instances o f some physical 
types P] and P*i, respectively, although it is not the case that all instances o f M  are in­
stances o f Pi (and, similarly, all instances o f F  are not instances of P*i), since the men­
tal predicates carve up the world differently from physical predicates (although all in­
stances o f Pj are instances of M, and similarly for P*i and F).
This way of putting the issue is important, since we should not let the language 
o f identity relations between event-tokens lead us astray here: token physicalism is a 
form o f ontological monism, which implies that when we focus on the cause-event m, 
there is only one concrete particular present, m, and the talk about token identity simply 
means that we can describe that one event-token as a mental event (as an instance o f the 
mental type M) or as a physical event (as a an instance o f some physical type Pj). In 
particular, to say that in fact there are two particulars -  a physical event and a mental 
event -  would be a form o f Cartesian ontological dualism.
Hence, the token-identity theory implied by the Multiple Realisability Argument 
holds that our use of mental types allows us to express law-like connections (such as the 
one between M  and F) that cannot be expressed in terms of physical types, for there are 
no physical types P„ and P*m that would be co-extensional with M  and F, although all 
instances o f M  and F  are instances of some physical types. Thus, Figure 1 is replaced 
with the following Figure 2.
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Psychological Law: / F
Physical Laws: Pi or P2 or ... or P„ P*i or P * 2  or ... or P*m
1— * 1
Figure 2: Token Physicalism with Multiple Physical Realisations of Mental Properties 
(Adapted from Fodor 1974, 695)
In Figure 2 the connections between the physical types P, and P * j  and the mental types 
M  and F  are not identity relations anymore, because that would, by definition, amount 
to the type identity theory. Rather, we must say that P, and P*,- provide multiple realisa­
tions of M  and F, respectively. In accordance with the supervenience thesis, P, and P*, 
determine the mental properties, but not vice versa. Hence we do not have the bicondi­
tionals connecting physical types with mental types required for traditional Nagel- 
reduction (Nagel 1961). None o f the physical laws is identical with the mental law. 
However, the principle of the causal closure is not violated, for all instances o f  the law 
“if  M  then P ” are also instances o f some physical law “if P, then P * ”, but none o f the 
physical laws realising the psychological law is co-extensional with the psychological 
law.
In other words, because the mental types have multiple realisations, the mapping 
from physical types to mental types is many-to-one, not one-to-one as required for Na- 
gel-reduction. However, the reason why the Multiple Realisability Argument is bound 
to fail to deliver the kind o f strong mental causation where mental states really are caus­
ally efficacious qua mental, and which is required for the Standard View (and as we 
saw, for example Tuomela (1998) is very explicit about this requirement), is clearly 
visible here. The causalist view says that a particular is an instance o f M  in virtue o f  the 
causal powers it has. The principle of the causal closure o f the physical world, however, 
requires that an instance o f M  has the causal powers it has solely in virtue o f the fact that 
it is also an instance of whichever P, applies to it. But this is simply another way o f say­
ing that all the causal work is done at the physical level, and hence it follows that “[t]he 
causal powers o f a mental event-token are completely determined by its material proper­
ties” (Tuomela 1998, 6).
This implication, however, is o f course precisely what the Multiple Realisability 
Argument was supposed to deny, for its denial is a necessary condition o f strong mental 
causation and the Standard View. As Tuomela (1998, 6) puts it, the Standard View and
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mental causation can be defended only if “[t]he causal powers o f at least some mental 
events are not completely determined by their material properties”. My claim is, pace  
the Standard View, that also the Multiple Realisability Argument fails to deliver this, 
and hence I think the Standard View cannot be defended in terms o f the Multiple Re­
alisability Argument. There is no such thing as non-reductive but causal theory o f men­
tal states that stays within ontological naturalism and materialism that comprises causal 
closure and supervenience.
If mental predicates such as M  and F  are indeed irreducible to physical predi­
cates {i.e., if type-identity fails) but we nonetheless remain materialists in the present 
sense, the irreducibility shows at most that there is a way of talking about physical cau­
sation that cannot be translated directly into physics. There may be good practical rea­
sons to keep the folk psychological language o f mental predicates, but the Multiple Re­
alisability Argument shows that we should not imagine that the language of mental cau­
sation amounts to anything more than to imprecise talk about normal physical causation. 
I think this is rather obvious, but since the denial, i.e., the idea that the Multiple Realis­
ability Argument allows us to combine strong mental causation with the principle o f 
causal closure, is today so universally accepted, it is worth the extra ink to spell out this 
argument in detail. Before I do that, however, I want to return to Tuomela’s (1998) ver­
sion o f the Multiple Realisability Argument and demonstrate how it smuggles in the 
Logical Connection Argument. If  I am right, Tuomela’s thesis implicitly presupposes 
the anti-causalist view the paper explicitly denies.
As we saw, the core of Tuomela’s account o f  mental causation is the claim that 
there are robust connections between mental types such as M  and F  that are not equiva­
lent with (and reducible to) any physical connections. Fodor’s Multiple Realisability 
Argument seems to deliver that. Now Tuomela’s thesis T* adds to this the claim that 
although all the particular instances o f the mental law (such as event-tokens m and b) 
are subsumable under some physical law (m and b are also instances o f some physical 
types), nonetheless “[i]f m had not been M then b would not have been [i7]” (Tuomela 
1998, 6). In other words, Tuomela’s claim is that the irreducible connection between M  
and F  guarantees that if m had not been M, it might have caused b, but not b qua F. I 
fail to see how he can hold this view if  he really sticks to the non-normative conception 
of action.
The core o f the problem is that within the present context o f supervenient token 
physicalism it does not make any sense to imagine m being there at all without it being 
also M, and thus the counterfactual “if  m had not been M, b would not have been i 7” is
183
rather futile.130 The token identity theory says that each token of a mental type is identi­
cal with the particular, physical event-token that realises the mental property in that 
situation. There are not two particulars here, only one. In this instance the event o f the 
occurrence of the mental state M  of the person in question is the event-token m, where 
m (identified qua a physical state) is the neurophysiological state o f the person or, if 
wide theories o f content are correct, a wider state including the person and her environ­
ment.
According to the supervenience thesis, the fact that m (an instance o f a Pi) oc­
curs is sufficient (although not necessary) for M  to occur. Under the assumption o f 
causal closure, to deny this is to subscribe either to Cartesian dualism or to Davidson’s 
anomalous monism -  both views that the Multiple Realisability Argument was designed 
to reject. Thus, the aspiration to hold to the causal closure and token physicalism in the 
sense o f the mental supervening on the physical while at the same suggesting that su­
pervenient causal relations would be independent o f physical causation is deeply con­
fused.
Let us assume that m causes b. Let us further assume that m instantiates a mental 
type M  and b instantiates an action type F. According to token physicalism, m and b 
must have also physical descriptions. Let us thus assume that m instantiates also Pi and 
b instantiates P*j. Hence in this case there are only two event-tokens present, m and b, 
and thus although M  is not identical with P j, in this particular case the instantiation o f  
M  simply is the instantiation o f Pi (and similarly for F  and P*i). Now recall Tuomela’s 
central thesis T*. According to it, if the connection between M  and F  holds, i.e., if 
“Q(mM,b,Py' is true, there is no physical predicate P  so that “Q{m,P,b,F)” is also true. 
Tuomela even emphasises that there is “especially no such predicate in the base sup­
porting M [...] such that [...] \n i\ qua P caused b qua F” (Tuomela 1998, 12). However, 
it seems to me that Pj is exactly such a predicate. By assumption, Pi is in the base sup­
porting M, and m qua Pi causes at least b qua P*i, and in this particular case b qua F is 
b qua P*j -  unless we accept von Wright’s Logical Connection Argument.
So in this situation at least the following three claims are, by assumption, true: 
“C(m,£)”, “Q(mJA,b,F)” and “QfaP^byP*])”. More precisely, we have one concrete 
particular, m, causing another concrete particular, b, i.e., C(m,b). This is a brute fact 
about the world. The other claims are more complicated claims in the sense that their
130 With a sufficiently rich theoiy o f  the semantics o f  conditionals and counterfactuals (e.g., David Lewis’ 
or Robert Stalnaker’s theories) we can o f  course make sense o f  this counterfactual. Typically, however, 
such theories hold that since the antecedent o f  the counterfactual is nomologically impossible, the coun­
terfactual is vacuously true regardless o f  the truth-value o f  the consequent. Hence this line o f  thought can 
hardly help to defend the causal efficacy o f  mental properties (cf. Sober 1999,548).
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truth depends on m causing b and m and b being event-tokens such that our predicates 
M , F, Pj and P*j apply to them. If intentional predicates M  and F  are used simply to 
pick out the causal powers o f the particular they refer to, then there is no reason why we 
could not in Fodor and Tuomela’s system -  in this particular case -  use, for example, F  
and P*j interchangeably.
It is important to understand this point correctly. The mental causation thesis 
holds that what matters here are the description-independent causal powers o f  the par­
ticulars picked out by our predicates, and in this case the physical and the mental predi­
cate pick out the same particular. Thus, in this case and for this purpose the predicates 
can be used interchangeably. However, o f course the predicates cannot be used inter­
changeably in our language games, for although the extension in this case is the same, 
the types as such are not identical -  not in terms of extension and certainly not in terms 
o f intension. Thus, if one follows Davidson and von Wright (and, ultimately, Wittgen­
stein -  see Chapter III.3 onwards) to think that the rules governing the use o f predicates 
is constitutive o f the mental qua mental, the reductive thesis does not follow (because o f 
the no echo thesis). But the Multiple Realisability Argument rejects explicitly this line 
o f thought and defends the irreducibility o f the mental in virtue o f the independent 
causal powers of mental-tokens (qua mental).
To recapitulate, it is the very same token-event, b, that is F  and that is P*j. Hav­
ing P*j is sufficient (although not necessary) for having also F , but as it happens in this 
case to have F  (to be a certain action) nonetheless simply is to have P*j (to be a combi­
nation of certain physical movements) -  unless we accept the Davidsonian view o f ho­
listic constructivism. Hence, in the present context m causing b is sufficient for m caus­
ing b qua whatever predicate applies to b. And in the non-Davidsonian picture b is what 
it is, regardless o f what predicates apply or have been explicitly applied to b’s causes. I 
conclude that we have a counterexample to Tuomela’s thesis T*. The situation I have 
described is such that “Q(m,M,b,F)” and “Q(m,Pfb,F)’\  where P  = P j, are both true.
One could perhaps try to avoid my conclusion by insisting that the nature o f the 
causal history o f the action we want to explain (b qua F) matters to the acceptability of 
the explanation. After all, Davidson’s climber example (III. 1.3) showed that for a physi­
cal behaviour to be an action (for b to really be F), it must have been caused by the rea­
sons in the right way. However, this line o f defence cannot help a causalist, since it will 
only get us are back to the arguments o f III. 1.3 where I showed that a causalist cannot 
accommodate this line o f thought. If one takes this route, she ought to admit that one of 
Tuomela’s core claims concerning the relevance of the mental, namely that if  m had not
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been M, then b would not have been F  (Tuomela 1998, 6) is based on a logical, concep­
tual or normative connection between M  and F, just as von Wright explained, Tuomela 
(1976) acknowledged and the post-1963 Davidson was forced to admit.
In fact, the return to the Logical Connection Argument is o f course the best way 
to make sense o f Tuomela’s strange-sounding suggestion that we could imagine a coun­
terfactual situation in which m (as an instance o f Pj) is not M, even if all the other in­
stances o f Pj are also instances o f M. If  reasons, prepositional attitudes and mental 
states are seen as naturalistic phenomena belonging to the causal order o f the world, 
then the Multiple Realisability Argument and token physicalism, despite their antireduc­
tionist aspirations, make it nomologically impossible to imagine that the instances o f Pi 
would not be also instances o f M, for to be an instance of M  is nothing but to be an in­
stance of Pj or P 2 or ... or P„, as Figure 2 above shows. Therefore, statements such as 
that if  m had not been M  then b would not have been F  make more sense in the anti- 
causalist normative framework o f the Logical Connection Argument where b’s being F  
is not a brute fact o f nature but rather F i s a  normative status partly constituted by norms 
o f rationality (and similarly for m's being M).
In such a case it would be up to us to refuse to assign the status o f F  to b if we 
do not assign also the status of M  to m. But then the connection between M  and F  is 
clearly not a causal but conceptual or normative relation. Indeed, von Wright’s (1971) 
verificationist argument (III.1.2) for the acceptability of the Logical Connection Argu­
ment was precisely that whether or not a certain behaviour (b qua P*i) counts as an ac­
tion (whether it is F) does not depend solely on b, but on whether or not m was M. As 
we saw Stoutland (1976) emphasising, to see b qua F  is not to point out a naturalistic 
property of b, but rather to embed it, via an intentional redescription, to a normative, 
conceptual framework.
III.2.3 KIM ON EXPLANATORY EXCLUSION
Thus, Tuomela’s 1998 attempt to return to the Standard View via a defence o f irreduci­
ble, sui generis mental causation in terms of the Multiple Realisability Argument fails.
1^1The causal closure o f the physical world leaves no room for strong mental causation.
On the contrary, the argument actually elucidates further the derived or secondary sense
131 In fact, towards the end o f his article Tuomela (1998,28-29) appears to acknowledge this. He suggests 
that to make room for strong mental causation we may have to reject the closure principle and straight­
forward mind-brain supervenience. The result would be something very close to Dupre’s view (III.2.5). 
But then Tuomela (1998) would not give an argument fo r  mental causation anymore, but an examination 
o f what the acceptance o f  mental causation presupposes. Dupre is very explicit about this.
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in which intentional explanations can be thought o f as causal explanations. Instead o f 
strong mental causation that Tuomela (1998), Elster (1985) and most contemporary phi­
losophers of mind who accept the Standard View are after, perhaps we could defend a 
much more modest view, which Kim (1984) calls epiphenomenal supervenient causa­
tion. To spell out this line o f thought, let us return to Fodor’s version o f the Multiple 
Realisability Argument.
In the Fodorian Figure 2 the law M  —» F is co-extensional with the following 
conditional: (Py or P.? or ... or P„) -»  (P*y or P *2 or ... or P *m). Why does Fodor think 
that the mental law is not reducible to this implication? After all, if  the mental law is 
true, then the conditional is true, too. Fodor’s (1974, 695-696) point seems to be that 
even if the conditional is true, from the point of view o f physical science it is an acci­
dentally true generalisation rather than a law. Neither (Py or P2 or ... or P„) nor (P*y or 
P *2 or ... or P *m) expresses a type recognisable to physical science. Perhaps the only 
salient thing P, (and similarly for P*j) have in common is the fact that they are realisers 
o f M  (and F), and hence grouping P, (and P*,) together is motivated solely from the per­
spective o f psychological theory. Physical theory will not tell us whether or not a given 
physical type P* should be included in the conditional. The only criterion is whether or 
not Pk realises the relevant mental property.
If this is the case, the conditional (Py or P2 or ... or P„) —> (P*y or P *2 or ... or 
P *m) can be formed only on the basis o f the mental law M  —» F, especially since the 
number o f possible realisers may well be infinite. Hence the mental law is conceptually 
prior to the physical implication. However, this would again imply a move towards the 
Logical Connection Argument: the intrinsic causal properties o f Pk would not be suffi­
cient for it to count as mental, for that status involves a conceptual element that depends 
on the rational assertability conditions o f our mental concepts.
However, Fodor’s arguments do seem to justify his main conclusion, namely 
that the Multiple Realisability Argument blocks the possibility of a Nagel-reduction o f 
mental explanations. Type-identity is replaced with token-identity and the mental su­
pervenes upon the physical. Now the question is whether or not this is really sufficient 
for mental causation? I have argued that it is not. After all, the very reason why we can 
hold that M  is causally connected to F  is precisely that each and every instance o f F  fol­
lowing M  is actually an instance of some process o f  normal physical microcausation 
(Kim 1984).
But this, in turn, means, as Kim puts it, that if  we say that mental causation is 
real, it is nonetheless real only in an epiphenomenal sense and not in the strong sui
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generis sense Tuomela (1998) and other advocates o f the Standard View require: “Men­
tal causation does take place; it is only that it is epiphenomenal causation, that is, a 
causal relation that is reducible to [token by token, not in the sense o f full-scale Nagel- 
reduction], or explainable by, the causal processes taking place at a more basic physical 
level” (Kim 1984, 107). According to Kim, the combination o f the causal closure o f the 
physical domain and the non-existence o f massive causal overdetermination renders 
mental causation essentially epiphenomenal. Under these assumptions, talk o f mental 
causation is nothing but a way to talk about normal physical causation.
The explanations in terms of mental causation cannot amount to anything more 
substantial, since in fact monism with causal closure commits us to the following thesis, 
which Kim labels the thesis o f explanatory exclusion: “No event [token] can be given 
more than one complete and independent [causal] explanation” (Kim 1989a, 239). Let 
us look at the following two explanations, (TV) and (R) (Kim 1989a, 240).
(TV) Whenever an organism o f structure S is in neurophysiological state q it will emit
movement m. Organism O o f structure S was in neurophysiological state q. 
Therefore, O emitted m.
(R) Whenever an organism has goal G and believes that behavior B is required to
bring about G, O will emit B. O had G and believed B was required for G. 
Therefore, O emitted B.
The thesis o f explanatory exclusion applies to (TV) and (R) only if (TV) and (.R) are seen to 
share the same explanandum. As we saw in III.1.3, von Wright’s Logical Connection 
Argument and Davidson’s post-1963 view are committed to the view that they do not; 
(TV) is a causal non-intentional explanation o f behaviour and (R) a non-causal intentional 
explanation o f action. Hence, if the non-causalists are correct, Kim’s thesis o f explana­
tory exclusion does not apply to (TV) and (R); they can both be accepted as genuine, in­
dependent explanations (cf. Stoutland 2005, 141).
The Standard View, including Fodor’s Multiple Realisability Argument, on the 
other hand, is committed to the view that (TV) and (R) are both causal explanations, and 
even if their explanandum statements are not equivalent, token-identity theory implies 
that in every concrete case they nonetheless pick out or describe the same event-token 
(Kim 1989a, 242). Hence the exclusion thesis applies to (TV) and (/?) to the extent that 
(R) is seen as a causal explanation. This, o f course, means that if  the exclusion thesis is
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1correct, then (R) cannot be a sui generis causal explanation. This, in turn, would 
mean that the Multiple Realisability Argument fails to avoid reductionism (even if  it 
does avoid straightforward Nagel-reduction). In other words, if  we see agency, action 
and intentional explanations as essentially causal issues and if  the exclusion thesis 
holds, then agency, action and intentional explanations are reducible to physics. How­
ever, as human beings we are all committed to mental realism in the sense o f the irre- 
ducibility o f notions such as o f agency, action and intentionality. Hence, if  we are 
forced to accept Kim’s exclusion thesis, it is a very strong argument for the non- 
causalist position o f von Wright (l 971) (or indeed for rejecting the assumption o f causal 
closure or overdetermination -  see III.2.5).
Kim points out that the exclusion thesis seems to amount to the following claim 
(I) (Kim 1989a, 243):
(I) If C is sufficient for a later event E, then no event occurring at the same time as
C and wholly distinct from it is necessary for E.
Obviously, the Standard View is committed to the falsity o f (7). Again, we should be 
careful not to confuse types with tokens here. For it might seem that if C is a physio­
logical type such that its instances bring about instances of a behavioural type E, then 
the supervenience thesis implies that whenever an instance o f C  occurs, also a mental 
event of the type C* occurs being thus necessary for E. And since we have rejected the 
type-identity theory, C and C* are not identical. Thus this would seem like a counterex­
ample to (I). However, if one accepts the token-identity theory, it becomes clear that in 
all cases where a C-event occurs, there is no C*-event wholly distinct from the C-event, 
for in fact the C*-event, by definition, is the C-event. In other words, if the mental type 
C* is realised in virtue o f a physical realisation base C, the causal powers o f this in­
stance of C* must be identical with the causal powers o f C (Kim 1992, 326), for this 
particular instance o f C* is C. Kim calls this the Causal Inheritance Principle, and 
points out that the denial o f the principle “would be to accept emergent causal powers: 
causal powers that magically emerge at a higher level and of which there is no account­
ing in terms o f lower-level properties and their causal powers and nomic connections”
132 It is absolutely crucial to understand that the Standard View is committed to seeing ( T V )  and (R) as in­
dependent o f  each other (reasons causing actions irreducibly qua reasons, not qua physical states). If they 
are not independent in this strong sense o f  sui generis mental causation, then ( T V )  and (R) can o f  course 
coexist even if  the exclusion thesis holds; (T V )  and (T?) can coexist as causal explanations if, say, the ex­
planatory efficacy o f  (R) derives from the explanatory efficacy o f  ( T V ) .  (Kim 1989a, 241.)
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(Kim 1992, 326, see also 1998, 55-56). Needless to say, this would clearly violate the 
principle of the causal closure o f the physical domain.
Kim’s (1989a, 246) conclusion is that attempts to challenge (I) (and hence the 
attempts to challenge the exclusion thesis) fail because the two explanations (N) and (R) 
are not independent o f each other. If  C and C* are nomologically equivalent to each 
other, what we have is a reductivist type-identity theory subject to full-blown Nagel- 
reduction -  and hence there really is only one explanation. If we accept the Multiple 
Realisability Thesis and say that C* supervenes on C (a mere token-identity), explana­
tions in terms o f C* gain their explanatory or causal efficacy from the connection be­
tween C and E, and hence the explanations are not really distinct from one another. 
Avoiding the traditional type-identity theory and Nagel-reductionism is not sufficient 
for avoiding the kind o f token-by-token reductionism that is just as disastrous for mental 
causation and the Standard View o f seeing reasons as sui generis causes.
Thus, to the extent that neurophysiological and intentional explanations o f E are 
both seen as causal explanations (and we are operating under the assumption o f causal 
closure), I think Kim is right in saying that this is what we must conclude:
The two explanations differ only in the linguistic apparatus used in referring to, 
or picking out, the conditions and events that do the explaining; they are only 
descriptive variants o f one another. They perhaps give causal information about 
E in different ways, each appropriate in a particular explanatory context; but 
they both point to one objective causal connection, and are grounded in this sin­
gle causal fact.
(Kim 1989a, 248.)
This is o f course nothing like Tuomela’s 1998 aspiration of irreducible, sui generis 
mental causation or the Standard View o f reasons causing actions qua reasons, because 
the role left for mental predicates is merely that o f practical, instrumental aids in making 
predictions. Hence, for a causalist eliminativism is a real option: mental states and men­
tal causation are not sui generis features of the world -  whether or not we want to keep 
talking about them depends solely on the instrumental value of mentalist language.
Kim offers a helpful analogy. Consider a set o f minerals. Here each base- 
property P, can be seen as the property of being mineral X, for every mineral kind X. 
Now we can introduce a predicate M, “being jade”, which “can be thought o f as the sec­
ond-order property o f being a mineral that is pale green or white in color and fit for use 
as gemstones or for carving. This second-order property has two known realizers, jade- 
ite and nephrite.” (Kim 1998, 20.) Let us call the first-order property o f being jadeite Pj 
and being nephrite P2. In such a situation two o f the P ,’s, namely Py and P2, satisfy the
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conditions for M. Hence, all the instances o f P ; (jadeite) are also instances o f M  Oade), 
but not vice versa, for some instances o f M  are instances o f P2 (nephrite). The second- 
order property M  has multiple realisations, and hence it is not Nagel-reducible to the 
first-order properties P„ exactly as Figure 2 says.
It seems obvious that the introduction o f the predicate M  does not assign Pj and 
P2 any independent causal powers they would not have qua Pj and P2. However, as was 
explained in Part I, Pj and P2 can well be assigned a new social status M, and the as­
signment o f this status may give Pi and P2 a new institutional (normative) role Py and 
P2 do not possess independently o f the practices o f maintaining that status. In the case 
o f minerals this is indeed clear. Assume a collective accepts that henceforth instances of 
M  (jade) will count as money. Surely pieces o f Pj (jadeite) and P2 (nephrite) cannot re­
ceive new causal powers as a result o f such a collective performative speech act, for it 
would indeed be magical if  our speech acts had such powers. At the same time, how­
ever, it seems clear that the social and normative role of pieces of Py and P2 in the col­
lective in question has changed dramatically. New normative or institutional powers (or, 
to use Searle’s (1995, 100) terminology, new deontic powers) have been created. I think 
the situation is essentially the same if instead o f minerals and money we think o f physi­
cal states and propositional contents. Contents assigned to physical states can enter in 
normative relations, as the Logical Connection Argument holds, but such an assignment 
does not bring about new causal powers. How exactly this might work is explained in 
Chapter 111.3 onwards.
Obviously, this line o f thought is not available for a causalist. For her, M  is in­
teresting only in virtue o f its causal powers. And in the name of naturalism no instance 
o f M ean have causal powers other than the powers o f its physical realisation, since on- 
tologically speaking the instances of M  are nothing but instances o f Pi and P2. In fact, 
this is the only way o f understanding supervenience naturalistically:
Why is it that whenever P  is realized in a system s, it instantiates mental prop­
erty M? The answer is that by definition, having M  is having a property with 
causal specification D, and in systems like s, P  is the property (or one o f the 
properties) meeting specification D. For systems like s, then, having M  consists 
in having P. It isn’t that when certain systems instantiate P, mental property M  
magically emerges [...]. It is rather that having M  for these systems, simply is 
having P. We might even say, using a familiar if shopworn reductive idiom, that 
having M, for theses systems, is “nothing over and above” having P.
(Kim 1998, 24.)
Thus, contrary to the Standard View o f thinking o f mental causation as a sui generis 
form of causation, talk about mental causation is simply functionalist talk about normal
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physical causal relations. And as argued in Part I, functions are always observer-relative 
normative notions, not ontologically independent facts o f the world.
The mistake repeated again and again in contemporary philosophy o f mind is to 
think that since the Multiple Realisability Argument denies the existence o f one-to-one 
bridge laws between the physical and the mental, preventing thus the possibility o f a 
traditional Nagel-reduction, the argument is strong enough to secure a place for sui 
generis strong mental causation. But the question o f mental causation is a metaphysical 
problem, and hence the relevant notion of reduction must be that o f a metaphysical to- 
ken-by-token reduction (token physicalism), not methodological Nagel-reduction that is 
ultimately about intertranslatability of languages. Again, Kim has got it right: “the re- 
ducibility o f a property critically depends on its functionalizability -  whether or not it 
can be construed as a second-order functional property over properties in the base do­
main -  not on the availability o f bridge laws. Bridge laws are neither necessary nor suf­
ficient for reduction.” (Kim 1998, 27.)
The failure o f the Multiple Realisability Argument to defend the causalist posi­
tion can be summarised with the following argument (adapted from Kim 1998, 39-46). 
Let us start with a truism:
(1) Either the mental supervenes on the physical or it does not.
If the mental does not supervene on the physical, then, if  the view is still ontologically 
monistic, the mental is either nomologically connected to the physical, in which case 
(Nagel-) reductionism follows, or the mental is completely anomalous, in which case it 
is causally impotent. In both cases mental causation is an illusion. As I explained above, 
this dilemma was precisely the reason why, e.g., Fodor introduced his Multiple Realis­
ability Argument, according to which the mental is neither connected to the physical via 
biconditionals nor is it completely unconnected to it. Instead, the mental is said to su­
pervene on the physical. Supervenience may o f course fail also if ontological dualism is 
accepted, but then the mental cannot have physical effects without violating the causal 
closure o f the physical domain.
Thus:
(2) If  supervenience fails, there is no way o f understanding the possibility o f mental 
causation (under the causal closure assumption -  see III.2.5).
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Let us suppose that there is mental causation:
(3) Suppose that an instance o f mental property M  causes an instance o f another 
mental property M*.
From (2) it follows directly that
(4) M* has a supervenience base P*.
Let us now look at the following assertion:
(5) M* is instantiated on this occasion because either (a) M  caused M * to be instan­
tiated or (b) because P* is instantiated on this occasion.
Under the assumption (3), (a) is true. However, under the supervenience thesis (4), (b) 
is true. Hence it seems that the only way for (a) to indeed be true is that M  caused M* 
via P*, for P* is what instantiates M* on this occasion. Hence:
(6) On this occasion, M  caused M* by causing P*.
This means that under the supervenience assumption mental causes can have mental ef­
fects only in virtue o f the mental cause causing a physical effect. But from (2) it also 
follows that:
(7) M  has a supervenience base P.
But now it seems that both P  and M  are causally sufficient for P*, which would violate 
the dual thesis o f the causal closure o f the physical domain and the non-existence of 
massive causal overdetermination, i.e., the thesis o f explanatory exclusion. To save the 
assumption (3), it appears that we must accept that:
(8) P  caused P*, M  supervenes on P  and M* supervenes on P*.
Now, as Kim points out, (8) “explains the observed regularities between A/-instances 
and A/*-instances, and those between M-instances and P*-instances. These regularities
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are by no means accidental; in a sense they are law-based, and may even be able to sup­
port appropriate counterfactuals.” (Kim 1998, 45.)
Has Kim found a respectable way to defend mental causation and the Standard 
View? The answer, as Kim is well aware of, must be in the negative, because where the 
connections between the supervenience bases P  and P* are “genuine, productive and 
generative causal processes” (Kim 1998, 45), the observed regularities featuring mental 
predicates are mere “noncausal regularities that are observed because they are parasitic 
on real causal processes” (Kim 1998,45). Thus we are forced to accept that:
(9) The M-to-M* and M-to-P* relations are not genuine causal relations at all; they 
are regularities parasitic upon an authentic causal process from P  to P*.
Hence Kim’s conclusion:
(10) “If mental-physical supervenience fails, mental causation is unintelligible; if  it 
holds, mental causation is again unintelligible. Hence mental causation is unin­
telligible.” (Kim 1998, 46).
Introducing the Multiple Realisability Argument and mental-physical supervenience has 
not, contrary to the received wisdom in contemporary philosophy o f mind and action 
theory, helped us to save the Standard View o f seeing reasons as causes.
III.2.4 CONCLUSION
The Multiple Realisability Argument has left us in exactly the same situation we found 
ourselves at the end o f Chapter 111.1: Intentional explanations can be causal explana­
tions only in the parasitic sense that where they work they do so because of the genuine, 
physical causal processes allow also such talk to succeed. The psychological laws are 
not causal laws in their own right, and hence it seems that when Fodor (1974) empha­
sises that the Multiple Realisability Argument shows that we cannot translate our men­
tal talk into the language o f physics, this is not, pace Fodor, an argument for the special 
sciences operating with higher-order laws such as mental laws. Rather, this is exactly 
what eliminativists such as Quine or the Churchlands want to hear: if  the language o f 
psychology prohibits us from talking about the genuine causal processes out there in the 
world, we had better eliminate this misleading language and replace it with a physicalist
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language suitable for capturing the genuine causal laws (those between P, and P * j  in the 
Fodorian Figure 2).
Even if we wish to resist eliminativism, causalists ought to admit that the much- 
celebrated Multiple Realisability Argument has not taken us much further from John 
Stuart Mill’s view o f psychology. Mill held that the laws o f psychology are Empirical 
Laws, i.e., inductive generalisations o f observed connections (such as that F  is con­
stantly observed to follow M). An Empirical Law is simply a generalisation for which 
we have not observed counterexamples. The real causes supporting the generalisation, 
on the other hand, may be very different from the observed generalisation. Thus, 
whether the generalisation will hold also in unobserved cases depends on the real causal 
laws that maintain the observed connection.
An Empirical Law [...] is an uniformity, whether o f succession or o f co­
existence, which holds true in all instances within our limits o f observation, but 
is not o f a nature to afford any assurance that it would hold beyond those limits, 
either because the consequent is not really the effect o f the antecedent, but forms 
part along with it o f a chain o f effects, flowing from prior causes not yet ascer­
tained, or because there is ground to believe that the sequence (though a case of 
causation) is resolvable into simpler sequences, and, depending therefore on a 
concurrence o f several natural agencies, is exposed to an unknown multitude o f 
possibilities o f counteraction. In other words, an empirical law is a generalisa­
tion, o f which, not content with finding it true, we are obliged to ask why is it 
true? knowing that its truth is not absolute, but dependent on some more general 
conditions, and that it can only be relied on in so far as there is ground o f assur­
ance that those conditions are realised.
(Mill 1865, Book 6, Chapter 5, §1.)
Thus, if we do not have access to the real causes behind the Empirical Laws o f psychol­
ogy, we might find it convenient to use Empirical Laws for practical purposes. But we 
should not delude ourselves into thinking that the Empirical Laws o f psychology are sui 
generis causal laws. Rather, as I have argued above, Empirical Laws and mental proper­
ties inherit whatever causal explanatory efficacy they may have from the real causal 
properties — and the laws covering them.
Unlike many contemporary philosophers, Mill was able to see very clearly that 
the Empirical Laws o f psychology must not be confused with true causal laws o f sci-
133 Admittedly, for Mill the true causal laws were also psychological laws (e.g., maximisation o f  expected 
pleasure and so on), and hence my appeal to Mill may be somewhat misleading. But for the contemporary 
naturalists I have discussed it is clear that the basic causal laws are physical laws, and thus what we ought 
to learn from Mill is that the (Nagel-) irreducibility o f  Empirical Laws is not an argument for thinking 
that they are sui generis causal laws.
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The empirical law derives whatever truth it has from the causal laws o f which it 
is a consequence. If we know those laws, we know what are the limits to the de­
rivative law; while, if we have not yet accounted for the empirical law -  if  it 
rests only on observation -  there is no safety in applying it far beyond the limits 
of time, place, and circumstance in which the observations were made.
(Mill 1865, Book 6, Chapter 5, § 1.)
Moreover, Mill makes it clear that empirical laws, as opposed to true causal laws o f sci­
ence, may well have exceptions.
This agrees very well with Fodor s picture, for also Fodor (1974, 696) considers 
one of the main virtues o f his token physicalism to be that it explains how the laws of 
the special sciences can have exceptions. Fodor (1974, 696) argues that it is conceivable 
that there may be some properties P, in the supervenience base of M  that do not bring 
about an effect in the supervenience base o f F, even if most realisers of M  do have an 
effect that realises F. This is also one of the main reasons why Fodor thinks that the 
conditional (Pj or P2 or ... or P„) —> (P*j or P *2 or ... or P *m) cannot be regarded as a 
physical law (to which the psychological connection M  —» F  would be reducible): the 
implication does not in fact hold for all P, and hence the conditional is not a law, for 
true laws are suppose to give sufficient conditions for the effect. Where Mill regards 
this as evidence that Empirical Laws are not proper causal laws of science (and people 
such as Quine or the Churchlands as a strong argument in favour o f eliminativism), Fo­
dor thinks that his argumentation portrays the laws of the special sciences as proper 
causal laws -  and that the fact that his theory allows the laws o f the special sciences to 
have exceptions simply makes his view more realistic.
I think that in fact this is simply more bad news for the causalist view on agency 
and action. If causation is what matters, then surely we ought to prefer the neurophysi­
ological framework (the laws P, —» P*j) to psychology, since even in the cases where 
we observe M, psychological theory is not going to tell us whether this instance o f M  is 
going to have an instance of F  as its effect or not. Neurophysiology, on the other hand, 
operates (Fodor assumes, cf. III.2.5) ultimately with exceptionless causal laws. A spe­
cial science that is content with Mill’s Empirical Laws, such as Fodor’s causalist psy­
chology, is in Fodor’s own terms exactly like the “science” o f Plato’s prisoners in their 
cave (the Republic, Book VII), who may be able to construct a wonderfully sophisti­
cated system o f empirical generalisations concerning the sequences o f shadows cast on 
the wall o f the cave. Their generalisations may even support some counterfactuals, and 
the observed regularities are not random or accidental. This is why we can use Empiri­
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cal Laws as indicators o f causal processes in our explanations even if  as such they do 
not capture fundamental causal processes (cf. Pettit 1996).134
Nevertheless, to the extent that we are interested in detecting genuine causal 
processes, studying shadows is not enough. There is no (direct) causal connection be­
tween a shadow at one moment and a shadow at one instant later, for both are effects of 
the objects casting the shadows. Whether one calls descriptions o f shadow-sequences 
laws of the special sciences (Fodor), mental causation (Tuomela 1998), epiphenomenal 
supervenient causation (Kim), programme explanations (Jackson and Pettit) or Empiri­
cal Laws (Mill), a serious causal science should not be about them, because “[t]he really 
scientific truths [...] are not these empirical laws, but the causal laws which explain 
them” (Mill 1865, Book 6, Chapter 5, §1).
To conclude this discussion we could say that a core problem o f the contempo­
rary philosophy o f mind is that it is very difficult to see how to defend an acceptable 
causalist view o f action coherently. The philosophers discussed here want to subscribe 
to physicalism in the sense of accepting the principles of causal closure and token- 
identity. However, as agents we are as strongly committed to mental realism: mentality 
-  intentional ity, contentful mental states and meaningful actions -  is a real feature o f the 
world. According to Kim, however, the failure o f the Multiple Realisability Argument, 
together with the fact that Davidson’s anomalous monism cannot portray reasons (so 
described) as causes, shows that these two fundamental principles, i.e., physicalism and 
mental realism, are mutually incompatible. “So if I am right, the choices we face con­
cerning the mind-body problem are rather stark: there are three -  antiphysical dualism, 
reductionism, and eliminativism” (Kim 1989b, 267). Anti-physical dualism is not an 
option, but the alternatives seem to render mental realism impossible.
However, we are left with Kim’s three intolerable options only if  we accept his 
two fundamental premises: (i) physicalism in the sense o f the combination o f causal clo­
sure and token-identity and (ii) the conviction that mental realism is a causal affair. In
134 Pettit, however, builds on his (and Frank Jackson’s) model o f  programme explanations (see the essays 
in Jackson, Pettit and Smith 2004) that seeks to secure a more fundamental role for Empirical Laws: The 
presence o f a mental state featuring in an Empirical Law is said to non-causally programme it to be the 
case that a causal process instantiating the Empirical Law will be present. However, “non-causal pro­
gramming” is either an utterly unnatural and incomprehensible notion or a purely instrumentalist or 
pragmatic notion in M ill’s sense (for also Pettit accepts the causal closure principle, cf. UI.2.5).
135 Hence I think the persistent claims, according to which -  despite their explicit denials -  thinkers such 
as Dennett (e.g., 1991b) who accept the purely instrumental reading o f mental causation and intentional 
explanations are really eliminativists, are by no means unfounded. Dennett’s case is particularly interest­
ing, for in what follows I argue that Dennett’s (2003) recent views might be interpreted such that in his 
view intentional explanations are purely instrumental only qua causal explanations (opening the door for 
reductionism/eliminativism), but we can also treat them as non-causal rationalising explanations, in which 
case mental states would matter qua contentful states -  and mental realism would be rescued. This would 
be a view not very different from the one defended in this dissertation.
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In III.3 onwards I wish to argue that the causalist reading o f mental realism is unmoti­
vated: we can and should accept the anti-causalist, normative interpretation o f mental 
realism o f G. H. von Wright’s (and, perhaps, post-1963 Davidson’s) Logical Connec­
tion Argument. However, before I seek to undermine the motivation for causalism, I 
want to say something about the other possibility o f resisting Kim’s conclusion, that of 
relaxing one’s notion o f physicalism.
III.2.5 POSTSCRIPT: THE CAUSALIST’S LAST HOPE
Contrary to the received wisdom in contemporary philosophy o f mind, the Multiple Re­
alisability Argument fails to make causal mental realism compatible with physicalism 
that accepts the principles o f the causal closure o f  the physical domain and token- 
identity instead o f type-identity. However, as such this does not imply the failure of 
mental causation. Rather, the argumentation shows that one cannot coherently accept 
the following five theses (adapted from Crane 1995, 229) that the advocates o f the 
Standard View typically want to accept:
(A) Causes have their effects in virtue o f (some of) their features or properties.
(B) There is sui generis mental causation.
(C) The physical domain is causally closed.
(D) There is no massive causal overdetermination.
(E) Mental and physical causation are o f the same kind.
I have argued that the Multiple Realisability Argument cannot deliver (B) if  it 
sticks to the other theses. Tuomela (1998), for example, opens his paper by claiming to 
defend (B) while keeping the other theses, but towards the end of his paper he suggests 
that perhaps keeping (B) requires us to abandon (Q . This, however, is not a defence o f  
mental causation anymore, but an explication o f what mental causation requires.
Davidson’s defence o f (B), discussed in III. 1, is essentially based on a nominal­
ist rejection o f (A). In Davidson’s view it does not make sense to say that causes have 
their effects in virtue o f their physical or mental features. Rather, we must say that a 
cause is a concrete particular that causes its effects qua the particular it is, regardless of 
how we happen to pick it out. I argued that this does not suffice for the Standard View, 
for in Davidson’s view the mental exists only relative to the essentially normative and 
non-causal mentalist language game that constitutes the mental qua mental, and thus
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psychology cannot be a causal science (Davidson 1974a). In other words, in the context 
o f the Standard View one cannot have (B) without (A): As Elster (1985) shows, for the 
Standard View the mental must be causally efficacious in virtue of one o f its features, 
i.e., its content, which in the context o f Davidson’s holism exists only relative to the 
non-causal language game. Thus Davidson cannot deliver (5) in the sense required by 
the Standard View.
Further, in III.2.4 I briefly mentioned (especially Footnote 134) how Jackson 
and Pettit’s (see Jackson, Pettit & Smith 2004) theory o f programme explanations re­
jects (B), but when this is seen to threaten mental realism they revert to saying that men­
tal states can nonetheless non-causally “programme” things to happen. Without an ex­
planation of what this programming is, this view is but an unintelligible attempt to res­
cue (B) by rejecting (E) without violating (C).
Hence, we must reject either (B), (Q  or (D). Notwithstanding some exceptions 
(e.g., von Wright, Stoutland and the present dissertation), the consensus appears to be 
that (B) “is the last assumption we should reject” (Crane 1995, 230). However, no-one 
seems to be willing to reject (D) either. Kim (1989b, 281), for instance, calls the rejec­
tion o f (D) absurd. To hold that in cases of intentional agency there always happens to 
be two mutually independent sufficient causes presupposes such a gigantic coincidence 
that we simply cannot consider rejecting (D) (recall Footnote 128).
Thus, rejecting (Q , the principle of the causal closure o f the physical domain, is 
the causalist’s last hope. This, however, is something most philosophers do not even 
consider. In their view contemporary science simply compels us to keep (C) (e.g., Pap- 
ineau 2002). But then we cannot have (B), sui generis mental causation, and, therefore, 
the Standard View.
However, some philosophers (e.g., Cartwright 1999, 32-33 and Dupre 1993, 
184; 2001, Chapter 7) think that the acceptance o f (C) is simply an uncritical dogma. 
John Dupre defends this view explicitly in the context o f the problem o f mental causa­
tion, and thus in what follows I concentrate on his version o f the idea.
Interestingly, the spirit o f Dupre’s discussion is very similar to the animating 
themes o f this study. For example, my criticism o f mainstream rational choice approach 
in Part II (which I see as closely connected to my views on intentional explanation and 
mental causation -  see III.5.1 onwards) is very close to, and indeed partly motivated by, 
Dupre’s (2001) arguments. Similarly, I argue (III.5.3) that the non-causal view o f 
agency and action I defend allows me to reinforce Dupre’s (2001) criticism o f evolu­
tionary psychology. Further, a major motivation for Dupre’s rejection o f (Q  seems to
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be (e.g., 1993, 90 ff.) his willingness to resist naive fetishisations o f fundamental phys­
ics, i.e., the view that one day physics could replace the human sciences. Exactly the 
same motivation underlies my rejection o f causal theories of action and agency.
Moreover, when it comes to explanations o f actions, Dupre (1993, 152) under­
lines that more often than not we are interested in what someone is doing rather than 
how, exactly, the action takes place. Explanations in terms o f fundamental physics can­
not answer such what-questions, essentially because actions “take place in social con­
texts that have much to do with determining what kinds of actions they are” (Dupre 
1993, 153). The (largely sociological) question of what one does cannot be answered in 
terms of a physical account o f how, exactly, the physical movement that instantiates the 
action happens. This could serve as a summary o f my non-causal view too. Similarly, 
Dupre’s denial of (mind-brain) supervenience is based on seeing the content o f mental 
states as determined largely by “contextual social factors that go beyond the internal 
structure o f the individual” (Dupre 1993, 157). Dupre even hints (1993, 156; 2001, 35) 
that the reason for this is Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument. Once again, this is 
exactly the line I take in the following Chapters. However, where I think this view goes 
hand in hand with my non-causalist, normative view of action and agency, Dupre is a 
firm causalist.
Crucially, however, Dupre agrees with Crane, Kim and the present study that 
supervenience as such cannot suffice for the Standard View (Dupre 1993, 96-97 & 101). 
But where I reject (B) and the Standard View, Dupre rejects (Q  (concerning which I 
remain neutral). Dupre’s (1993) main arguments against (C) are based on his observa­
tion that -  pace, e.g., Papineau (2002) -  far from supporting the principle, our best sci­
ence in fact speaks against it. In particular, determinism, which is the natural fellow 
traveller o f the principle, “seems almost entirely, or perhaps entirely, devoid o f  empiri­
cal support” and, accordingly, “our most successful scientific theories describe a prob­
abilistic rather than a deterministic world” (Dupre 1993, 184). The idea is that the ex­
clusion thesis (III.2.3; recall especially how the exclusionist principle (I) and the step 
from (7) to (8) built explicitly on the physical causes being sufficient for their effects) 
and the argument from overdetermination (III.2.2.), which lie at the core o f my Kim- 
inspired criticism o f (B), are based on a deterministic reading o f the principle o f causal 
closure. If indeterminism is true, and antecedents in the laws of fundamental physics are 
insufficient for their consequences, the sui generis mental causation that rejects (Q  does 
not challenge (D).
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Although Dupre’s view stands or falls with his rejection o f (C), assessing the 
(un)acceptability o f determinism and causal closure is beyond the scope of this disserta­
tion. Hence, I adopt a different line o f argumentation. First, I wish to point out that 
Dupre agrees, contrary to the prevailing view, that causal closure renders (B) and the 
Standard View impossible, regardless o f the Multiple Realisability Argument. However, 
just as most advocates o f the supervenience orthodoxy, also Dupre finds the rejection of 
(B) intolerable. Thus, he wants to turn “the reductionist modus ponens (causal com­
pleteness [closure] requires reductionism) into [...] [an] antireductionist modus tollens 
(the failure of reductionism implies the falsity o f causal completeness)” (Dupre 1993, 
102). As most contemporary philosophers, also Dupre is not so much interested in de­
fending mental causation as such; rather, his goal is to demonstrate how one can consis­
tently accept mental causation.
What I am getting at is that the reason why Dupre and others insist on keeping
(B) is, I think, their commitment on mental realism. Crucially, however, my non- 
causalism is not meant to challenge mental realism, but the further assumption that 
mental realism is a causal notion. My point is that although Dupre may well be correct 
in his criticism o f determinism and, thereby, causal closure, in any case his causalist 
mental realism is committed to much stronger presuppositions than my non-causalism. 
In particular, Dupre’s defence o f mental realism presupposes indeterminism and the
136 • •failure o f (Q . At least the latter presupposition remains unacceptable to the majority 
o f contemporary philosophers of science and mind. My non-causal mental realism, in 
contrast, is compatible with both views: The normative view is a compatibilist notion o f 
agency that is not tied to the fate o f indeterminism and the principle o f causal closure.
All this is, o f course, still merely a negative argument in favour o f non- 
causalism: 1 have argued that the causalist view has implications many will find unat­
tractive. However, perhaps there are causalist theories that avoid these implications, al­
though I doubt it (recall also Footnote 124). Be that as it may, instead o f criticising 
more causalist theories I think it is time to finally offer a positive argument in favour o f 
non-causalism.
The non-causal, normative view of mental realism holds that the constitutive 
principles o f the mental realm are essentially different from causal relations regardless 
o f our specific views on causation (as long as we take causal relation to be essentially 
non-normative -  see III. 1 and Appendix). Dupre, on the other hand, thinks that mental
136 This, o f  course, does not worry Dupre, since in his view we have further, independent arguments for 
these presuppositions (see Part III o f Dupre 1993).
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states are essentially causal, as his modus tollens testifies. Thus, although I have not re­
futed Dupre’s view, if I can show that mental states exist only relative to normative 
(constitutive) rules essentially different from causal relations, the motivation to accept 
causalism even in Dupre’s sense is seriously compromised. The talk o f the mental 
would belong to the logical space of normative reasons, not to the space o f causation 
(the rejection o f (B)). This is the task undertaken in the rest o f this dissertation.
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CHAPTER III.3: 
WHAT IS INTENTIONALITY ANYWAY? THE PROBLEM OF RULE- 
FOLLOWING137
III.3.1 INTRODUCTION
The challenge undertaken in this Part o f my dissertation is to show that the intentionalist 
framework adopted in Parts I and II is justified. Intentionality and intentional action 
must form sui generis, irreducible features o f the world. After Chapters III. 1 and III.2 
above, the jury is still out. III.2 showed that the celebrated attempts to defend the 
framework o f intentional agency on the basis o f the Multiple Realisability Argument 
fail in their own terms. The failure stems from the steadfast commitment to the principle 
o f the causal closure of the physical world (e.g., Papineau 2002) and to deterministic 
causation. Rejecting these widely-held commitments appears to offer the most promis­
ing defence of the causalist interpretation o f the intentionalist framework (II1.2.5).
Another way o f defending the intentionalist framework was set up in III. 1, 
where I showed that contrary to the view dominating contemporary action theory (e.g., 
Mele 2003, 82), Davidson’s alleged refutation o f the Logical Connection Argument 
fails to refute the non-causalist view o f von Wright and others. If von Wright is right, 
reasons and actions belong to what Wilfrid Sellars (1963) called the logical space o f 
normative reasons, not to the logical space of non-normative causal processes. This 
move rescues the intentionalist programme, since it is only contentful states and inten­
tional actions (in virtue of their propositional contents) that can stand in normative, con­
ceptual relations. And they do it precisely qua contentful, qua intentional. Thus, non- 
causalism is another viable option for a defence o f the intentionalist framework. Which 
should we choose?
Thus far the argumentation of this Part has been almost exclusively negative in 
nature. I have shown that the non-causalist view survives Davidson’s alleged refutation. 
Similarly, I have argued that Dupre’s metaphysical pluralism is the only hope a causal­
ist has left. But I have not explained how, exactly, either programme works. I have not 
argued for  causalism or non-causalism. This is what I want to do next. More precisely, I 
want to examine the nature o f intentional phenomena (such as meaningful actions, sen­
tences, thoughts and languages) qua intentional and ask what it is in these phenomena
137 This and the following Chapter build largely on Saaristo (2004b).
203
that makes them intentional. My goal is to show that explicating the nature o f inten­
tional phenomena tips the scales in favour of normative non-causalism -  and, ulti- 
mately, yields a novel theory o f collective intentional ity in the sense o f Parts I and II.
As part o f my defence o f the normative view I need also to explain how, exactly, 
the sui generis normative space of reasons is possible in the world that ultimately con­
sists o f non-normative, blind physical processes governed by causal laws. Again, it 
seems that I face a dilemma. Either the required normativity is based on independently- 
existing Platonist norms, in which case the ontological naturalism I have been advocat­
ing is compromised, or it is a socially constructed social fact, in which case -  given the 
intentionalist analysis o f social facts given in Part 1 -  the attempt to appeal to normativ­
ity as the saviour o f intentional ity seems blatantly circular.
Thus, I need to give an account of normativity that avoids the dilemma. I argue 
that our most fundamental social institutions -  which, echoing Wittgenstein, I call social 
bedrock practices -  constitute simultaneously both normativity and intentional ity, 
avoiding thus the looming circularity. These are social bedrock practices, for they do 
not presuppose intentional ity, but all intentional notions presuppose them (including the 
practices Part I talks about). I argue that the social practice view allows us to see norma­
tivity as an external and objective feature of the world without assuming anti-naturalist 
Platonism (recall the intersubjective but ontologically naturalist definitions o f external­
ity and objectivity constructed in Part I). In the terminology of Kusch (2006), the nor­
mativity I talk about is intersubjective normativity, not metaphysical or semantic.
This combination of naturalism and objective normativity, in a sense, presup­
poses that I perform the ultimate philosophical magic trick and derive “ought” from 
“is”. Again, I argue that the theory of social practices and the intersubjective but non- 
independent notion o f objectivity defended in Part I comes to the rescue. The normativ­
ity I defend will be relative to the social bedrock practices and, hence, objective fo r and 
external to individuals participating in the practices (but dependent o f the practices) and 
invisible for others. This kind of bootstrapped normativity is the strongest kind natural­
ism can allow (cf. Appendix), and I hope to show that it suffices for the intentionalist 
programme. In the course of my argumentation I hope to establish the importance o f 
normativity for actions and agency -  and by doing so I wish to undermine the motiva­
tion behind causalist approaches to intentional agency.
138 However, the non-causalism I defend is not a rejection o f  causalism tout court, for instead o f  claiming 
that causal factors have nothing whatsoever to do with intentionality and agency, the goal is rather to 
specify the precise scope o f  causalism.
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To do all this requires me to say a lot about the ontological nature o f normativ­
ity, meaning, mental contents and, most importantly, intentionality. The task, enormous 
as it may be, is nonetheless worth the effort, for its successful completion (i) delivers a 
naturalistic defence o f the intentionalist programme so badly needed, (ii) allows us to 
sharpen our understanding o f social practices and social institutions, (iii) reveals the true 
nature o f human action and agency and, finally, (iv) ties together the main themes o f all 
the three Parts of this dissertation. So, let me roll up my sleeves and get to work. The 
job is colossal, but still -  or precisely for that reason -  it is best to start from the founda­
tions. So what is intentionality? How is it possible?
Intentionality in the general sense -  as aboutness; certain things such as content­
ful thoughts, meaningful sentences or linguistic signs etc. being directed at, about or o f  
something else, i.e., having contents -  is a deeply astonishing phenomenon. However, 
for something to be intentional it is neither sufficient nor necessary for that something 
to be causally connected to its object. After all, we can have meaningful thoughts about 
unicorns as well as abstract objects such as numbers. Hence, intentionality cannot 
amount to a mere straightforward causal relation between stimulus and reaction (the 
fundamental flaws of this popular view are explained in detail in III.3.2). Intentionality 
is directedness that can take different forms. An intentional state can amount to taking 
something as true (beliefs), hoping that something would be true (desires), aiming to 
make something true (intentions) and so on. We are capable o f entertaining ideas with­
out being committed to their truth (without believing them). Whatever theory o f inten­
tionality one is going to advocate, the theory must be able to accommodate these differ­
ent aspects of intentionality and intentional states.
I may as well lay my cards on the table. I think that in order to take into account 
the different features o f intentionality we must concede that for the theory o f intention­
ality the primary question is not about the nature o f the relation between thoughts and 
the world, but about the nature of content, i.e., how there can be contentful thoughts in 
the first place.139 Intentionality is not made possible by certain kind of connection be-
139 Brandom (especially 2002, 21 ft.) thinks that this kind o f  emphasis marks a departure from Cartesian 
philosophy that treats intentionality and content (and representation) as unproblematic and consequently 
concentrates on epistemology, i.e., on the success o f  our representations. The animating thought o f  my 
approach is then rather a semantic, Kantian question: I wonder how we can represent anything in the first 
place, rightly or falsely? In Appendix I follow Brandom and, e.g., Putnam (recall his semantic argument 
against the essentially Cartesian Brains in a Vat scenario in Chapter 1 o f Putnam 1981) in suggesting that 
the semantic problem is not only conceptually prior to Descartes’ epistemological problem, but also that a 
successful solution to the semantic problem allows us to avoid Cartesian problems in epistemology. Solv­
ing the semantic problem solves, in a sense, epistemological scepticism for free. This approach is essen­
tially anti-representational; pace  the Cartesians, representation is not treated as a primitive semantic no­
tion but a highly problematic one (note that my anti-representationalism is nonetheless o f  Brandom’s kind
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tween, say, a human brain and physical objects, but in virtue o f certain states or things 
being contentful. It is the intentional, meaningful content that makes it possible for 
something to be directed at something else. Moreover, the core o f the theory o f meaning 
or intentional content is already given in Part I o f this study, where it was argued that 
the facts that certain pieces o f paper are (count as) money or that certain marks on a pa­
per are (count as) meaningful sentences are to be analysed in terms o f normative 
statuses collectively assigned to the pieces o f paper and the marks on the paper.
Part I argued that ontologically speaking such normative statuses boil down to 
collectively accepted and required patterns of behaviour. Similarly, this Part argues that 
meaningful (intentional) states such as beliefs and desires are normative statuses that get 
their content from the patterns o f behaviour attached to them in virtue o f collective ac­
ceptance {i.e., in virtue o f a 1 normative connection interdefining and (partly) constitut­
ing beliefs, desires, actions etc. -  recall III. 1). Forming a belief amounts to undertaking 
a commitment to something being the case, and such commitments bring with them cer­
tain collectively accepted rights and collectively accepted duties. Similarly, desires and 
intentions bring with them different commitments, as do thoughts about unicorns and 
mathematical objects. It is, for example, collectively required that, ceteris paribus, in 
the presence o f cows I undertake the commitment to use the sentence “there are cows 
present” (form the belief) as a premise in my practical reasoning (leading to actions) and 
theoretical reasoning (leading to other commitments, such as the commitment that there 
are mammals present).
This view, which in what follows will be argued for in detail, implies that my 
account of intentionality subscribes to the Wittgensteinian idea o f seeing meaning as 
use in the sense that meaning, content and intentionality are constituted by collectively 
sustained use of assertions (including appropriate performances of actions). Meanings 
reside in normative, social practices. However, 1 cannot simply apply the theory o f Part 
I to intentional states such as beliefs, desires and intentions, since that theory was for­
mulated within the framework o f intentional agency. In Part I the analysis o f social facts 
in terms of normative statuses built on full-blown intentional attitudes that ground the 
statuses. The intentionality o f marks on a paper etc. was analysed as derived from the 
more fundamental intentionality o f human agents, which was simply taken as given. In­
deed, (collective) intentionality was identified as one of the fundamental building 
blocks of social reality.
in the sense that I, like Brandom but unlike, e.g., Rorty (1979), think that the notion o f  representation is 
extremely important, although not primitive (cf. Appendix)).
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The present Part, in contrast, focuses on exactly the kind o f original intentional­
ity that the intentionalist framework o f Part I presupposes, and hence to avoid vicious 
circularity I will need to build on pre-intentional (or sub-personal) building blocks. Thus 
it should be kept in mind that although in what follows I for sake o f simplicity talk 
mainly about meaning and content in general -  or rather carelessly about sentences, 
thoughts, concepts and linguistic signs -  the target o f my argumentation is the original 
intentionality that makes the intentional contents o f mental states possible.
Crucially, it is clear that for anything to be directed at something else, it cannot 
be directed at everything or at randomly chosen targets. This is very clear in the case o f 
linguistic terms. They apply to certain things precisely to the extent they do not apply to 
everything or randomly chosen things. In this sense, concepts are essentially rules stat­
ing how terms may be applied: for a linguistic entity or a mental state to have concep­
tual content -  to be intentional -  its use must be rule-governed.140 Basically, our 
thoughts have content when they are normatively connected with specific states o f af­
fairs and propositions. If this is not the case, then we cannot talk about a contentful (and 
thereby intentional) thought or sentence. The meaning of a sentence or thought is con­
stituted by the norms governing the appropriate applications o f the sentence or thought 
in question, i.e., its assertability conditions. This kind o f inferential or normative role 
semantics is, I think, the core o f Wittgenstein’s insight o f seeing meaning as use.141 
Consequently, a behaviour is an action precisely to the extent that it has meaningful 
content, i.e., to the extent that we can ask for reasons (and not only causes) for the be­
haviour.
Thus, a thought or sentence has meaning to the extent that it is embedded in a 
normative system (this, o f course, is the thesis of meaning holism we saw to be an es­
sential part of the Logical Connection Argument); when it can serve as a premise or
140 I am o f  course alluding to the well-known problem of rule-following here. The problem is usually lo­
cated in the so-called later philosophy o f Wittgenstein (1953 in particular), but more often than not the 
discussion concentrates on Kripke’s (1982) reaction to Wittgenstein’s arguments. This essay is not the 
place for any kind o f general review o f  the rule-following literature. Rather, I stick to my own task o f  
constructing a positive argument fo r  the non-causal view o f intentional action and agency and draw from 
the rule-following discussion only when it is directly relevant for this quest. The key reactions to Kripke’s 
arguments are collected into Miller & Wright (2002). Kusch (2006) analyses and answers virtually all the 
criticisms directed to Kripke’s book. Another good critical discussion o f  the suggested solutions to the 
rule-following problem is Haukioja (2000).
141 Thus I also think that the fundamental semantic unit is a move in a language game (Wittgenstein) or a 
judgement one can be responsible for (Kant), i.e., a sentence or a proposition, and the sub-sentential enti­
ties such as singular terms should be explained in terms o f the basic units (e.g., rules governing the use o f  
terms -  concepts -  determine to what one’s judgement or sentence commits one); see Brandom (1994, 
2000 & 2002 and Pagin 2002 for criticism). Since this Chapter is principally interested in the normativity 
common to all semantic notions, especially actions, and not in orthodox philosophy o f  language, I will 
talk rather carelessly about terms, sentences, concepts etc. without explicating these differences (cf., how­
ever, A. 1.2).
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conclusion in inferences -  including practical inferences featuring actions (as conclu­
sions) and observations (as premises). Indeed, the inferential role is the content. I think 
that by now my sudden interest in semantics should be clear: the conditions for a sen­
tence or thought to be intentional and to have meaningful content are exactly the same 
as the conditions for a behaviour to be an intentional action.
Actions are, by definition, meaningful behaviours, intentional states are mean­
ingful states, words are meaningful utterances and so forth. To be intentional is to have 
meaningful content. To have meaningful content is to have a normative role or status in 
an inferentialist framework. Hence to show how meanings are possible in our ontologi- 
cally naturalistic world is to show how there can be intentional actions in the non- 
causalist normative sense of the Logical Connection Argument in our ontologically 
naturalistic world. This, I argue, requires social holism.
III.3.2 MEANING AND RULES
My first approximation for capturing the nature o f meaning shall be the claim that any 
theory o f meaning must be able to accommodate the following three conditions 
(adapted from Williams 1999, 159 and Esfeld 2001, 73-74 and explained and analysed 
in detail below):
(1) Meaning is something that we understand immediately and completely.
(2) Meaning determines the future applications.
(3) Meaning sets the normative standards o f correctness for the future applications.
These conditions are based on observations made by Wittgenstein. In his view, Condi­
tion (1) simply states an obvious fact about our use of meaningful language: “we under­
stand the meaning o f a word when we hear or say it; we grasp it in a flash” (Wittgen­
stein 1953, §138). Condition (2), in turn, requires that meaning is extended in time and 
space. The meaning of the term “cow” is not exhausted by a single application; it de­
termines also which other objects are cows and which are not, and whether or not the 
term applies in situations one faces in the future. Thus, to call a dog a cow is a mistake 
(Condition (3)). In this sense meanings (concepts) are essentially rules, and meaningful, 
intentional behaviour, i.e., action, is essentially rule-governed behaviour.142
142 Hence Kant’s paradoxical-sounding statement that for one to be a truly free intentional agent capable 
o f intentional actions one’s behaviour must be bound by rules is literally correct.
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Take an example where someone learns the meaning o f a term by being shown a 
sequence o f examples o f correct applications o f the term. The motivation behind Condi­
tions (l)-(3) is to account for problems created by the obvious point that on some inter­
pretation any way to continue the finite sequence o f examples can be seen to be com­
patible with the sequence (Kripke 1982, see also Chapter III, “The New Riddle o f In­
duction”, in Goodman 1973).143 Thus, if I have learned a concept on the basis o f a se­
quence of examples, how can I be justified in thinking that I know how to go on to ap­
ply the concept? How am I to know that I have picked the correct rule out o f infinitely 
many possibilities on the basis o f the finite sequence of examples? What if the rule cap­
turing the meaning of, say, the concept cow is that the term “cow” is to be applied to 
cows until 2007, and to horses thereafter? Or perhaps the point of the sequence was not 
that the term “cow” should be applied to cows, but to any four-legged, homed rumi­
nants. “Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule [i.e., the con­
cept governing the use of the term]” (Wittgenstein 1953, §198).
Condition (2), o f course, is designed to rule out these kinds of problems. As 
Wittgenstein expresses the idea behind Condition (2), “[t]he rule, once stamped with a 
particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be followed through the whole 
o f space” (Wittgenstein 1953, §219).144
In addition to this, a peculiar feature of meaning is that the use o f concepts is 
rule-governed', it must be possible to apply a concept incorrectly. In other words, the 
theory of meaning must allow for cases when I am applying the concept cow incorrectly 
(say, to horses on a dark night). The rule cannot be identical with actual applications, for 
we must be able to say that in calling the horses cows I was nonetheless applying the 
concept cow, albeit mistakenly. This problem o f error is captured by Condition (3). 
“Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order” (Wittgenstein 1951, §206). I must 
be able to think that I am following a rule correctly while actually failing to do so.
143 Note, however, that Kripke’s and Goodman’s problems are not identical: Goodman is challenging in­
ductive reasoning, whereas the target o f  Kripke’s argument is still a deeper issue, the ontology o f  mean­
ing.
144 In what follows this thesis is interpreted such that the extension o f  the rule (future applications) is de­
termined via a social process. The meaning finitism  o f  the so-called Edinburgh School sociologists o f  
science emphasises this feature in a very provocative way: “the established meaning o f a word does not 
determine its future applications” (Bloor 1983, 25) and hence “[t]he future applications o f  terms are open- 
ended” (Barnes, Bloor & Hendry 1996, 55). Condition (2) appears to deny this kind o f meaning finitism, 
and even my final interpretation o f (2) holds on to the idea that meanings are -  at least in most cases, cf, 
Footnote 146 below -  determined for each individual. However, the difference between my view and that 
o f  orthodox meaning finitism may be one o f  mere emphasis rather than a substantial disagreement, for 
also in my view the future applications are determined by a social practice (which indeed is open-ended), 
not by the term itself, individual interpretation or meaning as an abstract object. More on these issues in 
1II.3.3 and Appendix.
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Wittgenstein’s goal is to show that understanding a meaning cannot be grounded 
on a mental act o f consciously interpreting a sign. His argument is meant to refute both 
the Platonist and psychological theories o f understanding meanings. In short, Platonism 
treats meanings as external objects that agents understand by connecting to them. The 
connection may be either purely causal or based on a non-causal interpretation. Psy­
chologism, in turn, holds that meaning is based on a conscious interpretation o f an ex­
ternal meaning, be that a Platonist entity, social use, or what have you. The core o f 
Wittgenstein’s view o f meaning as use is that Platonism, psychologism and indeed all 
theories that dissociate the practice of applying a rule from the rule itself are bound to 
fail. In Wittgenstein’s view meanings reside in our social practices, and to understand a 
meaning is to be able to participate appropriately in the social practices (the language 
game) that constitute the meaning, not to contemplate them from outside. Meaning is 
identical with (social) use.
The core o f Wittgenstein’s argument is that Platonism and psychologism cannot 
satisfy Conditions (l)-(3) simultaneously. Wittgenstein’s general hostility towards phi­
losophical theories suggests that conceivably in his view no explicit theory can do so 
(cf. McDowell’s quietism in 111.3.3), for perhaps (l)-(3), albeit unavoidable, simply are 
inconsistent. My goal, however, is to argue that (l)-(3) can be made consistent without 
challenging Wittgenstein’s lasting intuitions concerning the essence of meaning. None­
theless, also my view renders Platonist and psychological theories o f meaning implausi­
ble and subscribes to a social practice view o f meaning.
The starting point of Wittgenstein’s argument is his observation that Conditions 
(1) and (2) are in fact incompatible: “we understand the meaning o f a word when we 
hear or say it; we grasp it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something 
different from the ‘use’ which is extended in time!” (Wittgenstein 1953, §138). Thus, 
Wittgenstein formulates what has become known as the Infinity Problem o f rule- 
following. The very point of learning rules (concepts) is that the same rule (concept) is 
thought to apply to infinitely many new cases. The question is, then, that when a person 
encounters a new situation to which she has never applied the rule, how is she to know 
how the rule applies to this new case? The obvious answer that the rule should be ap­
plied in the same way as in the earlier cases is not satisfactory, because the problem is 
precisely what counts as the same way (Kripke 1982, 8).
Thus, the Infinity Problem raises what Meredith Williams (1999, 159) calls the 
(Infinite) Regress Argument against rule-following and meaning. Condition (1) requires 
that meanings must be grasped in a flash. But surely nothing that can be grasped (in the
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sense of a conscious interpretation) in a flash is capable o f determining all the possible 
applications of what is grasped, for they are always open for new interpretations.
This, however, is exactly what Condition (2) requires o f any acceptable theory 
o f meaning. As Williams says, the Regress Argument “shows that in the end meaning 
must be something other than an act o f interpretation or that which requires interpreta­
tion” (Williams 1999, 159). Thus the Regress Argument challenges psychological theo­
ries of meaning and understanding (including those versions o f Platonism that build on 
interpretation). The idea is that if understanding a meaning amounts to an act o f inter­
pretation (and requires that the meaning is grasped in a flash), then meaning cannot ex­
tend beyond the very act o f interpretation, or Condition (1) remains unsatisfied. But this 
means that Condition (2) remains unsatisfied. In other words, there seems to be a criti­
cal trade-off between Conditions (1) and (2). If understanding a meaning is based on a 
psychological act o f interpretation, then this interpretation determines further applica­
tion only on a new interpretation, and so on ad infinitum.
This is how Wittgenstein himself puts the argument: “Suppose, however, that 
not merely the picture o f the cube [satisfying Condition (1)], but also the method o f pro­
jection [satisfying Condition (2)] comes before our mind? [...] But does this really get 
me any further? Can’t I now imagine different applications o f this schema too?”, Witt­
genstein (1953, §141) asks. The answer he gives is that interpretations cannot indeed 
solve the problem, since “any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it in­
terprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine 
meaning.” (Wittgenstein 1953, §198.) If  understanding a concept is based on conscious 
interpretation, it seems that every concrete application o f the concept requires one to re­
interpret also the method o f projection -  and whichever way one does it, one’s solution 
will be compatible with earlier applications on some interpretation, and Condition (2) 
remains unsatisfied.
However, it seems to me that the Infinity Problem is a problem precisely to the 
extent it gives rise to the Regress Argument. Consequently, if we can avoid the Regress 
Argument, then the Infinity Problem is not necessarily a problem for us. Thus it is cru­
cial to notice that an essential component of the Regress Argument is the explicit com­
mitment to psychologism, i.e., the idea that to understand a meaning is to give a con­
scious interpretation or to grasp the meaning consciously. It is psychologism that leads 
to the infinite regress o f interpretations.
In other words, the Regress Argument is simply another way o f expressing the 
circularity problem I have formulated already several times above. What we are after is
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an account o f original intentionality constitutive o f meaningful thoughts and human 
psychology, and hence to explain meaning in terms o f conscious psychological interpre­
tations would simply beg the question -  we would need to ask the very same questions 
concerning the intentionality o f the language of thought. The problem is to have a the­
ory of meaning and intentionality, and thus to build on intentional and meaningful no­
tions simply begs the question.
This is why the Regress Argument is a strong argument against all psychological 
(and interpretatively Platonist) accounts of meaning (i.e., accounts building on intrinsi­
cally meaningful notions). We want to know how original intentionality is possible -  an 
account of derived intentionality is already given in Part I o f this study. The Regress 
Argument shows that essentially psychological theories are bound to simply beg the 
question when it comes to the explanation o f original intentionality.
However, 1 do not think the Infinity Problem will remain with us no matter 
what. We can avoid the problem by rejecting the commitment to treat understandings o f 
meaning as acts o f conscious interpretation. This would evade the Regress Argument. I 
think this is also the route taken by Wittgenstein:
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here [i.e., in thinking that to un­
derstand a meaning is to give an interpretation] from the mere fact that in the 
course o f our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if  each one 
contended us at least for a moment, until we thought o f yet another standing be­
hind it. What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an 
interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and 
“going against it” in actual cases.
(Wittgenstein 1953, §201.)
So what is needed is an account of understanding as something that is not an instance of 
interpretation but shows in actual applications of concepts and in other meaningful 
events. But what could this kind of understanding be?
Wittgenstein offers useful guidance: “Try not to think of understanding as a 
‘mental process’ at all. -  For that is the expression which confuses you.” (Wittgenstein 
1953, §154.) To understand a meaning is to obey a rule, and “‘obeying a rule’ is a prac­
tice” (Wittgenstein 1953, §202) and hence to understand a meaning is not a mental act 
but an ability to behave appropriately: “To understand a language means to be master o f 
a technique” (Wittgenstein 1953, §199). The Regress Argument, and hence the Infinity
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Problem, can be avoided only if  we are absolutely clear that rule-following (understand­
ing) is not a psychological concept at all.145
This requirement is the rationale behind Wittgenstein’s famous dictum, accord­
ing to which “[w]hen I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly.” (Wittgen­
stein 1953, §219.) G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker sum up this position nicely: “the 
point of the argument was [...] to show that rule-following, and hence a language, is a 
kind o f customary behaviour, a form o f action, not of thought” (Baker & Hacker 1984, 
21 -  although here “action” cannot be read in the customary sense o f intentional action, 
for that would again beg the question).
The task is, then, to give an account of rule-following such that rules are fol­
lowed blindly or, in other words, so that understanding amounts to a practical technique 
requiring no contentful deliberation. One popular and prominent trend in the rule- 
following literature (e.g., Blackburn 1984, Boghossian 1989, Forbes 1983-4 and Mil- 
likan 1990) is to hold that to avoid the Regress Argument we must say that rule- 
following, and thus understanding, is ultimately based on a biological disposition char­
acteristic o f the human species to continue sequences (to follow a rule) in a certain way.
Recall that the core of the rule-following problem is to explain how we are to 
pick out one rule out of infinitely many rules instantiated by a finite sequence o f exam­
ples. The dispositional solution holds that it is a mistake to concentrate on the logical 
point that whatever one does is logically compatible with the sequence o f examples. 
Rather, say the dispositionalists, we should concentrate on the fact that as biological be­
ings it is often the case that one o f the infinitely many logically possible ways to con­
tinue a sequence simply strikes us as the natural way to continue the sequence.
Perhaps evolution has equipped us with homogeneous dispositions to continue 
sequences o f examples uniformly. The suggestion is that our shared biological nature 
makes us to share the (logically unjustifiable) sense of what counts as obviously the 
same. We know, for example, that animals are able to classify objects they face into 
those who belong to the same species with them and to those who do not on the basis o f 
a very small sequence o f examples. In Philip Pettit’s words, “although any finite set o f 
examples instantiates an indefinite number o f rules, for a particular agent [or for mem­
bers of particular species] the set may exemplify just one rule” (Pettit 1990, 36; my ital­
ics).
145 Needless to say, most cases o f  everyday understanding are “mental processes” or even acts o f interpre­
tation. Recall, however, that what we are after here is understanding and intentionality at the most funda­
mental level o f original intentionality that makes the psychological everyday concept o f  understanding 
possible in the first place.
213
In this manner, the dispositional suggestion goes, Kripke is right to hold that 
there is no logically compelling solution to the problem of why to continue a sequence 
in one way rather than another, but often enough there nonetheless is a specific way in 
which we as members o f the species Homo Sapiens are disposed to continue it (cf. Es- 
feld 2001, 81). Assuming the existence of such a disposition (or a system o f such dispo­
sitions) is, I think, the sensible way to understand the talk about an intrinsic, biological 
language instinct all humans are supposed to share. To put this suggestion in the termi­
nology introduced above, the dispositional solution says that “my understanding o f a 
concept at a time is a dispositional state” (Forbes 1983-4, 21), and hence we ought to 
replace Condition (1) with the following Condition (1*):
(1 *) Meaning amounts to (or is constituted by) a disposition to react in a certain way (to 
continue a sequence o f examples in a certain way).
This, I think, delivers exactly what we required. (1*) captures the motivation be­
hind (1), for certainly a directly activating disposition counts as grasping something in a 
flash. Hence we have a solution to the core o f the rule-following problem: there are in­
finitely many ways to continue a sequence, but in virtue of our shared biological make­
up we are disposed to pick exactly one of them. Moreover, since we are talking about a 
directly activating biological (causal) disposition, when we continue a sequence we do 
not consciously choose (interpret) but continue the sequence blindly, exactly as Witt­
genstein (1953, §219) required. The act o f picking out one of the infinitely many possi­
bilities is not based on logical considerations or interpretations but on a biological dis­
position. Surely this counts as blind obedience exactly in the sense required to avoid the 
Regress Argument.
Finally, (1*), unlike (1), is compatible with (2), since to have a causal disposi­
tion to continue a sequence in a certain way just means that the future applications are in 
most cases146 determined for the person who has the disposition, which is precisely 
what Condition (2) requires (Blackburn 1984). Thus, replacing (1) with (1*) explicates, 
I think, the motivation behind Wittgenstein’s way o f avoiding the Regress Argument by 
appealing to blind obedience: “How can he know how he is to continue a pattern by 
himself -  whatever instruction you give him? -  Well, how do I know? -  If that means
146 But not in all cases. The view o f meaning I am building here is naturalistic in the sense that there is no 
a priori guarantee that our concepts will apply smoothly to all possible situations. Perhaps in some out­
landish situations our dispositions simply do not work and we cannot find anything to say.
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‘Have I reasons?’ the answer is: my reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act, 
without reasons.” (Wittgenstein 1953, §211.)
The dispositional solution seems undoubtedly to be heading in the right direc­
tion. The question is, then, whether or not it suffices for meaning and intentionality? 
Note that if  the dispositional solution indeed is sufficient, then causalist theories o f 
meaning, and thereby o f action and agency, unquestionably have the upper hand. In
III.3.1 I argued that the rule-following problem captures the ultimate nature o f meaning­
ful action and agency. Thus, if the solution to the problem is essentially causalist, as 
biological dispositionalism is, surely causalism about intentional action and its explana­
tion must take priority over non-causalism.
However, the dispositional solution to the problem o f rule-following is ines­
capably insufficient. The reason is that the Infinity Problem, and the corresponding Re­
gress Argument, is only the first part o f the problem of rule-following. The second, 
more fundamental problem of rule-following is the Normativity Problem (cf. Esfeld 
2001,73).
The Infinity Problem was raised by the mutual incompatibility o f Conditions (1) 
and (2). The incompatibility was resolved by replacing (1) with (1*). The Normativity 
Problem, on the other hand, is created by the mutual incompatibility of (1) and (3), and 
replacing (1) with (1*) serves only to make the problem worse. Recall that Condition
(3) was assumed to capture the possibility o ffailing to follow a rule while trying to do 
so, i.e., the possibility of making mistakes. As Kripke puts this, “[t]he relation o f mean­
ing and intention to future action is [also] normative [Condition (3)], not [only] descrip­
tive [Condition (2)]” (Kripke 1982, 37).
The obvious problem is that if we solve the rule-following problem by appealing 
to a blind, causal disposition to simply continue a sequence in one way without reasons, 
then our solution to pick that particular way to continue the sequence cannot be ration­
ally justified. Reasons cannot be given for that solution; it is simply what we do (Witt­
genstein 1953, §217). This is indeed what the Infinity Problem and the Regress Argu­
ment appear to require us to hold. But then the view falls prey to Kripke’s question: “Is 
not the dispositional view simply an equation of performance and correctness?” (Kripke 
1982, 24). The essential normativity o f meanings, captured by Condition (3), seems to 
have been lost.
The causal “blind” solution succeeds to make (1) and (2) mutually compatible, 
but renders the question o f the normative aspect of rule-following completely unan­
swerable. I think Williams has got this right. “Though causal factors are relevant to our
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understanding o f rule-following, a fully causal account cannot make space for the basic 
normative distinction, that between correct and incorrect actions. [...] There are con­
straints on behavior that [...] are not purely causal.” (Williams 1999, 168.) I think this is 
also Wittgenstein’s view. He very clearly says that the dispositional solution is the first 
and necessary part of the solution to the problem of rule-following, but that as such it 
cannot be sufficient (Wittgenstein also emphasises -  correctly, see II1.4.2 -  that the dis­
positions must be socially mediated):
“But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, 
on some interpretation, in accord with the rule.” [...] “Then, can whatever I do 
be brought into accord with the rule?” -  Let me ask this: what has the expression 
o f a rule -  say a sign-post -  got to do with my actions? What sort o f connexion 
is there here? -  Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to this sign in 
a particular way, and now I do so react to it [the dispositional solution].
But that is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we 
now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in. On 
the contrary, I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so 
far as there exists a regular use o f sign-posts, a custom.
(Wittgenstein 1953, §198.)
As Sellars (1963, 327) puts this, a mere “pattern governed” behaviour (the dis­
positional solution) cannot suffice for linguistic practices, for they are essentially rule- 
governed and, in Sellars’ terminology, require “rule obeying” behaviour that goes fur­
ther than mere pattern governed behaviour. Sellars shares my reading o f Wittgenstein in 
thinking that the normative rule obeying behaviour involves the dispositional, pattern 
governed behaviour, but the two cannot be identified with each other. Biological dispo­
sitions producing pattern governed behaviour are causal mechanisms to react to certain 
kinds o f input with certain kinds of output. As Kripke sees, there is no room for a dis­
tinction between performance and correctness here, and hence they cannot suffice for 
the construction of linguistic practices.
Some dispositionalists see this problem. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1990), for ex­
ample, builds on the distinction between selection and selection for (e.g., Sober 1993, 
83). To use Fodor’s (1990, 71 ff.) example, evolution has selected frogs with a mecha­
nism that causes them to snap their tongue at any little black thing flying around them, 
but evolution has nonetheless selected fo r  a mechanism which snaps at flies. Millikan’s 
claim is that since it is snapping at flies that is causally responsible for the evolution o f 
the mechanism, we can say that snapping at flies is the proper function o f the mecha­
nism and that when the mechanism snaps at non-flies, the mechanism is malfunctioning,
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and hence the solution building on evolved, biological dispositions does leave room for 
normativity.
I think the crucial ingredient here is that we can redescribe biological disposi­
tions as normative functions. As such, biological dispositions are simply blind, non- 
normative causal mechanisms. In Part I it was argued that Searle is correct to hold that 
biological functions are not intrinsically normative; their normativity is always assigned 
to them in virtue o f being embedded into a system o f values constructed and maintained 
by intentional agents. Similarly, earlier in this Part I have explained how von Wright 
and Davidson thought that normative notions follow a unique logic and hence “have no 
echo” in the realm o f blind, causal mechanisms. The anti-naturalist claim that the bio­
logical world is intrinsically normative is, paradoxically, the (in my mind unacceptable) 
core o f the allegedly naturalistic programmes of, e.g., Millikan and Dretske (1988). 
Their idea is not far from, say, objective idealism where the natural world is assumed to 
be largely conceptual and rational so that we, as rational beings, can have epistemic ac­
cess to it (see Appendix).147
In short, intentional phenomena cannot be identified with causal factors (includ­
ing causalist Platonism), for that would fail to resolve the Normativity Problem. “No 
one ever acts incorrectly in the sense o f violating his or her own dispositions. Indeed, to 
talk of ‘violating’ dispositions is illicitly to import normative vocabulary into a purely 
descriptive context.” (Brandom 1994, 29.) The dispositional solution commits a funda­
mental philosophical category mistake, because it is not sufficiently sophisticated to dis­
tinguish between Conditions (2) and (3) or, in other words, between causal determina­
tion and normative determination. As Robert Brandom (1994) likes to express this, 
meaning cannot be understood in terms of mere causal properties', what matters for 
meaning are the proprieties of use. Or as Peter Winch explains, “the notion of following 
a rule is logically inseparable from the notion of making a mistake. If it is possible to 
say of someone that he is following a rule that means that one can ask whether he is do­
ing what he does correctly or not.” (Winch 1958, 32.)
147 My objection to Millikan proceeds, in a sense, at the meta-level. For a decisive criticism o f Millikan in 
her own terms, see Haukioja (2000, 35-38).
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III.3.3 KRIPKE’S SCEPTICISM, THE NAIVE COMMUNITARIAN VIEW AND 
MCDOWELL’S QUIETISM
The situation I have arrived at is the core o f Kripke’s (1982) meaning scepticism. 
Kripke thinks that to have a positive theory o f meaning, Conditions (1 )-(3) must be sat­
isfied, but the Infinity Problem and the Normativity Problem together appear to show 
that the conditions cannot be met:
The sceptical argument, then, remains unanswered. There can be no such thing 
as meaning anything by any word. Each new application we make is a leap in 
the dark; any present intention could be interpreted so as to accord with anything 
we may choose to do. So there can be neither accord, nor conflict.
(Kripke 1982, 55.)
However, it seems to me that the precise nature o f Kripke’s scepticism is often misun­
derstood. He does not think, contrary to what the quotation above seems to imply, that 
there are no meanings -  “the sceptical conclusion is insane and intolerable” (Kripke 
1982, 60).
Kripke is not a sceptic about meaning, but about a certain approach to the theory 
o f meaning. In Kripke’s view the rule-following considerations show that any fact- 
based theory cannot capture the nature of meaning. Kripke’s point is that if we see 
meanings as independently existing facts in need o f interpretation, we run into the Infin­
ity Problem (the incompatibility of (1) and (2)). I f  we see meanings as based on natural­
istic facts about us, such as dispositions, we run into the Normativity Problem (the in­
compatibility of (1 *) and (3)). Kripke thinks that the sceptical challenge, i.e., the mutual 
incompatibility of Conditions (1), (2) and (3), cannot be answered insofar as we think 
that our account o f meaning must be fact-based: “Now if  we suppose that facts, or truth 
conditions, are of the essence o f meaningful assertion, it will follow from the sceptical 
conclusion that assertions that anyone ever means anything are meaningless” (Kripke 
1982, 77).
However, in Kripke’s view this is not surprising, for he thinks that the central 
message o f Philosophical Investigations is to give “a picture o f language based, not on 
truth conditions, but on assertability conditions or justification conditions: under what 
circumstances are we allowed to make a given assertion?” (Kripke 1982, 74). Thus, in 
Kripke’s mind an appropriate answer to this question must not be stated in terms o f 
truth-conditions, for the question does not amount to a naturalistic search for a brute 
fact. Rather, the question is inherently normative: when am I entitled to make a given
218
assertion, or when am I required to make it? The question is about a normative status, 
rights and duties, not about a brute fact o f the matter. Meanings are norm-based, not 
fact-based. When we want to find out what is the meaning o f a given judgement (or a 
word or concept), we are not searching for an independent fact that establishes the 
meaning. Rather, we have to find what is the appropriate way of using the judgement 
(word, concept) in our language game. We are searching for a role or status, not a fact. 
When we acknowledge this, no sceptical conclusion follows (Kripke 1982, 77):
If Wittgenstein is right, we cannot begin to solve it [the sceptical problem] if  we 
remain in the grip o f the natural presupposition that meaningful declarative sen­
tences must purport to correspond to facts; if this is our framework, we can only 
conclude that sentences attributing meaning and intention are themselves mean­
ingless. [...] The picture of correspondence-to-facts must be cleared away before 
we can begin with the sceptical problem.
(Kripke 1982, 78-79.)
It is very difficult to see what, exactly, Kripke argues for here. It seems to me that his 
line of thought must be the following. Take the following judgement in Finnish: “Kissa 
on matolla”. How could someone who does not know Finnish know that she has under­
stood the meaning of this judgement? She may be given a sequence o f examples o f 
when this sentence is correctly applicable. And although there are infinitely many ways 
o f coherently (under some interpretation) continuing the sequence, she may find it natu­
ral to concentrate on the fact that in all those cases there was a cat on a mat in front o f 
the person uttering the sentence. Thus, she might become disposed to apply the sentence 
to cases where a cat is on a mat.
Kripke’s point seems to be that there cannot be an independent brute fact o f the 
matter as to whether the learner is now in possession o f the meaning of the sentence. In 
particular, the disposition she has acquired cannot constitute such a fact, for this view 
would run into the Normativity Problem. Similarly, her knowing the meaning cannot be 
based on the learner consciously grasping the idea (a Platonist meaning) behind the sen­
tence, for this would fall prey to the Regress Argument. It seems to me that Kripke’s 
emphasis on (later) Wittgenstein’s rejection o f truth-conditional semantics suggests that 
in his view we cannot describe independently existing (in terms o f Part I) conditions that 
would unambiguously dictate whether the learner has grasped the meaning.
The best we can do, Kripke thinks, is to see whether we find her use o f the sen­
tence acceptable. If we do, we should be willing to treat her as someone who under­
stands the sentence, i.e., assign her a certain status and allow her to participate in the 
practice of using the sentence. Crucially -  and this is the radical core o f Kripke’s argu­
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ment -  if  we recognise her usage as acceptable, this is not evidence for any practice- 
independent fact that she indeed understands the meaning. Rather, this kind o f social 
recognition of her competence to participate in language games is what understanding a 
meaning consists in.
Thus, Kripke writes, “Wittgenstein’s sceptical solution concedes to the sceptic 
that no ‘truth conditions’ or ‘corresponding facts’ in the world exist that make a state­
ment like ‘Jones, like many o f us, means addition by *+” true. Rather we should look at 
how such assertions are used” (Kripke 1982, 86). The meaning o f the assertion is its 
normatively defined place in our language games. Its meaning is given by the condi­
tions of its appropriate assertability, and the rule-following considerations guide us to 
see that the answer to this question cannot state a brute fact. The answer -  and therefore 
the theory of meaning avoiding the sceptical conclusion -  must be an essentially norma­
tive judgement.
According to Kripke (1982, 74 ff.), this changes the way in which we should ap­
proach intentional phenomena. To know the meaning o f a sentence is to be able to use it 
appropriately. This is of course very close to the view of von Wright and Davidson 
(III. 1) who thought that the meaning o f a judgement is constituted by the norms govern­
ing the appropriate use o f the judgement, i.e., normatively defined role in a language 
game that specifies when one is allowed to form the judgement and what follows from 
it. The main difference between Kripke and von Wright/Davidson is that, contrary to 
what the rule-following considerations might seem to imply, von Wright and Davidson 
insist that even a rule-governed use o f a single judgement (not to mention a single word) 
cannot be enough for the judgement (or word) to have conceptual content. Content re­
quires that not only is the use of the judgement rule-governed, but also the rational rela­
tions between several judgements must be rule-governed. This is the aspect o f the 
Quinean meaning holism in von Wright and Davidson’s view. I think the point is easy 
to understand by looking at an example by Brandom (who also accepts the view):
You do not convey to me the content of the concept gleeb by supplying me with 
an infallible gleebness tester that lights up when and only when exposed to gleeb 
things. I would in that case know what things were gleeb, without knowing what 
I was saying about them when I called them that, what I found out about them or 
committed myself to.
(Brandom 1994, 122.)
Mastery o f assertability conditions does not suffice for conceptual content. 
Rather, we understand the meaning o f  a judgement when we recognise (in practice) in 
which situations we are entitled to endorse it and what other judgements (including
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meaningful actions) we become entitled and committed to if we endorse it, and what 
other judgements are excluded by endorsing the judgement we are contemplating. Thus, 
it is a mistake to see the Wittgensteinian slogan that meaning is use as a commitment to 
behaviourism (cf. Williams 1999, 242, Stoutland 1988). As Brandom explains, the 
Wittgensteinian normative practice view implies a crucial difference between “a spec­
trophotometer [...] hooked up to a tape recorder in such a way that it produces a noise 
o f the acoustic type ‘That is red’ when and only when it is irradiated with light o f the 
proper frequency” and “a fanatical human red-reporter nearby [...] [with] just the same 
responsive dispositions to produce those noises” (Brandom 1994, 88).
The machine simply reacts to the input in accordance with its dispositions. For 
the human, on the other hand, the dispositional story is not the whole story. To the ex­
tent that she is capable of contentful thoughts and language, her emitting the noise 
counts as a commitment that (normatively) brings with it other commitments and ex­
cludes still some others -  and it is precisely such normative (logical) connections that 
make the noise a contentful judgement and not a mere series o f sounds. Part o f the 
meaning o f the judgement “That is red” is that by endorsing the judgement one is com­
mitted to holding that the object in question is colourful, that it is not green etc. Simi­
larly, endorsing the judgement may commit one to certain actions (if, for example, one 
has previously become committed to red-related desires). These normative relations 
give the judgement its conceptual content (Brandom 2000, 48).
The Quinean meaning holism at the centre o f the view o f Brandom, von Wright 
and Davidson already presupposes that we are able to follow rules, i.e., that there is a 
solution to Kripke’s problem. Thus the rule-following considerations add to the mean­
ing holism (i) a further argument as to why purely causal (dispositional) solution cannot 
suffice for meaning and (ii) a requirement o f also social holism. Or so I argue.
However, the topic of this study is not the Quinean holism (although I return to 
it in Appendix). Rather, for the present purposes it suffices to see that the fundamental 
Kripkean practice theory of meaning that I defend does not take representation or corre­
spondence to facts to be a primitive semantic notion. That role is reserved for a position 
in a normative linguistic practice. This is often referred to as Wittgenstein’s replacement 
o f  his earlier representational and descriptive picture theory o f language with his later 
view o f seeing language as normative practice.148 This view is both controversial and
148 As I argue below (especially in Appendix), this -  pace , e.g., Rorty (1979) -  should not be seen to im­
ply that representation and truth conditions are not important. They are. The claim is rather that they are 
not primitive: representation and truth conditions are to be explained in terms o f  a normative, linguistic 
practice and not vice versa.
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complex: I hope the rest of my dissertation offers an explanation o f what this view 
really amounts to in the case o f meaningful actions (including not only speech acts but 
all intentional actions).
First o f all, it is important to notice that at precisely this point Kripke begins to 
build a social element into his theory of meaning. Although we need some kind o f dis­
positional solution that provides the blindness required for the Infinity Problem, the 
practice within which an assertion can be meaningful must be a social practice, for only 
the social element can give a normative standard of correctness to the assertions o f indi­
viduals (Kripke 1982, 88). This, Kripke suggests, is what also Wittgenstein had in mind 
in Philosophical Investigations:
[T]here is a way o f grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is 
exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual 
cases.
(Wittgenstein 1953, §201.)
And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule 
is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise 
thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it. 
(Wittgenstein 1953, §202.)
In my view Kripke’s social theory o f normative semantics is basically correct. Unfortu­
nately, it is not at all clear what, exactly, the theory is. In the next Chapter and Appen­
dix I give my own argument as to what the best way o f explicating the view is. How­
ever, to motivate that argument we need to see why a popular reading, which I call the 
naive communitarian view, cannot be an acceptable reading o f Kripke.
In short, according to the naive communitarian view, Kripke holds that individu­
als just do what comes naturally to them (and thus bypass the Infinity Problem), and 
then compare their individual applications o f  a rule to the applications o f the members 
o f their linguistic community. The normative element is brought into the picture by this 
comparison. An application (a judgement) is correct if it agrees with the applications o f 
the members o f the community, and it is incorrect if it differs from the communal use.
This, however, is not what Kripke has in mind. We saw before that Kripke 
(1982, 111) very explicitly rejects all theories (social or otherwise) that try to describe 
truth-conditions for attributions of meaning. Wittgenstein’s message is that we must 
look for practical assertability conditions, not factual truth conditions.
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The naive communitarian view was, it seems to me, held in the early 1980s by, 
for example, Crispin Wright (1981) and Christopher Peacocke (1981).149 Here is how 
Wright formulates the view:
None o f us unilaterally can make sense o f  the idea o f  correct employment o f 
language save by reference to the authority o f securable communal assent on the 
matter; and for the community itself there is no authority, so no standard to 
meet. [...] we shall reject the idea that [...] a community goes right or wrong in 
accepting a particular verdict on a decidable question; rather, it just goes.
(Wright 1981, 105-106.)
In this picture the communal practice is neither constrained by any facts about meaning 
nor is it subject to any kind o f rational criticism, because it itself is the ultimate con­
stituent o f meaning and rationality.150
My view is that this approach is on the right track. Whatever solution to the 
problem of rule-following is to be accepted, the solution must be able to accommodate 
the dispositional solution to the Infinity Problem. However, also the Normativity Prob­
lem must be taken into account, and I think Kripke and others are right to think that this 
requires the theory to be essentially social.151 The 1981 naive communitarianism o f 
Peacocke and Wright is nonetheless unacceptable for at least two reasons.
Not surprisingly, the first reason why the naive communitarian view fails is that 
it subscribes to the crude summative view o f collective acceptance and (linguistic) 
groups that was criticised and rejected in Part I o f this study. As was argued in detail
149 Some formulations o f the meaning finitism o f the Edinburgh School, e.g., Bloor (1983) and Barnes, 
Bloor & Hendry (1996) appear to be committed to the naive communitarian view too. Below, however, I 
argue that at least Barnes (2000), Kusch (1999) and, perhaps, Bloor (1997) can be read as moving to­
wards a more acceptable position.
150 Recall that the reason why Collin and Niiniluoto (1.3) wanted to reject the kind o f theory o f  social facts 
I defend was precisely that they thought that when applied to language it implies the naive communitarian 
view. However, in this Chapter 1 reject the naive communitarian view, in the next I show that the com­
munitarian view that follows from my theory is very different from the naive version and finally Appen­
dix argues that my view o f social practices avoids the problems identified by Collin and Niiniluoto.
151 Baker and Hacker (1984), as well as, e.g., Haukioja (2000), Pettit (1993) and Tuomela (2002) think 
that the crucial point is that meanings are based on practices, and it is at most a contingent fact that the 
linguistic practices o f  social creatures such as humans happen to be social practices. I, however, think 
that, e.g., Barnes (2000), Bloor (1997), Brandom (1994), Esfeld (2001), Haugeland (1990), Kripke (1982) 
and Kusch (1999) are right in thinking that the Normativity Problem shows that the practices must be 
social. We need an external standard o f  correctness, and only a social aspect can deliver it in a way that 
does not run into either the Infinity or the Normativity Problem all over again. It seems to me that the 
main motivation for the non-social view is Blackburn’s (1984) claim that whatever a social dimension can 
deliver, the same can be achieved by letting the different time-slices o f one individual to play the role the 
different individuals play in the social picture. 1 have already argued against this kind o f  view in Part II, 
and I think that in the present context it is even clearer that this cannot work. There is no interaction be­
tween the time-slices and hence the correct and the factual are always equated -  in which case normativ­
ity is in fact lost (see Esfeld 2001, 89-91 for a similar argument and Kusch 2002, 181 ff. for a detailed 
classification o f  the degrees o f  communitarianism and a criticism o f the intuitive arguments for the non­
social view). Admittedly Blackburn’s argument may apply to the naive communitarian view which, as I 
explain below, is essentially individualistic and thus privileges an individual’s perspective in the same 
way as Blackburn’s time-slice view privileges the present time-slice.
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there (1.1.5 and, in particular, 1.2.3), summative accounts cannot capture the foundations 
o f human sociality. In the present context, the summative identification o f correctness 
with a generalisation about what the others typically do contuses performance with cor­
rectness just as much as the individualist dispositional view does (Kripke 1982, 111). 
This is how Paul A. Boghossian voices this objection:
The community [...] will be disposed to call both horses and deceptively horsey 
looking cows on dark nights ‘horse’. [...] The communitarian, however, cannot 
call them [i.e., applications o f ‘horse’ to sufficiently horsey looking cows] mis­
takes, for they are the community’s dispositions. He must insist, then, firm con­
viction to the contrary notwithstanding, that ‘horse’ means not horse but, rather, 
horse or cow.
(Boghossian 1989, 173.)
The naTve communitarianism would imply a view according to which the community is 
infallible, and as Boghossian insists, this is hardly plausible (cf. 1.3).
Moreover, the naTve communitarian view is not Wittgenstein’s view: “From its 
seeming to me -  or to everyone -  to be so, it doesn’t follow that it is so” (Wittgenstein 
1969, §2; see also 1953, §241). Or as Williams puts this, “[a]n empirical generalization 
about what most people do is not the same as a norm standing for what people ought to 
do” (Williams 1999, 165; see also Baker & Hacker 1984, 71). To put this in Kripke’s 
(1982) terminology, the infallibility of the community, which amounts to an intolerable 
form o f cultural relativism (cf. Appendix), is due to the naive communitarian view’s 
commitment to a truth-conditional or fact-based (the fact being the generalisation) view 
o f meaning attributions. An acceptable version o f communitarian semantics must not 
imply “that the answer everyone gives to an addition problem [Kripke’s main example 
o f rule-following] is, by definition, the correct one” (Kripke 1982, 112).
Since in what follows I defend an essentially Kripkean, social theory of seman­
tics, I must be able to demonstrate that Kripke is right in thinking that the rejection o f 
fact-based accounts of rule-following allows us to resist the strong relativism o f the na­
Tve communitarian view. This is done in Appendix. As can be anticipated, the remedy I 
favour is the one used in Part I to develop an account of social groups and social action 
that overcomes the problems o f the summative view. Normativity, I argue, cannot be 
assimilated with a statistical notion. Normativity comes from collective acceptance, 
which, as I argued in Part I, is not a summative (statistical) notion at all.
The second reason why the naTve communitarian approach fails is perhaps con­
ceptually more interesting. Recall that the core o f the Regress Argument is that to un­
derstand a meaning cannot be based on an interpretation o f a rule external to the prac-
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tice o f following the rule. In the naive communitarian picture, however, we have the 
individual application on the one hand and the norm as a statistical generalisation on the 
other. As we saw Kripke emphasising, this is a programme doomed to failure. Meanings 
are based on normative practices, not on non-normative representations and facts. Put 
differently, the naive communitarian view accounts for applications of a rule in terms o f 
the rule “an application is correct if it agrees with the communal use, and it is incorrect 
if  it disagrees with the communal use”. To account for rule-following in terms o f rules 
is, of course, blatantly circular.
Thus, as Baker and Hacker (1984, 96) emphasise, to avoid the Regress Argu­
ment we must concede once and for all that the practice o f applying a rule and the rule 
itself cannot be separated from one another. In their terminology, the connection be­
tween them is internal and grammatical. If, as I have argued, both the Platonist proposal 
o f appealing to an external, universal idea that can be interpreted to determine meaning 
and the direct psychologism that builds on conscious interpretations o f signs lead to an 
infinite regress o f interpretations, surely the same regress follows regardless o f whether 
the object o f interpretation is a statistical generalisation, a sign or a Platonist idea. A 
generalisation can be a norm only if it is interpreted as one, and hence we are back 
where we started.152
To conclude this Chapter, let me explicate the position we have arrived at. First, 
we saw that to account for intentionality (including intentional action), we need to show 
how meanings, or contentful thoughts and mental states are possible in our naturalistic 
world. This requires us to formulate a theory o f meaning (or content) that succeeds in 
accommodating Conditions (1), (2) and (3). It seems clear that to avoid the Infinity 
Problem we need to replace (1) with (1*), i.e., to accept the animating thought o f the 
dispositional solution. But this very move seems to make Condition (3), the essential 
normativity o f meaning, inaccessible. John McDowell captures this dilemma well:
Wittgenstein’s problem is to steer a course between a Scylla and a Charybdis. 
Scylla is the idea that understanding is always interpretation. This idea is disas­
trous because embracing it confronts us with the dilemma o f §4 above [i.e., what 
I have called the Infinity Problem, the Regress Argument or simply the mutual 
incompatibility o f (1) and (2)] [...]. We can avoid Scylla by stressing that, say, 
calling something ‘green’ can be like crying ‘Help!’ when one is drowning -  
simply how one has learned to react to this situation [i.e., the dispositional solu­
152 It is o f no help to say that the Regress Argument was raised by the Infinity Problem, and the naive 
communitarian view appeals to dispositions in that context, and to interpretations only in the context o f  
the Normativity Problem. Surely any application agrees with the communal practice on some interpreta­
tion, and hence the naive communitarian view has only managed to raise the Regress Argument also in 
the context o f  the Normativity Problem.
225
tion of replacing (1) with (1*)]. But then we risk steering on to Charybdis -  the 
picture o f a basic level at which there are no norms; if we embrace that, [...] 
then we cannot prevent meaning from coming to seem an illusion.
(McDowell 1998a, 242.)
Moreover, we have seen that the attempt to avoid the dilemma in terms o f the 
naive communitarian solution serves only to make things worse. It leads to unacceptable 
relativism and, further, re-invokes the Regress Argument in another context. However, 
just as we need to keep the core of the dispositional solution on board, I think we need 
to remain faithful also to the key insight o f the communitarian view, namely that the 
solution must be essentially social, since only interaction between an individual and her 
community can give rise to the required normativity in a way that is able to defeat the
1 SItwo problems of rule-following and deliver objective meanings (III.4).
Again, McDowell is on the right track.
The [...] key to finding the indispensable middle course is the idea o f a custom 
or practice. How can a performance both be nothing but a ‘blind’ reaction to a 
situation, not an attempt to act on an interpretation (avoiding Scylla); and be a 
case of going by a rule (avoiding Charybdis)? The answer is: by belonging to a 
custom [...], practice [...], or institution [...].
(McDowell 1998a, 242.)
What I have claimed might be put like this: Wittgenstein’s point is that we have 
to situate our conception of meaning and understanding within a framework o f 
communal practices.
(McDowell 1998a, 243.)
As Williams (1999, 168-169) explains, what is needed is a social solution where the re­
lation between an individual application and the communal practice is not based on in­
terpretation. Rather, we need a view that allows a practical agreement o f the community 
to be displayed in the behaviour of individuals (Williams 1999, 175-177). As Wittgen­
stein puts it, “[t]o use a word without justification [i.e., blindly] does not mean to use it 
without right [i.e., non-normatively]” (Wittgenstein 1953, §289).
In other words, I think Kripke, McDowell and Williams are absolutely correct in 
thinking that intentionality and meaning must, ultimately, be based on our bedrock rule- 
following practices that are essentially both social (making room for normativity) and 
blind (avoiding the Regress Argument). The problem is that Williams has nothing pre­
cise to say concerning what such bedrock practices could be like. She can explain what
153 Note that this conviction reflects straightforwardly the argumentation in Part 1, where I argued that 
social institutions, which are ultimately norms o f  appropriate behaviour, must be assumed to be collec­
tively upheld in order to secure the epistemic objectivity o f the norms in question.
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the bedrock practices must deliver, but she cannot say how they do it. In particular, she 
does not explain why the emphasis on sociality solves the Normativity Problem.
McDowell has similar problems. Also he knows what is required, but he does 
not know how to answer to this requirement. When explaining the nature o f the bedrock 
practices he, like Williams, repeatedly falls back on vague illustrations and metaphors, 
such as his statement that “a linguistic community is conceived as bound together [...] 
by a capacity for a meeting of minds” (McDowell 1998a, 253). McDowell is well aware 
that the naive communitarian solution is unacceptable and that he does not really offer 
an alternative way of thinking about social bedrock practices. However, McDowell 
thinks that this is inevitable and, to support this, he asks us to recall what Wittgenstein 
says about the bedrock rule-following practices.
“How am I able to obey a rule?” -  If  this is not a question about causes, then it is 
about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do.
If  I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is 
turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.”
(Wittgenstein 1953, §217.)
McDowell thinks that Wittgenstein is telling us that we should not even try to 
dig below the bedrock. Accordingly, McDowell concludes that we have to treat social 
bedrock practices as primitive constituents o f the human form of life that cannot be ana­
lysed further, since all rational discussion already presupposes them. Thus McDowell’s 
position is that o f quietism. As agents we cannot deny the reality of meaning and inten­
tionality (since to hold any view, including the view that there are no meanings, presup­
poses meanings), and the rule-following arguments show that they presuppose social 
bedrock practices that are both normative and blind. Hence we must assume the exis­
tence o f such practices even if we cannot say anything more about them.
However, I fail to see how this position is any more acceptable than the naive 
communitarian view. After all, McDowell simply holds that an acceptable solution pre­
supposes something about which we can say nothing whatsoever. I think Haukioja’s 
criticism o f McDowell captures this accurately:
The important question that remains is: how does a practice give rise to mean­
ing? [...] we need to know how shared membership in a community equips us to 
make our minds available to one another, how shared command o f a language 
equips us to know one another’s meaning without interpretation. To say that it 
just does so equip us is really only to say that we just do not know how it does 
so.
(Haukioja 2000, 52.)
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Unfortunately, McDowell gives no answers to Haukioja’s important questions. Thus it 
seems to me that “social bedrock practices”, as McDowell and Williams use the expres­
sion, is at risk of turning into the kind o f empty phrase which in fact explains nothing 
whatsoever and which Wittgenstein called a philosophical superlative. “You have no 
model o f this superlative fact, but you are seduced into using a super-expression. (It 
might be called a philosophical superlative.)” (Wittgenstein 1953, §198.)154 Hence, if 
the choice between the quietism of McDowell and Williams, the naive communitarian 
view and the sceptical conclusion really is the last word on intentionality and meaning, 
the chances of the intentionalist programme certainly do not look good. In fact the es­
sence o f social science, the study o f meaningful behaviour, is at risk.
The rule-following considerations show that the causalist approach, which ac­
counts for contentful mental states in terms o f their causal role, cannot be sufficient (be­
cause o f the Normativity Problem). In III.2 I argued that -  Davidson’s criticisms not­
withstanding -  non-causal, normative view remains a viable option to causalism. Now, 
however, it seems that the non-causalist is running into other problems. In particular, in 
line with McDowell’s quietism the non-causalist appears to be compelled to assume that 
the required normativity is created by social bedrock practices, even if we cannot tell 
how. Perhaps we must simply accept as given that human action, thought and all other 
meaningful activities just include both a non-normative blind element and a normative 
element. Maybe this kind of unanalysable dualism of the normative on the one hand and 
the non-normative on the other is not as unacceptable as full-blown Cartesian mind- 
body dualism, but still it would heavily undermine the general naturalism that I have 
advocated throughout my dissertation.
Fortunately, however, the theories developed in Parts I and II o f this study show 
the way towards an account required for an acceptable solution to the problem of rule- 
following. The solution is not to discard completely the dualism o f the normative and 
the non-normative, for in order to save intentional agency an irreducible space o f rea­
sons (the Kantian Kingdom of Ends155) is required. Thus our goal must be to understand
154 To appeal to Wittgenstein when criticising McDowell’s quietism is o f course risky in the sense that 
McDowell (especially 1994) thinks that proper understanding o f  Wittgenstein amounts to understanding 
that questions such as Haukioja’s miss the point fundamentally and thus do not deserve any other answer 
than “a shrug o f the shoulders” (McDowell 1994, 178). Although McDowell’s view may be justified as 
an explication o f how Wittgenstein in fact thought, my aim in what follows is to show that a view that 
both acknowledges McDowell’s achievements and answers to Haukioja can be constructed.
155 Thus I subscribe to the Kantian idea that human agency can be acknowledged only if  we admit that 
qua agents we are not inhabitants o f  the empirical world (Sellars’ logical space o f causation and the natu­
ral sciences) but the Kingdom o f Ends (Sellars’ logical space o f normative reasons). My view is nonethe­
less essentially anti-Kantian in the sense that in this Chapter I have argued that the rule-following consid­
erations demonstrate that the Kingdom o f  Ends cannot be understood in terms o f  universal, Platonist
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how such a space is constructed and maintained within social practices without reducing 
the space into non-normative notions. An acceptable theory o f meaning must be essen­
tially normative. In other words, we need as much dualism as we can have within gen­
eral naturalism, and this requires a social theory o f rule-following with an intersubjec- 
tive notion o f normativity. We have to accept naturalised methodological holism.
principles that we reach via reason and interpretation (because o f  the Regress Argument). Such a view  
renders agency just as impossible as dispositional causalism does. In the following Chapters I seek to 
replace the Kantian noumenal principles with blindly (implicitly) normative social practices. One could 
say that the Kantian aspect o f my argumentation corresponds to what Rorty has identified as the need for 
analytic philosophy to move from its Cartesian phase to a Kantian phase and the anti-Kantian aspect to 
Rorty’s insistence that analytic philosophy ought not to halt at the Kantian phase but to move on to Hegel 
and Wittgenstein’s philosophy in the sense o f  preferring historical practices to the timeless principles o f  
Kant and Plato (see Brandom 2002 for a similar line o f  thought). In fact, I think the so-called continental 
tradition in contemporary philosophy has been much more able to appreciate the socio-historical nature o f  
the principles o f  rationality than the Anglo-American analytic tradition, which has all too often seen the 
naturalistic anti-Platonism as a form o f  objectionable relativism (see Appendix).
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CHAPTER III.4: 
DIGGING BELOW THE BEDROCK
III.4.1 INTRODUCTION
David Bloor (1997, 64-65) argues that Kripke’s conclusion that all fact-based theories 
o f meaning are bound to fail is seriously unfounded. The failure o f theories based on 
psychological, Platonist or dispositionalist (causal) facts leaves room for a fact-based 
theory that builds on an essentially social fact, when social facts are understood as 
something different from mere aggregations o f facts about individuals (Part I).
I think this disagreement between Bloor and Kripke is largely based on a misun­
derstanding. In particular, what seems to be at stake is confusion concerning what, ex­
actly, the sceptical conclusion is. Bloor appears to read it as the claim that in Kripke’s 
view objective meanings are impossible, full stop. If this is Kripke’s sceptical conclu­
sion, then Bloor’s plea for social facts seems justified. Part 1 argued that there is a class 
o f social facts that are essentially different from individual facts and their aggregations 
(thus, this is not dispositionalism or psychologism) such that these facts are, despite 
their ontological dependence on individuals taken collectively (thus, this is not Platon­
ism), epistemically fully objective and external to all individuals taken singly. There­
fore, it seems, pace Kripke’s insistence on the impossibility o f fact-based accounts o f 
meaning, that a possibility of a theory building on social facts remains, for Kripke does 
not appear to acknowledge this class o f facts.
However, this is not what Kripke means by a sceptical conclusion (III.3.3). His 
sceptical conclusion holds that a fact-based account in the sense of an account building 
on non-normative features cannot succeed. However, he thinks that objective meanings 
are real. This implies in Kripke’s view that an acceptable theory of meaning must build 
on collective practices governing appropriate behaviour. However, as we saw in Part I, 
this is exactly what social facts ultimately amount to. Thus, I conclude, to give a fact- 
based account o f meaning in Bloor’s sense, i.e., an account building on truly social 
facts, is to explicate precisely the kind o f social, normative practice theory o f meaning 
that Kripke argues to be our only hope for a theory o f meaning that avoids the sceptical 
conclusion. The aim o f this Chapter is to provide such a theory.
The animating thought behind the theory I present is that that a satisfactory solu­
tion o f the rule-following problem must be essentially social. The social aspect is re­
quired for addressing successfully the Normativity Problem: a rule-follower needs an
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external, objective standard to differentiate between performance and correctness. But 
the standard can be neither a fact (be it social or Platonist) in need o f interpretation nor a 
mere cause affecting the follower’s behaviour with no room for normativity. The stan­
dard must be such that it assesses an individual’s solution as correct or incorrect without 
appealing to interpretation. The argument I shall give is that the only way o f fully ap­
preciating this is to see rule-following essentially as a social practice.
Before I proceed to my argumentation I need to bring in a caveat. I o f course 
have not analysed each and every particular attempt to resolve the rule-following prob­
lem in a non-communitarian way, for this dissertation is not the right place for that (cf. 
Kusch 2006 that does a pretty good job in this respect). Instead, 1 have tried to show at a 
more general level why any view that subscribes to psychologism, Platonism, naive 
communitarianism or purely causal dispositionalism is bound to fail to account for ei­
ther the Infinity Problem or the Normativity Problem o f rule-following. Moreover, in 
this Chapter I show that a more sophisticated form o f communitarianism can triumph 
over such problems. However, it is conceivable that one day a profoundly new kind o f 
(i.e., such that we cannot at the moment envisage it at all) non-social solution to the 
rule-following problem may nonetheless be developed. Thus, although I have argued 
that the essential features o f the rule-following problem I have analysed make non­
social theories unsuitable for solving the problem, perhaps there are possible ways o f 
resolving the problem that are different from mine, although 1 cannot imagine what they 
would be like.156
However, this small, unavoidable disclaimer should not be seen to undermine 
the importance of this Chapter too much. Recall that the main aim o f this and the pre­
ceding Chapter is to provide a positive argument for the normative view o f agency and 
mental realism after the negative arguments of III. 1 and 111.2, and not to do general phi­
losophy o f language. In particular, my aim is to use the social solution to the rule-
,56 Cf. Kusch (2006, 182), who argues that all arguments in favour o f the social solution must be open in 
this way and, thus, since the equation o f performance with correctness closes the door for non-social but 
non-fact-based theories o f rule-following, “[t]he strongest conclusion to be drawn is that given currently 
available versions o f meaning determinism [fact-based theories in my terminology, be they private as in 
dispositionalism or social as in the naive communitarian view], private rule-following is impossible” and 
the only option we have left is the view defended in this Chapter, i.e., the combination o f  communitarian­
ism and the rejection o f  fact-based views. However, although my conclusion must remain open in this 
sense, I should add that my argument is nonetheless stronger than what Kusch (2006, Ch. 6) calls “the 
official road to intersubjectivity” that builds on analyses o f factually existing rule-following practices and 
thus has a problem in making the inference from contingent facts o f  what particular rule-following prac­
tices are like to modal claims o f  what all rule-following practices must be like. By analysing the essential 
features o f  the problem (rather than particular practices and examples) I have taken Kusch’s “improved 
road to intersubjectivity” and hence possible views that challenge my conclusion cannot simply offer a 
new analysis o f  contingent practices or disconnected examples; rather, they must answer my philosophi­
cal arguments (cf. Kusch 2006, 183).
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following problem -  or rather, my reconstruction o f the strongest possible version o f it 
(III.4.2 & III.4.3) -  to provide a constructivist account o f the framework o f intentional 
agency and to show how this account not only favours the normative view (III.5.1) but 
also provides a novel way to understand the foundations o f the theory o f collective in- 
tentionality (III.5.2) and, finally, how the social solution ties together the different 
themes o f this dissertation (III.5.3).
Those who think that my argument is not able to establish the correctness o f the 
social solution beyond all reasonable doubt are welcome to think of this Chapter as pro­
viding (i) a novel, positive angle to the debate between causal naturalism and interpre­
tive understanding that was found to be so badly needed by presenting (ii) a strongest 
possible version o f the social solution to the problem o f rule-following and (iii) an ex­
amination o f what implications that solution, if correct, has for the philosophical foun­
dations o f the human sciences in general and the theory o f collective intentionality in 
particular. As said, however, I think that by constructing a view that combines the dis­
positional solution to the Infinity Problem with a social solution to the Normativity 
Problem the argument provided is as strong a defence o f the social solution to the prob­
lem of rule-following as one can hope for.
III.4.2 THE INDISPENSABILITY OF COLLECTIVE AGENCY
My claim is that the problem of rule-following cannot be solved unless we adopt the 
anti-individualistic view defended in Parts I and II o f this study. Recall that I argued 
that we must accept we-mode behaviour as a primitive form o f behaviour and, more­
over, that certain biological (causal) dispositions that are vital for social action are es­
sentially group-level behaviours (and group-level adaptations) and thus, in a manner o f 
speaking, dispositions o f a group rather than of individuals. In this Chapter I argue that 
these notions allow us to defend an account o f rule-following practices that portrays the 
practices primarily as social practices such that, first, the practices are blind (the Infinity 
Problem) and, second, the individual applications the practices consists in are derived 
from the group-level framing of the situation (the Normativity Problem).
I mentioned that this kind o f view is suggested by Bloor. However, my argu­
mentation moves immediately beyond Bloor’s framework, since Bloor (1997, 17) ap­
pears to think that the required social practices are based on monitoring, controlling and 
sanctioning o f others. Part II argued against attempts to account for truly social action 
and practices in terms o f sanctions, at least insofar as sanctioning is understood as indi­
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vidual-mode action. The relevant practices must be practices o f a group in a stronger 
sense than the sum of individual practices. In short, the practices cannot be based on 
individual-mode action. A plural subject consisting o f agents behaving in the collective 
we-mode is required.
However, since we are talking about the bedrock practices that make rule- 
following, and thus meaning and intentionality, possible, the notion o f the we-mode ap­
plicable here cannot be that of full-blown collective intentionality, for that would again 
beg the question. This is the main reason why I cannot be satisfied with Bloor’s ac­
count:157 As Kusch (2004) points out, Bloor (1997) uses intentional language in his 
characterisations o f the constituents of rule-following practices, and thus Bloor is guilty 
o f this kind of circularity.158 We must be absolutely clear that individuals capable o f 
rule-following (and thus, ultimately, intentionality, meaning and action) possess pre- 
intentional (or sub-personal) social dispositions to constitute social practices already at 
the non-intentional (causal) level. Such individuals must have social dispositions to co­
operate and harmonise their behaviours with other individuals. And all this must be 
done blindly, i.e., in virtue of pre-intentional dispositions. However, the Normativity 
Problem prevents us from identifying rules with such dispositions. They are necessary 
but insufficient.
These theoretical considerations are compatible with our ejnpirical understand­
ing of the innate mechanisms that play a crucial role in human language acquisition.159 
Human babies share many inborn dispositions with the great apes such as chimpanzees. 
For example, both are capable o f adopting new patterns o f behaviour on the basis o f ex­
amples. However, empirical studies have established that pre-Iinguistic infants, unlike 
chimpanzees, are disposed to react appropriately to purely co-operative, communicative 
gestures, such as simply showing something or pointing something out. Chimpanzees, 
in contrast, recognize agentive gestures only in a competitive setting. Humans, unlike 
Chimpanzees, appear to be intrinsically disposed to co-operatively harmonise their be­
haviour with others as opposed to merely interacting with others. Accordingly, as long 
as the interaction involves co-operation and collaboration, human infants, unlike more
157 Indeed, in my view Bloor’s theory cannot be fully satisfactory, for it is closely connected to Bloor’s 
treatment o f  intentional explanations as causal explanations and Bloor’s reductivist view o f  meaning. As I 
have explained, I cannot accept these claims; normativity must remain in a central role.
158 The circularity is especially clear in Bloor (2001). Although Kusch (1999 & 2004) is very clear about 
the importance o f avoiding such circularity, it seems that some o f  his earlier works (especially 1997) may 
be guilty o f it too.
159 Discussions with Maija-Liisa Kakkuri-Knuuttila, who has applied the social theory o f  rule-following 
as defended in Saaristo (2004b) to empirical studies o f language acquisition (in her presentation at the 
annual conference o f  the Philosophical Society o f  Finland, January 2006), have been very helpful to me 
regarding these issues.
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economically inclined chimpanzees, are fascinated with games and other interactive 
situations that are pointless from the individually instrumentalist point o f view o f 
achieving a further end. Offering things to others for no further purpose is very charac­
teristic o f pre-linguistic infants learning to participate in social practices. This is some­
thing chimpanzees never do. (Hare & Tomasello 2004, Tomasello & Camaioni 1997, 
Tomasello 2004, Rakoczy & Tomasello 2006.) The characteristically human, intrinsic 
inclination towards co-ordination and social harmonisation of behavioural dispositions 
is, it will turn out, a crucial step from Sellars’ pattern governed behaviour to real rule- 
obeying action.
This sits very well with our understanding of the biological basis o f meaningful 
language. Dunbar (2002), for example, concludes that the exchange o f information 
could not have been the main factor in the evolution o f language, since large scale ex­
change o f information is possible only when we already have a well-developed lan­
guage. Evolution, however, is a gradual process, and benefits to be gained exclusively 
from full-blown language cannot explain the evolution o f less developed forms o f  lan­
guage. Hence, argues Dunbar, we have reason to believe that language evolved to con­
struct and maintain social bonds between individuals and to promote group cohesion. If 
this is the case, no wonder meaningful language is based on social, co-operative disposi­
tions.
Similarly, Snowdon (2002, 209) emphasises that the nature and evolution o f 
language cannot be understood if we do not focus on the social function o f language in 
creating and constructing social bonds between individuals.160 Further, Sterelny (2003) 
argues that co-operation (and indeed group selection -  recall Part II) has been a crucial 
factor in the evolution o f human cognition. Although I argue (III.5.3) that the tendency 
o f the evolutionists to interpret their studies as confirming the view o f the human brain 
as intrinsically meaningful and capable o f representations is heavily confused, I think 
that as such their results lend strong support to my theoretical arguments.
To introduce this perspective to the present philosophical discussion I follow 
Barry Barnes’ (2000) terminology and say that individuals capable for social rule- 
following must exhibit collective agency (cf. 112). Barnes acknowledges the Wittgen- 
steinian point that under some interpretation any way o f continuing a sequence o f ex­
amples can be made consistent with the sequence. There is nothing in the sequence it­
self -  or indeed in any explicit formulation o f a rule -  that would determine the correct
160 Correspondingly, sociologists studyind dialogues have argued forcefully that in verbal communication 
the conveyance o f  prepositional contents is only a small part o f the ongoing activity: what is really at 
stake is the construction o f a social bond that promotes co-operation (e.g., Scheff 1990).
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extension. However, if one simply does what strikes one as the natural way to proceed, 
the crucial distinction between correctness and actual performance is lost (III.3).
Thus, Barnes (2000, 54) argues, the extension o f a sequence can be said to be 
correct only if  the relevant community agrees tacitly in practice on which way to con­
tinue the sequence counts as correct. The agreement must be collectively sustained such 
that the members of the collective seek actively to harmonise their respective individual 
dispositions to extend the sequence. Such a process creates, Barnes thinks, a shared 
sense of what is the right way by ordering the “[d]i verse individual inclinations in the 
[...] application of rules [...] into a coherent collective practice” (Barnes 2000, 54).
Moreover, Barnes is very explicit on the requirement that the agreement in ques­
tion, and the process o f seeking to harmonise the individual dispositions, cannot be un­
derstood as deliberative processes that already presuppose intentional states and actions, 
for that would beg the question. Thus, says Barnes, “[s]ocial agents are necessary here, 
agents with a prior non-rational [pre-intentional] inclination toward agreement and co­
ordination, agents who by virtue o f this inclination possess collective agency” (Barnes 
2000, 56). This leads to Barnes* notion of the fundamentally collective agency (and, o f 
course, also the core o f Barnes’ argument against seeing rational choice theory as capa­
ble of explaining fundamental sociality -  recall 1.1.5): Intentional individual agency 
presupposes that agents are highly social in the sense o f non-consciously seeking to 
harmonise their individual dispositions at the pre-intentional level. In this sense the so­
cial is prior to the psychological. This, I think, gives exactly what we need without 
building circularly on intentional notions. The task, then, is to make the notion o f col­
lective agency more precise.
An interesting attempt for such an explication is given by Esfeld (1999, 2001), 
Haugeland (1990), Haukioja (2000), Kusch (1999) and Pettit (1993, 2002). Their central 
idea is that to explain rule-following we must assume that individuals are equipped with 
two kinds o f dispositions. First, they have the familiar first-order disposition to continue 
a sequence in a certain way. This is argued to solve the Infinity Problem. Second, indi­
viduals are assumed to have second-order dispositions to monitor the first-order dispo­
sitions and to make them match the first-order dispositions o f  others. These second- 
order dispositions are understood as exactly the kind o f dispositions towards co­
ordination and synchronisation that Barnes talks about.
Kusch, to use his argumentation as an example, thinks that this line o f thought 
can be articulated by stating that the problem of rule-following shows that individuals 
must be assumed to be equipped with an imitation device, a sanctioning device and an
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adjustment device (Kusch 1999, 267-268, see also Esfeld 2001, 81 ff.). The imitation 
device is a disposition to seek to continue a sequence of examples (to classify things) in 
the same way as most others do. The sanctioning device is a disposition to (a) sanction 
those individuals who classify things differently from the collective practice and (b) 
sanction those individuals who fail to do (a). Finally, the adjustment device is a disposi­
tion to adjust the functioning of all three devices in accordance with the received sanc­
tioning from others. Note that these are all blind dispositions; interpretation does not 
enter the picture.
Kusch thinks that individuals who possess both the first-order disposition to con­
tinue a sequence blindly and the three devices required for collective synchronisation 
form a “proto-normative system”:
In such a system, the collective consensus and the process o f sanctioning con­
stantly shape and determine one another. The consensus sets the standard for the 
sanctioning, and the sanctioning protects and recreates the consensus. Neither 
phenomena can be reduced to the other without distorting the overall process. 
(Kusch 1999,270.)
Similarly to Sellars, Kusch concludes that although an isolated individual can engage in 
activities that may look like concept application (by simply continuing a sequence o f 
examples blindly on the basis of her internal first-order disposition), such a crude dispo­
sitional solution can never deliver meaningful classifications (concept applications), 
since, as we have seen (III.3), an isolated individual has no access to the normative 
standards o f correctness required for meaningful actions. Hence “[cjoncepts are ‘pos­
sessed’ primarily by normative systems of individuals, and they are possessed by indi­
viduals only in so far as they are parts o f such systems” (Kusch 1999, 270).161 Or, as 
Winch puts this, “all meaningful behaviour must be social, since it can be meaningful 
only if  governed by rules, and rules presuppose a social setting” (Winch 1958, 116; see 
also Williams 1999, 147 & 168 and Kripke 1982).
I think Kusch is essentially correct. His proto-normative system is a system that 
goes on blindly (solving the Infinity Problem), but since it is primarily the collective 
that possesses the rule, the collective sets (proto-)normative constraints on individual
161 In this matter Esfeld (1999,2001) and Haugeland (1990) agree with Kusch. Haukioja (2000) and Pettit 
(1993, 2002), on the other hand, defend a version o f  the second-order dispositional view according to 
which the second-order disposition does not have to be social -  in their view normativity emerges from 
the tension between the first-order disposition determining the applications and the second-order disposi­
tion monitoring the consistency o f  the applications (cf. Coates 1997), be the second-order disposition so­
cial or not. I think this cannot work. Without a standard exterior to the individual we cannot reach a solu­
tion that acknowledges the normative nature o f  meaning and intentionality: without a social aspect the 
Normativity Problem can never be solved, for in the non-social picture performance and correctness (o f 
the second-order disposition) remain equated.
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members o f the collective (solving the Normativity Problem). However, the norm con­
sists in the totality or blind functioning of the system. Rules, as Brandom’s (1994) slo­
gan has it, are implicit in social practices. We must not postulate an explicit rule (either 
a Platonist timeless truth or the generalisation o f the naive communitarian view) that 
would be in need o f interpretation (and would lead to the Regress Argument). Rather, 
the system embodies the norm (Kusch 1999, 268; Haugeland 1990, 405).
Hence to follow a rule is to participate in a social practice, not to learn to state 
explicitly what exactly the rule says (Williams 1999, 205). What matters is a rule- 
instantiating practice, not an explicit rule. O f course, when we have meanings and lan­
guage, we can seek to make explicit the rules that are ultimately implicit in our practices 
(and move from implicit proto-normativity to explicit normativity). This, however, is a 
task for linguists, logicians and other theorists; it is not relevant for laypeople or chil­
dren learning their first language, for they are learning to participate in social practices, 
not a set o f explicit rules.
However, it seems to me that Kusch’s (and Haugeland’s) way of describing the 
social aspect of rule-following may be somewhat misleading in the sense that they may 
appear as sharing Bloor’s implicit individualism. As Williams explains, “community 
agreement is constitutive o f practices, and that agreement must be displayed in action” 
(Williams 1999, 176), and thus “[w]hat Wittgenstein is really emphasising is not even 
defeasibility so much as our agreement as human beings. The very emphasis that com­
mentators have placed on corrective behavior is out of place.” (Williams 1999, 175). 
The problem is that the emphasis on corrections (sanctioning) gives still too individual­
istic (recall 11.3.1) a picture o f rule-following.162 We must find a way of understanding 
social practices so that the practice is indeed primarily social and not a result o f individ­
ual-mode corrective actions. “The point o f learning bedrock practices is to come to 
share the same sense o f the obvious” (Williams 1999, 180; my italics), not to learn to 
avoid sanctions.
Sharing the same sense o f the obvious is meant to capture the blindness of bed­
rock practices: bedrock practices can ground rule-following precisely because the social 
element o f sharing the same sense of the obvious that establishes normativity is direct 
and not based on more fundamental individual-mode considerations. To produce norma­
tivity, the social must somehow be prior to the individual applications. Although the
162 Moreover, Gliier and Wikforss (2006, 26), for example, argue that the emphasis on sanctions as cor­
rective actions -  something that can be done correctly or incorrectly -  leads to a regress that renders, e.g., 
Brandom’s account o f  rule-following unacceptable. It is important to notice that the present view does not 
imply such a regress: for Brandom (1994, 44) rule-following is “norms all the way down”, whereas I 
build explicitly on non-normative dispositions; on behaviour, not on actions.
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talk o f sanctions seems fit to capture proto-normativity, it is too individualistic for an 
account o f collective agency in Barnes’ sense.
III.4.3 SOCIAL PRACTICES AND IMPLICIT NORMATIVITY
In short, bedrock rule-following practices must correspond to the kind o f social behav­
iour I have analysed in detail in Part II in the context of the group-selection theory and 
the social identity approach in social psychology (and which was explicitly denied to be 
based on sanctioning but rather to provide sanctioning). Thus, although I think Kusch 
intends his three devices to capture this kind of strongly social behaviour, in my mind 
the best way to capture the requirements of bedrock rule-following practices is the the­
ory that was used to capture the core elements of strongly social behaviour in the earlier 
parts o f this study, i.e., the theory o f collective intentionality.
However, since we are here analysing (preconditions of) original intentionality, 
the account must be spelled out in strictly non-intentional terms. In the earlier parts, 
however, I have operated with Searle’s (1995) notion where the content o f an individual 
application as part of a collective task is deliberately derived from considerations at the 
collective level, or with Tuomela’s (2002, 26) notion of a razso/7-based we-intention 
where X  has a reason-based we-intention to participate in a social practice P  (where P  is 
a social action type such as following a rule) iff 
( \ )X  intends P
(ii) X  believes that everybody in the relevant collection of agents intends P
(iii) .Y believes that there is a mutual belief in the collection that everybody intends P
(iv) (i) at least partly because o f (ii) and (iii).
Searle’s and Tuomela’s accounts work well when we are analysing social insti­
tutions in a setting that already presupposes, as it were, the framework o f intentional 
agency. To apply Searle’s account for the present purposes, however, we must reject the 
notion o f consciously deriving the meaningful contents o f individual applications from 
collective-level considerations and replace this with blind framing o f the situation. 
Similarly, to apply Tuomela’s account the intentions and beliefs mentioned in the analy- 
sans must be interpreted in the non-propositional sense in which we attribute intentions 
and beliefs to non-linguistic animals and machines. Hence the account cannot be rea­
son-based but purely causal, and consequently the connection expressed by (iv) must be 
seen as a causal connection stating how the second-order social dispositions (ii) and (iii)
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monitoring the behaviour of others regulate the first-order disposition (i) to continue a 
sequence o f examples.
This reading o f Tuomela gives us the following, essentially social (normativity) 
and blind (infinity) account o f rule-following:
For any individual X  in a community C, T s  performance p  (an event-token) in a situa­
tion s (a unique situation) is rule-governed (by the rule “do P  in S”) in the proto-
normative sense iff
(i) X  is disposed to treat s as an instance of a situation-type S.
(ii) X is disposed to perform P  (an event-type) in S.
(iii) X  performs p  as an instance o f P.
(iv) The members of C share the dispositions (i) and (ii) and go along with (iii) (the
members treat -  tacit agreement in practice - p  as a token of P).
(v) (i) -  (iii) hold at least partly because o f (iv) (other causes include A”s individual, 
biological first-order dispositions).
As said, the causal mechanism in (v) is to be understood in terms of Barnes’ (2000, 56) 
notion o f “non-rational inclination toward agreement and co-ordination” which collec­
tive agency consists in and which creates “agreement in practice” (Barnes 2000, 54) and 
which Kusch seeks to explicate with his three devices. Moreover, the types S and P  are 
constituted by the dispositions and thus do not commit the analysis to the existence o f 
Platonist universals or anything similar. With these clarifications, the result is essen­
tially a pre-intentional version of my final explication o f Tuomela’s notion o f we- 
intentionality in 1.2.4.
Further, the dispositions are essentially social in the strong sense that although 
they are features o f individuals, their evolution requires group-level selection and, cor­
respondingly, the dispositions can be seen as instrumentally rational only when rational­
ity is understood as a collective-level concept. These notions were analysed in detail in 
the context o f the evolution o f social behaviours and collective intentionality in Part II.
As I explained above, this kind o f normativity and rule-following is normativity 
in practice. Rules and norms have their home in what is done rather than in what is said. 
Brandom (1994, 22, 100-101 & 206) and Winch (1958, 55-57) illustrate this by appeal­
ing to Lewis Carroll’s classic article “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles” (Carroll 
1895) in which Carroll famously argues that there is no non-circular way to justify the 
fundamental principles o f rationality (the case at hand is the conditional in logic) if  we
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insist on appealing to explicit rules. This is because, ultimately, the rules are implicit in 
our practices o f performing and accepting inferences. An appeal to an explicit rule -  to 
ground the practice on a fact -  would lead to the “insane and intolerable” sceptical con­
clusion.
Thus, explicit rules depend on tacit norms that are implicit in our practices. This 
applies to all rule-governed behaviour, be it applying a concept or drawing logical infer­
ences. As Carroll elegantly shows, we can formulate the logical rule o f the conditional 
because we already recognise certain inferences as valid in practice and not vice versa. 
In other words, the conditional qua an explicit rule is an explication of a conceptually 
prior implicit practice of treating certain inferences as acceptable. To think otherwise is 
to commit the interpretationist mistake and, consequently, fall prey to the Regress Ar­
gument. Moreover, the practice must be social, or it fails to resolve the Normativity 
Problem.
Thus, according to this view the normativity is created by identifying the rule 
with the practice of the whole collective (a proto-normative system) within which indi­
vidual applications are assessed. A peculiar implication of this view is that a proto- 
normative system is such that the distinction between correct and incorrect applications 
is available only for those participating in the practice, for to participate is to subject 
one’s applications to the assessment o f others. Looking from within the practice, there 
is normative rule-following instead of mere regularities o f behaviour. Since intentional­
ity, meaning and content presuppose rule-following, individuals can perform actions 
and have beliefs and intentions precisely to the extent that they participate in social, 
bedrock rule-following practices embodying implicit proprieties (Williams 1999, 242; 
Brandom 1994, 159). Or to put this in more fashionable terms, “[a]ll this entails that 
contents o f thought are socially constructed” (Tuomela 2002, 74).163 This, o f course, is 
methodological holism par excellence.
The Wittgensteinian account o f normative rule-following holds that the norma­
tive distinction between correct and incorrect application exists only relative to social 
practices and is therefore visible and significant only for those who participate in the 
bedrock practices. From the point o f view o f an external, detached observer,164 our most
1631 am not sure if  Tuomela would approve o f the way in which I see him agreeing with, among others, 
Brandom, Kusch, Williams and Winch. The theoretical background in the relevant Chapter 3 in Tuomela 
(2002) is, however, Sellars (1963) which, together with Wittgenstein (1953), is also the main source o f  
inspiration of, e.g., Brandom (1994).
164 Of course, in order to form contentful judgements, such an external observer would need to participate 
in some other social practices. According to the present view, an autonomous, non-social agent is a con­
ceptual impossibility.
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fundamental social bedrock practices consist o f nothing but workings o f interconnected 
and non-normative causal dispositions of non-independent individuals, evolved via 
group selection and generating regularities o f behaviour -  but no rules, for rules require 
participation in the bedrock practice (cf. Esfeld 2001, 88-89).
Needless to say, to aim for anything stronger would require us to derive “ought” 
from “is” in the strong metaphysical sense, which is not a plausible goal. The normativ­
ity in question must be intersubjective, tacit agreement in practice, not an unnaturalistic 
metaphysical sui generis quality. We must be content with a view that explains why cer­
tain things appear as normative for those participating in the rule-following practices 
constituting the human form o f life. This, I think, is the idea behind Wittgenstein fa­
mous declaration that “[i]f God had looked into our minds he would not have been able 
to see there whom we were speaking o f ’ (Wittgenstein 1953, p. 217).
In particular, physical brain cells per se cannot be about anything nor have pro- 
positional contents (the rejection o f the wonder tissue theory). As such they are simply 
physical objects governed by non-normative causal laws. They may contain meanings 
only if such a normative, meaningful status is assigned to them in social practices em­
bodying norms. Within social practices they can count as meaningful. And, as the Logi­
cal Connection Argument holds, the meanings and contents of mental states, actions etc. 
are made possible by normative proprieties relative to social bedrock practices. To at­
tribute an intentional state or action to someone is to attribute her a normative status 
(Brandom 1994, 16-17). Such status receives its content by being rationally (norma- 
tively) connected to other statuses that ultimately, as we saw in Part I, consist of collec­
tively accepted and required patterns o f behaviour (cf. also Appendix).
However, before I can conclude this section and move on to the actual topic o f 
this Part, intentional action and its explanation, I must address one more influential line 
o f thought. In III.3 I argued that a straightforward, causal dispositionalism cannot solve 
the rule-following problem, because it runs into the Normativity Problem. However,
III.3 simply followed the custom and accepted that Kripke is right in thinking that the 
Normativity Problem is both a real problem and indeed the hard part o f the rule- 
following problem, and one that straightforward dispositionalism cannot resolve. How­
ever, although most writers acknowledge the importance o f the Normativity Problem, 
there are philosophers who think that a dispositionalist needs not resolve the problem, 
for it is but a pseudo-problem that does not need an answer. They argue that meaning is
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not normative in the sense of requiring a solution to the Normativity Problem. Rather 
than resolving the Normativity Problem, they aim to dismiss it altogether.165
Asa Maria Wikforss, for example, points out that Kripke does not really give 
arguments as to why meaning must be normative. Rather, Kripke simply assumes this to 
be case and uses the Normativity Problem “as a pre-theoretical litmus test for other 
theories: Any theory which fails to allow for the required normativity can be rejected 
out o f hand” (Wikforss 2001, 203). Admittedly III.3 does something similar. Most, if  
not all, o f the philosophers I discuss in this dissertation accept that meaning indeed is 
normative in the sense o f the Normativity Problem. Davidson and von Wright, for ex­
ample, think (1II.1) that if  the system o f intentional attitudes (including actions) one has 
do not for the most part comply with norms o f rationality they simply are not intentional 
attitudes, for this kind normativity is constitutive o f them (so described). In the end, in 
my view Wikforss and others fail to challenge the kind o f normativity I have advocated, 
but explicating their objections -  and the answers implied by what I have said above -  
is nonetheless worth the effort since it helps us to understand what, exactly, the position 
defended in this dissertation is and how, surprisingly, I am actually in rather large 
agreement with Wikforss.
The first thing to notice is that the normativity Wikforss and others are mainly 
targeting is of the kind Wikforss (2001, 203) calls “ought-implying” normativity: it pre­
scribes what one ought to do in a given situation (Papineau (1999) is similarly very 
clear on this). However, as 1 have explained, this is not the kind o f normativity that is 
relevant here. The normativity behind the Normativity Argument is that o f constitutive 
rules, not regulative (although it has to be said that many formulations o f Kripke 
(1982), as Wikforss demonstrates, give the impression o f being instances o f regulative 
normativity). As 1 have repeatedly explained, the rules that are relevant here are compa­
rable to, say, rules o f chess: they do not tell what one ought to do in certain situations 
within the game; rather, they constitute the very framework of rules that is the game (cf. 
1.2.1). Only when we have the system o f constitutive rules constituting the game (chess, 
language game), can we seek to formulate regulative rules of the form “if  one wishes to 
do X  in this game, one ought to do Y \
Part III has emphasised that the Logical Connection Argument talks about con­
stitutive connections (recall that III. 1.1 explicitly rejected the regulative reading o f the
165 The dismissal o f the Normativity Problem is advocated, for example, by Bilgrami (1992), Coates 
(1986, 1997), Horwich (1995), Gliier & Pagin (1998), Gluer & Wikforss (2006), Pagin (2002), Papineau 
(1999) and Wikforss (2001). Particularly influential for this line o f thought is Bilgrami (1992, 83 ff. in 
particular), but in what follows I concentrate mainly on Wikforss (2001), for Wikforss both develops fur­
ther the other criticisms and brings them to bear explicitly on the issues I have discussed in this Part.
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normativity in question) and that Kripke’s arguments are ontological, not epistemic. 
Hence, I think Wikforss (2001, 205) is right in arguing that “ought-implying” regulative 
rules about how to use terms cannot show the essential normativity o f meaning, for they 
already presuppose meaning. To use this line of thought to show that meanings are not 
normative is, however, equally futile, for it simply presupposes that meaning is not con- 
stitutively normative. O f course Wikforss and others are right in claiming that moral (or 
even epistemic) norms concerning how one ought to apply meaningful words already 
presuppose meaning and thus cannot be constitutive for meaning.
However, Wikforss seems to acknowledge this when she writes that “if meaning 
is to be normative, the normativity in question must be semantic in kind, not merely 
epistemic or moral” (2001, 205). She even conceptualises (Wikforss 2001, 215) this ex­
plicitly in terms of Davidsonian constitutive (as opposed to regulative) norms and 
claims that her arguments challenge the normativity o f meaning also in this sense. 
However, as I show below, her arguments, while fatal for some positions close to the 
present one, do not challenge the present view. Indeed, in some crucial aspects I fully 
agree with her. Let me first, however, clear away a couple of objections that obviously 
have no bearing on the present view.
First, Wikforss says correctly that meanings cannot be normative in the sense 
that expressing a false judgement would by definition be always a semantic (and not 
only epistemic) error. Her argument is that the normative view of meaning cannot han­
dle this, if normativity -  correctness and incorrectness -  is really seen as constitutive o f 
meaning. Notwithstanding the seeming plausibility o f Wikforss’ argument, I find this 
surprising, since the social normative view was introduced explicitly to make room for 
the case where an individual makes an epistemic error by calling, e.g., horses cows, but 
not semantic, since she was nonetheless applying the concept cow, albeit mistakenly. As 
we saw, equating actual use with meaning was a major problem both for the naive 
communitarian view and the non-normative, crude dispositionalism, but not for the pre­
sent view. Again, Wikforss’ argument applies to theories that see explicit, regulative 
rules as constitutive of meaning, not to the present social practice view that treats par­
ticipation in social practices as constitutive o f meaning. Moreover, it seems that Wik­
forss may well be right in saying that her considerations show that “the normativity o f 
meaning” cannot derive “from the connection between meaning and truth alone” (Wik­
forss 2001, 207, cf. Horwich 1995). This, however, is not a problem for the present
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Kripkean view, which, as we saw, explicitly rejects truth-conditional semantics and 
builds on assertability conditions.166
Second, perhaps my view is not that different from a charitable reading o f Wik­
forss’ anti-normativism after all. She argues that “the problem of error arises for theo­
ries [...] that construe the relation between meaning and use in such a way that any dif­
ference in use implies a difference in meaning.” (Wikforss 2001, 208). I agree with this. 
We need a distinction between actual use and the meaning, i.e., the correct use. And 
Wikforss is correct in holding that once we have solved the problem of error in this 
sense, i.e., bridged the gap between true meaning and actual use so that we avoid the 
problem of error, there is no need for further, metaphysical normativity in the theory o f 
meaning. I have argued that the way to do this is to introduce a social element that 
grounds this (normative) distinction between actual use and true meaning into the the­
ory. However, I have built the social element out of non-normative dispositions instan­
tiating collective agency. They bring in the normativity required for solving the Norma­
tivity Problem but, crucially, do not require further normativity. The view I defend, con­
tra some formulations by Kripke, is a form of second-order social dispositionalism. 
Like Wikforss, I have explicitly refused to see anything more normative in meaning. 
Indeed, I have argued that to do so would be to turn to unacceptable metaphysics. We 
need a theory of social practices that builds purely on naturalistic dispositions but that 
nonetheless has room for the normative aspects (external and objective from the point o f 
view o f those participating in the practice) o f linguistic practices: In the technical par­
lance o f Part I, I have no need for independent normativity.167
Thus, if the core o f non-normative dispositionalism is, as Wikforss (2001, 209) 
says, that meanings are fully determined by actual use, and actual use can be accounted 
for in terms of causal dispositions, I have no quarrel with this, for it is true also o f my 
view.168 The only difference is that Wikforss (and, e.g., Coates 1997) does not require 
the dispositions in question to have complex social and hierarchical structure, whereas,
166 Wikforss (2001, 207) seems to counter this move by saying that one can o f  course accept pragmatist 
semantics, where normativity indeed is constitutive o f  meaning, but then the normativity thesis stands or 
falls with pragmatist semantics. In a sense 1 am happy with this, because I do accept the pragmatist view  
in this sense. Indeed, Wikforss concludes that “[wjhat we need to do, o f course, is distinguish between 
what a word is true o f and what it is not true of, but this is just the old problem o f  accounting for refer­
ence and has nothing to do with norms” (Wikforss 2001, 207). This however, is just a statement and re­
mains unjustified in Wikforss’ papers. Indeed, Appendix argues that the normative nature o f  meaning is 
precisely what is required to make room for an acceptable and naturalistic (rejection o f  both wonder tis­
sue and objective idealism) solution to the “old problem”.
167 Kusch (2006, e.g., 66) makes a similar point by explaining that the Kripkean view replaces “semantic 
normativity with intersubjective normativity”.
168 Indeed, many anti-normativists criticise the normativity argument primarily as part o f  a view that 
builds normativity — and semantics -  on the notion o f  agents intending to use expressions in certain ways. 
Such psychologism is something I have explicitly rejected as question begging.
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as I have shown, for me the social aspect and the structure o f first and second-order dis­
positions do a considerable amount o f philosophical work in contexts that do not fall 
into the scope o f Wikforss’ (2001) interests. Moreover, also Wikforss (2001, Footnote 
29, p. 222 & 212) accepts explicitly that to counter further problems regarding linguistic 
practices (such as those discussed in Appendix) we may have to go for a social theory 
o f meaning, but that this does not challenge forms of “non-normative pure use theories” 
that build on social dispositions.169 Again I agree, for my theory is a socialised version 
o f dispositionalism: as I have all the time said, in the name of ontological naturalism I 
am not prepared to accept anything but non-normative, physical, causal features to the 
fundamental furniture of the world. In particular, I do not want to assume any practice- 
independent norms or contents (cf. Appendix).
Further, when Wikforss (2001, 214 ff.) argues that the Davidsonian conviction, 
according to which the rules of rationality are constitutive o f the meaningful realm, can­
not ground the idea that meanings are normative, it is very important to notice that Wik­
forss’ arguments are explicitly such that they do not challenge my argumentation in 
III.]: Wikforss is not attacking the animating idea behind the Davidsonian anomalism o f 
the mental (and thus the Logical Connection Argument). Rather, her goal is to show that 
“[i]t is quite possible to stick to the Davidsonian view of intentionality and yet deny that 
meaning is normative” (Wikforss 2001, 215). Wikforss emphasises that the David­
sonian view is that unless one uses terms rationally one’s uses are actually meaningless 
-  not that if one means something with a term, then one ought to use the terms such and 
such a way (Wikforss 2001, 215). As said, I agree with this wholeheartedly. If the rele­
vant rules were regulative in nature, they would already presuppose meanings.
Thus, Davidsonian normativity boils down to the constitutive nature o f rational­
ity constraints (and not to the regulative ought-normativity). In Wikforss’ view this 
shows that the Davidsonian view does not imply that meaning includes a normative 
element that cannot be captured by “pure use”, i.e., dispositional, accounts, because 
Wikforss’ concern is explicitly “exclusively with normativity in the sense that impli­
cates an ‘ought’, a prescription” (Wikforss 2001, 203), i.e., regulative normativity, 
which she also explicitly opposes with constitutive normativity. Indeed, Wikforss 
(2001, 218) endorses enthusiastically the idea that the link between use and meaning is 
constitutive, which, o f course, is a view I have as earnestly defended in this dissertation.
169 Here Wikforss parts company with Bilgrami (1992), who resists social theories o f  meaning categori­
cally. But the sociality Bilgrami has in mind is primarily o f Burge’s type (see, e.g., Burge 1979). How­
ever, discussion on Burge’s social theory o f language goes beyond the scope o f this dissertation, and thus 
I will not address Bilgrami’s anti-socialism here.
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Hence, here we have the feature that allows the view defended in this disserta­
tion to prevail over Wikforss’ challenge and, in a sense, it to largely agree with Wik­
forss. After all, like Wikforss, I want to emphasise very strongly that in my view all the 
building blocks o f rule-following practices must be non-normative causal dispositions; 
there is no room for normativity that is not constructible by using dispositional ele­
ments, i.e., by a “pure use theory” in Wikforss’ terminology that she contrasts with 
normative views. To think otherwise would be circular. Indeed, in this respect my view 
was explicitly argued to differ crucially from, e.g., McDowell’s quietism -  which Wik­
forss (2001, 214) sees as a paradigmatic example o f the kind o f normative theory she 
resists -  where an unnatural normative element remains unaccounted for (cf. also my 
further criticisms o f McDowell in Appendix that take up precisely this point). My sec­
ond-order social dispositionalism is meant to develop further naturalistic pure use theo­
ries so that they can account for the apparent normativity o f linguistic practices and re­
solve the Normativity Problem. This is my anti-causal humanism within causal natural­
ism.
Thus, to conclude this Chapter we can say that the meaning of an action amounts 
to the role the intentional description o f the action plays in our social practices o f giving 
and asking for reasons. Actions are what we do, what we are responsible for. Causation 
matters in human activities for sure, but to capture a behaviour qua meaningful -  qua 
action -  we must not concentrate on the causal history o f the behaviour but on whether 
our practices authorise that kind o f behaviour in the particular situation and what further 
commitments the performance brings with it. Thus, we finally have an answer to the 
question o f what makes behaviour action. An action is a behaviour that is assigned a 
certain (normative) status in our social practices.
With this answer we are able to return to the problem concerning the nature of 
intentional explanations of actions.
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CHAPTER III.5:
EXPLANATION OF ACTION AND COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY
III.5.1 THE TRUE FORM OF INTENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS
Behaviour is an action to the extent that reasons can be given and asked for it. This re­
quires that the behaviour is redescribed in a way which embeds the behaviour (via the 
redescription) into the normative web o f practical reasoning consisting o f collectively 
acknowledged entitlements, requirements and commitments, just as von Wright (1971) 
says. However, as such von Wright’s Logical Connection Argument remains silent 
about why meaningful actions must be seen as essentially normative in a sense that 
purely causal theories cannot capture (even the no echo argument o f III. 1.3 simply ar­
gues that i f  -  or rather: since -  actions are essentially normative, a causal theory cannot 
be satisfactory), where the normative web comes from and indeed how it is possible to 
follow  normative requirements (rules). Answers to these questions are what I have at­
tempted to provide with my social account o f rule-following.
In particular, I have argued that the norms governing practical reasoning cannot 
be explicit rules in Plato’s heaven, in the language o f thought or what have you. In con­
trast, I have defended the view that they are implicit in our social practices. Thus, when 
we look at the standard form o f intentional explanation,
1. X  desires D
2. X  believes that A is the best means to attain D  under the circumstances
(L) If any agent, X, desires D, and believes that doing A is the best means to attain D
under the circumstances, then X does A__________________________________________
Ergo, X does A,
we should realise that the explanation has this form because this is how rational agents 
are collectively required to arrange their desires, beliefs and actions in order to count as 
rational agents that are capable o f desires, beliefs and actions. In the Wittgensteinian 
picture, (L) is an attempt to make explicit a norm that resides implicitly in our practices 
o f giving and asking for reasons.
Similarly, the rule-following considerations show that the form o f the argument 
in general and (jL) in particular cannot be based on a timeless Platonist idea or Kantian 
universal principle in need of interpretation. But this means, pace Davidson, that the
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belief-desire model o f intentional action is not universally necessary for rational, inten­
tional action. Rather, it is commitments, which in our practices are connected to other 
commitments, rights and duties, that are essential for intentional action, and these no­
tions correspond naturally to beliefs and intentions -  in my mind there is not always 
need for a desire or pro-attitude170 (recall my analyses o f collective intentionality and 
we-mode action in Part I that operated solely with beliefs and intentions and, crucially, 
not with desires).
As was explained, in the Wittgensteinian social practice view the form or ex­
plicit model o f an acceptable inference (such as the belief-desire model) cannot be con­
ceptually prior to accepting certain inferences as valid in practice. The rule-following 
considerations show that we cannot justify our rule-governed practices by appealing to 
explicit rules. Rather, formulations o f explicit rules or models o f practical inference are 
attempts to make the essential components of an implicit, blind practice explicit. In 
short, the social practice view I defend treats as an acceptable form of practical infer­
ence any form that is (tacitly) accepted as valid in social practices.171
Crucially, there are familiar cases o f practical reasoning that do not operate in 
terms o f the Davidsonian belief-desire pair. Brandom (2000, 87) uses the following ex­
ample:
(a) It is raining.
(b) I shall open my umbrella.
According to the orthodox Humean, or mainstream Davidsonian, tradition in action the­
ory we ought to insist that such an inference is crucially incomplete: we must assume 
that at least the following premises are implicitly present:
(c) I desire to stay dry.
(d) I believe that it is raining.
(e) I believe that if it is raining 1 must open my umbrella in order to stay dry.
However, when we understand that the form of intentional explanation is deter­
mined by our own (collective) practice o f treating certain forms as acceptable in prac-
170 A closely related reading o f intentional explanations is defended by Brandom (in particular 1994, 245 
fif. & 2000, Chapter 2). I would also like to thank Brandom for discussing my criticism o f  Davidson with 
me at his research seminar “Concepts and Contents” at the University o f  Tampere (Finland) in May 2004.
171 Again, this is not as relativistic a claim as it may sound. Collective acceptance is always open to criti­
cism and corrections -  see Appendix.
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tice, it becomes clear that the standard insistence o f adding the extra premises (c)-(e) is 
justified only if it is our practice to require them to be added. But, typically, we do not 
in fact (indeed in practice) require such additions. This, I think, is also in Anscombe’s 
(1959) view the core of practical reasoning. In our practices the fact that it is raining is 
a perfectly good reason for opening one’s umbrella. Only the most dedicated 
Humean/Davidsonian action theorists among us will not accept “it is raining” as full 
answer to the question concerning my reasons for opening my umbrella when I leave 
the philosophy department and face the streets of London.
A related, important point is also that if we think, as the Standard View holds, 
that the intentional explanation picks out a natural chain o f causes and effects, then we 
face the problem of an indispensable ceteris paribus clause: besides adding (c)-(e), we 
must require that I do not have any desire overriding (c), that I know how to do (b) and 
so on. It seems that no matter how many such premises we add to the inference, a clever 
enough philosopher could come up with a counterexample. In other words, (b) must in­
clude an indispensable ceteris paribus clause.
The indispensability of the ceteris paribus clause is a serious problem for the 
Standard View o f seeing the inference as a non-normative, causal process. This indis­
pensability is, o f course, simply another way o f pointing out the futility o f Elster’s pro­
ject o f trying to find necessary and sufficient causal conditions for a behaviour to count 
as an action (III. 1.3) and, thus, o f expressing Davidson’s (1973a & 1974a) post-1963 
acknowledgment that the premises o f a practical inference an intentional explanation o f 
action consists in cannot give “sufficient conditions of intentional (free) action” (David­
son 1980, xvii). It seems that we can complete the inference only be deciding not to take 
into account any further complicating possibilities. The ceteris paribus clause is indis­
pensable precisely because there is no other fact o f the matter as to when further quali­
fications are no longer needed than the social practice o f (tacitly) accepting certain rea­
sons as sufficient. This, o f course, is perfectly compatible with the normative, collective 
acceptance view o f practical reasoning I defend.
This point takes us deep into the philosophy o f action. We have already seen that 
in the case o f the theoretical reasoning o f Carroll’s (1895) Tortoise and Achilles, to state 
the conditional is “to make explicit [...] what before was implicit in our practice o f dis­
tinguishing some inferences as good” (Brandom 2000, 81), not to justify the practice. 
Thus, as Carroll saw, we cannot use the explicit rule o f the conditional to justify our in­
ferential practices, since the implicitly normative inferential practices are prior to the
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explicit norm. The explicit rule does not function as a premise in our fundamental infer­
ential practices which, after all, are blind.
Similarly, expressions o f desires should not be always required to feature in 
practical inferences, since, just like the expressions o f the conditional in the context o f 
theoretical reasoning, such expressions function ultimately not “as a premise, but as 
making explicit the inferential commitment that permits the transition” (Brandom 2000, 
89) from, for example, “it is raining” to “I shall open my umbrella”. In Brandom’s 
terms, “normative vocabulary (including expressions of preference) makes explicit the 
endorsement [...] o f material proprieties o f practical reasoning” (Brandom 2000, 89; 
boldface omitted). As the Logical Connection Argument states, my desire to stay dry 
(qua a propositional attitude) partly consists in and receives its conceptual content from 
my commitment to the inferential rule (or practice) taking me from “it is raining” to “I 
shall open my umbrella”.
Thus, the Humean belief-desire model o f practical reasoning and intentional ac­
tion that builds on instrumental rationality is parasitic upon the more fundamental Kant­
ian model in which to act intentionally is to act in accordance with a norm. However, 
whereas for Kant such norms where explicit rules, I have argued that the norms must 
fundamentally be implicit in our practices of giving and asking for reasons. Indeed, the 
Humean model, where it works, derives its plausibility from its ability to make explicit 
an implicit practice. This, o f course, is very different from the actual self-understanding 
of the Humeans, for they think that a desire as an entity logically distinct from beliefs 
and actions is required to causally initiate the action.
My reading of the Logical Connection Argument on the one hand and the Witt- 
gensteinian social practice view on the other rejects this view as a twofold mistake. 
First, desires, beliefs and actions qua contentful attitudes are essentially tied to (and 
constituted by) a normative web of commitments, entitlements, acknowledgements etc., 
and hence it makes no sense to talk about desires as something wholly distinct from be­
liefs, intentions and actions. Second, intentional action and intentional explanation are 
not primarily causal issues, and hence there is no need for a desire to set the action in 
motion in a causal sense. An intentional explanation explicates why a certain action was 
appropriate in light of the commitments o f the agent by subsuming the action (via a ra­
tionalising redescription) into a normative web. The point is not to show what triggered 
certain movements.
This view is not that far from, for example, Dennett’s views on intentional ac­
tion and its explanation. After all, in his view intentionality ought to be understood in
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terms o f mutual acceptance o f the intentional stance and the corresponding mutual as­
criptions o f intentionality. Dennett (2003, 251) even expresses this explicitly by arguing 
that the notions o f intentionality, agency, rationality, free action and the like are estab­
lished in the Sellarsian practice o f giving and asking for reasons. This idea o f seeing in­
tentionality and the framework of agency as something that is bootstrapped into exis­
tence within social practices (Dennett 2003, 259 ff.) is obviously very similar to the pic­
ture I have been painting in this Part o f my study. However, as for example Searle is 
very keen to point out, the Dennettian ascriptions o f intentionality and indeed the adop­
tion of the intentional stance appear already to presuppose the existence o f more funda­
mental original intentionality, for attributions o f intentionality surely require an inten­
tional agent to perform the attributions.
I think that in a sense this criticism is correct. Dennett’s account is not fully sat­
isfactory in this respect. However, the alternative favoured by Searle, namely that cer­
tain brain states just are intrinsically intentional (ridiculed as the wonder tissue theory 
by Dennett), does not do any better when faced with the problem of rule-following. Ac­
tually, in this duel of two contemporary philosophical titans I think it is Dennett who is 
closer to an acceptable solution. Jt is very important to see that the Searlean accusation 
of circularity has a hold only if  the ascriptions of intentionality that play such a crucial 
role in Dennett’s theory are understood as explicit assignments (ascriptions made ex­
plicitly by individual agents). In contrast, if  attributions o f intentionality are made, as I 
have argued above, in terms o f proprieties implicit in blind social practices, the circular­
ity accusation fails (cf. Brandom 1994, 147).
Indeed, the social practice view seems to be the view taken by Dennett (2003) 
when he suggests that the original intentionality does not belong to any agent but to the 
social game o f giving and asking for reasons which is, ultimately, constructed and main­
tained by the evolved tendencies (causal dispositions) o f Homo Sapiens. This is the 
view also the present study subscribes to. Moreover, I think that Dennett’s (2003) way 
o f locating intentional free agency within the normative game o f giving and asking for 
reasons, as opposed to the causal order o f things, is undeniably the most promising way 
o f defending free agency even if causal determinism is true (III.2, Saaristo 2004a).
However, more often than not Dennett seems to think that we are free to adopt 
either the intentional or the physical (causalist) stance, since in his view the distinction 
is not grounded in the objective features o f the world; all that matters is the instrumental 
value o f the chosen stance in predicting behaviour. I, on the other hand, think that as 
agents we are tied to the intentional perspective. I am also convinced that the theory o f
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intentionality I defend can capture intentionality as an external and objective (in the 
technical sense o f Part I, i.e., as nonetheless dependent on social practices) feature o f the 
world and not as a mere instrumentally useful tool.172 Contrary to some formulations by 
Dennett, I think that ascriptions o f intentionality are appropriate according to their accu­
racy in explicating objective proprieties, not only according to their predictive utility 
(cf. Brandom 1994, 56-57).
III.5.2 THE STATUS OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY
Let me next move on to discuss the case of full-blown collective intentionality. The cru­
cial point is that the form o f intentional explanation (such as the belief-desire model) is 
not forced upon us by some causal laws o f nature or eternal ideas in Plato’s heaven. The 
standard form of intentional explanation in terms o f (1), (2) and the conclusion has the 
form o f an acceptable practical inference because it instantiates (L), which in turn is an 
explication o f a norm or propriety implicit in our practices.
Similarly, the inference from “it is raining” to “I shall open my umbrella” is ac­
ceptable because it sits well with our practices, which implicitly include a norm that 
could be made explicit as “if it is raining, one is rationally entitled (or even required) to 
open one’s umbrella”. Thus, no further justifications are required. In contrast, if I give 
the statement “it is raining” as the answer when I am asked why I do not open my um­
brella, my answer typically is not accepted. I am not rationally entitled to such an infer­
ence. To get the others to acknowledge my entitlement to the practical inference from 
“it is raining” to “I shall not open my umbrella”, I can express, to use Brandom’s (2000, 
87) example, my Gene Kelly desire to sing and dance in the rain, which explicates my 
practical commitment to the inference from “it is raining” to “I shall not open my um­
brella”.
In sum, according to the present social practice view, whether or not a practical 
inference is complete depends neither on any independent fact about the correct Plato- 
nist form o f practical inferences nor a causal process, but simply on whether we in prac­
tice require the inference to be completed or not. Bearing this in mind, let us next con­
sider a situation where an agent faces a situation she recognises to be a social dilemma 
situation where mutual co-operation is the collectively optimal (best for us) thing to do. 
Note that this is an issue I have discussed at length in Parts I and II. I argued there that
172 This is one reason why I argued (III.4.1) that the Kripkean social practice view I defend does not con­
tradict Bloor’s (1997) claim that a social solution to the problem o f  rule-following can be fact-based in 
the sense o f  offering an objective ground for meaning and intentionality.
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we should expect humans to have the tendency to adopt the we-mode, i.e., to frame such 
situations as collective tasks where the individual action-intention or role is derived 
from the collective-level optimality considerations.
Thus, in the present context the question of the status o f collective intentionality 
and collective we-mode action can be formulated as the question o f what we ought to 
say concerning the following practical inference:
(a) In this (social dilemma) situation co-operation is collectively optimal.
(b) I shall co-operate.
In Part II, I argued that this inference captures the intentional action o f we-mode agents 
capable for collective intentionality. The standard individualistic view, on the other 
hand, insists that the inference must be completed by adding the following premises:
(c) I desire to realise collectively optimal outcomes.
(d) I believe that in this situation I must co-operate in order to realise the collec­
tively optimal outcome.
However, the mainstream obsession to treat the inference from (a) to (b) as in­
complete is nothing but the tired a priori insistence on the priority o f individual-mode 
notions and individual-mode psychology (II.3). In Part II it was argued that we have 
strong evolutionary reasons to assume that the anti-individualistic picture captured by 
the inference from (a) to (b) captures a sui generis form of reasoning which does not
J 73require individualisation in terms of (c) and (e). In this Part we have seen that indeed 
there is nothing in the world that would force us to treat the inference from (a) to (b) as 
crucially incomplete. It is up to us to establish it as an acceptable form o f intentional 
explanation in the game of giving and asking for reasons by treating it as such in prac­
tice. For example, when asked why I co-operated in a social dilemma situation I may 
simply answer that it is the right thing to do, explicating thus the norm that resides im­
plicitly in our practices.174 Thus, although co-operation is irrational from the point of
1731 wanted Part II to be neutral concerning the explanation versus understanding debate and the nature o f  
original intentionality, and thus it was left open whether the evolutionary process in question amounts to 
biological or cultural evolution. On the basis o f  this Part, however, it is clear that the process must be 
largely that o f  cultural evolution, for intentionality is an irreducibly social phenomenon.
174 One o f the most stable empirical findings o f social identity theorists (e.g., Kerr & Park 2001, 118) is 
indeed that people conceptualise the tension between individual-mode rationality (leading to defection) 
and collective considerations (requiring co-operation) in the obviously normative terms o f  good and bad.
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view o f individualistic benefit maximisation, co-operation is rational in the primary, 
Kantian sense o f corresponding with the fundamental norms (implicit in our practices) 
that constitute intentionality and rationality.
Moreover, the evolutionary arguments of Part II demonstrate that communities 
that treat the inference as an elementary form o f practical reasoning are likely to have 
flourished, for the practice o f accepting this form o f inference is a social trait that has 
the capacity to beat the Davidsonian strategy o f insisting on the primacy o f individual­
mode notions in multi-level selection processes. Similarly, Brian Skyrms (1996) argues 
forcefully that we should expect most societies to have evolved to include an implicit 
norm or practice that can be made explicit precisely in terms o f accepting the inference 
from (a) to (b).
We have also seen that an individualist cannot appeal to the idea that individual­
mode intentionality would be more naturally paired with our pre-intentional, purely 
causal (biological) dispositions. First o f all, intentional notions have no echo in the 
realm of causation, and hence the relevance o f this line o f thought is highly question­
able. Nonetheless, the individualist could insist that even if there are no systematic con­
nections between the normative (the intentional) and non-normative, the normative must 
eventually be constructed by the workings o f our biological (blind) dispositions. After 
all, we have seen that normativity resides implicitly in our blind practices. However, it 
should by now be also clear that this line o f thought speaks strongly against individual­
ism and the priority of individual-mode notions.
In Part II we saw that the pre-theoretical understanding of evolution as nothing 
but a competition between individuals is not warranted in light o f proper understanding 
o f evolutionary dynamics. Group-level selection processes that promote co-operation 
between individuals are most likely largely responsible for the evolution o f many o f our 
social traits. And we saw that the products o f group selection, when described in inten­
tional terms, are highly compatible with and supportive of the theory o f collective inten­
tionality. Moreover, in this Part we have seen that the biological dispositions that make 
the framework o f intentional agency possible must be essentially social dispositions 
structurally similar to the picture o f intentionality implied by the theory o f collective 
intentionality.
Thus it can be concluded that collective we-mode intentionality is real to the ex­
tent that our social practices make it so. This result may sound somewhat disappointing, 
since in the other parts of this study I have argued that we-mode collective intentionality 
is an objective, sui generis phenomenon, and now I am admitting that in fact it exists
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only relative to our practices which bootstrap it into existence. However, it should be 
clear that such dissatisfaction is unwarranted.
The fact that collective intentionality exists only relative to our social practices 
does not make it any less an objective phenomenon than the fact that the pieces o f paper 
in my pocket are money (Part I). Similarly, both facts -  that the pieces o f paper in my 
pocket are money and that collective intentionality is a sui generis form o f psychology -  
are in an important sense self-referential (cf. Barnes 1983, Kusch 1999, Searle 1995, 
Tuomela 1995, 2002): Both facts are constituted by our (tacit) collective acceptance to 
treat them as true in practice, and in both cases this practice boils down to practical ac­
ceptance o f certain inferences and patterns o f behaviour. To treat either of these facts as 
a truly practice-independent fact would be metaphysically highly questionable.
Moreover, collective intentionality is based on our implicitly normative prac­
tices such that collective intentionality is a sui generis form o f intentionality both in the 
sense that it is not based on a more fundamental individual intentionality and in the 
sense that it resides, as does all intentionality, in the Sellarsian logical space of norma­
tive reasons and not in the logical space o f non-normative causation and the natural sci­
ences. Hence, as Davidson (1974a, 230) puts it, short o f changing the subject it cannot 
be reduced to anything non-intentional. All intentionality is practice-dependent in this 
sense. Apart from accepting Cartesian dualism (or indeed full-blown objective idealism 
with objective spirits or collective consciousnesses), we cannot require intentionality -  
collective or individual -  to have a more independent status than the one assigned to it 
by the social practice theory.
111.5.3 TYING UP LOOSE ENDS
Finally, the position developed and defended in this Part allows me to sharpen some ar­
guments that were left somewhat open in Parts I and II. The first point I wish to make is 
a clarification o f the distinction I drew between a subjective and objective characterisa­
tion of collective intentionality when discussing Tuomela’s (2000) definition o f a rea­
son-based notion o f collective intentionality in 1.2.4.
Recall that Tuomela wrote his definition in the objective form, i.e., as saying that 
the fact that also others have the relevant we-intention (and the fact that there is a mu­
tual belief about this in the collective) is the reason why X  too adopts the we-intention 
in question. In my own formulations, however, I preferred the subjective version o f 
Tuomela’s definitions. The subjective version states that the reason why X  adopts the
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we-intention is that she believes (at least tacitly) that the facts in question obtain. The 
reason for preferring the subjective version was that I was after the perspective o f the 
agent X  and an intentional explanation o f her adoption o f the we-mode.175 Now when 
we have explicated the ontological nature of intentionality, it is easy to see that 
Tuomela’s original objective formulation is in a sense ontologically more fundamental.
The objective formulation corresponds roughly to the inference from (a) to (b) 
above, which was seen to capture the essence of collective intentionality. After all, I did 
not require (a) to be turned in to the subjective form o f “I believe that (a)”. Hence, to the 
extent that co-operation is normatively required in social dilemma situations in the rele­
vant community, i.e., insofar as co-operation in social dilemma situations is a normative 
(perhaps implicit) practice o f the community, the objective definition o f razsow-based 
collective intentionality is literally correct. The fact that the situation at hand is a social 
dilemma situation is a good (collectively accepted) reason for co-operation, for “this is 
a social dilemma situation” is a good answer (an acceptable rationalisation) to the ques­
tion concerning one’s reason for co-operative action. Co-operation is what is collec­
tively required o f agents in social dilemma situations in most everyday social practices. 
The objective definition o f reason-based collective intentionality explicates collective 
action with a reason in social dilemma situations.
However, also the subjective formulation captures an important aspect here. Just 
as (L) explicates the implicitly normative practices that tie beliefs and desires to actions 
in the individualist case, expressing a belief that the setting at hand is a social dilemma 
situation (and the belief that the others treat the situation as a collective task) amounts to 
undertaking a commitment with the kind of propositional content that, given the implic­
itly normative practices o f the collective in question, commits the undertaker also to co­
operation. The subjective definition o f reason-based collective intentionality explicates 
collective action fo r a reason in social dilemma situations.
In other words, the objective practice is what justifies the inference formulated 
in subjective terms. The implicitly normative practice explicated by the objective defini­
tion is what entitles the agent to her subjective inference. Moreover, this interplay be­
tween the subjective and the objective perspective is important not only for the proper 
understanding of intentional action, but also for seeing the nature o f the overall picture 
that emerges from my social practice view (Appendix).
1751 mentioned in Part I that Tuomela (2000, 52) acknowledges this point, but simply says that the “sub­
jective channelling” is assumed to be built into the reason-relation. I insisted on keeping the distinction 
explicit, but I was not able to justify my insistence satisfactorily. Now, at last, we have enough under­
standing o f the metaphysics o f  intentionality to fully appreciate the importance o f the explicit distinction.
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The second theme that was not brought into its proper conclusion when the issue 
was on the table for the first time is the connection between my theory of collective in­
tentionality and Hacking’s (e.g., 1999) notion o f the looping effect of human kinds. I 
explained (II.3) how Hacking thinks that the categories o f the human sciences are inter­
active, since “people [...] can become aware of how they are classified and modify their 
behavior accordingly” (Hacking 1999, 32).
Hacking’s motivation comes from the Anscombe-Davidson view o f intentional 
action, where the core idea is Anscombe’s (1959) insight that actions are essentially ac­
tions “under a description”. In Anscombe’s view, for one’s behaviour to be an inten­
tional action there must be a description such that one intended to act under that descrip­
tion (III.1.2). Thus, actions are largely conceptual, for conceptual descriptions are 
(partly) constitutive of actions qua actions. Hacking’s (1995a, 235) core idea is that 
from Anscombe’s insight it follows directly that one can intentionally perform only the 
kinds of actions one can contentfully describe176 and, consequently, “[w]hen new de­
scriptions become available [...], then there are new things to choose to do” (Hacking 
1995a, 236).
This is an important point, but in order to get to the looping effect Hacking 
moves quickly even further. It is not only that conceptual constructions are required for 
intentional actions. Rather, conceptual constructions are constitutive also o f the very 
possibility of being a person in the sense of an agent, and thus conceptual developments 
can also bring in new ways to be an agent. Hacking’s (1995a) interesting case study is 
the multiple personality disorder (cf. also Rovane 1998, 169 ff). Hacking argues that 
multiple personality is undeniably both a real psychological condition -  some people 
really do have multiple personalities -  and (at least partly) brought about by conceptual 
developments in psychological discourse: In the 1970s multiple personality was “a mere 
curiosity” and one “could list every multiple personality recorded in the history of 
Western medicine” (Hacking 1995a, 8), but after multiple personality had become an 
official diagnosis o f the American Psychiatric Association in 1980, cases o f multiple 
personality disorder were found in their thousands (Hacking 1995a, 8). However, ac­
cording to Hacking, it is not the case that before the year 1980 there were a lot o f undi­
agnosed multiple personalities around. Rather, suddenly in the North America o f the 
1980s there was a huge outbreak o f multiple personality disorder.
Hacking explains that the construction o f a contentful, relatively well-defined 
concept o f  multiple personality disorder has “provided a new way to be an unhappy per­
176 All we can do is to apply concepts, as Brandom’s slogan puts this.
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son [...] multiple personality [...] has become, to use one popular phrasing, a culturally 
sanctioned way o f expressing distress” (Hacking 1995a, 236). Roughly put, the con­
struction o f the theoretical concept of multiple personality disorder has made it possible 
that there can really be several persons in one body. The construction o f the concept has 
brought a new form o f agency into being. And, crucially, the new way is not less real 
than other ways o f being an agent, since this is what human agency consists in. All 
forms of agency are based on collectively constructed and maintained ways o f being an
x 177agent.
On the basis of this Part o f my study we can see that this is a profound point in­
deed. Our essence as intentional agents is based on collectively maintained proprieties 
governing appropriate inferences (including practical inferences concluding in actions). 
These proprieties are implicit in our practices and they constitute the normative frame­
work within which we can meaningfully see individuals as agents and persons, for to be 
an intentional agent is to be able to perform actions, i.e., behaviours that one is respon­
sible for (and which reasons can be given and asked for). The construction of the theory 
o f multiple personality disorder has provided new acceptable ways o f rationalising 
one’s behaviour, i.e., for constituting the behaviour as an action and the actor as an 
agent.
This reasoning suggests that there is no metaphysical self in the sense of a Carte­
sian ego behind the social practices constituting the human form of life. Rather, persons 
are constituted within such practices. Practices are prior to and constitutive o f  agents 
and personhood. Pre-social (or asocial) individuals are not agents unaffected by social 
practices; such individuals are not agents at all but only physical objects governed by 
causal laws. To be an agent (or a person) requires that one is situated within the logical 
space of normative reasons governed by normative rules of rationality, not by causal 
laws of nature. Personhood is a social status, not a causal property (Saaristo 2004a).
To be an agent is to participate in social bedrock practices that constitute (the 
forms of) agency. Thus, when Hacking (1986) says that in our practices we “make up 
people”, this should really be taken literally to the extent that by “people” we mean 
people qua intentional agents and persons and not qua physical objects. “My claim is 
that we ‘make up people’ in a stronger sense than we ‘make up’ the world” (Hacking 
1984, 40). What Hacking means, I think, is that we can causally modify the physical 
world that exists independently of our practices, but in our practices we non-causally
177 Besides Anscombe and Davidson, in the background o f  Hacking’s arguments lurks the towering figure 
o f Michel Foucault and his arguments on how new ways o f  being a person can be constructed in (scien­
tific) discourse.
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constitute the very possibility and form of personhood -  people qua agents do not exist 
independently of our practices, and thus there is no original form o f personhood (Carte­
sian ego) independent of our practices.1781 read Hacking’s claim that we make up peo­
ple as closely related to the central thesis o f Kusch (1999), namely that (folk) psychol­
ogy is a social institution.
Where Hacking concentrates on the construction of contents of actions (new 
kinds o f action) and on the construction o f types o f agents (e.g., agents with multiple 
personalities -  perhaps also collectives as agents), I have focused on the mode in which 
actions are performed, regardless o f the content and performer o f the action. I have 
shown that just as the possible contents and indeed types of agents are relative to our 
practices, also the mode o f our actions is dependent on what forms of practical infer­
ences we treat as acceptable in our practices. In this sense it is up to us to make the the­
ory o f collective intentionality true or false.
Consequently, what kind o f inferential proprieties we in fact reproduce in our 
practices has significant effects on the way the society works. Although intentional ex­
planations are not causal explanations, our practices are such that individuals are guided 
to modify their behavioural dispositions to reflect normative proprieties (cf. Brandom 
1994, 260 -  recall also Kusch’s three devices and my analysis o f collective agency). 
This is precisely the factor that allows us to use largely prescriptive, intentional expla­
nations also as descriptive generalisations in the sense of Millian empirical laws 
(III.2.4).
Thus, if our theoretical naivety leads us to disregard collective notions and insist 
exclusively on individual-mode accounts of agency and rationality, this is not a case of 
mere misrepresentation o f actual practices. Rather, such one-sidedness may lead us to 
modify our basic normative attitudes, i.e., what we expect and require of rational agents, 
what kind of behaviour is accepted as rational action, which kinds o f rationalisations are 
allowed and so on. In the worst case such individualism may contaminate even our ba­
sic practices, and since such practices constitute forms of intentionality, our theoretical 
immaturity may turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Attributions o f intentionality do not 
only describe but also prescribe.
This is also the fundamental reason why the empirical approaches reviewed in
II.3 failed to unambiguously settle the debate between methodological individualism 
(exemplified there by the discovered preference hypothesis in experimental economics)
178 Hacking (see especially 1995b, 362 & 364 ff.) actually resists this kind o f  reading -  not because he 
thinks it is wrong, but because he does not want to discuss what he calls “deep” issues such as construc­
tivism or the distinction between hermeneutic understanding and causal explanation.
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and holism in the sense of the theory o f collective intentionality (represented by the so­
cial identity approach in social psychology). Recall that we were forced to admit that in 
a sense individualism and holism simply construct different conceptual frameworks in 
terms of which actions can be conceptualised, and empirical evidence did not unambi­
guously determine which way is correct and which is not. Now we can see clearly why 
this indeed must be the case: Descriptions are (partly) constitutive o f actions.
As the Logical Connection Argument and Davidson’s philosophy o f mind ex­
plain, we turn a bodily behaviour into an action by embedding it into a conceptual 
framework via an intentional redescription. Thus, there are no description-independent 
actions that could set the truth conditions for our conceptualisations of actions. In other 
words, there is no independent fact o f the matter as to what is the true form o f inten­
tional actions. This is the by now familiar replacement o f truth-conditional semantics 
with inferential role semantics based on socially established assertability conditions 
when it comes to assignments o f intentionality. By accepting certain types o f explana­
tions as valid we constitute the social fact (practice) that indeed makes them valid (cf. 
C. Taylor 1985). This is the ultimate core o f Hacking’s theses of the looping effect o f 
social kinds and the view that we make up people: social scientific theories are partly 
constitutive o f their own objects, including the nature o f action and agency.
The third theme left open in the previous Parts is the relationship between the 
view I defend and the fashionable research programme of evolutionary psychology. Part 
II was largely dedicated to evolutionary issues, and I have appealed to evolutionary sci­
ence also in this Part. Nonetheless, I mentioned in Part II that I see my programme as 
highly compatible with John Dupre’s (2001) vigorous criticism o f evolutionary psy­
chology. However, I had not yet accumulated sufficient conceptual tools for making the 
compatibility explicit. Now, on the other hand, the connection practically suggests it­
self.
Dupre draws our attention to the fact that a founding premise o f evolutionary 
psychology is that it assumes the brain to “somehow contain symbolic representations” 
(Dupre 2001, 35).179 Dupre believes that Wittgenstein’s (1953) rule-following consid­
erations provide an impeccable argument against any scientific research programme that 
builds on such a premise. Meanings reside in social practices, not in the brain. Original 
intentionality is to be found implicitly in social bedrock practices, not as instantiated in 
wonder tissue. Psychology operating with mental contents is a normative social science,
179 In addition to evolutionary psychology, a good part o f contemporary cognitive science also accepts 
this premise. Hence, my criticism o f evolutionary psychology below applies, mutatis mutandis, also to 
much o f  mainstream cognitive science.
260
not a biological natural {i.e., causal) science. Nonetheless, Dupr6 admits that “Wittgen­
stein’s arguments are [...] notoriously difficult and controversial, and it would be be­
yond the scope o f the present work [i.e., Dupre 2001] to examine them in any detail” 
(Dupre 2001, 35-36). The present Part of my study, in contrast, has sought to provide 
precisely such a detailed examination vis-a-vis Dupre’s thesis.
The rule-following considerations indeed imply that the traditional humanist 
framework, labelled the Standard Social Science Model, or the SSSM for short, by the 
evolutionary psychologists John Tooby and Leda Cosmides (1992, 23), emerges as es­
sentially untouched from the attempts of the evolutionary psychologists to replace it 
with what Tooby and Cosmides call the Integral Causal Model, or the ICM.180 Tooby 
and Cosmides (1992, 26) characterise the SSSM as locating meanings to the public 
sphere of culture such that individuals are seen to be capable for meaningful action only 
to the extent they participate in cultural practices. As I have argued in length above, the 
position o f the SSSM is -  pace Tooby and Cosmides -  literally correct.181
It seems to me that the main reason why Tooby and Cosmides oppose the 
SSSM’s view o f meaning and content is that in their view the SSSM is essentially 
committed to treating the human mind as a tabula rasa or, at most, as some kind o f gen­
eral-purpose information processing machine (Tooby & Cosmides 1992, 28-29). Tooby 
and Cosmides (1992, 24) think that the empirical neurosciences as well as evolutionary 
studies have established beyond all doubt that the human brain includes a number of 
different context-specific mechanisms (dispositions). In other words, the brain is neither 
a blank slate waiting to be written on nor a general-purpose processor. Instead, the brain 
instantiates a system o f innate dispositions with very specific scopes.
I, o f course, applaud this line of thought. A crucial step in my argument against 
the impossibility o f human intentionality and meaning in general (the sceptical conclu­
sion) was to assume that the brain is not merely a passive receiver of inputs or a gen­
eral-purpose computer capable only o f purely logical operations. Indeed, to solve the 
Infinity Problem we had to assume that the human brain contains context-specific, in-
180 In what follows I defend only what I see as the philosophical core o f the humanist SSSM, i.e., the view  
implied by my own argumentation in this study. In particular, I am not committed to defending the spe­
cific views o f any o f  the social theorists Tooby and Cosmides identify as paradigmatic representatives o f  
the SSSM.
181 Further, I have claimed my view to be largely compatible with that o f  Daniel Dennett (especially 
2003). I think most theorists would agree with Don Ross (2002, 143) who argues that “Dennett’s work 
provides crucial philosophical background to the attack by evolutionary psychologists on what Tooby and 
Cosmides (1992) call the Standard Social Science Model”. I fear Dennett himself might be happier with 
Ross’ interpretation. However, the nature o f  my study is systematic rather than exegetical and, whether he 
likes it or not (and contrary to Ross’ claim), the lasting core o f  Dennett’s argumentation presents him as a 
defender o f the SSSM camp (for a related reading o f Dennett, see Kusch 1999, 340).
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trinsic (and evolved) dispositions to, for example, classify objects in a certain ultimately 
unjustifiable way and to harmonise the first-order dispositions to match the behaviour of 
others.
Thus, the humanist SSSM in my sense is not only compatible with but actually 
presupposes the view that the human mind (qua biological) consists largely of function­
ally specialised mechanisms (dispositions) to produce behaviours that solve particular 
adaptive problems, such as preconditions for language, co-operation and so on. More­
over, these dispositions must be assumed to be sufficiently richly structured for consti­
tuting a complex architecture of first and second-order dispositions. In short, I have 
shown that far from rejecting the picture of the biological mind as a collection o f func­
tionally specialised causal dispositions, philosophically mature versions of the SSSM 
actually presuppose the view Tooby and Cosmides say is implied by the brain sciences.
Thus, Tooby and Cosmides may be right in pointing out that the traditional em­
piricists’ picture o f the biological mind as either a blank slate or a general-purpose com­
puter is based on very primitive understanding of the natural sciences in general and 
evolutionary biology and neuroscience in particular. However, where empiricist social 
scientists may have somewhat unsophisticated understanding of the natural sciences, 
Tooby and Cosmides themselves are astonishingly naive when it comes to philosophical 
semantics and the metaphysics of intentionality. They think that the rejection o f the 
tabula rasa and the computer pictures o f the biological mind implies a view where the 
context-specific, innate causal dispositions are intrinsically meaningful, i.e., the ICM. 
This, of course, is nothing but the familiar hubris o f imagining that solving the Infinity 
Problem suffices to solve the problem o f rule-following (I1I.3.2).
The mechanisms (dispositions) Tooby and Cosmides talk about may well be 
necessary for meaning, content and intentionality, but they cannot be sufficient (because 
o f the Normativity Problem). As we have seen, these phenomena include -  exactly as 
the SSSM insists -  an irreducibly social element. To treat innate, causal mechanisms as 
intrinsically meaningful and contentful is simply bad philosophy. Thus, when Tooby 
and Cosmides (1992, 113) talk about innate causal mechanisms that instantiate, among 
other peculiar things, “a social-inference module, [...] a semantic-inference module, 
[...] a theory o f mind module”, we can see that they have a lot o f philosophical house- 
cleaning to do if  they wish to avoid making fundamental category mistakes (cf. Kusch 
1999, 351). When it comes to the social sciences, the proper task for the natural scien­
tific approaches is to study the biological preconditions o f the SSSM, not, pace Tooby
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and Cosmides, replace the SSSM with the ICM or indeed with any other naive oversim­
plification.
The fourth and final theme from the first two Parts o f this study that I want to 
bring into conclusion on the basis o f the present Part is closely related to the fundamen­
tal category mistakes committed by Tooby and Cosmides. What I have in mind is my 
somewhat ambivalent position regarding Bruno Verbeek’s (2002) analysis of co­
operation discussed in Part II. On the one hand, I sided with Verbeek in arguing that ac­
counts insisting on mere individualistic instrumental rationality cannot resolve social 
dilemma situations (such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma) in a collectively optimal way. 
Similarly, I appealed to Verbeek’s penetrating argumentation when I defended the posi­
tion that the attempts to analyse collectively optimal co-operation in terms o f individual 
utility transformation rules cannot succeed. However, when it came to the solution Ver­
beek himself advocated, I dismissed it rather quickly.
Recall that Verbeek argues that since individual-mode rationality cannot deliver 
the kind of social co-operation we observe every day, we must assume that the explana­
tions o f social action must refer to both individual-mode rationalisations and non- 
rational, purely causal dispositions (which Verbeek calls co-operative virtues) that sim­
ply cause us to co-operate, despite our individual-mode rational inclination to defect. 
Verbeek’s idea is, in short, that since “[c]ollective beneficial instrumental action is in­
deed individually irrational” (Barnes 2000, 57), co-operative action must be based on 
non-intentional, causal dispositions evolution has equipped us with.
In Part II my main argument against Verbeek’s line of thought was simply that it 
hardly corresponds to our experience o f social action. As Barnes puts this point, 
“[cjollective action is scarcely well-described as irrational, since it may be exquisitely 
calculated and highly effective instrumental action, but it cannot be rationalised by ref­
erence either to altruistic or self-interested individual goals” (Barnes 2000, 57). I con­
cluded that while Verbeek explicitly acknowledges the second part of Barnes’ descrip­
tion o f collective action, i.e., its essential individual irrationality, Verbeek’s straightfor­
ward causalism cannot account for the obvious intentionality and (collective) rationality 
o f collective action. Hence, I argued, both our everyday experiences and scientific stud­
ies o f social action support the theory o f collective intentionality more than Verbeek’s 
peculiar mix of rational considerations and blind causal dispositions that sometimes 
cause us to act against our rationality calculations.
Obviously, the arguments o f the present Part reveal the philosophical profundity 
o f my objection to Verbeek in a way that was not possible to see in Part II. I have ar-
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gued that one cannot explain actions (including co-operative social actions) in terms o f 
causal dispositions, for actions are essentially (logically, conceptually) tied to reasons, 
and these notions have no echo in the realm o f causal dispositions. The intentional (ra­
tional) explanations o f actions must be conceptually separated from causal explanations 
o f behaviour. In particular, the attempts to combine these two incommensurable catego­
ries in the way Verbeek (and Tooby & Cosmides -  or the Standard View for that mat­
ter) try to do simply will not, and cannot, work. The problem with Verbeek’s solution is 
not only that it contradicts our experience; rather, it is based on a massive conceptual 
(indeed, philosophical) confusion.
However, when we keep our philosophical categories clear it is possible to see 
the lasting achievements o f Verbeek’s reasoning. In addition to offering perceptive 
criticisms of the prospects of individual-mode rationality, Verbeek sees correctly that 
human co-operation presupposes pre-intentional (or sub-personal), essentially social, 
causal dispositions. I have made the very same point above in terms o f the indispensa­
bility of collective agency (III.4.2). I think Verbeek’s co-operative virtues could well 
play the same role as Kusch’s three devices or my own social dispositions. Thus, Ver­
beek’s reasoning is largely correct; his philosophical carelessness in mixing together 
rational, intentional explanations and non-rational, causal explanations simply makes 
him to fail to grasp the acceptable core o f his own reasoning.
Indeed, one o f the main morals o f this Part o f my study is that we must keep our 
philosophical categories clear. Hence, it is only appropriate to let G. H. von Wright, 
whose work is a great example of such clarity, to have the last word: “Natural science 
can be characterized as a study of phenomena under the ‘reign’ o f natural [causal] law. 
Human science again is primarily a study o f phenomena under the ‘reign’ o f social in­
stitutions and [normative] rules.” (Von Wright 1976b, 415.)182
182 Thus, this agreement with von Wright dissociates me from Kusch (2003, 342), who argues that von 
Wright’s (1989a, 41) statement that “philosophy o f action [...] must terminate in a philosophy o f  society” 
shows that von Wright is still committed to the methodologically individualistic view that the psychologi­
cal, including intentional actions, is conceptually prior to the social. However, on the very same page von 
Wright explains that in his view Wittgensteinian considerations imply that “the conceptualization o f  be­
havior as (intentional) action presupposes a community o f institutions and practices” and this is why 
“philosophy o f  action must terminate in a philosophy o f society”. Thus,pace  Kusch, it seems clear to me 
that also for von Wright “[t]he philosophy o f  society provides the foundations for the philosophy o f  ac­
tion, not vice versa” (Kusch 2003,342). Hence, although the present dissertation by and large agrees with 
Kusch’s (1999; 2002; 2003, 341 ff.) socialisation o f philosophy o f  action, I do not see this as a move for­
eign to von Wright’s philosophy o f action. Of course Kusch is right in saying that von Wright (1971) 
does not explicitly discuss the constitutive role o f  the social behind actions -  largely because von 
Wright’s explicit appreciation o f  “the strong influence o f Wittgenstein’s last writings” came “[t]oo late to 
leave an imprint on Explanation and Understanding [von Wright 1971]”, although the “influence had 
been latently there since [...] 1947” (von Wright 1989a, 40). What I in this dissertation call von Wright’s 
view seeks to make explicit also the “latent” features -  as I have explained, the animating interest behind 
my work is that o f  systematic reconstruction and analysis, not o f historical exegesis. Moreover, von
264
CHAPTER III.6: 
CONCLUSION
In this Part I set out to defend the framework of intentional action and agency assumed 
in the earlier parts of my dissertation. In III.l I started with von Wright’s Logical Con­
nection Argument against the view that the framework is a causal framework. I argued 
that -  contrary to the view accepted almost universally in contemporary analytic phi­
losophy -  Davidson’s theory o f action cannot deliver a refutation o f the Logical Con­
nection Argument or support the Standard View.
111.2 challenged another piece of contemporary orthodoxy. I argued that the 
Multiple Realisability Argument cannot deliver what it is all too often assumed to de­
liver, i.e., sui generis mental causation in a causally closed physical world. I argued that 
to hold on to the causal interpretation o f the intentional framework requires one to com­
promise physicalism in the way that many philosophers -  although not all -  find unac­
ceptable and that the Multiple Realisability Argument was meant to circumvent.
111.3 approached the nature o f the framework o f intentional agency directly by 
examining the nature of intentionality. This quest took us to the Wittgensteinian prob­
lem of rule-following, which tipped the scales in favour of the non-causal, normative 
view. The framework o f intentional agency is a collectively constructed and reproduced 
normative framework within which actions are understood.
However, while this kind o f hermeneutic humanism is often seen as an enemy of 
naturalism, III.4 argued that the conditions of the existence of the normative framework 
can be satisfied by developing a non-intentional or pre-intentional complement to the 
theory of social facts, social practices and co-operative social action that was defended 
in Parts I and II. While explaining how there can be an irreducible space o f normative 
reasons in our physical world, this theory itself operates with purely naturalistic causal 
notions. III.4 defended irreducible, interpretive humanism within general naturalism.
By constructing a naturalistic theory o f the (normative) framework o f intentional 
agency, III.4 turned the present Part into my final argument for the central thesis o f my 
dissertation: The unavoidability o f naturalised methodological holism in the social sci­
ences. Meaningful action must be explained and understood in terms of norms implicit
Wright himself {e.g., 1989b, 806 ff.) appears to think that in his writings he may actually have failed to 
express his own view properly. Hence the importance o f the kind o f  systematic reconstruction -  even at 
the cost o f  historical adequacy -  this dissertation aims at. Stoutland, whose position 1 largely agree with, 
says that he defends a view that he attributes also to von Wright “in terms that he himself [von Wright] 
might not have used but that bring it into more explicit contact with current work in the philosophy o f  
action”. I could say the same concerning the approach o f  the present study.
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in social practices. However, this strong methodological holism was argued to be per­
fectly naturalistic in the sense that it (i) rejects all appeals to unnatural entities, be they 
Platonist principles, group-minds or wonder tissue and, moreover, (ii) builds on biologi­
cal dispositions -  thereby showing how irreducible, non-causal moral sciences fit into 
the same picture with causal natural sciences. Finally, III.5 explicated the non-causal 
view of intentional action and its explanation and the constructivist theory of collective 
intentionality that follow from naturalised methodological holism.
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APPENDIX:
DURKHEIM’S GOD or
THE SOCIOPHILOSOPHY183 MANIFESTO
183 By the label “sociophilosophy” (adopted from Kusch 1997) I mean a philosophical approach which 
holds that certain central notions o f  philosophy, such as the intentional mind, meaning and knowledge, 
are essentially social notions.
267
INTRODUCTION
In this Appendix I want to explain how I think the view defended in this dissertation 
(Part III in particular) is to be located in the field of philosophy. To keep this Appendix 
appropriately short I will have to paint with a broad brush indeed. The combination o f a 
limited space and a vast topic is far from ideal. Consequently, rather than as the last 
word on these issues, the arguments offered in this Appendix might serve as indications 
o f the paths further research could take. However, I firmly believe that the task I under­
take here is important, not only in order to guide further research, but also -  and perhaps 
primarily -  because only this kind of general discussion will guarantee that the philoso­
phical nature of the standpoint I defend is seen in its proper light. In particular, I fear 
that if I do not explicate exactly what kind o f general position I am committed to, my 
views can all too easily be disregarded as a form o f rather banal social constructivism, 
naive antirealism and unacceptable cultural relativism (which indeed was the accusation 
o f Niiniluoto in 1.3), whereas in fact nothing could be further from truth.184
184 Accusations o f  anti-naturalistic constructivism and relativist anti-realism are precisely what 1 tend to 
hear when I present arguments this study consists o f  at philosophical conferences. While I am sympa­
thetic to some views that accept these labels (e.g., Kusch 2002), I do not recognise the picture people of­
ten claim to follow from my arguments -  including the relativism that, for example, Halfpenny (2001, 
378) claims to follow so straightforwardly from Wittgensteinian views that he can present it as an uncon­
tested feature o f  Wittgensteinian philosophy in a handbook o f  social theory. Hence the importance o f  in­
cluding this Appendix in my dissertation.
A.l: WHEN THE COMMUNITY IS MISTAKEN
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A .1.1 SOCIAL RELATIVISM AND TALKING ABOUT THE WORLD
The motivation for the issues I want to raise in this Appendix comes from my rejection 
o f the naive communitarian view, in which I identified two major problems (III.3.3). 
First, it was seen to render the linguistic community infallible. When the community 
agrees on a judgement that something is the case in the world, it cannot make a mistake 
-  regardless of what it happens to judge to be the case. Second, the naive communi­
tarian view was argued to re-introduce the Regress Argument and hence to fail as a so­
lution to the rule-following problem. Crucially, my main reason for rejecting the view 
was the second problem and not the fact that it implies objectionable relativism. Conse­
quently, I have argued that my own social solution to the rule-following problem avoids 
the Regress Argument. The question is, then, whether my view nonetheless commits the 
first sin o f the naive communitarian view, that of implying questionable relativism.
At first glance it seems that the answer must be in the positive. After all, I ar­
gued that meaning o f a judgement is constituted by the practice o f applying the judge­
ment in a community, i.e., that we replace truth-conditional semantics with the Krip- 
kean view that builds on normative assertability conditions which are constituted by 
tacit collective acceptance in social practices.185 This sounds very much like social rela­
tivism. However, I want to argue that the essentially anti-individualistic collective 
agency view that grounds my social solution to the problem o f rule-following -  and 
which in effect distinguishes the view I defend from the naive communitarian view with 
its summative (and thus essentially individualistic) conception o f the social -  is also the
factor that sets my view clearly apart from the relativism o f the naive communitarian
186view.
In short, according to the naive communitarian view the individual must com­
pare her application o f a term to the collectively accepted way of applying the term, 
which gives the truth conditions for her application. In other words, the community is
185 Hence, although I did claim in III.3.2 that my acceptance o f  Condition (2) dissociates my view from 
the most provocatively relativistic formulations o f  the meaning finitism o f the Edinburgh School sociolo­
gists o f science, it could be argued that it is my interpretation o f  Condition (3) -  my conviction that the 
normativity o f  meaning must be due to a social aspect -  that commits me to social relativism. Meanings 
may be determined, but they are determined largely by social agreement in practice.
186 As will become clear below, my views here are strongly influenced by Brandom (1994 & 2000) and 
Esfeld (2001), with whom I am largely in agreement. Brandom and Esfeld, however, do not discuss in 
terms o f  collective agency and collective intentionality. Thus, despite the shared starting points, they 
would not necessarily appreciate the way in which I discuss these issues.
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seen as something external to the individual, i.e., as part o f the circumstances an indi­
vidual must take into account when performing actions (including the actions o f apply­
ing concepts). This view is certain to lead to Kripke’s sceptical conclusion. In contrast, 
throughout this study I have emphasised that my picture o f sociality is utterly different. 
Social practices are not something external to individuals -  and indeed individuals qua 
agents are not prior to social practices. Rather, it is part o f the constitutive essence o f 
individuals that they, via collective agency in the case o f bedrock practices (construct­
ing the framework of agency) and via collective we-mode intentionality in the case o f 
full-blown practices (within the framework of agency), participate in and indeed form  
the practices.
This is a critical dissimilarity. Recall that social practices are essentially and ir- 
reducibly normative (from the point of view of the participants, not metaphysically) in 
nature. The speech acts o f individuals normatively commit them to certain other propo­
sitions, and exclude commitments to other propositions (this is what makes the speech 
acts contentful performances in the first place). In the naTve communitarian view the 
agents are interested in harmonising their understanding of the contents of such com­
mitments with the collective understanding o f their contents, and this depends only on 
what the majority view happens to be. In my picture, in contrast, individuals are respon­
sible participants collectively interested in getting the commitments right, and this de-
• • • 187pends on the way the world is (see Esfeld 2001, 65 for a similar line o f thought).
This idea is at the core o f Brandom’s (1994) inferential role semantics as well. 
Brandom thinks, correctly to my mind, that the rule-following considerations show that 
an acceptable semantics cannot be representationalist (or truth-conditional) in nature. 
The Cartesian project o f treating representational content as a primitive notion, and 
then worrying about the descriptive accuracy of different representations, is doomed to 
fail. Rather, we must start with the normative notions o f commitment and justification, 
and explain representation on the basis o f them. Representation and truth conditions are 
important, but not semantically primitive. However, also the inferentialist conception o f 
meaning must explain the realist requirement that often our language is about the world.
187 Note that here I put the points about moral philosophy I made towards the end o f  Part II into ontologi­
cal and semantic use. Recall that I mentioned that the denial o f  individualism inherent in the theory o f  
collective intentionality does not amount to saying that individuals should conform to some timeless 
Kantian principles; rather, the point was to take seriously the Kantian doctrine o f  treating all individuals 
as ends in themselves as opposed to the rational choice notion o f  strategic action where other agents are 
simply part o f  the circumstances (i.e., mere means) one has to take into account when striving for indi­
vidual-mode goals. Similarly here the rejection o f  naive communitarianism emphasises social practices 
constituted by egalitarian participants who are allowed and even required to assess the others.
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My claim is that this can be done only if  we accept the social practice theory o f meaning 
I have defended in this study.
As I have explained, at the primitive level semantics is about normative statuses. 
To possess a concept is to master the ultimately practical skills o f applying the concept 
only in appropriate circumstances and inferring other commitments that follow from 
such applications (cf. Esfeld 2001, 55), and this is possible only within a social bedrock 
practice. The (representational) content of a concept is determined by the normative, 
inferential relations the concept enters into and not vice versa. In other words, content is 
constituted by a position in a normative web. This is the aspect o f meaning holism in the 
present theory. The norms guiding the proprieties o f application and inference and thus 
constituting the normative web are, ultimately, implicit in social practices. This is the 
aspect o f social holism in the present view.
Crucially, far from bringing in unacceptable relativism, it is precisely the social 
aspect o f semantics that makes representation and realism possible. To keep score o f the 
commitments o f others we must keep score both of their judgmgs (the undertaking o f  a 
commitment) and what they have judge*/ (the content o f the commitment). And this lat­
ter aspect requires, at least in the case o f judgements involving natural kind terms, that 
we keep track o f concrete relations in the world (articulated in the inferentialist sense as 
w ell).'88
For another person to use my judgmg as a premise (or a reason) in her own in­
ferences, she must know what I have judge*/ to be the case. It is the social perspective 
constitutive o f normativity that also introduces the representational aspect o f meaning. 
By endorsing a contentful sentence I commit myself to the consequences of the en­
dorsement, even if  I do not know or understand them. By making a judgement I under­
take a public commitment with external and objective (in the technical sense of Part I) 
consequences. The social aspect o f meaning constitutes a huge positive freedom: the 
social aspect enables me to talk about things that I do not understand properly, such as 
quantum physics or the proposed constitution of the European Union. I undertake a
188 For example, if  I commit myself to abstain from eating anything that has a heart, then the way the 
world is implies that I am committed to not to eat birds, whether I know it or not. This is why the others 
who keep score o f  my commitments must introduce the representational aspect to know what exactly I am 
committed to. Similarly, if  I am entitled to the status o f  being a PhD candidate at the London School o f  
Economics, then it follows that I am also a PhD candidate at the University o f  London (since the LSE is a 
college o f the university), whether I know it or not. In this case, however, it is enough that the scorekeep- 
ers keep track o f  our collectively accepted norms; they do not have to bother with concrete relations. So­
cial kind terms are essentially self-referential; their assertability conditions depend on our practices, not 
on the way the physical world is -  social relativism is o f  course true o f the social world (Kusch 1999). Or 
as Brandom (1994, 53) puts this, “[wjhatever the KwakiutI treat as an appropriate greeting gesture for 
their tribe [...] is one; it makes no sense to suppose that they could be collectively wrong about this sort 
o f  thing”. Natural kind terms, in contrast, are answerable to our practices and the world.
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commitment, and the linguistic division o f labour made possible by a social theory o f 
meaning (cf. Putnam 1975) allows me to let the others to find out what exactly I am 
committed to. The possibility o f committing oneself objectively to unknown conse­
quences is possible only within a community -  an important positive freedom assigned
• 1RQto an individual by the socially holistic picture.
In other words, representation is based on our interest in finding out the real 
normative status -  what a person really is committed to -  as opposed to mere normative 
attitudes -  what anyone, including the person undertaking the commitment, takes the 
person to be committed to. As Esfeld emphasises, “the meaning o f a belief p  is not de­
termined by those other beliefs that a person actually has, but by those other beliefs to 
which she is committed and entitled to and to which entitlement is precluded by endors­
ing p n (Esfeld 2001, 66). Moreover, as Esfeld also points out, this is precisely the point 
o f the Wittgensteinian insistence on avoiding all forms o f psychologism or mentalism in 
semantics. The social aspect of semantics makes it possible for our beliefs and asser­
tions to be answerable to the world and not only to other beliefs and assertions. Far from 
destroying the possibility o f realism, social holism makes room for realism worth want­
ing.
Indeed, the point of both the social solution to the Normativity Problem in Part 
III and my discussion o f the possibility o f objective social (normative) facts in Part I is 
precisely that the distinction between a normative status (objective) and normative atti­
tudes (subjective), which grounds representation, is available only within a social prac­
tice. This holds, because to determine the normative statuses, as opposed to mere nor­
mative attitudes, requires that the participants of a linguistic community distinguish be­
tween the de dicto (judgwgs, or commitments acknowledged by the speaker) and de re 
(judgeds, or commitments actually undertaken by the speaker) ways o f assigning con­
tents to their interlocutors.190 The introduction o f this distinction -  made possible by the 
social aspect of semantics -  is the introduction of the perspective required for full ap­
preciation of the representational aspect o f intentional states and sentences.
189 The fact that the fundamental sociality o f  agents brings in positive freedoms unavailable for an isolated 
individual is, o f course, one more major point o f  connection between my anti-individualism in the phi­
losophy o f  social science, mind, language and action on the one hand and anti-individualistic accounts in 
social and political philosophy on the other.
190 The easiest way to explain the difference between de dicto and de re reading o f  a content is by means 
o f an example. To Europeanise Brandom’s (1994, 500 & 2000, 170) example, consider the statement 
“The President o f  the European Commission will be a woman by the year 2020”. Read de dicto, this 
means that the sentence “The President o f the European Commission is a woman” will be true by the year 
2020. Read de re, the statement means that the present President, Jose Manuel Barroso, will be a woman 
by the year 2020.
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In III.3.3 we saw Boghossian (1989) to complain that the naive communitarian 
view cannot cope satisfactorily with cases where a community, when observing suffi­
ciently horsey looking cows on a dark night, believes incorrectly that there are horses in 
front of them. The present view, in contrast, can accommodate this situation easily. 
Each member of the community believes that there are horses in front o f them. When 
they keep score o f the commitments o f others they ascribe these commitments (beliefs) 
in the de re sense: So and so believes o f  those objects {de re) in front o f us that they are 
horses {de dicto).
O f course, in Boghossian’s example every ascriber believes o f  the cows (a de re 
identification of a commitment) that they are horses (a de dicto identification o f a com­
mitment). Crucially, however, the present view -  precisely because it includes a social 
aspect -  leaves conceptual room for the community to be mistaken. Since the individu­
als are egalitarian participants in communal practices (and not disparate individuals ex­
ternal to the practice as in the naive communitarian view), it is an open possibility that 
one o f them (or indeed a new member joining the community) will find out and con­
vince the others that what the whole community believed {i.e., that they are horses) o f  
these objects, i.e., cows, is in fact wrong.191
Conceptual contents are essentially perspectival in the sense that they are always 
specified from some point of view. But this perspectivalism is taken explicitly into ac­
count in the social picture by distinguishing between the de dicto (normative attitude) 
and de re (normative status) ascriptions o f contents (see Brandom 2000, 177), and hence 
an explicit acknowledgement of perspectivalism is essential to participants’ understand­
ing of contents -  they know that each perspective may hide certain aspects o f the situa­
tion that ought to be taken into account. Social practices based on collective agency or 
collective we-mode intentionality are open to criticism in this sense. The naive commu­
nitarian view -  not to mention any explicitly individualistic view! -  cannot accommo-
199date this crucial aspect.
191 This, o f course, is simply another way o f  highlighting the open-ended nature o f  semantic practices so 
crucial to meaning finitism.
192 Although Brandom and Esfeld do not discuss in terms o f  collective notions, I believe that they are af­
ter the same point when they insist that social practices should not be seen as “I-we practices”, where an 
individual is subordinate to an external practice fixing static truth conditions, but as “I-thou practices”, 
where the dynamic interaction o f  egalitarian individuals is what the practice consists in. Moreover, I have 
always found it rather puzzling that in the context o f  the philosophy o f language an appeal to a social 
practice as the guarantor o f  representational accuracy is often seen as somehow dubious, whereas in the 
context o f  the philosophy o f science it has been commonplace since Charles S. Peirce’s days to think that 
open peer criticism o f the judgings o f  others is essential for the collective quest for truth -  and that hence 
the true possessor scientific knowledge is the scientific community.
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Thus, the social view I defend can accommodate both (i) cases where there are 
truths about which the community is completely ignorant and (ii) cases where a proposi­
tion universally accepted in the community is false. In contrast, the naive communi­
tarian view rejects at least (ii) and, perhaps, also (i). As Brandom (1994, 602-603) ar­
gues, unacceptable cultural relativism requires that we reject both (i) and (ii), for that 
would imply that p  is true iff the community accepts that p. This is not an implication of 
my view, and hence I conclude that my version o f the social solution to the problem of 
rule-following does not imply the kind of social relativism that plagues the naive com­
munitarian solution. In other words, the present social view includes an explicit ac-
1knowledgment that brute natural facts are independent facts (1.1.4).
A. 1.2 THE BRANDOM -  KUSCH DISSENSION: A DISSOLUTION
I have created my position above largely on the basis o f Brandom and Kusch. Although 
my dissertation concentrates on issues somewhat different from their core interests, I 
have implied that the views of these two authors are highly compatible with my view -  
and with one another. However, Kusch (2002, 256 ff.) argues that there is a fundamental 
difference between his view and that o f Brandom. So is the present view completely 
misguided in emphasising the similarities between Brandom and Kusch?
First of all, Brandom builds his view of social practices on “I-thou relations” 
rather than “I-we relations” (recall Footnote 179). Kusch (2002, 256) thinks that by not 
grounding objectivity on I-we relations Brandom rejects the kind of intersubjective so­
ciality that is ultimately required for normativity. Kusch (2002, 258-259) appears to be 
saying that to prefer I-thou relations to I-we relations in this context is to return to unac­
ceptable individualism. While I agree completely with Kusch’s rejection o f individual­
ism, I think that Brandonrs rejection of I-we understanding of practices is not an accep­
tance of individualism but a rejection of the naive communitarian view, i.e., the idea 
that the community and its practices instantiating norms are essentially external to an 
individual.
193 One might find it surprising that I do not discuss at all the standard form o f  cultural relativism, i.e., the 
claim that the practices o f different collectives may well be incommensurable, making it impossible to 
understand foreign cultures. However, in my picture social practices are ultimately based on the innate 
dispositions we all share as humans, and hence understanding foreign practices, while often tremendously 
difficult, is not a priori impossible (cf. Esfeld 2001, 147 & Collin 1997, Chapter 2). It seems to me that 
even the infamous arch-relativist Peter Winch (1958, especially 181) shares this view -  as does Wittgen­
stein: “The common behaviour o f mankind is the system o f reference by means o f  which we interpret an 
unknown language” (Wittgenstein 1953, §206).
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As I have argued above, the naive communitarian view is in fact committed to 
an ultimately individualistic view o f sociality. Thus, I think that by replacing the I-we 
account o f sociality with his I-thou account o f sociality Brandom is in fact making room 
precisely to the kind o f non-summative account of sociality (1.1.5) that social bedrock 
practices require (III.4.2). Michael Esfeld puts this nicely in his exposition o f Bran- 
dom’s philosophy o f mind and language: “Setting social holism out in terms o f open- 
ended and symmetric I-thou relations [...] prevents us from having to identify at some 
stage what is correct with social facts in the sense o f what a community takes to be cor­
rect” (Esfeld, 200, 132). The I-we view emphasises truth-conditions, and the I-thou 
view assertability conditions (III.3.3). However, I agree with Kusch that Brandom’s 
terminology sounds misleadingly individualistic, and thus I have favoured the terminol­
ogy o f collective agency and collective we-mode intentionality -  which, just as Bran­
dom’s rejection o f I-we accounts, is based on the rejection of the idea that the individual 
is conceptually prior to and independent o f the social. In my view Kusch and Brandom
, 194are in agreement here.
Second, Kusch (2002, 256-259) appears to criticise Brandom’s (1994, 331) in­
sistence that the nature o f our discursive practices is partly up to the mind-independent 
world. I address the metaphysics behind this issue in detail in A.2 below, but I want to 
partly clarify this issue already here.
As we saw, in Brandom’s (and my) view it would be incorrect if the whole 
community started to apply the word “cow” to horses. Kusch, on the other hand, holds 
that the whole point o f the rule-following considerations, on which also Brandom is 
building, is that independent objects themselves cannot determine how they are to be 
classified. Thus, if  the community dictates that the word “cow” is to be applied to these 
things (horses), then this is what we ought to do.
Despite the seemingly contradictory positions, I think also here Brandom and 
Kusch are largely in agreement. Kusch is thinking about the problem o f how to follow a 
particular rule, namely how the word “cow” is to be used in classifying objects. It seems 
obvious that the community cannot be wrong about this. Kusch is concentrating on the 
socially holistic aspect in the inferentialist picture. In contrast, when Brandom makes 
the point about the relevance o f the mind-independent world to our discursive practices, 
he is thinking about a situation where we have a full-blown language such that the basic 
unit o f application is not a word but a judgement and, moreover, where we have a num-
194 Kusch (2002, 256 & 258) also points out certain inconsistencies in Brandom’s terminology (especially 
in his use o f  the term ’’fact”). Although Kusch is in my view correct here, this issue is not crucial to my 
study.
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ber of normatively interconnected judgements such that the interconnections constitute 
the space o f reasons that assigns meanings (conceptual contents and not mere exten­
sions) to the judgements. In other words, when making his point Brandom is concentrat­
ing on the aspect o f Quinean meaning holism in the inferentialist view.
Brandom’s idea is that given the other normative commitments o f the commu­
nity, to judge horses to be cows is a mistake by the standards o f the community, even if  
no member of the community realises the mistake. If  the community wants to stick to 
the judgement, some other commitments and judgements must eventually go (Quine 
1951). Brandom’s rejection o f summative accounts of social statuses and truth- 
conditional semantics implies that social practices that ground meanings are always 
open to criticism. A member o f a community can always argue against a universally ac­
cepted view that given their other commitments, the community should actually change 
its view about something. This is the core o f both Brandom’s replacement of inflexible 
I-we practices with open-ended I-thou practices and Kusch’s finitistic emphasis on con­
crete applications o f terms and judgements being always subject to reconsiderations and 
assessments.
This brings me to the third and last apparent disagreement between Kusch and 
Brandom that I wish to dissolve. Kusch (2002, 259) argues against Brandom’s dismissal 
o f the I-we views of objectivity that in Kusch’s we-based view there is no external stan­
dard in need of interpretation, but the communal view is constructed and maintained in 
concrete, local interactions, where essentially social individuals harmonise their inclina­
tions. Thus, the community view is not fixed but subject to continuing, gradual change. 
I have no quarrel with this: it is indeed what I have argued for too. But as we saw above, 
it is also precisely what Brandom is after with his replacement of the I-we picture with 
the I-thou picture. Similarly, when Kusch (2002, 259) emphasises that although the 
community can be mistaken, the judgement that this is the case must nonetheless be 
made from within some other community (or a later time-slice o f the same community), 
this is in my view exactly what Brandom is after as well when he emphasises that (i) all 
judgements are perspectival, but (ii) the I-thou view of sociality implies an explicit ac­
knowledgement that each perspective is open to criticism from some other perspective 
(A. 1.1). I see no deep disagreement here.195
195 In his 2006 book, Kusch (2006, 195-201) reformulates his criticism o f  Brandom so that it is not a criti­
cism o f Brandom’s I-Thou position anymore but a demonstration that Brandom is mistaken in thinking 
that Kripke (1982) is committed to the I-We view in Brandom’s sense. 1 have no quarrel with this. Indeed, 
I have argued that the view I have built on the basis o f Brandom, Kripke, Kusch and Wittgenstein (and 
others) does not fall prey to Brandom’s criticism and that even if  Brandom and Kusch disagree on 
whether Kripke’s view is acceptable in this matter, they do agree to large extent (explained in detail
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A.2: DURKHEIM’S GOD: CONCRETE PRACTICES AND DIRECT 
REALISM
The social view I defend does not imply social relativism. In this Section I want to take 
this claim further and suggest that in fact realism worthy of the name actually presup­
poses the kind o f social picture in which assertability conditions replace truth- 
conditions. The problem of realism is o f course a huge issue in philosophy and I cannot 
hope to discuss it exhaustively in a short Section like the present one, but I think it is 
nonetheless important to indicate what kind o f view regarding realism is implied by the 
views I defend in this dissertation.
Let us start with the observation that, as I show above, contrary to, e.g., Rorty’s 
(1979) relativism, the present social practice view does not deny the importance o f rep­
resentation. What is denied is only the Cartesian conviction that representation is a 
primitive semantic notion. Realism, however, is usually understood as essentially repre­
sentational realism, which is the thesis that (i) there is a physical world ontologically 
independent o f us and that (ii) we have epistemic access to the physical world via repre­
sentations (cf. Esfeld 2001, 112). The anti-representationalist social practice view, in 
contrast, implies direct realism that accepts the ontological thesis (i) but rejects the rep­
resentational ist thesis (ii), namely the idea of epistemic intermediaries (representations) 
between us and the world.196 Or so I argue.
Note that my argumentation has taken me to a broadly speaking Sellarsian 
(1963) position. I have argued that the notions o f agency, action, mental content, 
knowledge, belief and indeed intentionality belong to the logical space o f reasons,
above) what the acceptable view is (be it Kripke’s view or not). However, even though Kusch’s 2006 
book does not imply such a strong disagreement between Brandom and Kusch regarding the issue at stake 
(although it does imply one concerning the correct reading o f Kripke), I believe the present dissolution is 
nonetheless an important philosophical exercise in making the present view as clear as possible.
196 Accordingly, 1 think the social practice view I defend is the best way to make sense o f the criticisms o f  
contemporary analytic philosophy presented within the so-called phenomenological tradition in continen­
tal philosophy. Phenomenologists claim that analytic philosophy is dominated by the Cartesian tradition 
o f  assuming that when we are conscious we are primarily aware o f  our own ideas (i.e., representations) 
and not the world itself. The phenomenological tradition wants to replace the Cartesian representational- 
ism with direct realism in my sense by claiming that the mind is essentially intentional, i.e., about real 
objects and not simply a possessor o f  representations. Phenomenologists think that it is the Cartesian un­
derpinnings o f analytic philosophy that have led to the well-known embarrassments o f  analytic philoso­
phy, such as the mind-body problem, the problem o f  realism, the problem o f  other minds, solipsism and 
so on. Just as the phenomenological tradition, also I think that the way out o f  these essentially Cartesian 
problems is the rejection o f  the dual thesis o f  representationalism and individualism. As I have argued 
throughout this study, we should not build on disparate (including epistemic, representational autonomy) 
individuals, but acknowledge the priority o f  collective agency, social practices and collective we-mode 
intentionality (or the priority o f  intersubjectivity over subjectivity, as phenomenologists like to put this 
point).
277
which is essentially normative in nature and made possible by social bedrock practices. 
In contrast, when we do natural science and give empirical descriptions o f causal proc­
esses we are operating with the logical space of non-normative causation. The logical 
space o f reasons is governed by norms and rules, whereas the logical space o f causation 
is governed by laws o f nature. Moreover, the very heart o f my argumentation in defence 
o f the intentionalist programme and the possibility o f sui generis human science is that 
the logical space o f reasons, although compatible with ontological (materialistic) mo­
nism, is not reducible to the logical space of causation. It is not reducible, because the 
relations “that constitute the logical space of nature [causation] [...] are different in kind 
from the normative relations that constitute the logical space of reasons” (McDowell 
1994, xv).
Thus, as we have seen, phenomena belonging to the logical space o f reasons 
have no echo (Davidson 1974a, 231) in the logical space o f causation, and thus short o f  
changing the subject (Davidson 1974a, 230) we cannot move from one logical space to 
another in our explanations and discussions. This fundamental discontinuity o f the two 
spaces is crucial for irreducible intentionality, mental realism and free agency, for we 
cannot move from the space o f reasons to the space of causation. However, the very 
same discontinuity seems likewise to block a move from the space o f causation to the 
space of reasons, since an ‘“ empirical description’ cannot amount to placing something 
in the logical space of reasons” (McDowell 1994, xv). The misunderstanding that this 
could be done is what Sellars famously calls the Myth o f the Given, which is based on a 
serious philosophical failure to see the unbridgeable gap between the two logical spaces 
that are essentially different in kind. In III.3.3 we saw Kripke (1982) formulating the 
unacceptability of the Myth o f the Given in terms o f the rule-following problem forcing 
us to reject the fact-based view of semantics (the idea that a non-normative fact could 
ground normative meanings). It seems that my view is indeed committed to this.
The obvious question, then, is to ask what comes of realism in the sense o f the 
claim that we have epistemic access to the physical world that belongs to the space of 
causation? Realism seems to require that there is no fundamental gap between the two 
spaces, or between the mind and the world. The view I have defended is at risk o f clos­
ing our mind into a Cartesian realm o f ideas (the logical space o f reasons -  or, to the 
extent that Kant is read as a representationalist, the Kantian phenomenal world), which 
may be nothing like the realm o f physical things in themselves (the logical space o f cau­
sation -  or the Kantian noumenal world). Thus, the fundamental problem o f realism is 
that intentionality, contentful propositions and mental contents belong essentially to the
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Sellarsian logical space o f normative reasons, which is governed by norms o f rationality 
and appropriate inferences, but the objects that our thoughts are about belong to the Sel­
larsian logical space o f non-normative causation, governed by the causal laws o f nature. 
There seems to be no way of having epistemic access to the space o f causation, for epis­
temic relations belong exclusively to the space of reasons.
In Part III we have repeatedly seen that attempts to force these two fundamen­
tally different realms following essentially different logics into one picture is bound to 
fail. However, this is exactly what representational realism aims to do by claiming that 
representations bridge the gap between the two spaces. Thus, representational realism 
repeats the same fundamental category mistake that was so fatal for the Standard View, 
dispositional solution to the problem of rule-following, evolutionary psychology, the 
co-operative virtue theory of co-operation etc. All these lines of thought are guilty of 
accepting the Myth o f the Given, namely the view that purely causal processes (includ­
ing sense-data) could somehow ground normative (epistemic) features that determine 
representational content. In contemporary philosophy representations have replaced the 
Cartesian pineal gland as the deus ex machina. Both notions, however, simply beg the 
question.
Sellars' point is that sense-data, if there are such at all, belong to the logical 
space of causation. Contentful experience, on the other hand, is normative all the way 
down, and thus has no echo in the realm o f causation. To be contentful is to have a posi­
tion in the game o f giving and asking for reasons, and this game is constituted by nor­
mative proprieties. To think that non-normative causal constraints could play a role in 
such a normative game amounts to an uncritical acceptance o f the Myth o f the Given, a 
fundamental category mistake on a par with the naturalistic fallacy in ethics.
Thus, the unacceptability of the Myth of the Given seems to re-establish Carte­
sian dualism. Individuals qua intentional agents (knowers, minds, souls) and not qua 
physical bodies belong to the normative realm of ideas and representations, whereas the 
physical world belongs to the non-normative realm o f causation. To resist the represen­
tational ist reading o f Kant that leads to Cartesian scepticism, according to which we can 
never know the world as it really is but only our own representations that in fact belong 
to the space o f reasons, seems to require that we indeed postulate a Cartesian benevolent 
god to guarantee the truth o f our representations, or his Leibnizian colleague to establish 
a harmony between the two realms.
O f course we can also try to sidestep the problem by rejecting one or the other o f 
the two realms. We can refuse to admit that there exists a normative space o f reasons
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and representations, but then we are back with the kind o f eliminativism I have already 
rejected.197 Alternatively, we could follow the objective idealism o f Berkeley and, per­
haps, Hegel and deny the existence o f the physical world of causation, and claim that 
what is real must be rational. This would amount to the view that the world is somehow 
normative and conceptual in itself, and hence we can have epistemic access to it without 
accepting the Myth o f the Given. If the world itself is not conceptual, the reasoning 
goes, the world cannot set rational (epistemic) constraints on our beliefs. But we can 
have beliefs about the world and, hence, the world must be intrinsically conceptual and 
normative.
To a modem thinker this sounds like a completely unacceptable position, but it 
seems to me that at least McDowell (1994) is willing to bite the bullet and accept the 
idea as a necessary postulate (Kusch 2002 shares this reading of McDowell). We know 
the world precisely to the extent that it is essentially normative and conceptual, i.e., a 
possible object o f beliefs and other propositional attitudes residing in the space o f rea­
sons. In coherence with his quietism discussed in III.3.3, McDowell thinks that we sim­
ply have to accept this undeniably astonishing conclusion. Thus, one o f  McDowell's 
central claims is that we should not think that the world in itself must be equated with 
the logical space o f causation (McDowell 1994, xx). Arguably this animating thought of 
objective idealism is alive also in the thought of, for example, Millikan and Dretske, 
who we have seen to insist on the anti-natural ist view that there are intrinsically and in­
dependently (of us) normative functions out there in the physical world, and hence we 
can have epistemic access to the world.
I, on the other hand, want to keep following Wittgensteinian naturalism and hold 
that the objective and irreducible normative space o f reasons is simply bootstrapped into 
existence within our social bedrock practices in the way I have described. Recall how 
Wittgenstein opens his Philosophical Investigations'.
197 Indeed, as McDowell puts this with his distinctive style, more often than not the failure to acknowl­
edge the space o f  reasons does not even merit the status o f a philosophical view -  it is rather a form o f  
“unreflective scientism: not a principled avoidance o f  unprofitable philosophy, but a way o f  thinking that 
does not explicitly appreciate what threatens to lead to it. Perhaps people who think like this should be 
congratulated on their immunity, but it ought not to be mistaken for an intellectual achievement.” 
(McDowell 1994, 89.)
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Let us imagine a language [...] between a builder A and an assistant B. A is 
building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to 
pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose 
they use a language consisting o f the words ‘block’, ‘pillar’, ‘slab’, ‘beam’. A 
calls them out; -  B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and- 
such a call. -  Conceive this as a complete primitive language.
(Wittgenstein 1953, §2.)
Contents and meanings reside, ultimately, in our practices. But these practices are not 
only purely theoretical inferential practices. Rather, they are wide and concrete in the 
sense that they include physical objects (cf. Esfeld 2001, 150 ff.). Some commitments 
we undertake do not require us only to produce certain noises, but to perform certain 
actions involving physical objects, such as bringing the object to which the word 
“block” is appropriately applied within the practice.198
Wittgenstein’s view is modest or naturalised idealism. Physical objects are in­
deed normative in nature, but only to the extent they are assigned a role in our social 
practices. More precisely, objects can have a normative status within our practices -  
certain pieces of paper are money, which means that their bearer is allowed and required 
to perform certain actions involving those pieces. In this sense physical objects are con­
ceptual, for to be conceptual is to have a position or role in a language game, and this 
clearly is the case with blocks, pillars, slabs and beams in Wittgenstein’s example. 
Physical objects can be assigned a normative status. To the extent that we do so, the ob­
jects can enter the normative space o f reasons, since the status boils down to normative 
rules o f appropriate action (Part I).
So this is how Wittgenstein points towards direct realism. Semantics does not 
build on the notion o f representation, but on the notion o f practice. Practices ground 
meanings, and those practices involve individuals qua physical bodies and other physi­
cal objects such as blocks and pillars. Crucially, however, within such practices it is 
possible to be assigned an objective normative status, including the status of an individ­
ual qua an intentional agent or a block qua a possible object of beliefs and knowledge. 
Such social statuses consist of proprieties, implicit in the practice, the totality o f which 
constitute the human form of life featuring not only causal relations but also intentional 
agents, knowers and objects of knowledge; representers and things to be represented.199
198 Needless to say, in another sense Wittgenstein’s example is not a good example o f human language 
with conceptual contents in my sense. Non-conceptual animals could play this game, for it involves no 
judgements and inferences. As I have explained, in my view the basic semantic unit is a judgement that 
can function as a premise or conclusion in an inference, and sub-sentential units, such as concepts, are to 
be explained in terms o f their role in judgements (cf. Brandom 1994,360 ff.).
In other words, I find myself again in broad agreement with the phenomenological tradition, which 
holds that when we are doing phenomenology, i.e., when we treat individuals qua intentional agents, we
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The social practice view gives us an ontologically naturalistic but nonetheless 
non-reductive theory o f intentional agents with a direct epistemic access to the world. 
There are no representations or indeed any other epistemic intermediaries between us 
and the world. Rather, the very objects of the world themselves may have a role in our 
epistemic practices by being assigned a normative status -  just like the pieces o f paper 
in my pocket are not something behind money. They simply are -  or count as -  money 
in our practices. Similarly, certain objects simply play certain roles in our epistemic 
practices; we need to assume neither that they are conceptual or contentful independ­
ently o f our practices (just as the pieces of paper in my pocket are not money independ­
ently of our practices) nor that it is not the object themselves that play the roles or have 
the normative statuses (just as it is the pieces of paper that are -  count as -  money).200
At the risk of repeating some o f the things I have just explained, I believe it is 
nonetheless important to clarify the position I have arrived at in the context o f David­
son's (1983) defence of a coherence theory o f truth and, in particular, knowledge. 
Davidson's starting point is Quine’s (1951) famous criticism o f the two dogmas o f em­
piricism. The first dogma Quine rejects is the claim that we can separate analytic state­
ments (the truth o f which depends solely on the meaning o f words) from synthetic 
claims (the truth of which depends on two factors, meaning and the world) a statement 
by statement.
What is crucial in the present context, however, is Quine’s rejection o f the sec­
ond dogma, the thesis of meaning atomism, which claims that an individual statement 
can have a meaning in isolation from other statements. Quine replaces this with his fa­
mous thesis o f meaning holism, which we saw (in III.1.3) Davidson to formulate as the 
claim that “the content of a propositional attitude derives from its place in the pattern” 
(Davidson 1970, 221) such that “it is misleading to speak of the empirical content o f an 
individual statement” (Quine 1951, Section 6). As Quine also points out, the rejection of 
the dogma o f meaning atomism means that we cannot hold to the first dogma either, for,
bracket the natural world (individuals qua physical objects; qua inhabitants o f Sellars’ logical space o f  
causation) and operate within the Lebenswelt (the human form o f life, i.e., individuals qua agents and 
objects qua possible objects o f conceptual experience; in short, Sellars’ normative space o f  reasons) con­
structed in our intersubjective practices. Consequently, the often-heard claim that the phenomenologists’ 
bracketing o f the external world would amount to some sort o f  internal realism where we do not have 
epistemic access to the world as such is a gross misapprehension, for that would amount to a return to 
representationalism, the rejection o f  which is, as I mentioned above, at the very heart o f  the phenomenol­
ogical tradition.
200 1 believe this explains also Stoutland’s perplexing claim that our material environment includes “inten­
tional, and not merely physical phenomena” (Stoutland 1988, 44) in the sense that physical objects can be 
“observed as intentional phenomena” (Stoutland 1988, 55; recall Footnote 97).
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as I have argued, a single statement is meaningful only when it occupies a normatively 
defined role in the game of giving and asking for reasons.
Add to this Davidson’s conviction -  which I have also argued for in this disser­
tation -  that the principles o f rationality constituting the pattern from which meanings 
are derived (i.e., Sellars’ space o f reasons) “have no echo” (Davidson 1974a, 231) in the 
empirical world (Sellars’ logical space of causation), and it follows directly “that noth­
ing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief’ (Davidson 1983, 
141). Thus, when Quine claims that “our statements about the external world face the 
tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body” (Quine 1951, 
Section 5) such that “[t]he unit of empirical significance is the whole o f science” (Quine 
1951, Section 5), in Davidson’s view Quine still accepts the third dogma o f empiricism: 
The dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content (Davidson 1974b, 189). As 
Davidson explains, this third dogma is “the last” dogma o f empiricism, “for if  we give it 
up it is not clear that there is anything distinctive left to call empiricism” (Davidson 
1974b, 189).
The third dogma is of course nothing but Sellars’ Myth o f the Given, namely 
that non-conceptual causal processes could somehow set a rational constraint on our be­
liefs, be it individually or “as a corporate body”. Davidson’s (1983) point is that truth 
and knowledge are notions that belong to the space of reasons. Hence, they cannot be 
constrained by natural processes that operate within the space o f causation and, David­
son (1983) concludes, coherentism as the claim that our knowledge and beliefs are not 
constrained by anything in the natural world follows directly.
In other words, I think Davidson is right in thinking that when Quine talks about 
“the tribunal of sense experience”, while conceiving sense experience as “the stimula­
tion o f [...] sensory receptors” (Quine 1969, 75), i.e., as a causal process, the experi­
ence cannot set a rational (no doubt a minimal requirement o f a “tribunal”) constraint 
on our statements about the world (cf. McDowell 1994, 132-133). McDowell’s (1994) 
peculiar form o f objective idealism is motivated precisely by this dilemma: The choice 
between Davidson’s coherentism and Quine’s dogmatic Myth o f the Given seems to be 
all we have. But Davidson’s view, according to which nothing outside the sphere o f 
thought can rationally constrain us and hence the mind-independent world is irrelevant 
to our beliefs about it, is simply an intolerable version o f anti-realism. After all, “[i]f our 
activity in empirical thought and judgement is to be recognizable as bearing on reality at 
all, there must be [rational] external constraint” (McDowell 1994, 9). However, the 
other horn of the dilemma, Quine’s Myth o f the Given, is but an unintelligible dogma.
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To avoid the dilemma, McDowell thinks, requires that we admit that somehow the 
world itself belongs to the space o f reasons, i.e., is rational or conceptual in nature: “The 
constraint [on our beliefs about the world] comes from outside thinking, but not from 
outside what is thinkable. When we trace justification [of the contents o f our beliefs 
about the world] back, the last thing we come to is still a thinkable content; not some­
thing more ultimate than that, a bare pointing to a bit of the Given.” (McDowell 1994, 
28-29.)
In short, McDowell’s (1994) argument is this: Either there are reasons for em­
pirical judgements or there are not. If there are no reasons for empirical judgements, 
judgements cannot be rational and we cannot be responsible for them and thus, strictly 
speaking, they are not contentful or meaningful at all. If there are reasons for empirical 
judgements, they are either conceptual or they are not. If  they are not conceptual, they 
cannot rationally constrain our empirical judgements on the pain o f falling back to the 
unintelligible Myth o f the Given. Hence they must be conceptual; but then they seem to 
belong to the space of reasons and not to the empirical world. This “threatens to make 
what was meant to be empirical thinking degenerate [...] into a frictionless spinning in a 
void” (McDowell 1994, 66), committing us to Davidson’s intolerable coherentism.201 
All options are bad. McDowell thinks that the only tolerable possibility we have is to 
admit that there are reasons for empirical judgements, these reasons are conceptual but 
they do not belong merely to the realm of thoughts because also the mind-independent 
world contains conceptual contents, namely facts. In a sense, McDowell is arguing for a 
return to the world-view of the ancient Greeks, who thought that the cosmos is essen­
tially and intrinsically rational, or to Hegel’s idealism, according to which what is real is 
also rational.
201 Davidson tries to get out o f the problems o f this position by arguing for the principle o f charity, i.e., 
that we can assume that most o f our beliefs are true. But, as McDowell (1994, 68) correctly says, this 
comes too late: his coherentism has already endangered the whole idea o f  empirical content -  it is not 
clear that in his position it makes sense to talk about contents, not to mention their being true or false. 
More recently (see the essays in Davidson 2001), Davidson has aimed to restore empirical objectivity in 
terms o f “triangulation”, i.e., in terms o f  autonomous subjects who are engaged in mutual interpretation. 
Again, McDowell rejects this, and rightly so: “if subjects are already in place, it is too late to set about 
catering for the constitution o f  the concept o f objectivity. We must take subjectivity and the concept o f  
objectivity to emerge together, out o f  initiation into the space o f  reasons.” (McDowell 1994, 186.) Simi­
larly, since Davidson’s theory o f language builds on interpretation, Davidson is bound to either beg the 
question by assuming the interpreter to possess mysterious intrinsic intentionality or render intentionality 
and meaning impossible, for no account building essentially on interpretation can bypass the Regress Ar­
gument (see III.3.2 above and Williams 2000).
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In this study, however, I have argued for another way202 o f avoiding the Di­
lemma between anti-realism and the Myth o f the Given (and I believe that at least Bran­
dom (1994 & 2000) and Esfeld (2001) are largely in agreement with what I say). As so 
often in this dissertation, the key to an acceptable solution is the rejection o f methodo­
logical individualism and truth-conditional semantics. We must reject the Cartesian set­
ting of an asocial agent struggling to gain an epistemic access to the world. Rather, what 
is primitive and fundamental is a social bedrock practice within which there can be in­
tentional agents and objects o f empirical knowledge in the first place. As I have ex­
plained, the starting point here is the view that we are simply disposed to causally react 
to certain input by a certain output much as Quinean naturalism suggests. Indeed, pre­
cisely this was needed for solving the Infinity Problem.
Now for McDowell this is not enough. He thinks (correctly) that i f  all we have is 
such a dispositional theory of empirical experience, we cannot be rationally responsible 
for our empirical observations. In the Quinean picture empirical observations are mere 
causal reactions that happen to us, and thus they are not normatively or conceptually 
(indeed, logically) to propositions and actions -  and thus, according to Quine’s own 
meaning holism, they cannot be contentful at all. However, just as in the case o f rule- 
following the dispositional move is only the first part of the solution, similarly also here 
the causal disposition only serves to bring the new, empirical aspect into our language- 
game (hence Sellars and Brandom call these language-entry moves). As I have argued, 
within social practices a causal reaction may count as undertaking a normative com­
mitment, if the others accept it as such. The content of the commitment is determined by 
the norms (implicit in social practices) governing the inferential relations that define the 
other commitments such undertaking o f a commitment brings with it. Accordingly, the 
rational responsibility comes from the continuing acceptance o f  the commitment when 
we figure out what the commitment means (when we see its place in the normative web 
o f our other commitments).
Similarly, in the context o f rule-following considerations the dispositional aspect 
o f my solution explains only the forming o f a commitment (a judging); the causal story 
does not give us contents o f commitments (what is judge*/), since, as I have explained, 
that requires a social practice o f assessing the de dicto judgings o f others in the de re 
sense o f what is judge*/. The social aspect is required for assessing whether the per­
formed language-entry move was justified in the circumstances. As I have said already
202 Besides as an alternative to McDowell, my theory could also seen as a naturalisation o f  McDowell’s 
line o f thought, for I explain how physical objects can receive a normative status (as opposed to being 
intrinsically normative).
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so many times, a causal reaction (a disposition) is not all there is to content o f empirical 
statements (because it runs to the Normativity Problem), but it is the starting point (be­
cause it is needed for solving the Infinity Problem). And the social aspect that resolves 
the Normativity Problem is also the aspect that is required for representational (empiri­
cal) content.
Thus, although I do build on causal dispositions, I think McDowell’s criticism o f 
Quine does not apply to the view I defend:
The only connection he [Quine] countenances between experience and the ac­
ceptance o f statements is a brutely causal linkage that subjects are conditioned 
into when they learn a language. It is not that it is right to revise one’s belief sys­
tem thus and so in the light o f such-and-such an experience, but just that that re­
vision is what would probably happen if one’s experience took that course. 
Quine conceives experiences so that they can only be outside the space o f rea­
sons, the order o f justification.
(McDowell 1994, 133.)
The key phrase is: The only connection. 1 think the causal link really is like this, namely 
that “thus and so [...] is what would probably happen if one’s experience took that 
course”. Such a dispositional link is required for solving the Infinity Problem. But I add 
a social aspect to solve the Normativity Problem, and it is the social aspect, missing 
from Quine, that grounds the idea that “it is right to revise one’s belief system thus and 
so in the light of such-and-such experience”. Only when the causal reaction o f an indi­
vidual is embedded in a social practice it gains a content. Experiences qua contentful 
belong to a social practice, and within a social practice they are integrated into the space 
o f reasons and the order of justification. As I have emphasised in Part III, acceptable 
holism must combine Quinean holism with social holism.
Hence, in order to overcome the unacceptable options McDowell discusses, we 
must reject the Cartesian idea o f taking the notion o f an autonomous subject capable o f 
representations as primitive. An individual cannot by herself have contentful thoughts 
and, consequently, an epistemic access to the world. She needs something greater than 
herself to make these marvels, indispensable for the human form o f life, possible. Sur­
prisingly, this is where my line of thought meets Descartes’ reasoning. What I have in 
mind is Descartes’ philosophical motivation for theism, which ultimately lies in the in­
escapable fact that the capacities o f an individual are dreadfully limited. I have no quar­
rel with this. But I reject Descartes’ God; nor have I metaphysical taste for Leibniz’s. 
My God is that of Durkheim. As Kusch explains:
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Descartes obviously did not have [...] concept o f social institution, and therefore 
had to anchor stability o f meaning elsewhere. As is well known, in Descartes’ 
system it is God who makes meanings stable, truths persistent, and reality objec­
tive [...] yet there is a way to bridge the gap between Cartesius and us. The 
bridge is Durkheim’s suggestion that in their gods societies celebrate themselves 
and their achievements. In celebrating his God, Cartesius was celebrating collec­
tively sustained use [...].
(Kusch 1999, 363.)
And what a powerful god Durkheim’s God is! Outside social practices there are no 
agents, no meanings, no mental contents, no representation and, of course, no possibility 
of realism.
There really is no serious alternative to sociophilosophy in the sense o f natural­
ised methodological holism.
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